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 Abstract 
This thesis investigates Lord Lansdowne’s career at the War Office (1895-1900). At 
its core, however, is not a traditional biographical quest, but what does his career at 
the War Office tell us about late Victorian politics, civil-military relations, the 
reform discourse, the late Victorian Army and the war in South Africa? This is an 
especially relevant subject of historical study for two reasons: firstly Lansdowne as 
Secretary of State for War and a representative of his class, time and party 
epitomised late Victorian politics; secondly as Secretary of State he has been found 
wanting.  
The thesis aims to re-examine these questions and force those who have 
written on the problems Lansdowne encountered to rethink their conclusions. By 
portraying Lansdowne as a man of his time and returning him to his proper position 
this thesis demonstrates that it is possible to reinterpret the career of a historical 
figure. 
The main part of the thesis looks at how Lansdowne operated at the War 
Office and the complex inheritance he dealt with. It explores the political rivalries of 
those with power to influence military policy in Britain and the lack of interest in 
military matters both in and out of Parliament. Given these dynamics the thesis 
argues that the War Office and Army were unreformable. 
The thesis also examines Lansdowne’s legacy in relation to his three 
immediate successors. Despite the differences in the structure and professionalism of 
the British Expeditionary Force which performed in Flanders in 1914 and the Army 
Corps which embarked for South Africa in 1899 the social composition of both 
forces had not significantly changed.  As the best equipped and trained Army to 
leave Britain for war the BEF vindicated the attempts of Lansdowne and his 
successors to provide the country with an Army fit for war. 
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Preface 
In researching for this thesis thirty-seven public archives were approached, with 
approximately one hundred and forty collections for inquiry and six private archives 
with twelve collections for inquiry. Some archival sources were based in Ottawa, 
Washington, Durham N.C., Dublin and Paris, and these records were sourced either 
online or from a copy and postal service. No two archives are alike and in 
researching this thesis an important consideration has been to understand each 
archive, its records, how it was formed and who is employed there so as to make the 
best use of resources and time management. Printed primary and secondary sources 
that have been used include British Public Records, Parliamentary Papers, edited 
diaries, letters and papers, academic theses published and unpublished, primary and 
secondary books, newspapers, periodicals, journals and academic articles. Access to 
these works has been obtained from online sources, the British Library, the 
University of East Anglia Main Library and other specialist libraries, including the 
Templer Study Centre at the National Army Museum and the Liddell Hart Centre for 
Military archives at King’s College London. It has not been necessary to undertake 
any interviews for this thesis and only one sound recording has been accessed.  
The conceptual framework used in this thesis has comprised: themes and 
insight into how humans behave and how the world works, including authority and 
power, diffusion and disintegration. The thesis has explored: the actions, values and 
thinking that influence a historical figure; historical questions; and a chronological 
narrative providing a context within which to consider important themes and 
questions. A prosopographical approach was adapted from the works of Namier and 
Syme,
1
 to demonstrate the cohesive strength of the ruling class in the late nineteenth 
century. It should be noted that this thesis is not only an examination of late 
Victorian politics as pursued by the ruling classes but also as experienced by the 
diplomats, governors, civil servants, soldiers and sailors.  Prosopography does not 
attempt to provide all the answers but has been of use to this thesis in revealing the 
web of socio-psychological ties that bind a group together.  
                                                          
1
 L. Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III (2 Vols., London, 1929);  
R. Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford, 1939). 
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Introduction 
Lord Lansdowne occupied an important, but hitherto strangely neglected, position in 
the history of Britain’s armed forces. Studies of civil-military relations, the reform 
discourse, the late Victorian Army, and the war in South Africa (hereafter referred to 
as ‘the War’) suggest that flaws in Lansdowne’s personality caused the 
unbusinesslike methods of the War Office and unpreparedness for ‘the War’. 
Thomas Pakenham observed, ‘the Army needed fire and steel in the man at its head. 
Lansdowne, pillar of state that he was, had neither - nor the faintest spark of 
imagination.’2 John Gooch noted that Lansdowne ‘neglected logistical and 
administrative considerations of using military force,’3 and David Steele believed 
‘Lansdowne was not sufficiently forceful to adapt a cumbersome and intensely 
Conservative military machine to the requirements of a new age or to those of an 
impending South Africa campaign.’4 A belief has thus persisted that Lansdowne was 
a weak Secretary of State unwilling to take a wider view of his responsibilities and 
opportunities. A re-interpretation of the archival evidence presents a different 
picture. Many assumptions about Lansdowne at the War Office overlook that his 
decisions were not made in a vacuum but that they were taken in consultation with 
his Cabinet colleagues and his military advisers. 
Many assessments about Lansdowne’s career as Secretary of State for War 
overlook the questions relating to his purpose and intent and the degree to which he 
recognised the need for a progressive approach to War Office and Army reform 
which secured the strategic requirements of the Army. This thesis aims to redress the 
view that Lansdowne was found wanting. It is the opinion of this thesis that 
Lansdowne’s career at the War Office can act as a prism through which late 
Victorian politics and its successes and weaknesses and a well ordered society where 
people had responsibilities qua their position in society can be examined. Lansdowne 
was a man of his time operating in a contemporary system which he both shaped and 
was moulded by. It is not the aim of this thesis to claim he was or was not a great 
                                                          
2
 T. Pakenham, The Boer War (London, 1992), p.72. 
3
 J. Gooch (ed.), The Boer War: Direction, Experience and Image (London, 2000), p.xiv. 
4
 D. Steele, ‘Salisbury and the Soldiers’, in J. Gooch (ed.), The Boer War: Direction, Experience and 
Image (London, 2000), p.3. 
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man but to locate him in his time and context and show how he dealt with 
contemporary pressures and factors that influenced his thinking. It is hoped that by 
drawing Lansdowne out of the shadows and placing him in his own social, political 
and intellectual milieu this thesis will not only open up the debate about late 
Victorian politics including civil-military relations, the reform discourse, the late 
Victorian Army and ‘the War’, but be suggestive of how historical figures can be re-
interpreted in general. 
To begin with it is important to note that uniquely among late Victorian 
politicians Lansdowne has received little attention and does not have the biography 
he deserves. Newton’s Lord Lansdowne 5 is the only extant biography and is itself 
very much a product of its time, written when memories of Lansdowne’s part in the 
House of Lords stand-off in 1911 and his controversial ‘Peace’ letter of 1917 were 
still fresh in the public imagination. Since Newton’s work was written a few modern 
historians including Zara Steiner,
6
 Hugh Cecil,
7
 George Monger
8
 and P.J.V. Rolo
9
 
have examained aspects of Lansdowne’s career, most notably at the Foreign Office. 
Interestingly only one study has been made of Lansdowne at the War Office and this 
work, by Keith Surridge, has a specific focus on ‘the War’.10 In more mainstream 
works of late Victorian and Edwardian political history including W.S. Hamer, T.G. 
Otte, Halik Kochanski, and Gwyn Harries-Jenkins
11
 Lansdowne has a presence but it 
is shadowy. 
Although it is not the aim of this thesis to present Lansdowne and his career as 
Secretary of State as a traditional biographical quest, nevertheless a biographical 
introduction is required. Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice was born at 
Lansdowne House, London on 14 January 1845, his parents’ first child. His father 
was Henry Shelburne (b. London 1816), second surviving son of the 3
rd 
Marquess of 
                                                          
5
 Lord Newton, Lord Lansdowne: A Biography (London, 1929). 
6
 Z.S. Steiner, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914 (London, 1986). 
7
 H. Cecil, Lord Lansdowne: From the Entente Cordiale of 1904 to the ‘Peace Letter’ of 1917: A 
European Statesman assessed. (London, 2004). 
8
 G.W. Monger, The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy, 1900-1907 (London, 1963). 
9
 P.J.V. Rolo, ‘Lansdowne’ in K.M. Wilson (ed.), British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Policy: 
From Crimean War to First World War (London, 1987). 
10 
K.T. Surridge, Managing the South African War, 1899-1902: Politicians v. Generals (Woodbridge, 
1998); D. Judd and K.T. Surridge, The Boer War: A History (London, 2002). 
11
 W.S. Hamer, The British Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1885-1905 (Oxford, 1970); T.G. Otte, The 
China Question: Great Power Rivalry and British Isolation, 1894-1905 (Oxford, 2007); H. 
Kochanski, Sir Garnet Wolseley: Victorian Hero (London, 1999); G. Harries-Jenkins, The Army in 
Victorian Society (London, 1977). 
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Lansdowne. His mother was Emily Mercer-Elphinstone de Flahaut (b. Edinburgh 
1819) eldest of five daughters of Auguste Comte de Flahaut, himself an illegitimate 
child of Charles de Talleyrand-Perigord and Adelaide de Flahaut and Margaret 
Mercer-Elphinstone, 2
nd
 Baroness Keith. 
His father’s family, the Fitzmaurices, settled in Ireland in the twelfth century. 
The first twenty Lords of Kerry were largely a law unto themselves. The marriage of 
the twenty-first Lord of Kerry to Anne Petty, only daughter of William Petty the 
Physician-in-Chief to the Commonwealth Army in Ireland, brought the family a 
peerage and possession of the Petty estates. Their second child’s eldest son William 
was the first
 
Lord Lansdowne. Born in Dublin, he later joined the Army, rapidly 
reaching the rank of Colonel. On leaving the Army he entered politics and served in 
the Cabinets of Grenville, Pitt the Elder and Rockingham, becoming Prime Minister 
himself in 1782 with the death of Rockingham. Lansdowne’s grandfather, the 3rd 
Marquess, was also politically active and served in the Cabinets of Grenville, 
Canning, Earl Grey, Melbourne, Russell, Aberdeen and Palmerston. He was 
Chancellor of the Exchequer at the age of twenty-six and served as Home Secretary 
and Lord President of the Council three times during a ministerial career spanning 
forty-eight years.  After his death he was affectionately regarded as the ‘Nestor of 
the Whigs.’12 Lansdowne’s father had a shorter and less illustrious career in politics 
serving as Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs under Palmerston. 
His mother’s family were of Scottish and French origin. Emily’s grandfather 
Admiral Lord Keith had commanded the Channel Fleet and supervised Napoleon’s 
removal to St. Helena. Lord Keith’s daughter Margaret married Auguste de Flahaut, 
Napoleon’s ADC and the illegitimate son of Talleyrand-Perigord. De Flahaut also 
served as Ambassador to Vienna and London and strongly influenced his grandson 
in foreign affairs. Lansdowne was educated at Eton (1858-1862) and Balliol College, 
Oxford (1863-1867) where he achieved a second class in Literae Humaniores. 
Greater than any other influence on Lansdowne’s political career was that of 
Benjamin Jowett. It was while studying classics at Oxford under Jowett, in the years 
before Jowett became Master of Balliol, that Lansdowne came to appreciate the 
                                                          
12
 C.J. Wright, ‘Petty-Fitzmaurice, Henry, Third Marquess of Lansdowne’, Dictionary of National 
Biography online, (Oxford, 2003), 
http://www.oxforddnb.com.ueaezproxy.uea.ac.uk:2048/view/article/22071?docPos=3 
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ability to think for himself. Jowett, who was a great picker, trainer, and placer of able 
young men, instilled in Lansdowne the virtue of hard work. After Lansdowne left 
Oxford he advised him to ‘get into political life as soon as possible. A man of energy 
and character ought to find some real work to do.’13  It was Lansdowne’s opinion 
that his life might have turned out quite differently but for Jowett’s influence.14 He 
believed ‘I had no more constant friend, and I cannot express the gratitude with 
which I look back to his unfailing interest in all that befel me and to his help and 
guidance at times when they were most needed.’15 
In 1862, he followed his father into the Royal Wiltshire Regiment of the 
Yeomanry, joining as a Cornet. His father thought it did young men ‘good and they 
learn a little of their neighbours.’16 He had no direct experience of military service 
while with the Wiltshire Yeomanry, but as a Wiltshire nobleman was promoted to an 
Honorary Colonelcy in 1897. With no desire to pursue a career in the military, 
Lansdowne devoted himself to a life in politics which his private means and good 
connections enabled him to do. Political service was part of the patrician family 
tradition in which he had been brought up. To Lansdowne and many individuals of 
his class it was a responsibility adopted qua their position in society. Lansdowne 
accepted his responsibility at the age of twenty-one when in 1866 his father died and 
he inherited Bowood Estate of 11,145 acres, estates in Ireland of 121,349 acres, 
Lansdowne House in Berkeley Square, London and the Lansdowne heirlooms. He 
was also entailed through his mother to her Scottish estates of 10,418 acres. At this 
time Lansdowne, who was still studying at Oxford, received a letter from Jowett in 
which Jowett wrote: ‘when I pass by your splendid house in London I feel a sort of 
wonder that the owner should be reading quietly at Oxford. But you could not do a 
wiser or better thing for besides the value of the distinction & the knowledge plus 
increased power which is thus gained you show to the world that you are not going 
to be at the mercy of them.’17 
                                                          
13
 Jowett to Lansdowne (private), 17 November 1868, BL. (5) Lansdowne MSS, Add MS 88906/20/9. 
14
 Lansdowne to Dowager Lady Lansdowne, (private), 6 October 1893, BH. Lansdowne (5) MSS, 
uncatalogued. 
15
 Lansdowne to F. Nightingale (private), 11 October 1893, BL. Nightingale MSS, Add MS. 45778, 
f.238. 
16
 Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice (Fourth Marquess of Lansdowne) to William Fox Talbot (private), 19 
March 1863, Fox Talbot MSS, Add MS. 21742, f.8672. http://foxtalbot.dmu.ac.uk/ 
17
Jowett to Lansdowne (private), 2 April 1867, BL. (5) Lansdowne MSS, Add MS. 88906/20/9. 
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Becoming a peer in the House of Lords at such a young age meant that he had 
no early exposure to the hard political world of the House of Commons that many of 
his contemporaries experienced, and it is notable that during his career most of his 
contact with MPs came through the Cabinet. That he was not exposed to the ruthless 
atmosphere of the House of Commons did not diminish his awareness that the power 
of that House had risen beyond all measure during the nineteenth century and that 
political leadership was increasingly tending to come from that House. However, 
like Salisbury, he looked to the ‘establishment, the monarchy and the House of Lords 
for inspiration and resistance to popular pressures.’18  
Before his appointment to the War Office in 1895 Lansdowne’s political and 
imperial experience provided him with a solid foundation for understanding matters 
of military policy. He entered political life in 1869 when Lord Granville, the then 
Colonial Secretary and almost as important an influence on his career as Jowett, 
arranged his appointment to the vacant position of Junior Lord of the Treasury. 
Lansdowne’s political beliefs were strongly influenced by his family’s Whig 
traditions and support for moral reforms. After the Whig party merged with the 
Liberal party in 1859 Lansdowne’s political allegiance shifted to the Liberals. At this 
time the former Whig Liberal peers in the House of Lords were disappointing both in 
their numbers and their enthusiasm. Similarly, in the House of Commons, ‘the bulk 
of the Liberal M.P.s were neither Whigs nor Radicals but simply commonplace 
wealthy Englishmen whose political actions were bound neither by affiliation to 
great houses nor by theoretical intransigence.’19  
Lansdowne never fully embraced Liberalism. During Gladstone’s second 
premiership he broke from the Liberals over Gladstone’s Irish policy and joined the 
Liberal Unionists. In 1895, he and his fellow Liberal Unionists aligned themselves 
with Salisbury’s Conservative party. From the extant archive it is difficult to identify 
the exact date when Lansdowne officially offered the Unionists his support. In 
January 1887 Salisbury invited him to join the Cabinet as either Secretary of State 
for War or for the Colonies.
20
 At the time he was serving as Governor-General in 
                                                          
18
 M. Bentley, Lord Salisbury’s World: Conservative Environments in late Victorian Britain 
(Cambridge, 2001), p.170. 
19
 J.R. Vincent, The Formation of the British Liberal Party, 1857-1868 (Harmondsworth, 1972), p.34. 
20
 Salisbury to Lansdowne (private), 3 January 1887, BL. (5) Lansdowne MSS, Add MS. 
88906/12/4/3. 
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Canada. Declining the offer, he told Goschen, a fellow Liberal Unionist who had 
joined Salisbury’s Cabinet and with whom he would have liked to have served,21 that 
‘the temptation to accept was immense.’22 His reasons were partly because of home 
politics and partly because of Canadian politics. He had no desire to separate from 
Hartington or his Liberal Unionist friends. With no knowledge of the constructive 
side of Salisbury’s Irish policy,23 he was concerned as to what might be his position 
if on joining the Unionists’ he later found himself in disagreement. ‘I might have had 
to choose between resignation, which would have been bad for me and not good for 
the Govt., or the retention of office under circumstances thoroughly distasteful to 
me, and perhaps detrimental to my political prospects.’24 Furthermore he did not 
entirely trust some of the other members of the Unionist Cabinet.
25
 The first official 
occasion on which Lansdowne appeared on a public platform in support of the 
Unionist party was on 31 January 1895 at a Unionist demonstration in the Town Hall 
at Calne in Wiltshire. Stating, ‘I have been told that my presence on this platform 
requires explanation. I have nothing to explain. It is not the platform, it is not the 
party designation, it is the principles which signify. I am not conscious of having 
changed mine; some of those with whom I used to act have changed theirs and I have 
refused to follow. It is the betrayal of 1886 which has brought me here.’26 
Just as he never sat comfortably among the Liberals it is notable that after 1895 
as a Unionist minister Lansdowne never fully accepted Unionist party ideology. This 
was observed by Harold Macmillan,
27
 of a story told to him by Victor Devonshire of 
an occasion when he [Devonshire] and Lansdowne were caught in a rain storm on 
their way from the House of Lords to their London houses in Mayfair. Devonshire’s 
suggestion that they take refuge in the Carlton Club
28
 was ‘most distasteful’ to his 
                                                          
21
 Lansdowne to Dowager Lady Lansdowne, (private), 6 January 1887, BH. Lansdowne (5) MSS, 
uncatalogued. 
22
 Lansdowne to Goschen (private), 4 January 1887, BL. (5) Lansdowne MSS, Add MS. 
88906/12/4/3. 
23
 Lansdowne to Devonshire (private), 4 January 1887, BL. (5) Lansdowne MSS, Add MS. 
88906/12/4/3. 
24
 Lansdowne to Dowager Lady Lansdowne, (private), 6 January 1887, BH. Lansdowne (5) MSS, 
uncatalogued. 
25
 ‘I do not to tell you the truth quite trust Beach and Ashbourne.’ Lansdowne to Goschen (private), 4 
January 1887, BL. (5) Lansdowne MSS, Add MS. 88906/19/15. 
26
 Lansdowne, ‘Great Unionist Demonstration at Calne’, The Devizes and Wiltshire Gazette, 31 
January 1895, BL. (5) Lansdowne MSS, Add MS. 88906/16/30. 
27
 Harold Macmillan married Lansdowne’s granddaughter, Dorothy Cavendish. 
28
 The Carlton Club was and still is a London Gentleman’s Club associated with the Conservative 
party. 
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father-in-law who was the then Unionist Leader in the House of Lords. Devonshire 
told Macmillan, ‘Lansdowne looked at him with horror.’29 According to Richard 
Haldane, ‘A Whig he was to the end of time, the old type of Whig, and when the 
time changed he found himself naturally associated with a certain form of 
Conservatism.’30  
In 1872 a fellow Whig and the then Liberal Under-Secretary of State for War, 
Lord Northbrook, left the War Office for the Viceroyalty of India and Lansdowne 
was offered the post. He told Gladstone, ‘if Mr Cardwell did not consider my 
complete ignorance of War Office matters an obstacle…I would accept the post.’31 
Cardwell assured him that ‘when he came to the office he did not know a gun from a 
sword.’32 Lansdowne’s two years in the post provided a useful foundation and 
influence to his later work as Secretary of State. In Cardwell he found a master in his 
own house. In his administration of the War Office he always encouraged efficiency 
and was ever ready to avail himself of the advice and opinions of experts, even if 
they were not connected with the War Office. He filled his department with the best 
men he could find, whether soldiers or civilians and he expected them to ‘work with 
him and in subordination to his policy.’33 Although Cardwell’s principal reforms 
were mostly completed before Lansdowne arrived they were still on trial and 
relations between the civilians and the senior officers in the department were divided 
over the question of control. Attempting to grapple with this issue, Cardwell 
instructed Lansdowne to chair a committee to ascertain the points on which friction 
arose.
34
 Among the innovations introduced during his Under-Secretaryship the 
Intelligence Department and a system of Army reserve were established. Cardwell’s 
reforms were successfully put to the test by the Ashanti War during the final months 
of the Liberal government.  
Although Lansdowne’s tenure as Under Secretary of State was brief he was 
given a further opportunity to acquire knowledge of military administration in 1883 
                                                          
29
 H. Macmillan, The Past Masters: Politics and Politicians, 1906-1939 (London, 1975), p.194. 
30
 R.B. Haldane, ‘Lords Debate’, ‘Tributes to the Late Marquess of Lansdowne’, 16 June 1927, 
Hansard 5
th
 Series, Vol.67, c.716. 
31
 Lansdowne to Dowager Lady Lansdowne, (private), 24 April 1872. BH. Lansdowne (5) MSS, 
uncatalogued. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 O. Wheeler, The War Office Past and Present, (London, 1914), p.114. 
34
 ‘Lansdowne Committee on Army Control, Transport and Supply’, BL. (5) Lansdowne MSS, Add 
MS. 88906/13/5.  
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when he chaired a select committee on the Channel Tunnel. Whereas most senior 
officers and the public regarded the tunnel as a danger to the national existence of 
England, Lansdowne disagreed. Aside from the practical findings of the committee 
the inquiry raised awareness of the inadequacies of the military provisions for home 
defence and Britain’s dependence on the Royal Navy; issues that required 
Lansdowne’s attention twelve years later. It also served as an example of 
Lansdowne’s willingness to take a stand against the majority; a conviction he 
maintained throughout his career. A short time after the inquiry ended he rather self-
deprecatingly observed: 
A friend, usually very calm in his judgement but I am told the acute 
sufferer of sea sickness, met me in the street: “If you stop this tunnel – 
look out for yourself.” I took refuge in my club and met another very old 
friend of the military persuasion. He put his fist inconveniently near my 
face and said “Old fellow, if you allow this *** tunnel … none of us will 
ever speak to you again.” Bedlam … was the mildest form of punishment 
with which we were threatened, whether we went for or against.
35
 
Unable to betray his convictions Lansdowne resigned from the position of 
Under-Secretary of State for India in Gladstone’s second ministry in 1880 after only 
two months in office. He was unable to accept the Prime Minister’s policy towards 
Ireland and the effect it had on his position as an Irish landlord. As an Irish 
landowner he was deeply involved in the land question all through his career and in 
the 1880s was an outspoken critic of Gladstone. It can be speculated that his 
appointment as Governor-General of Canada in 1883 was made so as to remove him 
from Westminster just when Irish affairs were beginning to dominate political 
thinking in the Liberal party. From 1883 until 1888 Lansdowne’s attention was 
largely dominated by Canadian commercial affairs and the construction of the 
Canadian Pacific Railway, but with the Riel rebellion and Metis uprising in 1885 he 
experienced the interplay between military preparation and action and diplomacy. 
The incident impressed on him that as a civilian he ‘cannot interfere in the direction 
of military operations.’36 The rebellion was more important in its results than in 
itself. The leading rebels were tried and Riel with Lansdowne’s approval was 
sentenced to death. That this verdict was disapproved of by Queen Victoria and most 
other officials was a further example of his willingness to place himself at odds with 
                                                          
35
 Speeches 1883-1888, August 1883, BL. (5) Lansdowne MSS, Add MS. 88906/14/19. 
36
 Lansdowne to Elliot-Murray-Kynynmound (private), 10 April 1885, NLS. Minto MSS, MS. 12550, 
f.76. 
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the general consensus based on this conviction. Lansdowne not only proved himself 
to be a successful administrator during the crisis but a statesman with courage and 
conviction. 
While Canada impressed on Lansdowne the chain of decisions behind military 
administration in time of peace and war, India imparted on him a similiar lesson but 
on a larger stage. During his five years as Viceroy of India between 1889 and 1894 
he was regarded by Mortimer Durand as ‘a fighting Viceroy’. To Lansdowne the 
defence of the Indian Empire and the North West Frontier in particular were key 
components of his administration. During his Viceroyalty he faced problems and 
successfully oversaw ‘small colonial wars’ over Burma, Siam, China, Tibet, 
Afghanistan, Persia, Chitral, Hunza, Kashmir and Manipur. These military 
operations varied widely in scale and extent. He believed such ‘complications of this 
sort are unhappily inevitable, and we cannot expect entire immunity from them.’37 
As Viceroy, he exercised supreme authority over the soldiers in India which in 1888 
numbered 100,000 British soldiers and 180,000 native soldiers. In contrast to the 
British Army it was a non-Parliamentary Army and its numbers were not limited by 
an annual vote. To Lansdowne ‘the efficient working of the machine depended 
entirely on the personal qualities of the officers who are for the time being 
Commander-in-Chief and Military Member of Council.’38 Overseeing the efficiency 
and professionalism of the Indian Empire taught Lansdowne the importance of 
selecting and retaining the best people. He was acutely aware that an injudicious 
selection among the military officers ‘would be a positive calamity and would 
enormously add to the difficulty of my position here.’39 
His experience in India strongly shaped his views on defence matters. 
Economy and efficiency were central to his Indian policy. Faced with a currency 
crisis during his Viceroyalty he maintained the defence of India based on the 
resources the country then had. Faced with a similar concern for financial 
consideration in 1900 he repeated this pattern while at the War Office. He also set 
about reorganising the Presidential Army system in India. Attempting to remove the 
friction and waste of power caused by the way in which control exercised over the 
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Indian forces was divided between the Government of India and the local 
governments he suggested putting under the immediate control of the Government of 
India the different departments of the Presidential Armies.
40
 In similar ways the 
decentralisation of authority he introduced in India was also attempted at the War 
Office in 1897. How India influenced his War Office administration can also be seen 
in his willingness to innovate and adapt Anglo-Indian military practices through the 
formal establishment of the Imperial Service Troops. One can speculate whether he 
had their formation in mind when helping to establish the Imperial Yeomanry in 
1900. It was also during his Viceroyalty that he learnt from Roberts the important 
role of transport and logistics in mobilising an Army. He was certainly not unaware 
of logistical and administrative considerations of using military force. He believed 
that ‘any properly organised Army depended on its transport. Without that, no body 
of troops no matter how disciplined could be successfully employed.’41 During ‘the 
War’ Roberts found that transport was the British Army’s principal difficulty. In his 
reorganisation of the system he held that the existing transport system, which had 
never been tried before on a large scale ‘did not reflect discredit on any individual, 
but…defects of the system should be made public when personal blame cannot 
reasonably attach to anyone.’42 
That Lansdowne was offered and rejected a dukedom on his return from India, 
says much for his modesty and common sense. Like his own grandfather before 
him
43
 such an offer ‘was less acceptable to him than might have been supposed,’ and 
accepting the Garter was ‘more than sufficient recompense’ for his service in India.44 
A similar example of his humility was his decision to be buried in the local village 
churchyard rather than in the family mausoleum so as to be with his people. 
Lansdowne was pragmatic, hard-working, and positive even about his opponents. 
According to Sir John Macdonald, Prime Minister in Canada during his Governor-
Generalship, he was one of the most perspicacious of the governors he had known. 
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He and his ministers were struck by his quick grasp of the complex, often difficult 
nature of British-Canadian relations.
45
  
Lansdowne disliked formality. This was particularly evident during his period 
in India where he found himself attending events ‘with all sorts of preposterous 
formalities,’46 where even an informal visit into the Indian countryside was 
accompanied by numerous tents and retainers of all sorts.
47
 Harbouring no racial 
prejudices he was an excellent negotiator and dealt with questions in a candid 
manner.
48
 Having an interest in the machinery of departments he took pains to 
discover how offices under his authority operated. Disliking red tape and 
administering on party lines, he was dextrous, cool-headed and knew his own 
mind.
49
  He was capable of withstanding the insults of his opponents with humour 
and pluck. Denying extravagance he administered his estates and diplomatic posts 
with financial moderation. Subject to this consideration he allowed his subordinates 
a free hand. Although it was reputed that in India he was strongly influenced by his 
officials,
50
 there is no evidence of this in his later career. Presumed to be a good 
listener he could also appear aloof and impassive, and because he never vindicated 
himself when attacked many people imagined and saw what they were predisposed 
to see. According to his nephew Ernest Hamilton he was: 
Not one of those who lay bare their souls for the inspection even of 
intimates. I don’t think that he had any more desire to shine luminously 
at the dinner-table among his relations and friends than he had to shine 
luminously in the eyes of the public… In [his] very occasional 
anecdotes, he was never his own hero - not so much…because of lack of 
self-esteem as because the applause or appreciation of this man or that 
had little value for him… He was never one of the “jolly good fellow” 
fraternity. In eating and drinking he was restrained and careful which in 
the days of which I speak, was not only unusual but came very near 
ranking as a reproach… His sense of duty and his meticulous observance 
of rectitude were quite remarkable. I think those were the two standards 
at which he ceaselessly aimed… and so long as he consciously made 
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good on both counts, the voice of the public raised either in hoots or 
cheers, left him unmoved.
51
 
Cheap popularity had no value for him and this limited his ability to operate in 
a political environment increasingly dominated by machine politicians weaving and 
dealing and dishing the opposition. As a pragmatist he believed that public opinion 
was another expression ‘for the common sense of the country.’52  Owing to his 
patrician values and position in society he was also more willing than most of his 
contemporaries to perform duties others would shy away from. While in Bombay on 
a Viceregal visit he and his wife Maud visited a leper asylum and inspected one of 
the crowded steamers that carried pilgrims to Mecca.
53
 Neither a Jingoist nor an 
annexationist,
54
 he believed Britain had an Army system ‘the outcome, not of any 
deliberate plan of construction, but of gradual and spontaneous growth; our Regular 
Army, our Militia, our Volunteers have grown up side by side, at first with scarcely 
any connexion, upon no definite plan’.55 While the Army had grown up piecemeal he 
also realised that Britain’s military requirements were probably more extensive 
geographically and more complicated than any other European nation. As such he 
acknowledged a need to add to the strength of the Army. The widespread view that 
the Navy was the first line of defence he acknowledged, but he denied that it was a 
substitute for a strong Army. His view of war, as shaped by the events in South 
Africa, was that ‘we are fighting not about words, but about things; about the 
substance, and not about the form. It is the substance that we mean to retain.’56 As an 
advocate of modern military thinking he shared much in common with the reformers 
in and out of the Army. He believed that a British officer, ‘was the most valuable 
military asset that we possess,’57 but he deprecated their participation in politics. As 
Secretary of State he believed that he alone was responsible for the Army to 
Parliament. 
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In using Lansdowne as a prism through which to study late Victorian politics, 
an opportunity has been taken to explore the question of responsibility and the state. 
From the mid-1890s until Tariff Reform overshadowed it, a campaign of ‘National 
Efficiency’ assumed populist force.58 Although Lansdowne was not close to the 
informal network of members involved in the movement he knew and respected 
many of them. By concentrating their energies on a quest for Imperial efficiency they 
attempted to shake up laissez-faire habits and shame the government into 
modernising itself. The concern that Britain was falling behind other countries 
resonated with many politicians. Adopting certain ideas from the ‘National 
Efficiency’ movement they tried to shape debates around these ideas and use the 
argument to establish intellectual dominance and ultimately to win elections. 
Although the principal ideas of ‘National Efficiency’ were directed largely at 
education and social welfare, military and naval capability also merged in this 
ideology.
59
 It can be speculated that the movement tacitly influenced Lansdowne’s 
decision to relocate the War Office under one roof, to decentralise and reduce red 
tape, and to provide better conditions of service in the Army. Although the 
movement achieved little immediate success, an interest in the new ‘sociology’ that 
emerged during and after ‘the War’ brought with it a redefinition of the words 
‘individual’ and ‘society.’60 An example of this, noted during ‘the War’, was public 
recognition of the physical inadequacy of recruits from working class backgrounds 
found to be living below the poverty line. Reflecting on these ideas at the time the 
Unionists divided into on the one hand those eager to prioritise ‘economy’ and on 
the other those in favour of greater unity of the Empire, while the Liberals recast 
their thinking about Imperial society and the role that the state should play within 
it.
61
  
While the role of the state and responsibility was subject to scrutiny during this 
period, so the role of Britain in international affairs underwent a transformation. 
After the Congress of Vienna, the stability of Europe was assured by a rough balance 
of power. What existed in 1895 was a system in which any attempt by a European 
power to increase its relative strength or to dominate the continent tended to result in 
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the formation of a grouping to oppose it. Protected by geography and the Royal 
Navy, Britain had a degree of freedom in foreign policy denied to the other powers.
62
  
It was the British Empire that complicated matters. Lying outside Europe, but 
connected to it by Imperial rivalries, the Empire was both a British strength and a 
possible strategic liability. On the one hand, it provided prestige, trade and a safe 
haven for investment and on the other hand Imperial clashes with European powers 
might have repercussions for British policy in Europe. Moreover keeping the Empire 
intact was an expensive and difficult business. Whereas in Europe, were Britain to 
oppose another power’s attempt at obtaining hegemony, Britain would be certain to 
have allies to share the burden with, overseas this was not the case.
63
 
With the return of the Unionists to power in the summer of 1895 the electorate 
expressed its confidence in Salisbury and his government. Salisbury’s retention of 
the Foreign Office, combined with Chamberlain’s choice of the Colonial Office 
‘gave an implicitly higher profile to overseas than domestic affairs.’64 Major 
international developments had placed British foreign policy on a new footing. The 
conclusion of the Franco-Russian alliance of 1894 had unsettled the British Cabinet 
and raised fears that Britain’s Imperial defence might be inadequate. The Sino-
Japanese war of 1894-1895 and with it the prospect of the collapse of China and the 
emergence of Japan was an indication of how events in the periphery might impact 
on relations between the great powers.
65
 The first indication that Britain’s traditional 
foreign policy was no longer incontestable emerged when a Cabinet majority over-
ruled Salisbury during the Armenian Crisis of 1895. Salisbury’s inability to carry his 
Cabinet with him not only damaged his own authority but raised questions about 
traditional British foreign policy. Even though traditional British foreign policy was 
under assault it was slow to change, and so too was British military policy. This 
unwillingness to recognise change, this thesis will conclude, made ‘total’ reform of 
the War Office and Army unworkable during Lansdowne’s administration. Although 
this supposition will be examined in more detail even if there had been more appetite 
for ‘total’ change, internal and external political rivalries and the complex nature of 
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the state made it impracticable. Caught up in protecting their own self interests there 
was no spirit of collaboration between individuals. 
Investigating the spirit of collaboration is the aim of Chapter One which 
considers the organisation of the War Office that Lansdowne inherited in 1895. It 
explores how it operated and who the civilians and senior officers were. It describes 
the relations that existed between these individuals and what impact that had on 
Lansdowne’s ability to reform the department. The chapter juxtaposes the principal 
military reformers and their views with those of the civilians at the War Office. 
Highlighting that individual prejudices and rivalry were not only shaped by 
personalities but by the physical location of the department, the chapter describes 
how Lansdowne managed an office scattered across twelve different locations in 
London and three outside. In addressing how Lansdowne operated within this system 
the chapter explains the lines of command and how they were linked to him. It 
explains how he worked with and through his Under-Secretary of State and his other 
officials. It explores the various divisions of power in the department and how he 
dealt with the problems that this created. As military technology experienced 
profound changes the role of experts was essential and the chapter explores how 
technical issues influenced Lansdowne’s decisions and ability to shape and be 
shaped by the system he managed.  
The nature of personalities is also the subject of Chapter Two. This chapter 
interrogates the principal individuals outside the War Office, including the Cabinet, 
the Liberal opposition, the service parliamentarians, the defence intellectuals and the 
press. Exploring how Lansdowne’s aspirations and values did or did not connect 
with these groups, it aims to describe to what extent Lansdowne embodied a clear 
distinction between civilians and experts and his own reforming instincts; explores 
how and why Salisbury chose Lansdowne and how Lansdowne justified his position 
within the Unionist Cabinet as one of the five Liberal Unionists. It shows how the 
field of intellectual endeavour functioned in and out of Parliament and the 
contribution of thinking that lay beyond military policy. By intellectualising the 
subject, military policy is shown as less about brass buttons and more about strategic 
thinking. How far Lansdowne got into the current of intellectual force fields is 
explored as well as who were  the individuals who opposed him and used intellectual 
arguments to block his proposals that did not suit their interests. The chapter 
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explores these interests within the context of the movement for War Office and 
Army reform before and during ‘the War’. An examination of how Lansdowne used 
the reform discourse and this movement as a means to an end in order to get his 
proposals through Parliament is also made. Although it is not within the scope of this 
thesis to examine the small colonial wars fought during this period it will be shown 
how the success achieved by the British Army overseas created national heroes and 
cultivated a sense of complacency in Britain’s invincible Army. The chapter 
demonstrates that this complacency made Lansdowne’s task more challenging.   
Lansdowne’s ability to manage the reform discourse was partly shaped by his 
reorganisation of the War Office system in 1895, which is the subject of Chapter 
Three. By examining the Order-in-Council of 1895 this chapter describes the debate 
about the subordination of the Commander-in-Chief and the responsibility of the 
senior officers. The continuity of the Cardwell system under both Liberal and 
Unionist administrations is highlighted by reviewing previous War Office and Army 
reforms between 1870 and 1895. Lansdowne’s autonomy, statescraft and willingness 
to take tough decisions and be criticised for them is demonstrated. The chapter 
examines his encouragement for consultative bodies within the War Office and 
suggests that the creation of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet is indicative of 
the importance he attached to how the British might plan and organise for war. This 
need for forward planning, the chapter demonstrates, was not collectively accepted 
by the Cabinet and ultimately an opportunity was missed.  
In Chapter Four the unwillingness of the senior officers to pull together with 
their civilian counterparts and among themselves is shown to affect Lansdowne’s 
management of the reform discourse and his ability to implement his army proposals 
Highlighting the approaches Lansdowne and Wolseley, the Commander-in-Chief, 
both took to defend the existing military system, the chapter shows that they shared 
much in common. But it also suggests that Lansdowne in his defence of the system 
was willing to introduce elasticity far beyond that envisaged by his War Office 
colleagues. The chapter shows that Lansdowne had not only the right political and 
managerial skills to implement change but also an awareness and respect for public 
opinion. His ability to manipulate the agitation for ‘total’ reform in 1897 and 1898 is 
outlined. It is shown that by focusing largely on increases in men and better 
conditions he reduced the scope of the discourse and deflected his critics in their 
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attempt to abolish the Cardwell system. Demonstrating how Army reforms are 
contextualised the different views between the civilians and military of the purpose 
of the Army are highlighted. Conflicting personalities, pressures and self-interests 
both within the War Office and outside are described and suggest it was slow to 
change. By detailing the gradual reforms Lansdowne did implement the chapter 
illustrates that he had a clear vision of how the Army ought to be administered and 
that he envisaged it as a single force in which Regular and Auxiliary forces were 
linked. The chapter shows how Lansdowne’s whiggish values influenced his genuine 
interest in improving the conditions of service and the popularity of the Army. 
Lansdowne’s ability to control his critics is examined in Chapter Five in the 
context of the origins of ‘the War’. The chapter demonstrates the uneasy relationship 
between diplomacy and military planning. An examination is made of how 
Lansdowne arrived at solutions and what practical problems he encountered in 
implementing these. By using Lansdowne as a prism through which to study late 
Victorian politics, the chapter explores the nature of civil-military relations. The 
chapter will contrast the strategy of decision by crisis taken by the Cabinet with that 
of planning for war adopted by the military and show how each party played off each 
other under public scrutiny.  
With the breakdown in negotiations in October 1899, Chapter Six investigates 
the impact of ‘the War’ and its effect on the War Office and Lansdowne. It describes 
who his critics were and how he responded to them. While the British Army was 
good at dealing with small wars the chapter shows that it was far less well equipped 
for war on a large scale. It investigates how and why Lansdowne’s War Office and 
Army system did not break down and how he used the popularity of ‘the War’ to 
introduce permanent and temporary reform measures that both diverted his critics 
from their quest to abolish the Cardwell system and raised awareness of the under-
utilised skills of the Auxiliary Army. Using Lansdowne as a prism through which to 
study ‘the War’, the chapter also intends to give a general description of the 
challenges facing the War Office and Army in bringing ‘the War’ to a conclusion. It 
shows that Lansdowne’s willingness to allow the generals a free hand in no way 
reduced civilian supremacy at the War Office but satisfied the senior officers that 
their demand for greater autonomy was acknowledged. 
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Loosening the authority held by the civilians over the military is explored in 
the final chapter which assesses Lansdowne’s legacy. By an analysis of the War 
Office and Army reforms of Lansdowne’s three immediate successors, the Unionists 
St John Brodrick and Hugh Arnold-Forster and the Liberal Richard Burdon Haldane, 
the chapter shows how Lansdowne’s vision for the War Office and Army was 
continued. It is not within the scope of the thesis to examine each scheme of reform 
in depth. The chapter shows the way in which both Unionist and Liberal policy was 
made in and out of office. It locates each Secretary of State and his advisers within 
the general political background of the period and summarises some of the political 
factors that shaped their decisions. The chapter intends to highlight Lansdowne’s 
own thoughts on his successors’ reforms and how in his capacity as a respected 
statesman he was able to continue to influence the reform discourse. By 
demonstrating that the failures of his Unionist successors to implement a popular 
reform made it more urgent for their Liberal successor, the chapter shows how these 
failures played into his hands. Seen in the context of a continental commitment, it is 
speculated that Haldane’s creation and the subsequent deployment of the British 
Expeditionary Force and the Territorial Army during the First World War were 
influenced by Lansdowne’s earlier schemes. 
It is ironic that, after leaving the War Office, Lansdowne, satirised as the 
White Knight in Saki’s adaptation of Alice in Wonderland, went on to serve as 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs until 1905 and Leader of the House of Lords 
until 1916 with a certain degree of success. He was even acknowledged in 1904 as 
the only member of the Cabinet suitable to replace Arthur Balfour, the then Prime 
Minister, were anything to happen to him.
66
 Not long after leaving the War Office 
Lansdowne self-deprecatingly remarked ‘I fear it would be very difficult to make 
anything out of my five years at the War Office. The subjects dealt with there are so 
dry and technical that a popular and at the same time sufficient account of them 
would be nearly impossible to write.’67 By using Lansdowne as a prism through 
which to study late Victorian politics, including civil-military relations, the reform 
discourses, the late Victorian Army and ‘the War’, this thesis aims to re-examine 
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Lansdowne in his own context and restore him to his proper position. This will begin 
in the next chapter by focusing on how Lansdowne operated at the War Office. 
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Chapter One - The Organisation of the War Office 
The War Office was the nerve-centre for the military policy of the country and the 
military government of the Army. It was a highly complex department and 
continually in the eye of a political storm raging around its operation and 
organisation. Broad political, social and economic considerations compelled 
Lansdowne to try to reform the War Office and these acted as both a deterrent and a 
stimulant to his ability to achieve change. Among the principal constraints that 
hindered Lansdowne’s ability to manage the reform discourse was the physical 
structure of the department itself and the rivalry between the civilians and the senior 
officers within it. In the literature the number of works detailing the organisation of 
the War Office is limited and Lansdowne’s term of office has not received a proper 
assessment.
 1
 In order to understand how he operated at the War Office this thesis 
has made an interrogation of the extant archive with a particular focus on War Office 
records at Kew. Using this material this chapter will attempt to explain the War 
Office Lansdowne inherited and managed in 1895 and the complexities he had to 
grapple with. 
The department itself was established in June 1854 with the separation of the 
Colonial and Military business of the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies 
and the appointment of a Secretary of State for War.
2
 From 1854 until 1858 all the 
previously independent branches of the civil administration of the Army were 
brought together within a single department and as the department evolved it took 
over a number of different premises across London. It was Lansdowne’s opinion that 
the accommodation at the War Office was ‘most unsatisfactory, partly owing to the 
fact that the different departments were so scattered and partly to the unsuitability of 
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the main structure.’3 It was ‘an intolerable state of things, which interferes to an 
extent which I do not suppose anybody realises with the efficient conduct of 
business.’4 It added greatly to his difficulties in the department.5 The main structure 
housed at 80-91 Pall Mall comprised ‘a tiresome jumble of rambling passages, 
sudden stairs and confusing turns.’6 Its rooms were permeated by the odours of colza 
lamps and leather fire buckets. Beyond Pall Mall the department was housed in 
buildings at eleven other sites in London as well as at Enfield Lock, Birmingham and 
Waltham Abbey.
7
  
By the time Lansdowne left the War Office in 1900 it was regarded as 
probably the largest administrative establishment in the world.
8
 It was remarked that 
the fortifications branch ‘is a day’s journey - so to speak - from the Adjutant-
General’s room and we do not believe that the members of the Horse Guards staff 
even know where the Intelligence Branch is to be found.’9 The facilities were so 
poor and ill-health of the 1,140 members of staff so well known that one of the first 
decisions taken by Lansdowne was to establish a new War Office building which 
would bring the principal administrators under one roof.
10
 Lansdowne’s experience 
of administering his estates and his offices in Canada and India had ingrained in him 
the importance of economy and efficiency. Towards the end of the nineteenth 
century in Britain these ideas merged in an ideology of ‘National Efficiency.’11 
Although Lansdowne was not directly involved in the campaign it can be speculated 
that its consideration shaped his administration of the War Office.
12
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The physical separation of the different buildings within the War Office estate 
was also reflected in divisions between the civilian and senior officers employed in 
the department. At the head of the War Office was the Secretary of State for War. 
The Cabinet position was first created in 1794 and in 1801 became the Department 
of the Secretary of State for War and the Colonies. The position of Secretary of State 
for War was reinstated in 1854. Between 1661 and 1854 the War Office was 
administered by the Secretary at War. This person had no responsibility over military 
policy and was subordinate to the Secretary of State. In 1854 the office of Secretary 
at War was combined with that of Secretary of State for War. As a Minister of the 
Crown, Lansdowne was responsible to Parliament for the whole conduct of Army 
policy and administration. His role comprised wide duties and responsibilities. As 
well as attending debates, meetings, committees and the War Office Council, he was 
responsible for the Army’s supplies, equipment and readiness for the management of 
wars and military expeditions, and for decisions on technical questions which 
involved large sums of money. He was also accountable to Parliament for the Army 
estimates which might be submitted in draft to the Cabinet with or without the prior 
agreement of the War Office and Treasury. In administering his department he was 
influenced by Cardwell’s view of a Secretary of State for War as a Roman farmer 
‘vigorously pruning his fruit trees, amputating the useless boughs, and inserting in 
their place grafts of a happier growth.’13  
Unlike his predecessor, Campbell-Bannerman, who was distinctly lazy, hated 
detail
14
 and was content to leave the management of the department to his civil 
servants, Lansdowne took a personal interest in the administration and staffing of the 
office.
15
 There is no record of the hours Lansdowne kept at the War Office, although 
as one of the non-Saturdayites in Salisbury’s Cabinet he did almost all his work at 
the office from Monday to Friday, snatching the weekend away.
16
 Although there is 
no evidence that he conducted his duties with his senior War Office officials at 
Lansdowne House in the same way that he did as Foreign Secretary, when he 
routinely spent the morning at Lansdowne House meeting with foreign diplomats 
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and the afternoon at the Foreign Office, it can be speculated that the demands of the 
War Office required more of his attention in Whitehall. He was considered to be a 
hard-working Secretary of State, and during the first six months of ‘the War’ did not 
take leave from London.
17
 Determined to understand how his department functioned 
he took an especial interest in administrative problems, often upsetting his civilian 
and military officials by his perceived interference.   
Between June 1854, when the office was created, and July 1895 there were 
fifteen Secretaries of State for War.
18
 Six ministers were Conservative and one a 
Peelite, seven ministers were Liberal and one a Whig. Aged fifty, Lansdowne was 
five years younger than the average age of his predecessors. The oldest to hold office 
was Viscount Cranbrook, who held the post for two weeks in 1886 when aged 
seventy-one, and the youngest was Lord Hartington, who held the office in 1866 at 
the age of thirty-two. Generally, the Secretary of State was a civilian with no military 
service. Lansdowne was one of eleven ministers to have held the office with no 
previous career in the Army, although having served in the Royal Wiltshire 
Regiment of Yeomanry since 1863 he did have experience of the Auxiliary Army. 
Eight ministers had, like Lansdowne, graduated from Oxford and four had also been 
to Eton. He was also one of eleven who prior to becoming Secretary of State had 
held junior posts in the Colonial, India or War departments.  
The office was regarded by many as one of the toughest in government and 
many Secretaries of State struggled with their duties. To Lansdowne’s predecessor 
Campbell-Bannerman the office was ‘the best abused, and most freely denounced 
department in her Majesty’s service.’19 The path of a Secretary of State for War 
according to Crewe was ‘not strewn with roses but rather resembles one of those 
caravan routes across the African desert, strewn with whitened bones which show 
the disasters of those who have passed that way before.’20 Of the occupants from 
June 1854, when the Duke of Newcastle entered ‘that sink of iniquity’21 and 
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‘epitome of organization run mad,’22 until November 1900, when Lansdowne was 
promoted to the Foreign Office, only three, Cardwell, Stanhope and Lansdowne 
himself, spent more than five years in office. Lansdowne believed that of all the 
departments of the public service ‘the War Office was par excellence the department 
of dilemmas,’23 and, although it had imperfections in its theoretical constitution, the 
actual practice was better than the theory. 
24
 
Lansdowne employed a private secretary and two assistant private secretaries 
at the War Office who were career civil servants.
25
 From 1895 until he resigned in 
1899, Sir Charles Welby was Lansdowne’s private secretary, disseminating his 
decisions and organising appointments. He was twenty years younger than 
Lansdowne and had been educated at Eton and Christ Church, Oxford. As Private 
Secretary to Edward Stanhope at the War Office between 1887 and 1892 he 
understood the inner workings of the department. He was a loyal supporter of 
Lansdowne and a close colleague of Arthur Haliburton, the Permanent Under-
Secretary.
26
 His successor H.P. Harvey, who had been Assistant Private Secretary 
since 1895, was in Lansdowne’s view ‘one of the best of the junior men in the 
office.’27 
Lansdowne was assisted in Parliament by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
for War. As Lansdowne sat in the House of Lords his Under-Secretary had to be a 
member of the House of Commons. Against the wishes of Queen Victoria who had 
wanted the post filled by someone impartial to Army affairs and able to work with 
the soldiers, Salisbury appointed St John Brodrick.
28
 Brodrick was anything but 
impartial in military matters. Younger than Lansdowne by eleven years he had 
remarkable brain power and belief in himself.
29
 He had also been to Eton and Balliol 
College. Having ‘revelled in military history from his boyhood’ and ‘probably read 
                                                          
22
 Chesney quoted by Rasch, ‘Commons Debate’, ‘Army (Supplementary) Estimates, 1900-1901’, 27 
July 1900, ibid., Vol.86, c.1552. 
23
 Lansdowne, ‘Lord Lansdowne on the Army’, The Times, 14 July 1898, p.10.  
24
 Lansdowne, ‘The Guildhall Banquet’, The Times, 11 November 1895, p.6. 
25
 See Appendix III, p.269. 
26
 J.B. Atlay, Haliburton: A Memoir of his Public Service (London, 1909), p.151. 
27
 Lansdowne to Salisbury (private), 13 December 1900, HH. Salisbury MSS, 3M/E, Lansdowne 
correspondence, f.613. 
28
 Midleton, Records and Reactions, 1856-1939, p.92. 
29
 ‘The War Office. I. Exit Mr Brodrick’, Army and Navy Gazette 154 (2281) (10 October 1903). 
32 
 
more Napoleonic literature than most civilians’ before he was twenty,30 and served 
as Financial Secretary to the War Office between 1886 and 1892 he was well 
prepared for his position. Brodrick and Lansdowne had known one another socially 
for many years and Lansdowne was sure that they would work well together.
31
 
Salisbury made it clear in appointing him that Lansdowne would be his chief, ‘but as 
he is in the Lords the main Parliamentary burden will be on you.’32  
Brodrick earned his success in the office as a master of the art of estimate 
framing and was reputed to have been one of the principal authors of the Army 
proposals scheme of December 1897.
33
 He was unpopular with the senior officers 
who accused him of having an evil spirit of optimism and self-complacency.
34
 
Wolseley suspected him of dominating Lansdowne.
35
 Wolseley had ‘a horror of 
having to work with that prig of prigs’ and ‘clever talking ass with no shade of a 
statesman’s instinct about him.’36 In the House of Commons and the War Office 
Brodrick recognised how little the opinion of any civilian was worth on military 
questions but in certain matters, such as sending Guards to Gibraltar, it was not 
merely a question of military organisation. It was to some extent a question of 
military sentiment and a sentiment which civilians had as much right to share in as 
military men.
37
 Giving evidence to the Royal Commission on the War in South 
Africa in 1903 (hereafter referred to as the Royal Commission), he remarked that the 
two things that ‘the War Office has suffered from most in the past have been the 
division of military and civilian interests…and the isolation of War Office 
Departments from similar civilian services.’38 In October 1898 Brodrick accepted an 
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offer from Salisbury to move to the Foreign Office. Lansdowne thought he would be 
an immense loss to the War Office.
39
  
While making enquiries about a potential successor for Brodrick, Balfour 
advised him that the ablest candidate was George Wyndham who had been his 
Private Secretary. The appointment was a surprise to many who believed other and 
more favourable candidates would have been generally more palatable to the service 
parliamentarians in the House of Commons.
40
 Although this group of 
parlimentarians were unsatisfied by his appointment the defence intellectuals were 
pleased. Dilke remarked ‘One of the great testimonies of the ability of [Wyndham] is 
the fact that, while we may have our differences with the Secretary of State when he 
speaks in this House we are always inclined to believe that he really agrees with us 
beforehand, and that we should be in a better position if he had his way. I do not 
know whether that is so or not, but he gives us that impression, and we always speak 
with the feeling that we are speaking to one of ourselves.’41 Wyndham accepted, as 
he explained to his mother, ‘(1) Because it will please you and Papa. (2) Because I 
have set my heart on being a minister of Victoria.’42  
Eleven years younger than Lansdowne Wyndham also had an Eton education. 
After leaving the Royal Military College at Sandhurst he was commissioned in the 
Coldstream Guards where he served in Egypt in 1885 and later joined the Auxiliaries 
as a Yeoman. Entering the House of Commons in 1889 he quickly acquired a 
reputation as a skilful debater and fluent speaker, urbane, confident and easy of 
manner.
43
 As a member of the ‘Souls’ he was intimately connected with a new 
generation of parliamentarians including Balfour, Selborne and Curzon whose own 
political ideals differed from those of Lansdowne and his contemporaries. It has been 
noted that the ‘Souls’ set themselves a little apart from and above the rest of their 
class - the ruling class. They claimed keener intellect, better judgement, greater 
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social audacity and a defiance of conventions imposed by others.
44
 Like Lansdowne 
Wyndham was passionate about ideas and politics and had a very keen sense of 
honour. As an Imperialist he also defended the interests of colonials so zealously that 
he was known briefly as ‘the Member for South Africa.’45 Lansdowne and 
Wyndham developed a close working relationship, especially after the outbreak of 
‘the War’. Given considerable freedom by Lansdowne as a spokesman and official 
representative of the Army in the House of Commons his courage and tenacity 
confounded his critics, most notably Sir Charles Dilke, and earned him Lansdowne’s 
respect. 
Below the Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the War Office hierarchy was the 
Permanent Under-Secretary with responsibility for the day to day management of the 
Central Office of the department. As principal policy adviser to the Secretary of 
State he was a career civilian and non-political officer. He maintained the tradition of 
the office from one ministry to another
46
 and regarded all governments as being 
more or less the same.
47
 Acting as the channel of communication between 
Lansdowne and the various departments, the smooth running of the War Office was 
dependent on his knowledge and skills. He protected the financial and political 
superiority of Lansdowne’s office while respecting the role of the Crown and the 
military functions of the Commander-in-Chief. It was his task to draw a line between 
the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and those of Lansdowne. Using his own 
discretion it was not uncommon in matters of minor importance for the Permanent 
Under-Secretary to sometimes make decisions without necessarily referring the 
matter to Lansdowne.
48
  It was the view of Ralph Knox, Permanent Under-Secretary 
of State for War from 1897-1901, that he could relieve his chief of a ‘great deal of 
his routine work so as to give him more time to attend to questions of greater 
issue.’49 At the same time as Lansdowne began his duties at the War Office, the 
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existing Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Ralph Thompson, reached the age of sixty-
five and retired.
50
  
Thompson was succeeded by Sir Arthur Haliburton who was thirteen years 
older than Lansdowne. Entering the War Office in 1871 as assistant to the Director 
of Supplies, he was rapidly promoted and was considered a ‘permanent official of 
the old style, but more broad-minded than some of his class, and with a considerable 
gift of lucid literary expression.’51 As an expert in his field, particularly regarding 
short service and adept at marshalling facts,
52
 he developed a close working 
relationship with Lansdowne who valued his knowledge and continued to draw on 
this even after he retired in 1897. As a career civilian Haliburton believed that ‘the 
Government of this country being Government by the civil power, it follows that the 
administration of the great departments of state must be under the direct control of 
the civil power, advised and aided by such technical and expert assistance as the 
nature of the various administrations may demand. The extent to which the Secretary 
of State for War requires expert assistance to a military and of a civil character to 
enable him to secure the efficiency of the Army while guarding and preserving the 
prerogatives of the Crown and the interests of the public must be the measure of the 
division of duties between the civil and military employees of the War 
Department.’53  
Haliburton’s successor was Sir Ralph Knox who was older than Lansdowne by 
eleven years. Entering the War Office in 1856 he rose to become Accountant-
General in 1882. With a mastery of financial details, he earned the respect of his 
colleagues and chiefs. Lansdowne’s predecessor Campbell-Bannerman was closer to 
Knox than anyone else in that office during his tenure, and Knox was largely his own 
master.
54
 Such praise was not shared by the Duke of Cambridge, the former 
Commander-in-Chief, who described Knox in 1871 as ‘having not a military idea in 
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his configuration.’55  Lansdowne was less willing to give Knox a free hand and he 
consequently found working with Lansdowne difficult. As an official of the 
strongest type
56
 Knox was especially resentful of the manner in which business was 
sometimes transacted directly between Lansdowne and the senior officers.
57
  He also 
thought Lansdowne was weak
58
 and that because of his method of operating at the 
War Office civilian authority was damaged and military authority strengthened.  
Although their knowledge of military matters varied these civil servants had 
spent their entire careers in the War Office and had acquired an intimate knowledge 
of how the machine worked. They had been instrumental in the deliberations of the 
Northbrook Committee which devised Cardwell’s scheme for Army reform in 1870 
and in subsequent years were influential in maintaining the military system as then 
laid down with its short service and linked battalions. Having known Lansdowne 
since he served in the War Office between 1872 and 1874 they were acquainted with 
some of his working practices. Unlike in the case of Campbell-Bannerman, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary never dominated Lansdowne. And it was noted that he 
maintained his own voice in War Office matters.
59
 
Immediately subordinate to the Permanent Under-Secretary were the Assistant 
Under-Secretary and the clerical staff of the Central Department which dealt with 
registration of correspondence, editing of regulations and orders, Parliamentary 
questions and printings. Between 1895 and his death in 1898 the post was occupied 
by Sir George Lawson. His successor, Guy Fleetwood Wilson, held the post for ten 
years. Lawson was senior to Lansdowne by seven years and Fleetwood Wilson was 
younger than Lansdowne by five years. Fleetwood Wilson entered the Paymaster-
General’s Office in 1870 and subsequently served as Private Secretary to four 
Secretaries of State for War (1883-1893), before becoming Director of Clothing. His 
appointment was a surprise as he had seen little of the routine work in the Central 
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Office but as ‘a gentleman possessed both of “go” and ability’ he proved a valuable 
addition to the department.
60
  
The Financial Secretary of the War Office was historically a member of the 
House of Commons. He was charged with managing the Civil Department of the 
office. In 1895 Salisbury appointed Joseph Powell Williams, a Liberal Unionist 
Member of Parliament from Birmingham South and a Chamberlainite. Older than 
Lansdowne by five years he was a businessman, fresh complexioned, clean shaven 
and with an aristocratic mien. ‘Meeting him in the street one might have taken him 
for a great scholar or artist.’61 He was reputed to have played a key part in Joseph 
Chamberlain’s success in Birmingham and might have achieved more as Financial 
Secretary but for his tendency to be humorous, as on one occasion when meat was 
being discussed in the House and he remarked that he was not a butcher.
62
 His 
jocular replies in the House of Commons drew attention to himself and suggested 
that he was not quite equal to his responsibility, especially in negotiations with 
contractors. Lansdowne knew him only very slightly,
63
 and there is no record of the 
quality of their relations. The Civil Department of the War Office comprised the 
Contract Division, the Finance Division, the Ordnance Factories, the Income Duty 
Subdivision and the Clothing Division, until the latter was transferred to the 
Ordnance Department in 1899.
64
 
In contrast to the civil side of the War Office which was organised under the 
Central and Civil Departments, the Military Departments in July 1895 were all under 
the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army who at that time was the 
Duke of Cambridge. One month before Lansdowne came into office the Duke 
announced his intention to retire from office the following October,
65
 and it was 
Salisbury’s wish that Garnet Wolseley should succeed him. Prince George, 2nd Duke 
of Cambridge, was Queen Victoria’s first cousin and twenty-six years older than 
Lansdowne. Having joined the British Army in 1837, he became Commander-in-
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Chief in July 1856. The Duke’s natural conservatism was increased by his distrust of 
political interference in the Army which he feared would make military advancement 
dependent on party politics. His first loyalty was the Crown.
66
 Moreover, believing 
previous reforms had damaged the prestige and status of the Army, he questioned 
whether the Army needed reform. Lansdowne knew the Duke in both a personal and 
professional capacity. Professionally the Duke often disagreed with Lansdowne’s 
opinions; the most notable occasions being over the Channel Tunnel in 1883, 
Canadian Military appointments in 1884 and the Indian Presidential Armies in 
1889.
67
  
The Duke’s successor, Wolseley, was twelve years older than Lansdowne. 
Born and educated in Dublin, he joined the Army in 1852 as an ensign in the 12
th
 
Foot. Serving with distinction in the Crimea, the Indian Mutiny, Canada, Ashanti 
and South Africa he became Adjutant-General in April 1882, aged forty-eight. After 
service in Egypt he was created Viscount Wolseley and in 1890 was appointed 
Commander-in-Chief in Ireland before being promoted to Field Marshal in May 
1894. As a prominent advocate of reform Wolseley used political initiatives to 
achieve his aims. Although senior officers swore an oath of loyalty to the Crown and 
appeared above party politics they were entitled to speak and write openly on 
military matters. Yearning for a time when ‘a new Cromwell will clear the country 
of these frothing talkers,
68
 and the soldiers will rule’,69 Wolseley was by 
temperament strongly opposed to politicians, whom he disliked for ‘conforming to 
the democratic system of the day.’70 By 1895 his public criticism of politicians, the 
Duke of Cambridge and the state of the Army had earned him a reputation as a 
moderniser and zealous Cardwellian. Lansdowne first encountered him while serving 
as Under-Secretary of State at the War Office. In 1883 they met again during 
Lansdowne’s chairmanship of the Channel Tunnel Committee when Wolseley’s 
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unwaving views on the threat of invasion pitted him against Lansdowne.
71
 Further 
differences between the two men on military matters emerged soon after they began 
working together in 1895.  
The military department of the office of the Commander-in-Chief was based in 
Pall Mall and in July 1895 exercised duties over ten divisions including: the Military 
Secretary, Military Intelligence, the Adjutant-General, The Quartermaster-General, 
Works, Armaments, Medical, Military Education, the Chaplain-General and the 
Veterinary.
72
 
Until 1895 the Military Secretary dealt with the appointment, promotion and 
retirement of officers. Sir Reginald Cripps was Military Secretary when Lansdowne 
started at the War Office. Fourteen years older than Lansdowne, he had entered the 
Scots Guards in 1849 and had fought in the Crimea. Unlike his predecessors, of 
whom not one was still living, he did not leave office in poor health or broken down. 
Readily accessible to the War Office officials and in attendance to the Commander-
in-Chief the Military Secretary’s duties were onerous. In May 1896 Cripps was 
succeeded by Sir Coleridge Grove under a modified position with fewer duties. 
Grove was older than Lansdowne by six years and had served under Wolseley in the 
Egypt campaign of 1882. Having shown loyalty, intellect, bravery and experience of 
war to his ‘Chief’, he was one of Wolseley’s ‘Ring.’ This was a group which 
comprised military reformers and Army officers loyal to Wolseley. Among officers 
in the ‘Ring’ were William Butler, Redvers Buller, Henry Brackenbury, John F. 
Maurice, and Evelyn Wood. The ‘Ring’ itself developed from Wolseley’s 
appointments for the Ashanti Campaign of 1873 and 1874. The ‘Ring’ succeeded 
because patronage was a way of Victorian life, promotion in the Army was governed 
by seniority and not by selection and the Staff College did not produce a sufficient 
number of staff officers.
73
 The ‘Ring’ has been the subject of criticism for dividing 
the late Victorian Army. This argument rests on its competition with Lord Roberts’ 
‘Indians.’ The ‘Indians’ were Roberts’ cadre of military officers whom he had 
patronised in India. Regarded as ‘a man with the courage of his opinions and plenty 
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of common sense’ Grove’s appointment was satisfactory to both civilians and senior 
officers at the War Office.
74
 As a Wolseleyite he shared his ‘Chief’s’ dislike of 
Lansdowne and the encroachment of civilians on the military in the War Office. 
The Intelligence Department was supervised by the Director of Military 
Intelligence who in 1895 was Lieutenant-General Edward F. Chapman. Older than 
Lansdowne by five years he had served in Abyssinia in 1868 and the second Afghan 
War in 1878. Having shown exceptional ability as Quartermaster-General in India 
from 1881 until 1889 he was one of Lord Roberts’ ‘Indians.’ Having held the post 
since 1891 he was succeeded at the end of his five year term by Sir John Ardagh. 
Ardagh, who had been Lansdowne’s private secretary in India, was five years his 
senior. He had entered the Royal Engineers in 1859 and was attached to the 
Intelligence Branch of the War Office in 1875. Reputed to be the Army’s ‘foremost 
politico-military officer’,75 he enjoyed the friendship and patronage of Lansdowne 
and the respect and goodwill of senior political and military figures. Being in the 
confidence of Wolseley and admired by his staff for his industrious and taciturn 
nature he successfully negotiated the middle ground between civilians and senior 
officers in the office. Lansdowne chose him for his private secretary in India because 
‘he has made his reputation quite as much by civilian as by military work.’76 Above 
all, he believed that Ardagh would not get himself or the Viceroy into difficulties 
with the military in India.
77
  
The Adjutant-General was charged with the enlistment and discharge of men, 
the discipline and training of the forces, the maintenance of statistics relating to 
personnel and patterns of clothing. In 1895 General Sir Redvers Buller held this 
position. He was senior to Lansdowne by six years and had also been educated at 
Eton. He was commissioned into the 60
th
 Rifles in 1858, seeing service in Canada in 
1870, Ashanti in 1873, the Cape Frontier wars in 1875 and Egypt in 1882. Appointed 
Adjutant-General in 1890 he was one of Wolseley’s ‘Ring.’ Popular with the Duke 
of Cambridge and some members of the Liberal Party he was independently minded 
with Liberal sympathies.  He was in many ways the archetypal squire, returning as 
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frequently as his career permitted to his 5,000 acre Devon estate. He excelled at 
country sports and was a man of great physical strength and endurance, although by 
1895 good living and long hours at the War Office had weakened his physique. 
Known for the very determined way in which he expressed himself,
78
 Buller disliked 
Lansdowne and rarely agreed with the other civilians at the War Office, most notably 
Haliburton and Knox whose authority he regularly questioned. 
Buller thought the civil and military sides of the War Office should be kept 
quite distinct in their routine work and that Haliburton treated him with ‘extreme 
discourtesy and insincerity’ and told him so.79 To Haliburton, ‘the service would be a 
poor thing if officials never differed and a lamentable thing if they could not differ 
without losing their respect…for each other.’80 His view of Buller was that he had 
‘many good points, though in a rough exterior and an explosive interior’, and that it 
was ‘a pity such an able man should have so little judgement where he himself is 
concerned!’81 As an excellent businessman Buller knew the rules of the War Office 
and carried them out,
82
 such that he was very popular with the other senior officers at 
the War Office, and the officers and soldiers in the Army. In 1892 Brackenbury, the 
then Military Member of the Viceroy’s Council, recommended him as ‘a first rate 
man all round’ and advised Lansdowne, the then Viceroy, that he should succeed 
Roberts as Commander-in-Chief in India, being ‘the only man I know who would 
help me to bring about a more economical administration than that which now 
exists.’83  
Three months before Buller’s term of office as Adjutant-General ended in 1897 
discussions about his successor began. Among the candidates was Prince Arthur 
Duke of Connaught who was Queen Victoria’s favourite son and a career soldier. 
Lansdowne had known Connaught officially since the latter served as Commander-
in-Chief in Bombay during Lansdowne’s Viceroyalty. His abilities were not of a 
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high order, he was very conservative and had a reputation as a martinet.
84
 
Lansdowne was relieved that the Queen, who wished him to become Commander-in-
Chief of the British Army, did not press his candidature. Lansdowne explained this 
was wise because his prospects of becoming Commander-in-Chief later would not 
have improved had he been made Adjutant-General.
85
 The Queen, however, did 
indicate her strong objection to the most favoured candidate Sir Evelyn Wood whom 
she argued would not be good for the Army.
86
 Opposition to Wood’s candidature 
was also voiced by the Duke of Cambridge and the Prince of Wales. As one of his 
‘Ring’, Wolseley urged Lansdowne to appoint Wood remarking, ‘I am sure he would 
serve you best, and would certainly be accepted by the Army as the best man for the 
place.’87  
On 1 October 1897, Wood succeeded Buller as Adjutant-General. He was 
older than Lansdowne by seven years. Educated at Marlborough College he entered 
the Navy as a Midshipman in 1852, before transferring to the 13
th
 Light Dragoons in 
1855. He took part in the Indian Mutiny in 1858, the Ashanti campaign in 1873, the 
Cape Frontier war between 1877 and 1878 and South Africa in 1881. Although he 
was partially deaf, Lansdowne supported his promotion because he had been an 
excellent Quartermaster-General. His deafness did not prevent him from transacting 
official business and his ‘curious jerky manner,’ which annoyed some people, was 
just a fault of manner.
88
 Although they remained on cordial terms, it is interesting 
that after leaving the War Office Lansdowne noted that Wood’s deafness was a 
‘calamity to those that have to work with him.’89 In contrast to the reserved 
temperament of Buller, Wood was lively and hardly ceased to draw breath, which 
according to Queen Victoria came from his ‘inability to hear any general 
conversation.’ 90 
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Among those suggested to succeed Wood as Quartermaster-General were 
Charles Clark, the then Commander-in-Chief in Madras, who had the support of 
Wolseley.
91
 Henry Brackenbury, the then Military Member of the Viceroy’s Council 
in India, and Sir George White, the then Commander-in-Chief in India. It was 
Lansdowne’s view that the Quartermaster-General, who was charged with supplying 
the Army with food, fuel, horses and forage, with transport, sanitary services and 
administering the Army Pay Department, should have experience of the Army in 
India and its requirements.
92
 Having supported White’s appointment to Commander-
in-Chief in India believing that the Army would trust and follow him and that he was 
keen, hard-working, tactful and would make no mischief,
93
 he again supported his 
appointment for Quartermaster-General telling George Hamilton, his brother-in-law 
and Secretary of State for India, he ‘would be glad to get him at the War Office. He 
is not a conjuror but he has plenty of regimental experience.’ 94 To Lansdowne, 
maintaining an intimate connection between the headquarters staff and the Army and 
‘the great advantage which officers rising to high administrative posts’ acquired 
from regimental experience was important.
95
 In White’s case he had served over 
thirty years in a regiment but had never been employed in the War Office.
96
 Queen 
Victoria approved of Lansdowne’s choice and White accepted the appointment, 
telling his sister that, ‘though I hate London, I am too poor to refuse £2,000 a year 
and if I find the work and place intolerable, I must only make the best bargain I can 
out of it.’97 Brackenbury saw nothing humiliating in White being preferred over 
him.
98
 As the principal military officials in India, Brackenbury and White were on 
close personal and professional terms with each other.  
Owing to unrest in India during 1897 White remained there until the following 
April. In his absence the post was temporarily filled by Major-General Charles 
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Burnett, an Australian born officer two years younger than Lansdowne.
99
 It was 
Lansdowne’s belief that constantly moving officers was objectionable. ‘The result is 
that men do not settle down steadily to their work and are always looking out for 
transfers and officiating appointments.’100 Burnett’s short tenure at the War Office 
proved to be an exception to this view and he made good use of his time.
101
  
White began his work at the War Office in the spring of 1898. Older than 
Lansdowne by ten years, he entered the Army in 1853, serving in the Indian Mutiny 
in 1858 and with Roberts in the second Afghan war of 1879, where he was awarded 
the Victoria Cross and became one of Roberts’ ‘Indians.’ He was one of the most 
decorated officers in the British Army. White had been a great admirer of 
Lansdowne since his time in India. He thought he was ‘straight and strong’102 and 
that he and his Vicereine Maud were ‘the most popular Vice-regal pair I have ever 
met.’103 After White was sent to South Africa in October 1899 he was succeeded by 
Charles Clarke. Five years senior to Lansdowne, Clarke had been educated at Eton 
and entered the 57
th
 Foot in 1856. He served in the New Zealand war 1861-66 and 
the South African war of 1879. Holding a series of administrative titles, he was 
appointed Assistant Adjutant-General at Aldershot on 8 February 1884, Deputy 
Adjutant-General in Ireland from 1886-1888, and Deputy Adjutant-General at the 
War Office in 1892. In 1893 he became Commander-in-Chief, Madras serving under 
Lansdowne until the latter left India in February 1894.  
Among the other divisions within the Military Department was the Works 
Department, which in 1895 was headed by the Inspector-General of 
Fortifications, General Robert Grant. Based at the Horse Guards he managed an 
office of forty-four staff. He was charged with the construction and maintenance 
of forts, barracks, and other buildings, railways and telegraphs. He was eight 
years older than Lansdowne. Commissioned into the Royal Engineers, becoming 
Lieutenant in 1854, he saw service in British North America between 1859 and 
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1865 and in the Sudan in 1885. In 1898 Sir Richard Harrison succeeded Grant. 
Harrison was Lansdowne’s senior by eight years. Having been commissioned into 
the Royal Engineers and becoming a Lieutenant in 1855, he saw service in the 
Crimean war in 1856, the Siege of Lucknow in 1857, the Cape Frontier wars in 
1879 and in the Sudan in 1885. 
The Arms or Ordnance Department of the British Army in 1895 was under 
the control of Lieutenant-General Sir Edwin Markham. As Inspector-General of 
the Ordnance Department, Markham was charged with the manufacture and 
supply of all warlike stores and other stores, clothing and with questions of 
armaments, patterns of stores, inventions and designs. He was twelve years older 
than Lansdowne. Commissioned into the Royal Artillery in 1850, he saw service 
in the Crimea in 1856 and in India in 1857. With his replacement in 1899 by 
Henry Brackenbury the post of Inspector-General of Ordnance was retitled 
Director-General of Ordnance.  Brackenbury was older than Lansdowne by seven 
years. Educated at Eton, he became a Lieutenant in the Royal Engineers in 1856, 
later seeing service in the Indian Mutiny and the Ashanti Campaign where he was 
Wolseley’s Military Secretary and made one of his ‘Ring.’ Wolseley described 
him as ‘not one of the cleverest, but the cleverest man in the British Army.’104 In 
1891 he was sent to India as Military Member of Lansdowne’s Council because 
Salisbury wished to introduce a degree of realism into Indian military planning. 
While in India he was converted to the strategic views of Roberts,
105
 a conversion 
that Lansdowne approved of, noting, ‘Nothing could be better…than the way in 
which Roberts and Brackenbury get on…an injudicious selection would be a 
positive calamity, and would enormously add to the difficulty of my position 
here.’106 Forming a favourable impression of Brackenbury Lansdowne came to 
rely on him greatly. He found him full of energy and an asset.
107
 He believed that 
his wider political horizon and experience of intelligence at the War Office meant 
he was familiar with the opinions of British public figures and could judge 
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questions from the House of Commons.
108
 He also became a ‘great friend of Lady 
Lansdowne’s.’109 On his return from India in 1896 Brackenbury was appointed by 
Lansdowne as President of the War Office Ordnance Committee and acted as his 
principal point of contact for armaments advice. He held this post until becoming 
Director-General Ordnance in 1899. 
The other support services within the Military Department at the War Office 
were the Army Medical Department, the Educatation Department, the Chaplain-
General and the Army Veterinary Department. Across all of the military 
departments the senior officers employed principal and senior clerks most of 
whom were civilians and according to Grove, Wolseley’s Military Secretary, did 
‘most excellent work.’110  
The nature of the functions between the civilian and senior officers at the 
War Office were so different that they resulted in widely differing types of 
organisation. The military department served to govern the Army and the civil 
department to oversee all matters of military finance. Almost every aspect of the 
senior officers’ activities had political implications and cost money and as the 
guardians of finance the civilians exercised their right to know the reasons for that 
expenditure. Exercising authority in this way often caused friction between the 
two divisions. Lansdowne was aware that this friction was of long standing.
111
 In 
1895, when he re-entered the War Office, he remarked that the friction was less 
acute than when he had been there during Cardwell’s tenure.112 It was his view 
that ‘there will be differences between the civil officials at the War Office and 
military officials. It will be so to the end of time.’113 
The tensions within the department were the result of a culture of 
disharmony and distrust developed over more than a century. Two related 
problems were at the root of this tension. The first was the issue of Royal 
authority over the Army. As a largely constitutional question this involved the 
conflict between the Crown and Parliament for supremacy over the military 
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forces, most of whom regarded themselves as first and foremost loyal to the 
Crown. For good discipline and impartiality in the Army the soldiers believed that 
the Crown had to be the source of all military honours.
114
 The second was the 
extent to which civilians and soldiers should collaborate in deciding questions of 
a professional or technical nature and was related to the interference of Parliament 
on Royal authority. 
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Royal authority had barred 
civilians from probing too closely into technical matters which soldiers believed 
they, as civilians, were not qualified to discuss. By the late nineteenth century, the 
question of expertise in military matters was largely focused on the Secretary of 
State for War. To compound the problems this question raised the soldiers argued 
that because this person was constantly changing, establishing any continuity of 
military policy was impossible. ‘The difficulty at the War Office is that the heads 
of it are civilians who are constantly changing.’115 Lansdowne’s view of the 
soldier’s complaint was entirely pragmatic. He believed that the hand of the 
politician could not be forced by the senior officers and that a more or less 
ignorant civilian Secretary of State should not profess to be an expert but rather 
should ‘gather the best information he can from the experts.’116 This approach the 
senior officers believed was abused and that there was a ‘tendency for the 
civilians to express opinions on military subjects and consequently to take away 
from the military people the direct responsibility which ought to rest on them.’117 
Lansdowne disagreed. In his evidence to the Royal Commission he remarked that, 
when he found his civilian financial officers expressing their own opinions on the 
merits of military proposals and taking it upon themselves to ‘criticise the purely 
military merits of the proposal,’ he always ‘supported the military authority.’118  
In managing his department Lansdowne both listened to and was guided by 
his senior officers. Decisions were not taken without prior consultation and 
Lansdowne never found the senior officers diffident in expressing their 
                                                          
114
 Hamer, The British Army, p.6. 
115
 PP, 1887, XIX, C.5226, ‘First Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the civil 
establishments of the different offices of state at home and abroad’, 5160, p.192. 
116
 PP, 1904, XLI, Cd.1791, RC, 21438, p.531. 
117
 PP, 1901, XL, Cd.581, WOO, 6982, p.284. 
118
 PP, 1904, XLI, Cd.1791, RC, 21560, p.537. 
48 
 
opinion.
119
 In response to allegations that War Office civilians alone had framed 
the ‘Emergency Measures’ during ‘the War’, Lansdowne stated to the Royal 
Commission that since ‘the War’ had begun ‘there has not been a week, there has 
scarcely been a day, in which the civilian and military members of the War Office 
have not met at the same table in order to discuss from time to time the 
arrangements and the military measures that were being taken.’120 While 
Lansdowne referred all technical matters to both his civilian and military advisers, 
in matters of a non-technical nature he deferred to the expertise of the civilians 
and in particular his Permanent Under-Secretary and Under-Secretary of State.  
Just as the constantly changing position of Secretary of State was believed 
by the senior officers to be disadvantageous to the efficiency of the War Office so 
Lansdowne believed many of the five year appointments given to the senior 
officers disadvantaged them. To Lansdowne the smooth running of the War 
Office depended on the extent to which civilians and military officials were 
willing to share their expertise with each other. Many of the men who entered the 
War Office during his tenure to take up their appointments were experts in their 
field but did not know the back history of defence and military questions in the 
department. As such he believed that it was advantageous to them to have career 
civilians in the department with years of experience and knowledge of different 
cases and their difficulties.
121
 
To the parliamentarians and civilians of the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries financial control over the Army was the most powerful lever against 
abuse of Royal power. To these individuals it was in their own interest to 
maintain the division as to fail to do so might weaken their control. Objections to 
uniting the Horse Guards and the Civil Departments continued until the late 
1860s,
122
 when partly in response to Gladstone’s own suspicions of the 
‘praetorian’ ambitions of military men, Cardwell established by Order-in-Council 
a war department under the general authority of a Secretary of State for War with 
three principal divisions. These being: supply, finance and military command. 
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Although the Order-in-Council of 1870 resolved the constitutional issues then 
dividing the Army, the nature of warfare had changed and new issues in supply, 
administration, defence planning and strategy further widened the division 
between civilians and soldiers for the control of professional questions. 
The removal of the Horse Guards to the War Office at Pall Mall in 1871 put 
additional pressure on civil and military relations as it meant that the Horse 
Guards was over-run with civilian clerks and politicians. The following year, 
while Lansdowne was acting as Under-Secretary, the senior officers were further 
alienated when the Finance department was given authority to audit the accounts 
of Army commanders and the Surveyor-General became a political appointment. 
Throughout the 1870s and 1880s civilian domination of the War Office was 
fiercely condemned by the soldiers. Wolseley noted, ‘our system of military 
administration has been growing more and more civilian in character since the 
days of Wellington…soldiers don’t think the arrangement a good one.’123 As in 
the past their fear was that the manufacture and supply of equipment was being 
supervised by civilians who had no knowledge of the uses for which that 
equipment was needed. 
Concerns that the administration of military affairs by civilians was weakening 
the Army were brought to public attention in December 1886 when the then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Randolph Churchill, resigned over the defence 
budget. In his resignation statement he called for a select committee to examine and 
report on the Army and Navy estimates. The committee was established and 
Churchill as its first Chairman conducted a full inquiry.
124
 It led to many revelations 
but failed to capture the public imagination.
125
 Witnesses were, however, able to 
convince him that there was no waste or mismanagement of military expenditure, but 
that after years of civilian management the Army was in a state of unpreparedness 
for war with a European power. Converted to the side of the senior officers, 
Churchill argued that the politicians were to blame and that political necessity had 
put national security at risk. Although many of his accusations were derived from 
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hearsay and authoritatively contradicted, his conversion strengthened ties between 
the economists and the senior officers, and restored some of the power Cardwell had 
taken from the latter in the early 1870s.
126
 
As the controversy over civil and military relations worsened, and the fear that 
the Army was unprepared for war continued, several inquiries and commissions were 
instituted, some of which favoured the military case over that of the civilians. Of 
three commissions that reported during 1887 on different aspects of the Army’s 
administration the most important was chaired by Sir James Stephen to inquire on 
Warlike Stores.
127
 Supportive of the senior officers, his commission noted that 
soldiers were disillusioned with the state of the Army and that on account of 
Cardwell’s reforms it was ‘physically and morally impossible’ for the Secretary of 
State to perform all his tasks satisfactorily.
128
 The commission reported that too 
much authority was centred in the civilian Secretary of State. Highlighting that an 
efficient Army and a constitutional Army were dissimilar and that national security 
might be compromised with a party politician at the head of the military,
129
 they 
suggested the soldiers should be invited to submit an annual statement to Parliament 
stating the needs for national security.
130
 
Under pressure from reformers, senior officers and economists the government 
announced a reorganisation of Army administration in September 1887. The result in 
1888 was that the Army was reorganised by a War Office board, referred to as the 
Committee on the lines of Communication of an Army. This drew a distinction 
between soldiers and civilians, giving Stanhope, the then Secretary of State, just two 
official advisers: the Commander-in-Chief and the Financial Secretary. Reorganising 
the Surveyor-General’s department and assigning responsibility for supplies, 
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transport and lines of communication to the Commander-in-Chief appeared to give 
the senior officers greater freedom from political interference for the preparedness of 
the Army, but by keeping the finances and manufacture under civilian control the 
reality was different. The reorganisation did little to increase the individual 
responsibility of the subordinate officers and also made the senior officers 
principally responsible for maintaining an efficient Army. Neither the Duke of 
Cambridge nor Wolseley were willing to accept responsibility for an Army they both 
knew to be in a weak state. Their complaints did not go unheard and when the 
invasion scare of 1888 awakened public attention to the state of the Army a 
deputation called on Stanhope to push for a clearer definition of priorities.
131
 The 
results of this were a full scale Cabinet enquiry into the possibility of invasion, the 
Stanhope Memorandum of June 1888 and the appointment of a Royal Commission 
chaired by Lord Hartington to inquire into the Civil and Professional administration 
of the Naval and Military Departments, and the relation of those Departments to each 
other and the Treasury.  
After a year’s deliberation the Hartington Commission issued two reports: the 
first on 10 July
 
1889 and the second on 11 February 1890.
132
 Having found that there 
was practically no communication between the War Office and Admiralty the 
commissioners proposed that a defence committee comprised of Cabinet ministers, 
soldiers and sailors should be established.
133
 It stated that the committee should be 
empowered to examine the estimates of the two services before they were submitted 
to the Cabinet, to examine questions of defence policy and to determine the 
requirements of the services from an overall plan of Imperial defence.
134
 It suggested 
that consultative, executive and administrative duties were over-centralised in the 
office of the Commander-in-Chief. Moreover, that the Commander-in-Chief, by 
standing between the Secretary of State and the subordinate heads of military 
departments, in effect prevented the Secretary of State from acquiring adequate 
professional advice. Hence the commissioners recommended that the post of 
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Commander-in-Chief should be abolished,
135
 a War Office Council should be 
created,
136
 and that five senior officers including the Adjutant-General, 
Quartermaster-General, the Director of Artillery, Inspector-General of Fortifications 
and a Chief of the Staff should be responsible to the Secretary of State for the 
efficient administration of their departments.
137
 It also mentioned that a General Staff 
should be established enabling the military defence of the Empire to be considered as 
a whole.
138
 The new Chief of the Staff would be head of the department and advise 
the Secretary of State on all matters of general military policy, liaise with the First 
Lord of the Admiralty on inter-service questions and provide the Secretary of State 
with an annual report of the requirements of the Empire.
139
 Two members of the 
Commission, Randolph Churchill and Henry Campbell-Bannerman, dissented from 
the majority of the report. Churchill, under Wolseley’s influence, argued for a drastic 
change to free the handling of military matters from party interference.
140
 Campbell-
Bannerman opposed the concept of a General Staff.
141
 In his view the military ‘may 
be made good servants, but they would be bad masters.’142  
Four years later and under a Liberal government Campbell-Bannerman, the 
Secretary of State for War, instructed his civil servants headed by Ralph Thompson 
to prepare a scheme on defence management. In carrying out their task the senior 
officers were not consulted and no indication was given of what the civilians 
intended to implement until after the proposals had matured.
143
 The result was a 
modified version of the Hartington proposals and the most important finding was 
that too much power was concentrated in the Commander-in-Chief. Campbell-
Bannerman was strongly against the creation of the new office of Chief of the Staff 
as proposed in the report of the Hartington Commission; as such an office was ‘not 
only unnecessary, but undesirable.’ As such they would maintain the appointment as 
General Officer Commanding. He would be the ‘principal adviser of the Secretary of 
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State’ and associated with him would be four other military heads of department, 
each ‘directly responsible’ to the Secretary of State, forming a ‘deliberative council’ 
[Army Board] with responsibility for the discipline of the Army given to the 
Adjutant-General.
144
 For this proposal to succeed, the resignation of the Duke of 
Cambridge was essential, and for that to happen the Queen had to give her approval. 
As Wolseley later put it, ‘he was the grit that prevented our machinery from 
working.’145 She reluctantly agreed providing that his resignation would not preclude 
the Duke of Connaught from the role of Commander-in-Chief in the future. 
Somewhat unusually the politicians found themselves in accordance with the Queen 
and Wolseley.
146
  
On 21 June 1895 the government announced the proposed changes and the 
resignation of the Duke. Removing the Duke was complicated by the question of his 
succession and because the government’s own future in power was uncertain the 
Liberals were keen to fill the post swiftly.
147
 It was their intention to appoint Redvers 
Buller, the Adjutant-General, but he refused the offer, telling Campbell-Bannerman, 
‘I feel my appointment to such a post would possibly pain Lord Wolseley…I think 
moreover that you may not have quite taken into consideration that I have never 
really been tried as a head man and personally I am always inclined to think myself a 
better second fiddle than a leader of thought. Lord Wolseley I think the contrary and 
I should hope that the responsibility of a head place might find him better fitted for it 
than perhaps you think.’148 Lord Roberts’ candidature was easily discounted because 
of his perceived lack of knowledge of British military affairs. On 21 June before 
Campbell-Bannerman could complete the arrangements for reorganising the War 
Office and military departments the Liberal government fell from office. 
Unlike his predecessors, Lansdowne held a less punitive view of the senior 
officers. He believed that whether soldiers or civilians ‘we are all of us animated by 
a common desire to make the Army efficient and to study its requirements.’149 But as 
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the Crown’s representative to Parliament he objected to any intrusion from the senior 
officers in politics. It was his experience that ‘the soldier who is also a politician is 
apt not to be very much trusted in the Army.’150 He believed the constitutional 
position made it incumbent that ‘the Secretary of State and the Secretary of State 
alone is responsible to Parliament, and the Commander-in-Chief is responsible to the 
Secretary of State as his principal military adviser.’151 As such he believed that while 
the ‘Commander-in-Chief has a perfect right to appear in this House and address 
your Lordships when it may please him to do so, I confess I think he is well advised 
in sticking to his desk in the War Office, and leaving the Parliamentary 
representatives of the Department to say what is to be said on its behalf in 
Parliament.’152 He also recognised that the right mode of conducting business in the 
War Office, meant that ‘the soldiers and civilians should, as far as possible, sit side 
by side, and not occupy different branches of the office and occupy their time in 
controversies with one another.’153 However, ‘both soldiers and civilians recognize 
that they have their own special sphere of utility, and endeavour to keep within it. 
The civilians may sometimes think that they have picked up a good military 
inspiration, and I am not going to admit that all good military reforms are the work 
of military reformers. The soldiers may occasionally take it into their heads that they 
could handle the Army Estimates better than the civilians, and, perhaps, they are 
right; but each side knows perfectly well that it must sometimes give way, and it 
does so with good humour.’ 154 To Lansdowne, whatever the senior officers thought 
were advisable military measures, they had to reckon with the Secretary of State and 
he with the Cabinet and with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. As such they received 
‘something notoriously a great deal less than they would have liked to have and they 
had to make the best of it.’155 It was his view that the Army could not be organised 
on any other lines than those of finance.
156
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Rather than receive a ‘great deal less’ it was common for each senior officer to 
exaggerate needs. The problem this caused however was that the general financial 
interests of the Army were ignored and conflicts and suspicion increased. As such 
the finance division behaved like an outpost of the Treasury and rejected many 
proposals. Although Lansdowne knew many military men who were excellent 
financiers he recognised that ‘many did not have quite a sufficient appreciation of 
the financial difficulties in administering the Army.’157 Some of the senior officers 
such as Grove accepted they were poor financial administrators. ‘I have no wish of 
course to make out that my own profession is more wasteful or unwise than is really 
the case but I do think that there is a very considerable tendency in soldiers to think 
only of what they want to get and not what it will cost.’158 The majority of soldiers 
supposed that the War Office was guided by economy and as such they themselves 
could not be held accountable for national security. It was this attitude that motivated 
them to constantly attempt to transfer financial functions from the civilian side to 
their own department. Such persistence was noted by Knox remarking that ‘the 
soldiers are determined to make a long pull, a strong pull and a pull together to get 
rid of anything like an independent financial control in the department and Lord 
L[ansdowne] is so weak and Mr W[yndham] so sympathising that I fear we shall go 
to the wall.’159 During Lansdowne’s term of office Knox’s fear was not realised and 
the traditional view that the soldiers at the War Office were dominated by civilians 
remained.
160
 That Lansdowne organised the Army on lines of finance prompted 
Ardagh to note, ‘the War Office is in reality but a subordinate branch of the Treasury 
which holds the purse strings of the nation and inexorably refuses to open them until 
forced to do so by public opinion.’ 161  
The tense relations at this time between civilians and senior officers over 
administrative issues were further complicated by petty jealousies and rivalries 
among the senior officers themselves. While they were united in wishing to transfer 
financial and supply functions to their own side of the War Office, they were by no 
means united on broader issues of Army reform and reorganisation. This conflict 
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was mainly one of personalities but it also had its roots deep within the social and 
class structure of the Army. On the one hand were the regimental officers or 
traditionalists, including the Duke of Cambridge, and on the other were the 
reforming officers including men such as Wolseley and Roberts. Different views on 
regimental organisation, education, training and staff planning divided these two 
groups. The Duke failed to understand the reformers. He ‘always hated Sir E. Wood. 
He never could understand the work of any practical soldiers like Wood.’162 Such 
failure to empathise frustrated Wolseley who made no attempt to conceal his dislike 
for the Duke and his traditional views: ‘I have always despised as a poor useless 
mass of cowardly flesh and the greatest enemy the Army has ever had, I mean of 
course, the Duke of Cambridge.’ 163 The Duke was more sympathetic to the officer 
class than Wolseley, who was determined to correct the unattractive habits of social 
prejudice, professional jealousy and the high cost of living it promoted. So long as 
the regimental system continued unaltered the possibility of a cohesive officer corps 
with shared ideals and values lay dormant and any disposition on their part to 
intervene politically was inhibited and restricted their ambitions.
164
 Moreover 
military life and the nature of the Army conditioned officers to accept the status quo 
and not question regulations. In a system that rewarded those who feared that the 
rapid changes in society were eroding the status and prestige of the Army, the 
number of ‘practical’ officers remained in a minority. Unable to comprehend that 
regimental esprit de corps was remarkably resilient the traditionalists fell back on 
tried and tested methods. 
Just as these two groups were divided, so among the reformers themselves 
there were notable differences of opinion on military policy and the purpose of the 
Army. Whereas Roberts and his clique advocated reforms and strategic priorities 
modelled by service in India, experience in Africa and Britain was the model for 
Wolseley and his clique.
165
 Furthermore, although Buller, Wood and Brackenbury 
were regarded as part of Wolseley’s ‘Ring’, by 1895 the value of his patronage had 
diminished and the ‘Ring’ held less influence than it had previously. By 1895 the 
senior officers in the War Office were at the pinnacle of their careers and as 
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Lansdowne suspected he, as Secretary of State, was ‘less alarming to them as one 
military officer was to another.’166 Moreover with age and ill health Wolseley 
harboured petty jealousies against many of his ‘Ring’ colleagues which undermined 
their ability to work as a cohesive group towards reforming the War Office and the 
Army. While Brackenbury might have been one of the cleverest men in the Army 
Wolseley believed his selfishness made him very unpopular.
167
 His recommendation 
to the Hartington Commission in 1890 that the office of Commander-in-Chief should 
be abolished and replaced with a Chief of the Staff was, Wolseley suspected, an 
attempt by an embittered rival who would never become Commander-in-Chief but 
who had accumulated experience as head of the Intelligence Division which would 
have served him admirably as a future Chief of the Staff.
168
 Buller he argued had 
‘never urged great reforms upon either the Duke or the War Minister [Campbell-
Bannerman] that would displease the former or entail an increase to the latter’s 
budget.’169 Wood he described as ‘such a firework that I cannot rely on him.’170  
The appointment of Roberts and Kitchener to take command in South Africa 
revealed many more prejudices between the different cliques in the department. 
Wolseley remarked with a hint of jealousy, ‘I have no real confidence in little 
Roberts for I always feel him to be a play actor more than a soldier,’ and that ‘the 
Hindoo element is now in the ascendancy.’171 While Roberts considered White:  
the best general officer I know and I sincerely trust he will get the GCB, 
I feel sure, however, that there will be very great opposition at the Horse 
Guards, where I am afraid Indian services are not measured by the same 
standard as those performed under the auspices of the authorities at 
home. The Duke of Cambridge and all the higher officials at the War 
Office look upon White as an officer whom they have been forced to 
honor against their wish, he is consequently a persona ingrata to them, 
and they will resist his being given any further reward. Then Evelyn 
Wood, Redvers Buller and some other officers senior to White but whose 
services cannot, in my opinion, be compared to his, will make a 
tremendous fuss. Wolseley will back them up.
172
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Roberts’ suspicions were realised when, after White became besieged at 
Ladysmith, Wolseley noted ‘he has proved himself to be an utter failure - he would 
take no warning from me.’173 Departmental divisions in London were also reflected 
in the field in South Africa. When Buller met Roberts in Pretoria in July 1900 he 
noted, ‘I found Roberts sitting in one building with his Hindu staff, Kitchener in 
another with his Egyptian staff, and Kelly Kenny in a third with an English staff, all 
pulling against each other.’174 Such divisions weakened the professional soldiers and 
enabled the civilian authorities to exploit them and impose a system of divide and 
rule. As Secretary of State, Lansdowne might have been in a position to dispel some 
of the disharmony between the senior officers and the civilians. That he was unable 
to bridge this divide will be explored in the next chapter through an analysis of his 
relations with the Cabinet, the opposition Liberal Party, the service parliamentarians, 
the defence intellectuals and the press. 
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Chapter Two - The Environment Outside the War Office 
It might have been expected that Lansdowne would have performed a greater role as 
a conduit between the senior officers and those outside the War Office. That this was 
not the case was due to his refusal to dissociate his position as Secretary of State 
from his position as a member of the Cabinet. In operating the War Office 
Lansdowne not only had to contend with its inefficiency and the lack of cooperation 
between the civilians and the senior officers but also with his colleagues in Cabinet, 
the opposition Liberal Party, the service parliamentarians, the defence intellectuals 
and the press. An appreciation of these groups and Lansdowne’s relations with them 
can help to explain how he managed the reform discourse. A large number of studies 
and biographies on the personalities within these groups exist in the historiography.  
Since the 1970s a new generation of political historians has re-examined the role of 
prominent individuals in the light of new sources. Political history has not 
disappeared even if some individuals such as Lansdowne did.
1
 A wide range of 
monographs from the late nineteenth century to the present deals with the subject of 
public discourse on defence matters, but Lansdowne’s presence remains shadowy.2 
When the Liberal government fell in June 1895 there was a hope that the War 
Office and Army reforms of the incoming administration would be more thorough 
than those proposed by their predecessors. It was remarked that the land defences 
were handed over in a ‘shocking condition.’3 The Edinburgh Review, summarising 
the military record of the previous government remarked:  
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Real defects have been disclosed; real remedies must be found for them; 
and no little dissatisfaction will be caused if it appears that merely 
nominal changes are to take place of the fundamental reforms approved 
by the Hartington Commission. As in 1870, a Government powerful in 
statesmanship is rendered trebly powerful by the great majority which 
supports it in the House of Commons. It is in administration not less than 
in legislation that we expect the country to benefit by the change brought 
about by the general election. And it is perhaps in its treatment of the 
great subject of Imperial defence in all its branches that the 
administrative quality of the Unionist government will first be tested.
4
  
Among the soldiers Francis Grenfell noted, ‘there were few of us, that were not 
glad to see a Conservative government in again.’5 
Salisbury’s Cabinet had an average age of fifty-six, which was regarded by 
some members of the press and public as too old. Lansdowne, who as already 
mentioned was fifty years old, was one of the younger men in the Cabinet. Eight 
ministers were from the upper classes and eleven were from the middle classes.
6
 Six 
ministers including Lansdowne had been to Eton, four to Harrow, three to other 
public schools and six were privately educated. Ten ministers including Lansdowne 
had been to Oxford, three to Cambridge and one to Trinity College Dublin. Four 
ministers including Lansdowne had some form of military experience either having 
served in the Regular Army or the Auxiliaries.
7
 While the average age of the Cabinet 
was ‘too old’, it was also marked by a generational gap, which partially restricted 
Salisbury’s freedom to lead. As the late Victorian era drew close to an end this 
generational gap affected the lines of friction in the resulting foreign and Imperial 
policy debates and bonds were created by shared political experiences, a common 
policy outlook and shared assumptions.
8
  
Salisbury was fundamentally a mid-Victorian optimist. He was confident in 
Britain’s power and conscious of the weaknesses held by her possible enemies. In 
1877 he had compared British foreign policy to ‘floating lazily downstream 
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occasionally putting out a diplomatic boat hook to avoid collisions.’9 Twenty-two 
years later little had occurred to change his view. Many of his Cabinet including 
Lansdowne were not so sure. They were fin de siècle pessimists and worried that 
Britain was under attack.
10
 In so far as the function of the Cabinet was concerned, its 
primary tasks were to decide on policy and to provide leadership. It was the 
operative centre of public and political power.
11
 Although it was not his habit to hold 
regular Cabinet meetings Salisbury was guided by the principle that all final 
decisions in questions of policy lay with the Cabinet. He accepted that it was the 
duty of the Prime Minister to provide leadership, but by intention as well as 
temperament he avoided the role of prima donna. He treated the Cabinet as a council 
of ambassadors with whatever personal talents, came from various classes, interests 
and regions within the electorate.
12
 Lansdowne’s decision-making ability was 
directly impacted by his relations with his Cabinet colleagues. His upbringing and 
experience in Canada and India had provided him with the skills to operate and 
manage a network. He knew the right people and how to use his network to help him 
get policy through Parliament. Within the Cabinet Lansdowne was part of an inner 
circle of ministers comprising Salisbury, Balfour, Devonshire, Chamberlain, 
Goschen, Hicks Beach and Hamilton. 
In 1895 Salisbury’s reputation at home and abroad was at its height. Aged 
sixty-five years old he was fifteen years older than Lansdowne. The trust he inspired 
was renowned, he exerted his leadership lightly, by wit and a capacity for work 
rather than by persuasion.
13
 He allowed his ministers broad freedom of action, 
frequently letting important matters be decided by a small majority of votes, even 
against his own judgement.
14
 Combining the office of Prime Minister and the tenure 
of the Foreign Office, Salisbury, like Lansdowne, was cautious, reserved, disliked 
insincerity and public praise. Lansdowne knew him both personally and 
professionally and he believed he could not have had a kinder or more indulgent 
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Chief.
15
 In January 1887 while holding the office of Governor-General of Canada, 
Lansdowne, then a Liberal Unionist, was pressed by Salisbury to enter the 
Conservative government. He declined based on both Canadian considerations and a 
concern that he might later find in government that he could not agree with his new 
party and colleagues. He explained to his mother, ‘the offer was in some respects a 
very tempting one. I should like to find myself inside the Cabinet and to re-enter 
political life at home and besides this I am much drawn towards Goschen and should 
have liked to serve with him and to meet his wishes. My first impulse was to say 
‘yes’ and to begin to pack my trunks, but reflection brought hesitation and finally an 
adverse decision.’16 His reluctance was based on both Canadian considerations and a 
belief that ‘I have to bear in mind that I was in complete ignorance of the policy of 
the government on many important points notably as to Ireland and what would have 
been my position if after abruptly “scuttling out” of this country and crossing the 
floor of the House of Lords, probably alone, I had found that I disagreed with my 
heterogeneous colleagues?’17  
Salisbury respected and valued Lansdowne’s ability even though politically 
Lansdowne’s thinking was more Liberal. During Lansdowne’s Viceroyalty, 
Salisbury, who feared that the ideas which the dominant western world exported to 
the East would be turned against it sooner or later,
18questioned Lansdowne’s desire 
for a small measure of liberalisation in Indian government. Lansdowne, he 
complained privately, was still judging the world ‘from the fireside at Brooks’s’, a 
Whig stronghold in clubland.
19
 Salisbury had very little interest in defence policy 
and an ‘inborn horror of warfare’,20 although this did not preclude him from 
remarking to Lansdowne on Kitchener’s request for officers to serve in Egypt, ‘I 
believe officers are more necessary when you have poor niggers to lead than when 
you have good ones.’21 He initially offered the post to Joseph Chamberlain, 
Lansdowne’s Liberal Unionist colleague. Chamberlain declined to take it. Having 
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secured Lansdowne’s acceptance he informed Devonshire, another Liberal Unionist 
he had brought into his Cabinet, that ‘he [Lansdowne] is a devoted follower of yours 
and would work with you very well on Army matters.’22 
Like Lansdowne Salisbury was opposed to military interference in politics. He 
did not believe it was the place of senior officers to comment on government 
policy.
23
 It was his supposition that ‘any attempt to take the opinion of the expert 
above the opinion of the politician must, in view of all the circumstances of our 
constitution, inevitably fail.’24 Salisbury’s attitude resulted as much from the poor 
opinion he held of senior officers as it did from his Parliamentary constitutionalism. 
During the Dongola campaign in the Sudan he was determined to limit the 
interference of the Horse Guards with the soldiers on the spot, informing 
Lansdowne, ‘I shall assent to anything which commends itself to you, but my advice 
will be not to pay too much attention to your military advisers.’25 He had a ‘strong 
belief that seniority goes for a great deal too much in the Army and that machinery 
of promotion by merit is sorely wanted.’26 The only officer to impress him was 
Herbert Kitchener whose cautious ways resonated with his own views. 
Salisbury purposively encouraged weakening military control and increasing 
civilian authority. He recognised that ‘in every foreign country except our own the 
Minister of War is in the hands of a military man and not a partisan. But that is 
because the constitution of this country differs essentially from every other 
constitution. In this country the Government is conducted and the Departments are 
ruled by Parliament.’27 In contrast to the War Office, the Foreign Office which he 
administered enjoyed a degree of autonomy and was relatively inexpensive to 
manage. Until ill health caused him to take a break, the office was his personal 
fiefdom. Relations between his department and Lansdowne’s were, if not close, at 
least not distant and in certain Imperial campaigns the Foreign Office occupied an 
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influential administrative role. When Cromer implored Salisbury to deliver him from 
the hands of the War Office in planning the expedition to reconquer the Sudan, the 
latter needed no convincing, and Lansdowne raised no objection. The successful 
campaign was planned as Cromer later wrote ‘a Foreign Office war.’28  
The deep distrust of government enterprise held by Salisbury was shared by his 
nephew Arthur Balfour. Balfour, who was younger than Lansdowne by three years, 
had known him since they were at Eton, where Balfour had been Lansdowne’s fag.29 
He assumed an aristocratic nonchalance which masked a razor sharp intelligence. As 
one of the founder members of the ‘Souls,’ he was part of the new generation of 
political thinkers. Entering Parliament in 1874 Balfour became First Lord of the 
Treasury and Leader of the House of Commons in 1891, positions he once again 
assumed in 1895. He had a deep interest in defence matters, later establishing the 
Committee of Imperial Defence. He was one of the few politicians to realise the need 
for cooperation between the military and naval services in support of a 
comprehensive policy of defence. As he explained, ‘I am always one of those who 
take special interest in any organization which shall concentrate and coordinate the 
administration of the forces of the Admiralty and the War Office.’ 30 However, he 
recoiled at the idea that a single Minister of Defence should exist over the service 
departments, ‘for the Navy the First Lord and he alone, must lie responsible to this 
House; and similarly, for the Army that the Secretary of State for War, and he alone 
must be responsible to Parliament.’31 Lansdowne’s ability to manage the reform 
discourse and his Cabinet colleagues was strengthened by Balfour’s support. During 
‘the War’, when his reputation was greatly weakened, Balfour joined him at the War 
Office to help to formulate the government’s strategy. He noted at the time ‘I know 
this war has never been out of my thoughts for one moment for the last two months, 
that I sacrificed my whole holiday to assisting to the best of my ability those 
colleagues in whose special department the conduct of the war rests, and that the 
time of anxiety I have been going through is far greater than anything of which I 
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have had experience, even the worst periods of our Irish troubles.’32 In 1929, Balfour 
was interviewed by his biographer Blanche Dugdale about Lansdowne and said ‘I 
shouldn’t call him very clever. He was I don’t quite know how to put it - better than 
competent.’ Dugdale asked: ‘sort of typical “governing classes” kind of ability, do 
you mean?’ Balfour replied, ‘Yes, that’s what I do mean I think. Lansdowne had the 
mentality of the Great Whigs - remember he was descended from a great line of 
them. But one must qualify even that a little, he wasn’t quite an Englishman. His 
mother was French. She was a Flahaut. I always felt a sort of continental quality of 
mind in Lansdowne. I was always very fond of him.’33 
Among other members of the Cabinet who were supportive of Lansdowne was 
Spencer Compton, 8
th
 Duke of Devonshire. Older than Lansdowne by eleven years, 
he was self-contained, unemotional and prone to self-doubt.
34
 He never deviated 
from the Whig view in which he was raised ‘that a vigorous Parliament, active in 
legislative reform, was key to the working of the British constitution, forcing 
government to take account of public demands, but filtering those demands in the 
course of discussion by independently minded men of property and education.’35 
Lansdowne had served under him in Gladstone’s second Liberal government as 
Under-Secretary of State for India in 1880. As Irish landowners both men were 
conscious of the need to defend the security of Irish property and exchanged regular 
correspondence on all Irish matters. Their relationship was further strengthened by 
the marriage of Lansdowne’s eldest daughter Evie to Devonshire’s nephew and heir 
Victor Cavendish in 1892. Like Salisbury, by 1895 Devonshire showed signs of age. 
Lansdowne once complained to Balfour when the Prime Minister had accused him of 
discrediting a Cabinet decision, ‘I was quite unaware of any such decision, but our 
decisions are very often impalpable and perhaps I ought to have been able to 
construct one from materials afforded by Devonshire’s yawns and casual 
interjections round the table.’36 Known as Hartington until 1891, when he succeeded 
to the Dukedom and moved to the House of Lords, Hartington first entered 
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Parliament in 1857 as a Liberal. In 1895 Salisbury offered him the Foreign Office or 
the Lord Presidency of the Council. Devonshire accepted the latter. The attraction of 
this office was enhanced by Salisbury’s proposal that Devonshire would chair a 
defence committee along the lines recommended by his Commission in 1890.
37
 
Devonshire’s formidable prestige and seniority had a profound impact in reinforcing 
the importance of Imperial defence. It was his opinion that ‘we take our Imperial 
position so much for granted that sometimes we almost forget that we have an 
Imperial position at all.’38  
Among Lansdowne’s other Cabinet colleagues with a broad view of Imperial 
considerations was Joseph Chamberlain who was also eleven years older than 
Lansdowne. Clean shaven in a predominantly bearded or moustached age his politics 
also looked fresh. He entered Parliament in 1876 and rose to power through his 
influence with the Liberal grassroots. Fiercely ambitious, with ‘fearless tenacity of 
will,’39 he ‘knows what he wants, but does not appreciate the difficulty of realizing 
his fond hopes.’40 Lansdowne first met the Radical Liberal Unionist in an official 
capacity in Ottawa when Chamberlain stayed with the Lansdownes’ at Rideau Hall 
during Christmas 1887. The visit to Ottawa was a success and converted Lansdowne 
from his view of Chamberlain as ‘mischievous, dangerous and thoroughly 
dishonest,’41 to that ‘he gives me the idea of knowing his own mind and not being 
afraid of speaking but frankly and I would far sooner deal with him, or let him deal 
with me, than Gladstone.’42 That Chamberlain chose the Colonial Office in June 
1895 was a surprise to many. His choice showed he was aware of another ‘fertile 
field of opportunity.’43 Chamberlain had little interest in the mechanics of Imperial 
defence. He thought of armed force as an intimidating tool in negotiation rather than 
for deployment in warfare.
44
 The War Office and the Admiralty he believed were 
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‘mostly occupied in preparations for the defence of our markets and for the 
protection of our commerce.’45 As an Imperialist it was his view that after conquest 
‘must come development.’46 He made no secret of the fact that he did not agree with 
Lansdowne’s attempts to reform the War Office and Army but acknowledged after 
Lansdowne had left the War Office, ‘I do not believe that under the circumstances 
and with such a system and with such military advice and I may add under such 
political conditions the archangel Gabriel himself could have done better.’47  
In administering the War Office Lansdowne was acutely aware of the need to 
keep his own estimates as low as possible. This he achieved by occasionally shifting 
the Empire’s defence burden onto the Colonies and India. Outside India, the British 
maintained garrisons at no fewer than seventy overseas stations by 1898. They 
spanned the globe from Halifax, Nova Scotia where 1,800 men were stationed, to 
Hong Kong, where 1,167 men were based.
48
 The Colonial Office, which 
Chamberlain ran with unrestrained authority and which was responsible for the 
annual estimates of many Colonies, naturally attempted to tailor defence 
expenditures to a Colony’s ability to pay. When the interests of Great Britain and the 
Colonies clashed bitter disputes often developed,
49
 and contentious issues between 
the two departments flared up often requiring the influence of other departments to 
smooth matters over.  
While it was not uncommon for contentious issues to arise between 
Lansdowne and the Colonial Office, it was far more common for them to develop 
between Lansdowne and Sir Michael Hicks Beach, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
and a longstanding political associate of Salisbury’s. Presenting a striking figure 
which his biographer described as ‘almost statuesque severity of feature,’50 Hicks 
Beach was six years older than Lansdowne. To his colleagues in Cabinet this 
severity seemed to be too well reflected in his personality. Nicknamed ‘Black 
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Michael’ for his reputation for temper and thinking angrily,51 he was known to 
indulge in sharp verbal attacks on colleagues. As a strong party Conservative and 
High Churchman he entered Parliament in 1864, becoming Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in 1885. He again received the seals of that office in 1895. Hicks Beach 
had military experience having served as Captain in the Royal North Gloucestershire 
Regiment of Militia.
52
 In the archival record there is little evidence of the nature of 
relations between Lansdowne and Hicks Beach prior to 1895 with the exception of 
Lansdowne’s 1887 comment mentioning his distrust of Hicks Beach. As guardian of 
the nation’s finances Hicks Beach was determined to limit the inexorably rising 
demands for defence expenditure facing the country. It was his view that ‘we were 
not, we never had been, and…we never should be, a great Military Power. Our first 
line of defence, our first line of attack, if attack be necessary was the Navy.’53 He 
believed that ‘compared to armies of foreign countries the British Army was 
expensive and there did seem to him ways and means of increased efficiency and 
economy in their Army expenditure.’54 It was generally assumed in the press that the 
Treasury ‘does not perform to the public’ and ‘rules the War Office.’55  
Although the Treasury had the final word on Army estimates and acted as the 
final arbiter of military policy,
56
 such a simplistic view concealed some of the 
complexity between the two departments. Before submitting the annual estimates to 
the Cabinet the War Office officials discussed them with the Treasury officials in 
person. If they failed to reach agreement the matter would be referred to the Cabinet 
where it was not uncommon for Hicks Beach to be overruled. While Lansdowne was 
more sensitive to questions of cost than many of his colleagues,
57
 when he believed 
that real improvement in War Office and Army organisation was at stake he was 
unyielding, even threatening to resign in 1898. As such Lansdowne’s relations with 
the Chancellor were uneasy, ‘I admire Beach in spite of his atrocious treatment of 
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me.’58 In spite of their differences Lansdowne later described his relations with the 
Treasury to the Royal Commission, saying that ‘I have never heard that the Treasury 
was unfair to the War Office; on the contrary, although their business is to criticise, I 
have never heard that their criticism was unfairly exercised.’59 A similar sentiment 
was endorsed by Frank Marzials, the Accountant-General. Having examined some 
4,000 letters from the Treasury between January 1895 and December 1899 Marzials 
found ‘in a very few instances approval has been withheld and the decision adhered 
to in spite of the further representations made by this office, but in no case of real 
importance that we could discover has sanction been refused to any expenditure 
which the Secretary of State for War held to be urgently required in the interests of 
the public service.’60 
The preferential treatment given to the Admiralty over the War Office by the 
Treasury was satisfactory to George Goschen, the First Lord of the Admiralty. 
Regarded as one of the ‘very cleverest men’61 in the Cabinet, he was older than 
Lansdowne by thirteen years and was admired for his honesty and personal integrity. 
However, by 1895 his laissez-faire Liberalism seemed increasingly obsolete.
62
 He 
first entered Parliament in 1863 as a Liberal MP for the City of London, having 
previously worked in his family’s bank. Leaving the Liberal Party he joined the 
Liberal Unionists, and not long after in December 1886 became the first Liberal 
Unionist to accept a Cabinet post from Salisbury. Lansdowne had known him 
professionally since he was Under-Secretary of State for War in 1872 and their 
relations were amicable. In 1887 he strongly encouraged Lansdowne to join him in 
Salisbury’s second ministry. Goschen managed the Admiralty on ‘what were called 
business principles’ or by personal responsibility, promotion by merit and rigid 
control of costs.
63
 In 1896 the Admiralty accepted the responsibility of defending all 
overseas territory from seaborne invasion as part of the doctrine of naval 
supremacy.
64
 For the British Empire to prosper not only had it to be well organised 
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but it also had to exploit its strengths. In attempting to be strong everywhere, it was 
in danger of collapsing under the weight of its defences.
65
 The Royal Navy did not 
‘defend’ the Empire; it applied pressure wherever a potential enemy was most 
exposed.
66
 
Applying pressure against the potential threat from Russia was one of the tasks 
for the India Office and George Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India. Hamilton 
who was ten months younger than Lansdowne had a strong sense of duty and loyalty 
to the Conservatives but limited political skills. He entered Parliament in 1868 and 
as a strong supporter of Salisbury rose rapidly. He was Lansdowne’s brother-in-law, 
his sister Maud having married Lansdowne in November 1869. Initially Lansdowne 
found the strong party Conservatism of Hamilton overbearing, However, they both 
corresponded with each other on cordial terms fairly regularly throughout their 
political careers. Hamilton had little desire for the War Office. He rejected 
Salisbury’s offer of the War Office in 1887 believing that an ex-regular subaltern 
would be far too junior to overrule the formidable Duke of Cambridge on Army 
reform.
67
 He also believed it was ‘the most difficult and invidious post in the 
Cabinet.’68 Hamilton was one of the few members of the Cabinet with military 
experience having joined the Rifle Brigade in 1864 and served for four years abroad, 
partly with Wolseley in Canada. Knowledge of military men and their thinking did 
little to alter his view that if military authorities were given carte blanche the British 
Army would be worse off.
69
 Hamilton looked upon Lansdowne as the best War 
Minister Britain had had since Cardwell.
70
  
As Secretary of State for India, Hamilton was in constant communication with 
the War Office. In theory India offered Britain an almost limitless supply of soldiers 
that it could employ in Asia. In practice, however, Britain’s ability to mobilise 
India’s military resources was constrained by several factors. The first was that the 
British government believed that the costs of military occupation should fall upon 
                                                          
65
 A.D. Lambert, ‘The Royal Navy and the Defence of Empire, 1856-1918’ in G. Kennedy, Imperial 
Defence: The Old World Order 1856-1956 (Abingdon, 2008), p.120. 
66
 Ibid, p.124. 
67
 J. Ramsden, Lord G. Hamilton, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography online (Oxford 2004), 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/33667?docPos=7 
68
 G. Hamilton, Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections, 1886-1906 (2 Vols., London, 1922) 
Vol.1. p.276. 
69
 Hamilton, ‘Lord G. Hamilton on India’, The Times, 27 January 1898. 
70
 Hamilton, ‘Lord G. Hamilton in Marylebone’, The Times, 29 September 1900. 
71 
 
the Indian taxpayer, not his British counterpart.
71
 The second was that after 1858 the 
government established a principle that they would always need to have enough 
British troops on hand to suppress another mutiny.
72
 Consequently about a third of 
the British Army was normally stationed in India. Together with the Indian Army 
these troops existed to perform two functions: to assist civil power internally when 
called upon and to constitute a field Army that could repulse any threats from either 
Russia, the Afghans or tribesmen on the North West Frontier.
73
 The military 
department of the Government of India exercised general control over the ordnance, 
commissariat and other supply departments of the Army. According to Lansdowne: 
The control of the Indian Army rests with the Governor-General in 
Council. One of his colleagues [the Military Member of the Viceroy’s 
Council] who is virtually his Secretary of State for War, is responsible 
for the administrative work of the Army, “representing and issuing the 
orders of the Government of India.” The command of the Army and the 
executive functions are intrusted to the Commander-in-Chief, who 
has…the privilege of attending the meetings of the Council as an 
extraordinary member…These two high officials are both subordinate to 
the Viceroy in Council whose duty it is to co-ordinate their work and 
hold the balance between them.
74
  
Although the organisation and administration of the Army in India differed 
greatly from the British Army it can be speculated that Lansdowne’s reorganisation 
of the War Office in 1895 was made with his experience of India in mind. That the 
two armies differed did not lessen the need for both the War Office and the India 
Office to collaborate in matters of the selection of officers for higher appointments, 
in maintaining sufficient troops to safeguard the country against internal and external 
threats, and in matters relating to the change of pay of the British soldier in India. 
These were the ministers and their departments which Lansdowne, during his 
term of office, had frequent interactions with. Among the principal concerns 
Salisbury faced when forming his Cabinet in June 1895 was that the Parliamentary 
authority of the government to spend money was due to expire on 10 July and an 
Army vote had to be taken immediately. Without a ministry this was not possible. 
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The second was a fear that before they left office the Liberals might appoint Redvers 
Buller as Commander-in-Chief to succeed the Duke of Cambridge: an appointment 
Salisbury was against. Owing to these military considerations Salisbury made haste 
to get into office. Having held no previous Cabinet post Lansdowne had to be sworn 
in as Privy Councillor before he could assume the seals of office from Queen 
Victoria. Although this was feared as being likely to delay Salisbury, no delay was 
caused and Lansdowne was sworn in and received the seals of office on the same 
day (1
st
 July). 
His appointment to the War Office was quietly well received. Queen Victoria 
who was twenty-six years older than Lansdowne and had known him all his life 
welcomed the appointment. There is no evidence to suggest she had pressed for his 
appointment in the same way that she had done for his appointment to the 
Viceroyalty of India in 1889.
75
 Her interest in the Army was largely guided by her 
wish to preserve its special connection with the Crown.
76
 In part due to the legacy of 
Prince Albert,
77
 she favoured the pre-Cardwellian Army which her former husband 
had been connected with. However, by 1895 her ability to initiate or implement 
change in military matters was limited and she was obliged constitutionally to accept 
the advice of the Secretary of State and the Prime Minister, but she could exercise 
influence and occasionally delay a governmental proposal: ‘The Queen is rather 
inclined to think that the Commander-in-Chief is the sovereign’s Commander-in-
Chief and that the Army is not the property of Parliament, but of course we 
know…’78 As she listened to soldiers rather than to ministers Lord Esher noted, ‘the 
task of the Secretary of State for War is never easy.’79 She did, however, attempt to 
advance the career of her favourite son, Arthur, Duke of Connaught. Connaught, 
who was five years younger than Lansdowne, was a keen soldier, but his rapid 
promotion between entering the Army in 1867 and becoming Commanding Officer 
at Aldershot in 1895 caused hostile comment, and required Lansdowne’s utmost 
diplomacy to conciliate the Royals.
 
Lansdowne had demonstrated similar tact in 
1890 during his Viceroyalty when confronted with the appointment of a new 
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Commander-in-Chief in India. At that time the Queen pressed for her son’s 
appointment. Salisbury was determined the Duke of Connaught would not, at least 
for some years, become Commander-in-Chief in India and Lansdowne noted he ‘is 
not in the running. He knows a good deal about the Army, is popular, would not 
quarrel and would probably do what Brackenbury told him. But if there was a row 
we should want someone else to lead.’80 Although the Queen was unable to console 
herself that her son had not acquired a position at the War Office, she deferred to her 
Minister’s advice.81 
If Lansdowne was diplomatic in handling the demands of the Royals, he was 
also scrupulous in his relations with his Cabinet. Although he was naturally cautious 
he was used to making important decisions and had an instinctive awareness when to 
apply pressure. On all issues of military policy even relatively minor ones he 
consulted his colleagues before presenting his schemes. While he was popular and 
supported as a member of the Cabinet not all of his policies were met favourably. 
Given the Cabinet’s divided views on the justification of amending military policy 
and defence matters, Lansdowne’s ability to manage the reform discourse and 
persuade his colleagues of the need for a reorganisation of the War Office and Army 
was dependent on his ability to use public opinion. As a skilled negotiator 
Lansdowne often used public opinion as a bargaining lever with his Cabient 
colleagues. The most notable occasion he adopted this approach was during the 
reform agitation in 1897 and the prewar crises in 1899. During the 1897 agitation, 
provoked by a concern as to the poor state of the Army, that Lansdowne succeeded 
in convincing his colleagues to accept his proposals was achieved by informing them 
that ‘public opinion is apparently unanimous in demanding a large augmentation of 
the Force.’82 
To Lansdowne public opinion was another expression ‘for the common sense 
of the country,’83 and in framing his measures he was motivated by the need to 
balance what ‘he might call military considerations and the interests of the public.’84 
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Although events such as the Franco-Russian alliance of 1894 prompted a renewed 
interest in the problems of Imperial defence and military matters there was a 
collective complacency in the invincibility of the British Army. Successful 
campaigns in Ashanti, Crete, Egypt and the Sudan encouraged this attitude. In their 
speeches in and out of Parliament the Cabinet extolled the virtues of the Navy and 
the Army. Such complacency did not go unnoticed by the press and Lansdowne, who 
rarely spoke with official optimism and was one of the few ministers to admit to 
weaknesses in both services, was also branded as ‘a statesman of a complacent 
type.’85 It is understandable from a review of his speeches how such opinion got 
abroad. His remarks that the British Army’s ‘recent performance [in the Sudan] 
shows…that, whatever its imperfections, it contains soldiers who are able to uphold 
its great traditions under the most trying circumstances’, and ‘while we have in the 
British Army such leaders as Sir William Lockhart and Sir Herbert Kitchener we 
need never despair,’ certainly inflated the perception of Britain’s invincible Army.86  
With little to threaten Britain from foreign and domestic affairs a natural 
antipathy of politicians towards reform developed which provoked the antagonism of 
some and secured the votes of none.
87
 In such circumstances politicians appeared to 
have little appetite to debate defence and military matters and the reform discourse 
failed to capture the public imagination. In the House of Commons military debates 
were often held at the ‘extreme end of the session and in a jaded House’88 or to 
‘empty benches.’89 Lansdowne attributed the neglect of the Army in Parliament as ‘I 
cannot help believing, due mainly to the comparative indifference of the public in the 
affairs of the Army and to the absence of that interest which is taken in the sister 
service.’90 
That Parliament neglected the Army was not just complacency concerning 
Britain’s position in the world and the lack of public interest in military matters but 
also because the Liberal opposition were not interested in Army reform and igniting 
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debate. The whole trend of the Liberal Party was to limit Britain’s military 
responsibility as far as possible.
91
 It was their view that improving the efficiency of 
the Army would undermine the productive capacity of Britain and spark off a riotous 
spirit within the population.
92
 It was Gladstone’s belief that resistance to the 
militarist jingoes was the natural attitude of his party. Lansdowne’s predecessor, 
Campbell-Bannerman, shared this sentiment - he had a low opinion of military 
experts and harboured fears of the military: ‘You want to get the best professional 
advice but you must have the civilian control on the neck of it.’93 Just as he had a 
poor opinion of the military he also thought little of Lansdowne. He believed he was 
‘weak and pleasant, but exceedingly secretive and anxious to get the credit for 
everything.’94 Although he harboured these sentiments, he was rarely a threat to 
Lansdowne’s ability to operate at the War Office.  Without an alternative policy the 
opposition party largely resorted to destructive criticism and Lansdowne with his 
command of the subject and polite tone of language in the House of Lords and 
Brodrick with his confident manner in the House of Commons were easily able to 
deflect such criticism.
95
 At the start of Lansdowne’s term of office the opposition 
raised few objections to his reorganisation of the War Office which was in many 
respects a continuation of Campbell-Bannerman’s own scheme.96 However, during 
the 1896 session the opposition in the House of Commons did use dilatory tactics to 
obstruct three military bills.
97
 While Asquith remarked that the session was 
distinguished by the ‘steady discipline and sagacious strategy’ of the opposition, 98 
Lansdowne noted it was ‘loquacious.’99 It is of interest that, having obstructed the 
military policy of the new government, in subsequent years they allowed most 
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measures to pass with barely a fight; and even after the outbreak of ‘the War’ the 
opposition in Parliament was, with few exceptions, more critical of the efficiency of 
the Army and the dissemination of information than with the origins of the conflict 
and the approach taken by the government.
100
 One of their principal complaints was 
that the ‘House of Commons and the public…have never been so badly 
informed…and what we complain of is want of information.’101   
The fact that the opposition party’s own position on military matters in the 
House of Commons was so undefined led one observer to the remark that Campbell-
Bannerman’s and Brodrick’s speeches were ‘suspiciously in accord.’102 It can be 
speculated that Campbell-Bannerman’s willingness to accept Unionist military 
policy was a result of his personal uninterest in military matters.  A further factor in 
undermining the opposition’s ability to challenge Lansdowne’s position was their 
lack of unity on military and defence matters. As Sir Edward Grey observed during 
‘the War’, ‘there is one thing, and one thing only, in this situation on which I look 
with a thoroughly light heart and that is the differences of opinion which may exist 
among the opposition.’103 But for all their differences they did agree there had been 
‘great mismanagement on the part of the government.’104  
More significant than the opposition’s disunity and lack of alternatives in 
impacting on Lansdowne’s ability to reconcile Liberal opposition to his schemes of 
War Office and Army reform was that he preserved the basic structure of the 
Cardwell system which had remained overwhelmingly popular with the Liberals. As 
Campbell-Bannerman noted in 1900, ‘looking back as very few of us in this House 
now can for thirty years to the days when Lord Cardwell carried his great measure 
through the House, it is a perfect marvel to us how much he was able to do in the 
course of a very few years against the very strongest opposition, and how 
satisfactory it is to find that although of course mistakes were made and 
                                                          
100
 Spiers, The Army and Society, p.257. 
101
 Campbell-Bannerman, ‘Commons Debate’, ‘Army (Supplementary) Estimates, 1900-1901’, 27 
July 1900, Hansard 4
th
 Series, Vol.86, c.1556. 
102
 F.C. Rasch, ‘Inefficient Army’, The Saturday Review, 20 November 1897. 
103
 Grey, ‘Commons Debate’, ‘Address in answer to Her Majesty’s Most Gracious Speech’, 1 
February 1900, Hansard 4
th
 Series, Vol.75, c.374. 
104
 Ibid., c.374. 
77 
 
exaggerations were committed no doubt, still in the main it was a beneficial agent in 
maintaining the security and therefore the prosperity of the Empire.’105  
While the tone of the opposition in the House of Commons was critical and 
blunt, that in the House of Lords was similarly critical but less hostile. Lord 
Rosebery, the Leader of the opposition in that House, ‘would gladly see the War 
Office non-political.’106 Such an aspiration resonated with Lansdowne who it was 
claimed ‘administered the Army on no party lines.’107 The truth to this claim can be 
supportted from an interrogation of Lansdowne’s speeches in the House of Lords, 
many of which alluded to his frustration that the opposition did not offer more 
constructive support. Such cases are noticeably evident in Lansdowne’s replies to 
criticism from Rosebery, who was an old friend from Eton and Oxford.  It was his 
opinion that in light of Rosebery’s ‘perpetual attempts to belittle and ridicule 
everything which is done by Her Majesty’s Government we have the right to ask that 
he should at least give us some indication as to the defects of what we ourselves 
propose and some indication of the measures which if he were called to power he 
would adopt.’108 It can be speculated that Lansdowne purposively used such 
language, aware that his colleague would be silenced, but the tone of frustration is 
clearly evident. However such language was interpreted, as the opposition had no 
alternative policy on Army reform, Lansdowne’s position was unchallenged. 
Those in Parliament that could offer alternative policies but were often 
reluctant to do so were the service parliamentarians. With the aim of challenging 
civilian power and advancing their family interests these former officers, many 
whom were acquainted with the senior officers in the War Office, brought diverse 
military experience into Parliament.
109
 In 1870 there were approximately one 
hundred and eleven peers and one hundred and two MPs with military experience. In 
1898 there were approximately one hundred and eighty-two peers and sixty-five 
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MPs with such experience.
110
 In speeches and written word their political 
contribution during the late 1890s was as diverse and voluminous as any of the other 
political groups in Parliament.
111
 Overwhelmingly Unionist in their political 
allegiance, they participated in the fall of the Liberal government in June 1895 and 
returned to the House of Commons confident that their opinion was of such weight 
and importance that it could not be disregarded by any government.
112
 Their 
influence was certainly apparent to Lansdowne and the tactical appointments of 
Brodrick and Wyndham were made largely in consideration of these members. In 
debating the defence policy of the government both men proved themselves to be 
successful. That Campbell-Bannerman believed, ‘[Wyndham] will be clay in the 
hands of those formidable potters, the service members,’113 was never realised. 
Whilst to dismiss the service parliamentarians would have been irresponsible, their 
actual impact on the reform discourse was fairly limited. Although some of them 
chose to question every military policy the government introduced, many of their 
number accepted that under the British system of government whereby the Secretary 
of State had to consider the ‘real necessities of the Empire’ and the ‘exigencies of the 
Parliamentary situation’, no Minister was able to provide them ‘a wholly sound and 
true scheme.’114  
Unable to provide a coordinated lead in the House of Commons, one of the 
service parliamentarians’ most outspoken members, Cecil Norton, complained on 
one occasion after a military blunder that the fault was ‘not at all either with the War 
Office or with those who direct the military portion of our Army; the fault is with the 
House of Commons in not bringing to the knowledge of the country the position in 
which we stand.’115  Even when they addressed Lansdowne through the press and 
published a letter in The Times in January 1898 on conditions in the Army this 
impact was minimal. The incident merely allowed Lansdowne an opportunity to 
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reply publicly that their arguments had been ‘constantly before him.’116 However, 
after the outbreak of war in South Africa, subjects that had previously been treated as 
part of an academic discussion took on a practical aspect, and the service 
parliamentarians in the House of Commons revealed a strong reluctance to accept 
change, forcing the government to make concessions and undermining civilian 
supremacy. This was most notable during the passage of the Volunteers Bill during 
1900.
117
  
In the House of Lords the service parliamentarians were similarly ineffectual in 
motivating the reform discourse. Wemyss’ attempts to bring forward the Militia 
ballot and Raglan’s and Blythswood’s objections to the manner in which the Militia 
forces were treated by the War Office did not force the government to amend their 
policy but did elicit from Lansdowne the view that his critics were ‘apt to perform 
one part of their task with the utmost vigour; they look through the strongest 
magnifying glass they can find at our faults and imperfections, but they consistently 
turn a blind eye to anything that is good.’118 With their expertise in defence and 
military matters restricted very often to their individual knowledge of regimental life, 
as a group they lacked cohesion and leadership. As such they were unable to 
undermine Lansdowne’s position or challenge civilian authority. 
While attempting to meet the aspirations of the service parliamentarians 
Lansdowne also had to reckon with the defence intellectuals and their reforming 
ideas. In shaping public discussion, these civilians, who included the Members of 
Parliament Charles Dilke and Hugh O. Arnold-Forster and the military historian and 
journalist Henry Spenser Wilkinson, were more prominent than the service 
parliamentarians. It was their belief that Imperial defence transcended party politics 
and that defence questions should be coordinated under one Minister with an officer 
from each service acting as professional advisers. They denounced the effects of 
short-service and deferred pay and condemned the Army reserve. Claiming that the 
break-down of the Army was due to the Cardwell system, they advocated its 
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removal.
119
 Acquiring military backing for their ideas from Roberts and his ‘Indians’ 
and relying on the assistance of the service parliamentarians for additional support in 
Parliament, they endeavoured to contest civilian supremacy. 
Dilke was two years older than Lansdowne and as a Radical was a close friend 
of his brother, Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice. As a student of military history he had a 
natural interest in the British Empire and defence issues. He first began discussing 
the need for Army reform in 1885 and by 1887 he had begun to establish himself as 
a leading advocate of the reform discourse.
120
 In 1888 he developed his ideas further 
with the publication of The British Army in which he outlined a scheme for a 
professional Army for India and for a citizen Army at home in which the bulk of the 
infantry would be Volunteers, while the special arms and the infantry of two Army 
Corps, destined to be an expeditionary force, would be short-service soldiers.
121
 
Although Lansdowne identified Dilke, with his colleague Roberts, as ‘high military 
authorities’122 and it was acknowledged that there was probably no other non-
military MP ‘who had given so much of his time or attention to the subject of Army 
organization’,123 his ideas found little support in Parliament. This was mainly 
because it was contended that his information was based on the Army in India and 
was irrelevant to the rest of the Army.
124
 Moreover he suffered from the unpleasant 
scandal that his divorce created and from dislike within the Army of his other 
recommendations on naval and military matters.
125
 In the Cabinet it was Balfour’s 
view ‘there are no greater enemies to Army reform in my judgement, than those 
extreme Army reformers like [Dilke] who sneer at every change that is made, and 
are content with nothing but advocating revolutionary schemes by which the whole 
existing Army system would be upset.’126 His regular interjections in military 
debates were often fanciful, particularly ‘when he invariably begins his speeches 
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with complaints of the expense we incur and ends by proposing that we should have 
a much larger body of Regular forces.’ 127 
In 1891 Dilke, who had been strongly influenced by Wilkinson’s views on the 
Navy and imperial defence, suggested that they should write a popular book on the 
subject. Wilkinson, who was younger than Lansdowne by eight years, had been 
contributing articles on military reforms to The Manchester Guardian and Morning 
Post since 1881. He argued that the Army suffered because civilians possessed 
power without knowledge and not until the senior officers had real authority could 
they be accountable for the condition of Britain’s defence.128 By the mid-1890s he 
knew and was known by virtually everyone of influence. He corresponded with 
soldiers and politicians including Roberts, Haldane, Fisher, Kitchener, Hamilton and 
Lansdowne. His campaign to give the nation a military education, particularly his 
1890 The Brain of the Army was instrumental in the creation of the British General 
Staff.
129
 In 1894 he was one of the founders of the Navy League. Despite his 
pervasive influence it was not until 1904 that he was given an official voice when 
appointed a member of the Norfolk Commission.  
The third defence Intellectual Hugh O. Arnold-Forster was junior to 
Lansdowne by ten years and a fierce critic of his.
130
 He was ‘a critic who was 
determined to see the worst of everything that had been done by anybody who had 
anything to do with the administration of the Army.’131 Entering Parliament in 1892 
as a Liberal Unionist and one of Joseph Chamberlain’s followers, he quickly 
established a reputation for himself as an advocate of imperial defence, inter-service 
collaboration and Army reform. Committed to the doctrine of the primacy of the 
Navy and defence by the command of the sea, he worked in and out of Parliament to 
remove the barriers between political and military affairs. 
Arriving at a consensus between these defence intellectuals, Lord Roberts and 
his ‘Indians’ and the service parliamentarians was a difficult challenge. However, on 
12 February 1894, a letter on imperial defence and reform was drafted by Wilkinson 
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and signed by some of his colleagues.
132
 It was addressed to Gladstone, Salisbury, 
Balfour, Chamberlain and Hartington. The letter succeeded in stirring 
controversy,
133
 but failed to make any great impression on the Army because it 
threatened to leave the War Office at the mercy of the Blue Water School. This 
school believed that invasion would never be attempted until the enemy had 
established control of the sea. Their view that the Navy was the first line of national 
defence was unacceptable to most soldiers and senior officers. The military refused 
to believe the opinion of Sir John Colomb, the leading advocate of the school, that 
an Army of even 10,000,000 men would be useless to Great Britain unless she could 
also hold undisputed command of the sea.
 134
  
Despite their determined efforts to invigorate the reform discourse the defence 
Intellectuals’ ideas found little support until the passage of events in 1897 shifted in 
favour of War Office and Army reform. In a series of letters to The Times Arnold-
Forster set out a case against the War Office, arguing that the Army system had 
broken down. In defending the department Haliburton rejected Arnold-Forster’s 
criticism of Cardwell’s system but accepted there was a need for minor changes in 
the system. Some sections of the press dismissed Arnold-Forster’s colleagues as 
‘either greater amateurs than himself who desire to have a share in the valuable 
advertisement which The Times is so kindly according his name, or they are military 
men, without knowledge or experience of Army organisation and administration.’135 
The press exposure raised the tone of the discourse and meant that it was no longer 
possible to ignore that military reform was now ‘open to everyone to take an interest 
in.’136 That the defence intellectuals and the reform discourse achieved a measure of 
success in late 1897 did little to undermine civilian supremacy. Lansdowne, as 
mentioned, used the agitation to push through Cabinet his Army proposals, measures 
which limited the scope of the discourse but were enough to satisfy his critics and 
deflect their attempts to abolish the Cardwell system.  
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That the press and in particular The Times were willing to give valuable 
promotion to the reformers was not only that it shared some of their opinions but 
because it wanted to impose its own doctrinaire views on the War Office and Army 
reform debate. Among The Times’ many complaints of Lansdowne’s management of 
the War Office it opposed his Order-in-Council in 1895, condemned the 
continuation of linked battalions in the Army and red tapeism at the War Office, 
never ceased to inculcate the lesson that field troops organised and trained for war 
constituted the most important military requirement of the Empire and during ‘the 
War’ questioned whether Lansdowne’s ‘exceedingly crude yet peculiarly 
complicated scheme…will or will not stand in the way of future reforms.’ 137 Its 
constant attacks on Lansdowne prompted Campbell-Bannerman to ask, ‘what has 
happened to The Times? It used to be so reasonable and willing to support the 
present system in the main.’138 Maintaining that their view was constructive, The 
Times acknowledged that, unlike most of his predecessors, Lansdowne ‘has shown 
his willingness to accept reasoned criticism from the outside and to act upon it.’139 
That Lansdowne was willing to accept and act on comments from the press was not 
only because he listened to his advisors within  the War Office, but because he took 
note of suggestions from a wide range of sources outside it. This was particularly 
notable during his reorganisation of the War Office during 1895 which will be 
discussed in the next chapter, when he remarked ‘We have also been assisted by the 
abundant, I would say the copious, flood of advice and admonition placed at our 
disposal. There are two great schools of Army reformers, and they have told us what 
we ought to do and what we ought not to do. We are not of those who say “a plague 
on both your houses”. No such petulant expressions cross our lips. We are ready to 
take advantage, I think, of any useful suggestion, no matter from what quarter it may 
proceed.’140 Amongst the archival record up until 1899 there is evidence of 
Lansdowne communicating on military matters outside the War Office with both 
civilians and soldiers alike, including among others Haldane, Roberts, Methuen and 
Brackenbury. 
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While the influence of the press on public opinion cannot be ascertained with 
any degree of precision, its effects on parties and the ruling elite were always 
important. At the end of the nineteenth century newspapers were intimately bound to 
political organisations and individuals within them. They served those interests often 
to the detriment of their own commercial viability. Newspapers proudly affixed to 
themselves the labels Tory, Liberal or Irish Nationalist, and as new lights and party 
constellations changed newspapers modified their loyalties accordingly. Hungry for 
‘information’, a literate working class transformed the press. Politics neither sold 
newspapers nor followed them.
141
   
In tandem with these changes there emerged a new type of military 
correspondent attuned to the values and principles of particular officers they admired 
and determined to convert their readers to imperialism.
142
 Newspaper adulation for 
these officers and their military campaigns created national heroes and fed the 
complacency in the invincibility of Britain’s voluntary Army, making Lansdowne’s 
task more challenging. Although it was the habit of many newspapers including The 
Times, to promote radical reform,
143
 in giving wholesale condemnation to the entire 
system the press overlooked, that had it been ‘judiciously managed it ought certainly 
to have succeeded.’144 Although the lack of public interest in military matters limited 
the potential of the press to push the reform discourse and the question of civilian 
supremacy further, Lansdowne could not ignore them. That he was willing to listen 
to and occasionally act on their reasoned recommendations was indicative of his 
broad-minded approach to operating at the War Office. It was the view of one 
section of the press of Lansdowne that ‘outside criticism…has its good effects.’145 
Lansdowne was not exaggerating when he noted that the War Office ‘is the 
best criticized department in the public service; our misfortune is that the criticism is 
as a rule, purely destructive.’146 Although Lansdowne and the War Office were the 
focus of constant attacks between 1895 and 1900, attempts outside the War Office to 
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reduce civilian supremacy and influence the reform discourse were largely 
unsuccessful. By listening to and using the diverse aspirations held by Liberal 
opposition, the service parliamentarians, the defence intellectuals and the press and 
by maintaining his allegiance to the Cabinet, Lansdowne pushed through his Army 
proposals while securing the system his critics wished to abolish. That the Cabinet 
was unwilling to weaken civilian authority over the military was a combination of 
tradition, economics and a collective complacency in the invincibility of the Army. 
The next chapter will aim to demonstrate how Lansdowne’s ability to manage the 
reform discourse and the state of civil-military relations during his term of office 
were cast by his reorganisation of the War Office in 1895. 
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Chapter Three - The 1895 Reorganisation 
The War Office reorganisation of 1895 has been described as a compromise 
measure, containing the seeds of disarray,
1
 and causing the mistakes of ‘the War’.2 
Such a view overlooks the sad truth, as Lansdowne noted, that the system itself was 
not at fault and that the failures during ‘the War’ were ‘due if anything to the fact 
that the system was not carried out as faithfully as it might have been.’3 Wolseley in 
his zeal to strengthen the Army was too apt to forget the limitations which 
Parliamentary institutions then placed upon civilians and soldiers alike and he ‘failed 
correctly to apprehend the bearing of the system.’4 What neither Lansdowne nor the 
Cabinet could have anticipated in November 1895 was that Wolseley was not 
sufficiently capable to cope with the demands which changing diplomacy was asking 
of him. By subsequently attempting to contravene the system he encouraged 
disharmony and distrust, and further divided the senior officers and civilians at the 
War Office, irrevocably damaging his own relations with Lansdowne and the 
Cabinet. With the exception of W.S. Hamer’s 1970 examination and accounts from 
biographical studies there is very little in the literature on Lansdowne’s 1895 
reorganisation.
5
 While Hamer examines the differences between the civilians and 
military he shows little curiosity about the individuals caught up in the 
reorganisation. It is the aim of this chapter to return the human element to 
Lansdowne’s reorganisation of 1895. 
It was Lansdowne’s belief that reforming the War Office was a matter to be 
attacked first before the problem of Army organisation could be profitably 
approached,
6
 and within weeks of his appointment to the War Office he prepared a 
scheme for its reorganisation. Prior to appointing Wolseley, Lansdowne telegraphed 
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him, ‘you must clearly understand that changes in the position of the Commander-in-
Chief are inevitable. The precise extent is not yet decided, but I think they will be on 
the lines indicated by the late Secretary of State in his House of Commons 
statement.’7  
In this statement as explained in Chapter One, Campbell-Bannerman initated 
recommendations for a reorganisation of the War Office, some of which were based 
on those suggested by the Hartington Commission. The most important of these 
aimed to redress civilian concern that too much power was concentrated in the office 
of Commander-in-Chief. It was Lansdowne’s belief that Wolseley should be given 
‘full opportunity of discussing these with me, but it is necessary for me to have a free 
hand, and I could not agree to any conditions which might afterwards embarrass the 
government in carrying out the desired reform.’8 While Wolseley accepted 
Lansdowne’s offer, recognising that some changes would be inevitable,9 it was soon 
apparent that he did not agree with Lansdowne’s scheme, particularly regarding the 
modification to the role of his own office and the question of the discipline of the 
Army. Prior to Lansdowne’s formal announcement of the new arrangements 
Wolseley expressed his opinion that ‘whether in the field or on a peace 
establishment, his [the Commander-in-Chief’s] first duty…is that the Army under 
his command should always be a thoroughly efficient fighting machine. This is a 
responsibility he cannot divide or share with an Adjutant-General or anyone else…It 
is the most important of his functions.’10 Lansdowne’s proposal, he argued, ‘would 
leave the Army in doubt as to whom it should regard as primarily responsible to the 
Secretary of State for its fighting efficiency.’11 It was his opinion that the duties of 
the Commander-in-Chief as provided for by Stanhope’s Order-in-Council of 1888 
were superior. As he explained in March 1901, under those terms: 
The Commander-in-Chief - the military specialist - was charged with the 
discipline, education, military training, and fighting efficiency of all 
ranks of the military forces that are annually voted by Parliament. In 
other words, the Commander-in-Chief was held responsible by the 
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Secretary of State for War that those military forces were always 
thoroughly efficient, and, supposing the stores, guns, etc., voted were 
sufficient, that the Army was always ready for rapid mobilisation. This, I 
contend, was a practical, well working system…the military efficiency of 
the Army was secured by being placed under one man, the soldier-
expert, the Commander-in-Chief. He was, in effect, as I have said, 
directly responsible to the War Minister for the discipline, military 
education, training, and fighting efficiency of all ranks.
12
 
Wolseley’s dislike of the scheme was shared by some of Lansdowne’s closest 
colleagues at the War Office. Among the alternative suggestions made for 
reorganising the department, Brackenbury argued that the War Office’s ‘great defect 
was the want of a co-ordinating department’ - in foreign armies, that of the Chief of 
Staff. If they were to retain the Commander-in-Chief, there should be a Chief of 
Staff, free from executive duties, under him. Campbell-Bannerman’s plan would fail 
because it provided only for routine work, not for a department of ‘thought.’13 He 
advised Lansdowne, ‘until you have such a ‘brain of the Army’ you can never have 
really systematic control.’14 Lansdowne’s private secretary, Charles Welby, also 
questioned the new scheme. He thought the real stumbling block with the proposal 
was the Adjutant-General. ‘Surely Lord Wolseley’s contention is sound. The 
Commander-in-Chief must and ought to be responsible for the efficiency at least of 
the personnel of the Army and how can he be if the essential duties of training, and 
discipline and perhaps above all, recruiting are controlled by or their systems liable 
to be radically modified by an independent great officer?’15 
In light of his support for Campbell-Bannerman’s scheme Lansdowne was 
unwilling to accommodate these suggestions. On 19
 
August, Lansdowne made his 
first parliamentary statement as Secretary of State. In a speech under five minutes in 
duration he announced changes in the administration of the War Office, the 
retirement of the Duke of Cambridge the following November after thirty-nine years 
of service and the appointment of Wolseley as Commander-in-Chief for a term of 
five years.
16
 The following week he brought to public attention the changes 
envisaged in his reorganisation of the War Office with a ‘brief and imperfect 
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sketch.’17 He announced that there was ‘no material difference of opinion’18 between 
his own and Campbell-Bannerman’s scheme, announced the previous June, and that 
he intended to proceed on the main principles of the Hartington Commission. 
Speaking in the House of Commons a week after Lansdowne, Goschen remarked 
that the changes they were undertaking were ‘the crowning work of what has been 
done already, rather than anything entirely novel.’19 He also believed that ‘for my 
part, I may say that I am desirous that the responsibility of the First Lord of the 
Admiralty and of the Secretary of State for War should be absolutely retained and 
kept unimpaired.’20 
In outlining his scheme for the reorganisation of the War Office scheme 
Lansdowne both deflected criticism from the opposition Liberal party, and validated 
his Cabinet colleague’s Report [Hartington/Devonshire] as a ‘sufficient and 
authoritative exposition’ of the defects in the system of military administration. 
These defects fell under three heads: ‘That there was an excessive centralization of 
responsibility in the Commander-in-Chief’,21 ‘that in the distribution of work 
amongst the heads of the great military departments no sufficient provision had been 
made for the consideration of the plans for the military defence of the Empire as a 
whole, or for the examination of larger questions of military policy’; and ‘that what 
the commissioners spoke of as the consultative element was not sufficiently 
represented at the War Office.’22  
Although the Hartington Commission had recommended the creation of a 
central organising department under a Chief of the Staff and the abolition of the 
Commander-in-Chief’s office, Lansdowne, like Campbell-Bannerman before him, 
was opposed to taking such action. He believed that public opinion would not 
support the abolition of the post of Commander-in-Chief 
23
 which was so closely 
associated with the Crown and that a Chief of the Staff ‘entirely dissociated from 
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executive work, would be out of touch with the Army and would, in all probability, 
not secure its confidence.’24 Moreover such an officer would ‘inevitably become the 
real Commander-in-Chief.’25 By appointing a Chief of the Staff, Lansdowne feared 
he would establish a system where the expert advice of the heads of the departments 
to the Secretary of State would be ‘liable to be set aside on the advice of such an 
officer.’26 Essentially such a situation would have had echoes of Stanhope’s 1888 
Order-in-Council whereby the expert advice of the heads of department had to 
percolate to the Secretary of State through firstly the Adjutant-General and then 
Commander-in-Chief which meant that the ‘responsible adviser was not the expert 
for the Secretary of State that person being the Commander-in-Chief.’27 
Under Lansdowne’s scheme the department of the Commander-in-Chief would 
substitute for a General Staff.
28
 He would hold his office under the usual rules 
affecting Staff appointments, would exercise general command over the British 
Army at home and abroad, issue Army Orders, and hold periodical inspections of the 
troops. He would be responsible for commissions, promotions, appointments, 
honours and rewards, for the departments of military information and mobilisation 
and for the general distribution of the Army. He would be the principal adviser of the 
Secretary of State, and would give him general as distinguished from departmental 
advice upon all important questions of military policy.
29
 
The Adjutant-General would be charged with the discipline, education and 
training of the Army, with returns and statistics, enlistments and discharges. To the 
Quartermaster-General would be entrusted such matters as supplies and transport, 
Army quarters, remounts, the movement of troops, the Pay Department and the 
Army Service Corps. The Inspector-General of Fortifications would be responsible 
for barracks, fortifications and War Office lands and the supply and inspection of 
warlike stores and equipment for armaments, patterns, and inventions
30
 would be 
                                                          
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Lansdowne, ‘Lords Debate’, ‘War Office Reorganisation’, 26 August 1895, Hansard 4th Series, 
Vol.36, c.771. 
26
 Ibid., c.771. 
27
 Lansdowne, ‘Lords Debate’, ‘War Office Administration - Duties of Commander-in-Chief’, 4 
March 1901, ibid., Vol.90, c.348. 
28
 Editorial, ‘We welcome with satisfaction and with hope’, The Times, 27 August 1895, p.7. 
29
 Lansdowne, ‘Lords Debate’, ‘War Office Reorganisation’, 26 August 1895, Hansard 4th Series, 
Vol.36, c.771. 
30
 Ibid., cc.771-72.    
91 
 
entrusted to the Inspector-General of Ordnance. Drawing on the schemes of his 
predecessors Lansdowne recommended that these senior officers would be 
immediately responsible to the Secretary of State for the efficient administration of 
their departments and have direct access to him to provide advice regarding matters 
in which their particular department was concerned. Moreover they would be 
expected to take responsibility for the estimates of their own departments.
31
  
Trusting that military opinion would emerge more distinctly in a military board 
without the presence of the Secretary of State,
32
 he announced that the Commander-
in-Chief and the other heads of departments would act together as an Army Board 
for the purpose of reporting on selections for promotion and certain staff 
appointments and for proposals for estimates
33
 and ‘such questions as may be from 
time to time referred to them by the Secretary of State.’34 When Lansdowne took 
office ‘regular meetings were attended by the Adjutant-General and the three other 
great military heads.’ These meetings which were then known as Adjutant-General’s 
meetings were not recognised by the constitution of the War Office. As Lansdowne 
later explained, he thought they:  
May be regarded as having, to some extent, grown up in consequence of 
the somewhat special condition of the War Office at that time, when the 
Duke of Cambridge was Commander-in-Chief. The Duke of Cambridge 
gave a great deal of attention to certain parts of the business, and not so 
much to others, and the Adjutant-General consequently acquired a 
position of special authority in the office. It was his habit to convene his 
military colleagues and to confer with them as to various questions as 
they arose. I thought the arrangement a bad one, partly because it had no 
place in the constitution of the office. It was an irregular arrangement, 
because, when Lord Wolseley succeeded the Duke of Cambridge as 
Commander-in-Chief, it was quite clear that he would expect to have a 
voice in deliberations of that kind. I therefore regularised the matter by 
creating the Army Board, which consisted of the Commander-in-Chief 
and the four other military heads.
35
 
In creating the Army Board Lansdowne was also motivated by a belief that, 
‘since the larger military questions concerned more departments than one, it 
is…most important that the heads of those departments should be brought 
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together.’36 He maintained that a great deal of confusion would be avoided by 
consultations round a table between the soldiers and the civilians.
37
 Although 
Salisbury wanted Lansdowne to preside over the Army Board Lansdowne himself 
was against this proposal. That he did not participate in the proceedings met with 
approval from Queen Victoria.
38
 Balfour also urged Lansdowne to take part in Army 
Board meetings particularly when discussing the Army estimates.
39
 It can be 
speculated that Lansdowne desisted from taking his advice as under the terms of his 
new system he was empowered to consider his senior officers’ proposals and then 
indicate to the Board an ‘approximate amount’ within which the estimates should be 
kept and the proposals he wished them to report on. Aware of the sums involved the 
Board then made their report on the proposals based on their importance to the 
requirements of the Army. It was then at Lansdowne’s discretion to decide which of 
these proposals to accept. With that decision taken the final estimates were prepared 
in the Finance Department for submission to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
40
 
In an attempt to create greater understanding between civilians and senior 
officers on the long term objectives which the annual estimates were sanctioned for 
and the cost of the various proposals Lansdowne decided that the Accountant-
General should attend the Army Board. A few months after this change was 
implemented Knox, the Accountant-General, noted ‘that the soldiers did not like the 
change, because they have to face one another and argue out their ideas instead of 
attempting to push them through independently, and they don’t like my presence, 
because it makes them consider the financial aspects of affairs and also lets me know 
the differences of opinion.’41 Although Wolseley did not believe in ‘collective 
opinions’,42 the Board met ‘very frequently during the late autumn and winter’, when 
the estimates were under consideration.
43
 
Just before the outbreak of ‘the War’ Lansdowne created a new Army Board 
which comprised the Commander-in-Chief, the Adjutant-General, the 
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Quartermaster-General, the Inspector-General of Fortifications, the Director-General 
of the Ordnance Factories, the Accountant-General and Assistant Under-Secretary of 
State and such officers as were specially summoned to attend, to deal with matters 
necessary for maintaining the Army in an efficient and well-equipped condition. 
Unlike previously the proceedings of this new Board were noted and printed. 
Lansdowne believed it did its work ‘extremely well and was a valuable addition to 
the machinery of the War Office at the time.’44 Under the new system Knox 
observed ‘the Army Board machinery had begun to work more effectively; Secretary 
of State seems satisfied but the soldiers can’t bear it much preferring to paddle their 
own canoe in their own way if they can. However, matters are going with great 
smoothness, though with much fuss which I try to keep down.’45  
While the Army Board provided part of the consultative element which the 
Hartington Commission recommended, the other part was filled by a War Office 
Council, presided over by the Secretary of State and comprising the Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary, the Permanent Under-Secretary, the Financial Secretary, the 
Commander-in-Chief, and the four heads of the great military departments, and other 
experts specifically summoned to attend the meetings.
46
 This Council as reorganised 
in 1895 was similar to its predecessors of 1890 and 1892. The Secretary of State 
retained the right to determine the agenda and all decisions were in his name, not that 
of the Council. As a purely consultative body its purpose was to assist the Secretary 
of State in reaching consensus with his senior officers and civilian advisers. It was 
also understood that as the Secretary of State alone was responsible to Parliament it 
was with him that the final decisions of the matter under discussion would rest.
47
 
During Lansdowne’s term of office meetings were irregular and infrequent48 as 
had been the case at the time of Campbell-Bannerman.  Where records of discussions 
were kept it appears they had regard only for decisions made by the Secretary of 
State and not of opinions expressed or advice given by the other members.
49
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Although none of the members had any initiative, as Lansdowne later explained, ‘if 
any individual member desired to bring a matter before the War Office Council he 
certainly would not have been denied the opportunity of doing so.’50 Disagreements 
between the Secretary of State and his advisers remained an official mystery. 
Lansdowne’s claim that senior officers gathered together would not give unreserved 
opinion was partly attributable to the failure of the War Office Council. This view 
was reinforced by the Director-General Ordnance that at such occasions ‘he might 
not be prepared to express an opinion which might not be shared by the President.’51  
Lansdowne’s scheme was exposed to a cross-fire of criticism in and out of 
Parliament.
52
 The persistence with which the attacks were repeated during August 
and September made it incumbent upon him that the actual wording of a new Order-
in-Council would have to be very minutely considered. As one of the scheme’s 
fiercest critics, Wolseley was determined to force Lansdowne to redraft his 
reorganisation. Producing his own draft Order-in-Council, ‘as a sort of compromise 
between the extremely civilian views embodied in the Hartington Commission 
report, and the purely military view of the Army-men who have experience in Army 
administration’, Wolseley held firm to his belief that the Commander-in-Chief 
should be responsible for the discipline of the Army, and, if he were not, then ‘it is 
impossible he could be in any way responsible for that fighting efficiency.’53 
Military opinion was unanimous in holding that the attempt to dissociate the 
Commander-in-Chief, even in appearance, from the control of the discipline of the 
Army would be ‘fraught with danger’, and that ‘no scheme would work, or be 
understood by the Army which does not give the Commander-in-Chief an undoubted 
right of interference in questions of discipline.’54 While Lansdowne understood 
Wolseley’s counter-argument he remained unmoved. Attempting to break 
Lansdowne’s intransigence a few weeks before the Order-in-Council was published, 
Wolseley made a further attempt to sway Lansdowne by bringing to his attention the 
issue of the proposed change in role of the Adjutant-General and warning him:  
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I have urged upon you, namely that the Adjutant-General should be the 
staff officer of the Commander-in-Chief. I do not know what Lord 
Roberts’ opinion is, but although he may not know much about the 
English Army or about War Office administration I wish you could leave 
his opinion upon the proposal to disavow the discipline of the Army 
from the command of it. The discipline is the most important element in 
fighting efficiency. Now what I would like you to think of is this: that if 
you take away the Adjutant-General of the Army from the Commander-
in-Chief and so divorce discipline from command you and your 
successors will leave no one to whom you can look as responsible for the 
fighting efficiency of the Army: you will do so in opposition to the 
whole sentiment of the Army, and in opposition to the views and 
opinions of every general I ever heard of, General Brackenbury I suppose 
exempted…You propose to make the AG responsible for the discipline 
of the Army. Now there can be no responsibility without power. In other 
words, he must be independent quâ discipline of the Commander-in-
Chief if you mean to hold him responsible for it…Don’t you think your 
military advisers…might be able to give you their individual opinions 
upon this purely military point.
55
  
 
In ranging himself against Lansdowne’s scheme, Wolseley sought out and 
received the support of Wood and Buller, assuring them that it was in their own 
interest to support him in his struggle to amend the Order-in-Council.  
To Lansdowne the pre-eminence of the Commander-in-Chief was not in 
question; that officer had been made the principal adviser to the Secretary of State 
and given unlimited right of advising him on questions arising.
56
 As to the question 
of the discipline of the Army he informed the Cabinet that, as in all other questions, 
‘the Commander-in-Chief would certainly have his say.’ In wishing to preserve the 
attribute of command which ‘in the eyes of the public most contributes to the dignity 
of his position,’ he told his colleagues that he would frame his Order-in-Council as 
to ‘unmistakeably show’ that ‘the Commander-in-Chief is in a position different 
from that of the other Heads of Departments, a position giving him a general power 
of supervising and directing the whole of the military work of the office.’57 As he 
explained to Devonshire, ‘the point on which our scheme has been most successfully 
attacked is the absence of an intelligible frontier between the province of the 
Commander-in-Chief and that of the Adjutant-General. I see only two ways of 
dealing with it: 
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(1). To make the Commander-in-Chief neither more nor less than your 
Chief of Staff - stripping him altogether of command.  
(2). To give him, more distinctly than we have yet given him, a general 
right of supervising the military departments. I don’t think public opinion 
would accept (1). The proposal to create a Chief of Staff has few 
supporters. We must therefore; it seems to me, fall back upon (2). This 
proposal would I believe have the support of all the soldiers and most of 
the civilians connected with this office, and is much more likely to work 
than the other. It will leave the heads of departments with as much 
practical responsibility, as, under the circumstances, it would really be 
possible to give them. Whatever is done, their responsibility must be 
limited (a) by the financial control exercised by the civil side of the 
office, the Cabinet, and Parliament, and (b) by military ideas of 
discipline which will generally lead an ordinary head of a department to 
keep pretty well in line with the Commander-in-Chief. 
58
 
Providing the appropriate attributes to the position of Commander-in-Chief not 
only with regard to discipline but also to all other military questions Lansdowne 
informed the Cabinet that he proposed defining his duties as ‘principal adviser to the 
Secretary of State on all military questions’ and ‘charged with the general direction 
of the Military departments of the War Office.’59 Although documented evidence of 
the Cabinet’s opinion to the scheme is limited, Balfour was the most uncomfortable 
with the proposal and most determined to maintain civilian authority. He believed 
that: 
If you put the Secretary of State for War in direct communication with the 
Commander-in-Chief alone I do not see how the Secretary of State for War 
can be anything less than the administrative puppet of the great soldier who is 
at the head of the Army. He may come down to the House and express the 
views of that great officer, but if he is to take official advice from the 
Commander-in-Chief alone it is absolutely impossible that the Secretary of 
State should be really responsible, and in this House the Secretary of State 
will be no more than a mouthpiece of the Commander-in-Chief.
60
  
He concluded: 
There are only two possible schemes of Army government under 
Parliamentary government. According to the one the whole machinery of 
Army administration centres in one soldier, who is the sole channel through 
which subordinate officers approach the Secretary of State and who is, in 
effect, the ruler of the Army, controlled only by the Secretary of State in 
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those cases in which for financial or other reasons, he is likely, to come into 
conflict with the House of Commons. The second…is one in which the centre 
and focus of Army administration is not in the Commander-in-Chief but in 
the Secretary of State…Now the scheme of the Orders in Council is an 
attempt to combine fragments of both the other plans, and as a result is 
neither very coherent or logical.
61
  
 
He advised Lansdowne to cut out the sentence ‘and shall be charged with the 
general direction of the Military Departments of the War Office.’62 Influenced by 
Balfour and Brodrick, who was also uncomfortable with the scheme, Lansdowne 
replaced the word ‘direction’ with ‘supervision.’63 He did not replace the rest of the 
sentence, as he explained to Buller, who had assisted him in drafting the original 
scheme, ‘I could not accept your wording in many places, and I have amended my 
draft and Wolseley now thoroughly approves of it…You will see that I have 
substituted your word (direction) for supervision. And we have “charged” the heads 
of dept. with certain duties instead of making them “responsible”. Wolseley attaches 
great importance to this change. I do not myself see so much difference between the 
two expressions, but “charged” is the word to which the Army is used, so perhaps it 
expresses correctly the necessarily limited responsibility which the head of a dept. 
will possess.’64 Balfour, not wanting to be drawn into the controversy, later told 
Brodrick that whether the Commander-in-Chief was charged with supervision or 
direction he was ‘too ignorant of the real working of the Department…even to 
cherish the illusion that my opinion is very valuable. I cannot help entertaining the 
conviction that our administrative machinery is cumbrous and costly and that in all 
probability it would break down under a serious strain.’65 
Lansdowne’s reorganisation was confirmed by Order-in-Council on 21 
November 1895, and the Commander-in-Chief became ‘the principal adviser of the 
Secretary of State on all military questions’, and ‘charged with the general 
supervision of the Military Departments of the War Office.’66 To secure further the 
power of general supervision it was also announced
67
 that ‘all important questions 
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would be referred to the Commander-in-Chief before submission to the Secretary of 
State.’68 As Lansdowne later explained, he ‘never contemplated that the 
Commander-in-Chief should be kept in the dark’69 and he never intended having 
confidential communications with the separate heads of department behind the 
Commander-in-Chief’s back.70 What he envisaged was that he would get ‘the actual 
mind of a man who was an expert in a manner in which I should not get it if I was 
only to see him in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief.’71 He believed ‘it is the 
case that when you have a number of these high officers sitting round a table they 
will not give you the same absolutely frank, unreserved opinion that they will when 
you get them quietly in your room.’72 It was Lansdowne’s view that the new 
‘regulations reserved to the Commander-in-Chief a far larger measure of control and 
authority than was contemplated by the Hartington Commission, by the late 
government, or by the advocates of decentralization in the press.’73 He remained of 
the same opinion when giving evidence to the Royal Commission.
74
   
In his reorganisation of the War Office in 1895 Lansdowne not only proceeded 
with the main principles of the Hartington Report but adopted the commissioners’ 
recommendation for the formation of a Naval and Military Council.
75
 Because the 
proposal was only indirectly connected to the reorganisation of the War Office
76
 and 
was largely a body formed by the Cabinet for their members Lansdowne’s 
negotiations were conducted under less scrutiny than his reorganisation scheme. It 
was also less open to attack from the press. It was Lansdowne’s view that an inter-
service committee should be formed at Cabinet level with Devonshire as its 
Chairman. Although two inter-departmental committees already existed they did so 
at a subordinate level to the Cabinet and met infrequently. The Colonial Defence 
Committee was revived by the Salisbury government in 1885 tasked with offering 
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suggestions on broad imperial defence principles.
77
 The Joint Naval and Military 
Committee was established on the recommendation of the Hartington Commission. 
The organisation ‘met infrequently to consider the service estimates in relation to 
each other and to make recommendations to the Cabinet where the final decision 
would be taken and to consider and authoritatively decide upon unsettled questions 
between the two departments, or any matters of Joint Naval and Military policy.’78 
In giving prominence to the Council of National Defence
79
 or Defence 
Committee of the Cabinet as part of his reform scheme of 1895, Lansdowne 
demonstrated the government’s appreciation of the need for Empire-wide planning. 
In giving encouragement to this objective he attained the support of many of the 
service parliamentarians, and even Arnold-Forster.
80
 Dilke and Wilkinson remained 
critical; the former wishing for more information on the composition and functions 
of the Council before passing judgement.
81
 Interestingly Wilkinson was opposed to 
the formation of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet but applied to be its 
Secretary because ‘I was convinced by the fact of its formation that there was no one 
in the Cabinet who had thoroughly thought out the relations between policy, war, 
naval & military preparation & I hoped to be even with such small opportunities of 
personal contact with one or two ministers as might be afforded by the secretaryship 
of a committee & with no other engine than the chance of drafting an occasional 
agenda paper of which the heads could be settled for me, to be able unobtrusively to 
get the essential questions before the persons whose consideration of them was of 
vital importance to the nation.’ 82 
There was, however, a wide divergence of opinion between the principal 
architects of this committee in the formulation of its composition and functions. This 
divergence of opinion, combined with a lack of enthusiasm for making them a 
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reality, condemned the Defence Committee of the Cabinet from the start. Those 
asked by Salisbury to offer their suggestions included Balfour, Devonshire, Goschen 
and Lansdowne. Balfour and Salisbury believed respectively that strategical plans of 
any magnitude in which the interests of both Services were involved should pass 
through it,
83
 and that it should consider more fundamental questions of defence 
policy than budgets.
84
 Devonshire wished to begin operations ‘very gradually,’85 and 
Goschen, who was the most reluctant of the Cabinet to commit, noted:  
Unbeknown to Salisbury, Balfour, yourself [Devonshire], myself, or indeed 
any of the Cabinet except George Hamilton, there is a perfected, formal, 
active organization in full working order for the very purposes of the 
proposed Council of which you are as you call it, the somewhat definite head. 
There exists a Joint Naval and Military Committee who meet as occasion 
arises and discuss all the large questions where Army and Navy co-operation 
is necessary. There is the basis, the nucleus of the Council. We can be an 
upper Chamber to this Committee and deal with the conclusions at which 
they have arrived, or, we might simply add the Secretary of State for War, 
and myself to the Committee and you preside instead of the present 
arrangement…I daresay that Richards86 and Buller would propose the 
Committee remain as it is where they are masters.
87
  
 
As Devonshire noted, ‘I think I detect a little suspicion on Goschen’s part that the 
committee may interfere with his responsibility.’88 Lansdowne was more willing 
than Goschen to establish the committee on a firm footing and it can be speculated 
that his respect for his colleague at the Admiralty eclipsed any desire to take 
advantage of the latter’s evident dislike of the scheme. He was against allowing the 
Commander-in-Chief and First Naval Lord to have seats on the Committee but was 
favourable to their attendance as assessors. As far as the existing Joint Naval and 
Military Committee was concerned, he told Devonshire, ‘it would certainly be better 
to treat your Council [the Defence Committee of the Cabinet] as a kind of Upper 
Chamber to the Joint Naval and Military Committee. I had intended that the reports 
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of the Joint Committee be sent to the Cabinet Council…I should think it would be 
possible to draw a line between the functions of the Council and the Committee.’89   
Although the committee was established it was later remarked that ‘it seems 
almost as difficult to get a meeting of the Defence Committee as to define its 
duties.’90 The fact that between 1895 and 1900 the committee did not meet the 
expectations of the Hartington Report,
91
 or become anything more than an informal 
committee of the Cabinet was largely because those responsible for its operation 
ignored it. Balfour was occupied with leading the House of Commons and Salisbury 
after 1897 suffered from poor health. Hicks Beach doubted it could undertake the 
work which was suggested for it.’92 Its duties and responsibilities remained vague 
and it lacked real power. Professional members were in attendance for only part of 
the proceedings and took no formal part in the discussions. To Wolseley, ‘their 
meetings are always interesting, sometimes to a soldier amusing and always illustrate 
how absolutely unfit civilians are to manage a war or indeed to lay down rules or 
orders for the conduct of any military operations.’93  It had no agenda,94 met 
infrequently and ‘rarely at a time of year when it was possible for ministers to 
concentrate their attention upon questions requiring careful study.’95 Lansdowne 
believed ‘our discussions were not always sufficiently “focussed” and became 
consequently somewhat desultory.’96 That no minutes were kept convinced Arnold-
Forster it was ‘a fiction’.97 It was the opinion of Maurice Hankey, a prominent civil 
servant, ‘I can throw no light on the subjects dealt with by the Defence Committee of 
the Cabinet. I never remember seeing a single document or hearing anything about 
that august but ineffective body!’98 The ineffectiveness of the committee at this time 
to achieve a larger role in assessing Britain’s place in the world and how the nation 
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might adapt accordingly is revealing of the lack of interest at Cabinet level of 
popular pressure for reform of defence matters.  
Unsurprisingly, the formation of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet and 
the regulations embodied by the Order-in-Council were criticised in and out of 
Parliament. Wolseley was appalled by the modifications to his office.
99
 With ‘neither 
the supreme control exercised by the Secretary of State, nor the administrative 
functions now conferred on those below him’, he argued that he had ‘become a fifth 
wheel to a coach;’100 ‘Between the ministerial head on the one hand and the 
departmental heads on the other, he has been crushed out, and the Secretary of State 
has become the actual Commander-in-Chief of the Army.’101 Lansdowne disagreed 
with his claim. ‘I cannot accept as even approaching to accuracy, nor would it, I 
think, be regarded as accurate by those who have taken part in the business of the 
War Office during the last five years.’ 102 It was Wolseley’s and some of the other 
senior officers’ opinion that the distribution of responsibility laid down in 
Lansdowne’s scheme was a contradiction in terms.103 ‘How,’ he asked, ‘can a 
Commander-in-Chief exercise supervision over a department if another official is 
responsible for what is done by that department; and how can an official be held 
responsible for a department if he is supervised, i.e., controlled, by someone else to 
whom he has to submit all important questions before laying them before the 
Secretary of State?’ In endeavouring to combine general control in one place with 
individual responsibility in another the scheme failed in both objects.
104
  Wolseley 
was quick to make the other senior officers aware of his views on the question of 
precedence and authority.
105
 He ordered Wood to communicate with him first on any 
matters he wished to put to Lansdowne.
106
 The result was that Lansdowne ‘minuted’ 
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papers to Wood, but received them back through Wolseley.
107
 Lansdowne disliked 
this practice but accepted that ‘it comes well within the Commander-in-Chief’s 
powers of supervision.’108 Wolseley continued it because it reinforced his own 
position at the War Office and because he believed that Lansdowne was unable to 
understand the complexities of military affairs.
109
  
Although Lansdowne was a close friend and admirer of Wolseley’s military 
rival Lord Roberts, whom he had worked with in India, he made every attempt to 
maintain good relations with his Commander-in-Chief. They worked in adjoining 
offices at the War Office and were in constant communication. That ‘Wolseley 
objected to the whole system’110 did not weaken Lansdowne’s willingness to work 
harmoniously with him or maintain cordial relations. He often invited him socially to 
dine at Lansdowne House in London or to stay at Bowood, his estate in Wiltshire. 
Wolseley regularly accepted such invitations only to judge harshly of his host, 
hostess and their family after the event. Among letters to his wife, Lady Louisa, he 
refers to Lansdowne at different times between 1895 and 1900 as being ‘an ass’,111 
‘my little French Jew’,112 ‘the smallest minded man and least capable of all the War 
Ministers I have known’,113 ‘a whipper-snapper of a War Office clerk’, 114  ‘a man 
who in any of his dealings with me would ruthlessly turn on me’,115 and a ‘poor little 
creature not worth fighting over.’116 That Louisa and Lansdowne’s wife Maud were 
close friends and established and managed the Officers Families Fund only increases 
speculation that Wolseley’s frequent illnesses while at the War Office corrupted his 
mind. That Lansdowne did not react to Wolseley’s criticisms may also have 
increased the latter’s frustration. 
Wolseley was not the only one to be disappointed by Lansdowne’s 
reorganisation. Buller complained to Brodrick that ‘all his work was taken from him 
by the Commander-in-Chief and he had no power left except to say ditto to him on 
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Councils and Boards. He desired to go back to the old Adjutant-General’s meetings 
in which certain officers met informally and agreed on a joint opinion - usually the 
Adjutant-General’s.117 Buller also complained to Welby that the reorganisation was 
done without military say.
118
 In light of Lansdowne’s discussions with him over the 
framing of the Order-in-Council this appears to be an unjust statement. Knox as 
mentioned in chapter one also came to resent that business was transacted directly 
between the high military officers and the Secretary of State, a cause of friction that 
Lansdowne was aware of and later acknowledged.
119
 According to the strict 
procedure, ‘if an official proposal is put forward by one of the heads of Departments, 
the paper ought to go through the Permanent Under-Secretary, in order that it may be 
registered and not lost sight of, and there is an inconvenience when the head of a 
military Department takes a short cut and does business with the Secretary of State 
direct.’120 Although Dilke hoped the practice of the new system might be better than 
its theory, he doubted that the new man chosen to be the head of the Army would be, 
in practice, the real head of the Army and the real adviser of the Secretary of State.
121
 
He believed the government had chosen to ‘fritter’ individual responsibility away 
‘among a great number of different boards.’122 To Wilkinson the change ‘appeared to 
me to be disastrous’,123 and to some of the service parliamentarians it was 
‘impossible to work’ the system.124 The new organisation with its Army Board, War 
Office Council and Defence Committee of the Cabinet, the ‘three storied 
arrangement of Council’ seemed to The Saturday Review ‘to promise nothing but 
confusion, and to testify to nothing but timorous fear of unpractical men who try to 
dissipate responsibility instead of concentrating it.’125  
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It was the view of George Buckle, the editor of The Times, that ‘there might be 
a serious miscarriage,’126 if each high official of the Army Board was directly 
responsible to the Secretary of State. Interestingly The Times  initially misinterpreted 
the arrangements referred to by Brodrick in his speech to the House of Commons on 
War Office Reorganisation on 31 August 1895, stating that ‘the “focussing of 
military opinion” by means of a board which tends to prevent the Secretary of State 
from directly learning the opinions of the departmental chiefs, and gives him instead 
merely a collective opinion filtered through the Commander-in-Chief, bears an 
alarming resemblance in all essentials to the system actually in vogue.’ 127Among 
many letters to Buckle on the subject one reader suggested that ‘the violation of 
sound principles is aggravated, that complication is increased, that, more than ever, 
the working of the machine will turn upon the personal characteristics of its 
attendants, and that perhaps the most marked feature is the usurpation of new power 
by the civil side of the War Office in a manner certain to prove injurious to the 
Army.’128 
To these critics, and in particular to Wolseley, the reorganisation of 1895 
created an unworkable system. That Lansdowne disagreed, and that he ‘never 
yielded to the temptation of saying that it was no fault of mine, and that I was acting 
on the advice of others’,129 was testimony to his belief that it was ‘in principle a 
perfectly sound system.’130 On only one occasion was he forced to impute blame to 
Wolseley for the mismanagement of the system established in 1895 and this he did 
on 4 March 1901, four months after leaving the War Office during the ‘War Office 
Administration’ debate in the House of Lords. The origins of the incident took root 
the previous November when Wolseley was invited by Queen Victoria, who was 
supportive of him, to give an account of how Army administration might be 
improved. It is interesting to note that five years earlier she accepted his appointment 
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remarking that she ‘did not think it a good one.’131 She also trusted that his period of 
office ‘may not last so long.’132  
In his account, which was produced as a memorandum to Lord Salisbury, 
Wolseley observed the War Office system established in 1895 was contrary to that of 
the armies of all other Great Powers. He blamed the system for injuring the spirit of 
discipline and crushing out the Commander-in-Chief.
133
 Both Lansdowne and 
Brodrick refuted Wolseley’s accusations, stating that in their opinion the 
Commander-in-Chief could not be expected to undertake more duties than he already 
had.
134
 In light of the interest the correspondence created, the Duke of Bedford, who 
was one of the service parliamentarians and a supporter of Wolseley’s, initiated a 
debate. Bedford was motivated by his belief that he was ‘not hopeful of any real 
reform of the Army unless the Government would take the country fully and frankly 
into their confidence on the subject of Army administration.’135 During the debate 
Wolseley argued that since the system of 1895 was introduced, ‘it would not be 
difficult to show that the needs of the Army and its general efficiency have been 
more than once subordinated to the wish to produce a low Budget,’ and that military 
efficiency ‘must depend upon the statesman…invariably a civilian.’ It was his view 
that the ‘system established in 1888 was all that could be desired under our 
constitutional conditions’ and that the 1895 system ‘will never give us a satisfactory 
Army.’ In assuring the nation that its military interests were being safeguarded he 
suggested the Commander-in-Chief should prepare a certificate ‘year by year, that 
the Army was in proper order.’ 136 
In defending himself against Wolseley’s condemnation of his 1895 
reorganisation, Lansdowne dismissed any proposal involving a return to the system 
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of 1888.
137
 He questioned Wolseley’s willingness to give the scheme a fair trial and, 
in what was considered a bitter and personal attack, drew attention to confidential 
communications that had passed between them and reflected negatively on 
Wolseley.
138
 
Eleven days later, backed by the Liberal peers Camperdown, Rosebery and 
Northbrook, Wolseley motioned for presentation of all the papers relating to the 
accusation brought by Lansdowne that he had neglected his duties. The government 
refused to produce the papers on the grounds that it would involve publishing recent 
War Office documents and Salisbury rejected the motion as being too general. 
Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine thought the idea of soldiers appealing to the 
nation was ‘manifestly impracticable.’139 After the debate, Wolseley never publicly 
referred to what he privately believed was the most unpleasant incident in his life.
140
 
To James Bryce the recriminations of Lansdowne and Wolseley were novel and 
would have caused even more unfavourable comment had not public opinion been 
demoralised by the war, by Liberal divisions and by the recklessness of the 
government in so many other matters. ‘Things which once shocked people shock but 
little now.’141  
Lansdowne was well aware of the atmosphere in which his reorganisation was 
carried out: 
I have no doubt that there are imperfections in our scheme, but we 
cannot, I fear, please: The Queen, who wishes to keep the Army under 
the Crown, and who would like to clip Wolseley’s wings, providing the 
reversion of an extra pair for the Duke of Connaught. Devonshire, who 
harkens after his own headless Army and Chief of Staff. Goschen, who 
thinks there is nothing like the leather of the Admiralty. Wolseley and 
Buller, who want the military discipline to prevail and the Commander-
in-Chief to be the real master. Balfour, who wants a logical and self-
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consistent scheme which he can defend in argument against Dilke’s fire 
on one side and that of The Times on the other.
142
 
The War Office system was neither unworkable nor, as Balfour predicted, did 
it ‘break down under serious strain.’143 It was simply not given a fair trial and failed 
to heal the mutual suspicions between soldiers and civilians. ‘Something might have 
been salvaged from the mass of conflicting ideas and priorities had the War Office 
reordered its administration to recognise the priorities of efficient defence planning 
but it did not.’144 In the next chapter the priorities that the War Office did adopt 
under the new system will be assessed in relation to Lansdowne’s reform of the 
Army. Using him as a prism to explore late Victorian politics, civil-military 
relations, the reform discourse and the late Victorian Army, this chapter will 
examine Lansdowne’s decision-making and ability to manage this reform.  
                                                          
142
 Lansdowne to Salisbury (private), 21 October 1895, BL. (5) Lansdowne MSS, Add MS. 
88906/19/6. 
143
 Balfour to Brodrick (private), 2 November 1895, BL. (5) Lansdowne MSS, Add MS. 
88906/16/17/2. 
144
 Gooch, The Plans of War, p.20. 
109 
 
 
Chapter Four - The Reform of the Army 
Having ‘attacked’ the War Office during 1895 Lansdowne turned his attention to 
improving the state of the Army during the Parliamentary session of 1896. Although 
he acknowledged that since 1870 Britain had been ‘engaged in a number of military 
operations in different parts of the world’, and had succeeded in getting through ‘not 
only without disgrace but with considerable credit to the forces concerned’,1 he also 
recognised that the Army was ‘out of joint’,2 ‘wanting in elasticity’,3 and capable of 
simplification.
4
 As a pragmatist he recognized ‘the difficult task’ of Army reform,5 
and as a supporter of the modern practical school of military thinking he shared 
much in common with the senior officers, ‘who cared little for names and phrases if 
a fighting line worth the money spent could be produced.’6 With a reputation for 
frugal administration Lansdowne was considered capable of ‘repairing the main 
defects of the existing machine.’7 Although determined to improve the military 
system, he had no wish to introduce the ‘total’ reform urged by his critics. 
Lansdowne’s objective was not set on revoluntionary reform but on providing 
gradual changes for the sound defence of Britain at home and abroad. Undertaking 
subtle changes in this way he could justly claim, during his term of office, that ‘not a 
year has passed in which they [the Government] had not done something to make the 
Army stronger and more efficient.’8 Moreover, he could also take some satisfaction 
in the fact that before the outbreak of ‘the War’ in 1899 he emerged successfully 
from defending a military system that many traditional soldiers, service 
parliamentarians, defence intellectuals, a large section of the press, some of the 
opposition and the Royal family were ‘all clamouring to abandon.’9 By manipulating 
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and restricting the scope of the discourse Lansdowne deflected his critics’ from their 
principal demands.  
With the exception of the work of Edward Spiers, Lansdowne’s attempt to 
reform the Army has received less attention in the extant literature than his 
reorganisation of the War Office system.
10
 However, from the archival record and a 
large number of studies of the late Victorian Army it is possible to identify the 
process of Army reform that Lansdowne embarked on during his tenure at the War 
Office. Much of the recent work on the subject owes a debt to the scholarship of 
Brian Bond who in the 1960s elevated military history beyond the limits of 
regimental studies, campaign histories and biographies.
11
 Addressing the politics of 
command, modern military historians have made the study of the topic all-
encompassing rather than a purely analytical study of the Victorians at war.
12
 By 
using Lansdowne as a prism this chapter aims to explore the late Victorian Army and 
the reform discourse in their social and political contexts. It also aims to demonstrate 
the constraints and opportunities given to individuals operating in this environment.  
By identifying some of the perceptual differences that made these subjects so 
complicated this chapter will demonstrate how Lansdowne managed the Army and 
its reform. 
The existing military system was subject to different schools of opinion 
influenced by those who saw a war in Europe as one model for the Army and those 
concerned for its responsibilities in India and the Colonies as another. Such forces 
resulted in an artillery approaching continental standards of technical expertise and 
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education, an infantry trained towards the needs of colonial warfare, and a cavalry 
modelled upon studies of the American Civil War where the cavalryman was ‘the 
soldier of the charge.’13 As to supply and transport arrangements these were 
fashioned from campaigns in Africa.
14
  
Parallel to these cross currents and their effect on the late Victorian Army was 
the assumption that ‘secure behind the sturdy hulls of the Royal Navy, and with most 
of its wars on land against poorly armed and often badly led inhabitants, Britain 
proceeded with the slow caution of a rentier when responding to military 
development.’15 In the absence of a General Staff expeditionary forces were often 
hurriedly improvised and reliant on the organisational ability of their commanding 
officers. Officers such as Wolseley, Roberts and Kitchener had to be resourceful. 
‘Small colonial wars’ were so diversified, the enemy’s mode of fighting often so 
unorthodox, and the theatres of operation so hostile and diverse from one another 
that following textbook rules of conventional warfare was unreliable.
16
 Generalship, 
staff work and tactics were heavily influenced by experiences of these wars. 
However, such unconventional warfare did not prepare the Army for wars dominated 
by modern armaments.  
In addition, it was striking that many of the generals and commanding officers 
refused to accept that changes in technology were changing the nature of warfare. 
Many officers in practical matters were more inclined to rely on their own past 
experiences than adopt new theories and doctrines. This led to some of the 
reformers, including Buller, to remark that he had not been told what the duties of 
the British Army were and what the country expected it to do.
17
 Many of the generals 
and even some of the senior officers had become blinkered by their own success, and 
so long as the Army was successful most politicians saw no need to reform the 
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machine. Those that did tended to have some previous military experience or 
knowledge, such as the service parliamentarians or defence intellectuals.
 
To such 
individuals no reform was possible until it was known what the Army was meant for.
 
 
To Duncan Pirie, a service parliamentarian, the principal question for the Army 
was, ‘was it as good as it might be? Was it as good as this great Nation had a right to 
demand? He did not think that any answer could be given to that question except in 
the negative.’ 18  Lansdowne was ‘constantly pressed to tell the people…what our 
Army is intended to do…to justify the great sacrifices which we ask the 
taxpayers…to submit,’19 He believed in the objects of military organisation and 
administration as laid down by Cardwell and the role of the Army as defined by 
Stanhope in his 1888 memorandum.
20
 Entering the War Office as a relative 
newcomer to the British Army system he had no pre-conceived vision of how he 
wished to reform the Army. His views on the requirements and principles of the 
British Army were moulded by his experiences as a member of the Wiltshire 
Yeomanry, as Under-Secretary of State for War under Cardwell, as Governor-
General in Canada, and as Viceroy in India. It was his opinion that the military 
system in Britain was singularly complicated and unlike that of any other country. ‘It 
has, in the first place, been the outcome, not of any deliberate plan of construction, 
but of gradual and spontaneous growth; our Regular Army, our Militia, our 
Volunteers have grown up side by side, at first with scarcely any connexion, upon no 
definite plan. We have never had a clean slate to start with, and perhaps that is 
fortunate, for it implies that we have never gone through the disagreeable process to 
which other nations have had to submit of seeing the slate wiped clean for us by 
hands other than our own.’21 The second peculiarity he noted was that Britain was 
the only European nation which relied upon voluntary enlistment.’22 With a system 
of voluntary enlistment he held that Britain required a sufficient garrison for home 
defence, the ability to mobilise a force of two Army Corps for offensive purposes 
outside Britain, facility to despatch at short notice small bodies of men to meet minor 
emergencies, without recourse to a general mobilisation of the Army and to supply 
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punctually the Indian and colonial garrisons with their annual drafts as substitutes for 
those men who returned to Britain each year.
23
 To Lansdowne the bedrock of the 
military system was that ‘for a great part of the Army the term of service should be 
of moderate length so as to yield an efficient reserve.’ Secondly, he argued, that 
‘infantry battalions which were abroad should be supported by an adequate number 
of properly organised battalions at home capable of supplying the necessary drafts’ 
and, thirdly, that ‘there should be a connection between the country and the Army.’24 
This view was partly shared by Wolseley who was also a devoted follower of 
Cardwell and his system
25
 and had strongly influenced Stanhope’s ideas.26 While 
both Lansdowne and Wolseley assumed action on the European mainland was a 
remote contingency Wolseley took the threat of a French invasion more seriously 
than Lansdowne.
27
 However, Lansdowne accepted the duty incumbent on the Army 
to safeguard British commerce and society in the event of war. Acting on 
representations from the Admiralty regarding the importance of strategic harbours in 
1899 he completed a scheme first started in 1887 by Stanhope to strengthen coastal 
defences at Berehaven, Lough Swilly, Falmouth and Scilly. He also secured 
contracts for the erection of three powerful forts on the cliffs of Dover to protect the 
new harbour.
28
   
Neither Lansdowne nor Wolseley were followers of the Blue Water School but 
Wolseley accepted the need to add to the fleet to defend the Empire and improve the 
defences of the country. It was Lansdowne’s opinion that the Navy is ‘our first line 
of defence,’29 but that both naval and military defences must be considered together; 
‘partners the two services are, partners they must remain.’30 Lansdowne’s view 
differed from that of many in the Cabinet, in particular Hicks Beach who on one 
notable occasion attacked him at a public dinner for suggesting that his military 
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estimates had not kept pace with naval estimates.
31
 Although Wolseley wanted to 
improve the state of the Army, he believed that the foundation for reform had been 
laid and that further wholesale reform was unnecessary.
32
 Lansdowne partly shared 
this view. They both wanted to make the Army a profession and administer it on 
‘sound and simple business principles.’33  
They recognised the ‘inestimable value’ of regimental feeling known as esprit 
de corps and were determined ‘to foster it in all ranks of the Army.’34 Wolseley’s 
knowledge of and loyalty to the British soldier was shaped by his innate patriotism 
and career in Imperial service. He believed that the soldier ‘is a peculiar animal that 
alone can be brought to the highest efficiency by inducing him to believe that he 
belongs to a regiment which is infinitely superior to the others around him.’35 There 
is little archival evidence of Lansdowne’s views of the British soldier. However, it 
can be speculated from a remark made during a debate on the issue of military 
clothing in which he likened soldiers’ uniforms to those of domestic staff that he 
regarded a soldier as he might a member of his own domestic staff.
36
 If his view of 
the soldier was shadowy, his view of the British officer was less so. Shaped by 
different military experiences than Wolseley he believed that ‘a trained British 
officer is the most valuable military asset that we possess.’37 He also believed that 
one of Britain’s most admirable characteristics was its ability to produce ‘men to 
lead, and to inspire with their courage troops belonging to races less civilised than 
our own.’38 Unlike Wolseley Lansdowne harboured no racialist sentiment and had a 
‘sincere hope that we should frequently see native troops taking the field by the side 
of our own.’39 Wolseley did not share this view. He believed that the need to send so 
many drafts to India annually was a ‘serious inconvenience to our military 
organisation,’ and that since ‘our Army is really a great reserve for the Army in 
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India, India should therefore pay for everything connected with the Army.’40 His 
statement about sepoys, that ‘we should not like to fight France or Germany or any 
other Army with Indian troops,’ caused outrage both in Britain and abroad.41 Hicks 
Beach believed Wolseley’s opposition was based on the view that drawing on India 
for troops was a reflection on the rest of the Army.
42
  While their views may have 
differed in detail both men recognised that the increase in the size of the Army had 
not kept pace with the increase in the Empire. Lansdowne freely admitted that ‘we 
are finding great and increasing difficulty in providing both for the normal wants of 
the Empire and for the special calls which come upon us with growing frequency.’43 
In their views of the principles and requirements of the Army and how it might 
be reformed Lansdowne and Wolseley had much in common. They were both 
opposed to radical change. They did, however, differ over matters of finance. 
Lansdowne was also far more aware of the costs of reform than Wolseley. He did not 
believe that the Army could be constituted in any other lines than those of finance: 
‘Financial and military considerations are inextricably intermixed. We cannot 
emancipate ourselves from the financial limits which the state of the National 
Exchequer imposes upon us.’44 Wolseley, by contrast, believed ‘the main lines upon 
which our Army should be constituted must be framed on other considerations than 
those of finance.’45 Even though Lansdowne administered with financial caution he 
was willing to defend the Army estimates in cases where he presumed financial 
parsimony would undermine the efficiency of the Army. Between 1895 and 1899 the 
annual estimates increased by 14.2%, and Parliament voted £9,458,000 for military 
loans for the defence of Britain and the Empire.
46
  
As the Empire had grown so traditional financial prudence was threatened and 
public expenditure was rising inexorably, representing a ‘financial crisis of the 
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state.’47 While the Army estimates increased so Dilke challenged the War Office to 
‘give us a full return for our money,’48 and Wilkinson argued that ‘soldiers’ common 
sense was lost in Treasury clerk wisdom.’49 To one of the service parliamentarians 
the Cabinet had ‘starved the Army and money that was voted was improperly and 
absurdly spent resulting in an inefficient Army.’50 In defending the War Office 
against such complaints Lansdowne explained that he and his military advisers were 
opposed to asking for more money than past experience had shown could be spent 
within a reasonable period of time and that they were against asking large sums 
without providing a guarantee that the services those funds would settle were part of 
a carefully considered scheme.
51
 He also admitted obtaining funds was ‘not always a 
very easy task,’52 and ‘a great part of our Army expenditure is altogether beyond the 
control of the Secretary of State.’53 To secure expenditure particularly for barracks 
and defences at home and abroad Lansdowne chose to borrow large sums of money 
as military loans. This was a common practice and such loans were voted by 
Parliament in 1860, 1872, 1888 and 1890. Where Lansdowne differed from his 
predecessors was in his belief that the question of the Army estimates was so closely 
connected with that of military loans that both should be dealt with together.
54
 For 
Lansdowne such loans had an advantage over the estimates in that ‘you can make 
your contracts beforehand, and carry out your programme steadily, deliberately, and 
methodically, and without the apprehension that supplies may be forthcoming one 
year and not the next.’ 55  
Lansdowne’s objective to administer the Army upon both military and 
financial considerations was clearly evident in his initial measures introduced in the 
1896 session. Allowing the ‘machine to run on in the old grooves,’ while getting the 
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War Office and the Headquarters into working order,
56
 he brought forward four 
bills.
57
 These ‘innocents’, as he described them, which were essential to the Army’s 
efficiency, were ‘ruthlessly massacred’ by the opposition and the service 
parliamentarians.
58
 That their passage was described as ‘muddled out of existence,’59 
and the Parliamentary session as ‘disastrous,’60 was largely due to the government’s 
other commitments at the time, notably Ireland. Lansdowne and Devonshire were 
both fully preoccupied with the Irish Land Bill and neglected any questions of 
military defence. Devonshire’s Defence Committee of the Cabinet only managed a 
few desultory discussions in regard to the general question of naval and military 
policy in the Mediterranean. Lansdowne admitted to Ardagh at the end of 
September, that as ‘we all became busier & busier with Land Bills & such like 
rubbish, this really big question slid into the background.’61 While these failures 
were indicative of both a lack of appetite in Parliament to improve the Army and the 
Cabinet’s lack of interest for reform of defence matters, the War Office itself was a 
department of ‘exceptional activity.’62 As Lansdowne later stated, ‘during our first 
two years the greater part of our time was taken up fighting for the existence of a 
short service system. Lord Wolseley and I spent a good deal of our time in preparing 
the case for the defence which I am glad to say we were able to maintain 
successfully.’63  
Lansdowne and Wolseley both believed to varying degrees, that only by 
increasing the size of the Army in terms of men would they meet the external 
demands on it and provide for the security of the Empire. Wolseley wished to go 
further than Lansdowne in increasing the size of the Army. He suggested upgrading 
the two Army Corps system provided by the Stanhope Memorandum for home 
                                                          
56
 H.S. Wilkinson, ‘The Army Estimates’, The Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and 
Art, 81(2109), 20 November 1897, p.547. 
57
 The four bills were for authorising a Military Works Loan, Military Manoeuvres, Volunteers to 
equip rifle ranges out of public funds and a bill for the reserve to be more readily utilised in small 
wars.   
58
 Lansdowne, ‘Colston’s day in Bristol’, The Times, 14 November 1896, p.8. 
59
 De Vesci, ‘Lords Debate’, ‘Increase to the Army’, ibid., 5 February 1897, p.6. 
60
 Brodrick, ‘Mr Brodrick on Army Measures’, ibid., 17 September 1896, p.10. 
61
 Lansdowne to Ardagh (private), 24 September 1896, NA. Ardagh MSS, PRO 30/40/10. 
62
 Brodrick, ‘Commons Debate’, ‘Land Forces’, 12 February 1897, Hansard 4th Series, Vol.46, c.324. 
63
 PP, 1904, XLI, Cd.1791, RC, 21505, p.535; BL. (5) Lansdowne MSS, Add MS. 88906/22/19, 
21505. 
118 
 
defence to three Army Corps and four cavalry brigades for home defence.
64
 The 
military system introduced by Cardwell and accepted by ‘successive governments,’65 
was based on the principle that each of the double-battalion regiments of the Army 
would always have one battalion abroad and another at home to support it. Under the 
original proposal initiated by Cardwell each home based battalion had to provide an 
annual quota of drafts for its linked battalion overseas, train recruits and employ men 
in daily fatigue duties or as officers, clerks, servants, cooks, regimental tradesmen 
and bandsmen.  
Largely due to the requirements of the growing Empire that condition of 
equilibrium had not been maintained since 1872, and at no time had any government 
attempted to remedy the discrepancy.
66
  By constantly stealing from the home 
establishment or to use Wolseley’s expression ‘by sending trained men overseas or 
into the reserve, the home based battalions’ became ‘like a lemon when all the juice 
is squeezed out of it, they will be of little fighting use - they will be only weak 
depôts.’67 Lansdowne held that this system on which the Army was organised was ‘a 
very admirable basis’ and probably the only one on which it was possible to organise 
an Army which took its recruits young and which had to provide for the defence of 
India and to provide an Army reserve.
68
 While he respected and valued the system he 
was also willing to adapt it and present a more flexible defence of it than either 
Haliburton or Wolseley themselves envisaged. But even though he was willing to 
modify the system he had no wish to undermine its basic structure or principle. If 
overseas battalions were not relieved by home battalions the only alternative was 
feeding a battalion abroad from depôts based in Britain and this he was against. 
Though he accepted they were cheaper man for man than a battalion, depôts were 
less economic: ‘A battalion of infantry costs you about £50,000 a year, and a depôt 
strong enough to support a battalion on foreign service would cost you about half 
that sum; but which is the best bargain for the country - the depôt which costs, say, 
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£25,000 and adds nothing to your fighting strength at home, nothing to your power 
of relieving the Army abroad, or the battalion which costs £50,000 and does both?’69  
This sentiment was shared by Wolseley who since 1888 had advised 
Lansdowne’s predecessors of the case for increasing the military needs of the 
Empire.
70
 He essentially equated Army reform with Army increase.
71
 In 1896 
Wolseley brought this idea to Lansdowne’s attention informing him that eleven 
infantry battalions (or fifteen if two were sent to the Cape) were required to balance 
the system which was split between seventy-five abroad and sixty-five at home. 
Including additions to the artillery Wolseley’s proposal amounted to £2,000,000. 
Lansdowne asked him to investigate whether savings could be made in other 
branches of the Army.
72
 Having found sufficient savings from the cavalry and horse 
artillery he responded to Lansdowne with a proposal that would maintain a minimum 
number of the additional line battalions required. He suggested raising two new 
battalions for the Guards and using them for overseas service. This he emphasised 
would reduce the overall total required for the Army to do its duty from thirteen to 
eleven.
73
 The idea of using the Guards was the reverse of a position that he had taken 
five years earlier when he had denounced the idea as ‘a very Irish proposal and 
ridiculous and unworthy attempt to throw dust in the eyes of the British public.’74 
Although Wolseley’s ‘minute’ initially received a mixed reception from the Army 
Board, it was agreed later by all the senior officers that using the Guards was the 
most economic and efficient way to strengthen the home establishment. Under the 
proposal, the Guards would be increased by raising a new battalion for the 
Coldstream Guards and one for the Scots Guards and out of the nine battalions of 
Guards which the increase created, three battalions would be stationed in the 
Mediterranean and be relieved at short intervals. Gibraltar was proposed as the site 
for the battalions.  
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The idea met with Lansdowne’s approval. It was his view that sending the 
Guards battalions abroad was less expensive than raising new line battalions. 
Moreover, by bringing the Guards into the system established for the line and 
converting them into a modified kind of infantry of the line, they would be better 
utilised and the Guardsmen would see overseas duty.
75
 Among the opposition, 
Campbell-Bannerman thought the Guards might gain from overseas experience but 
he strongly objected to constituting Gibraltar a Guards' station, as it ‘would be very 
injurious probably in its effects to the discipline and efficiency.’76 Of the defence 
intellectuals Dilke complained in a similar manner noting, ‘they would get no proper 
exercise in field work and in the garrison station they would become garrison 
troops.’ It would ‘spoil the only battalions which at the present time were fit for 
war.’77 Wilkinson was also critical and in an article on the subject he alleged that 
Wolseley would have preferred raising eleven new battalions than be part of a 
scheme to interfere with the Guards. While there is no record of the source he used 
to make his claim it can be speculated that Wolseley’s enthusiasm for the scheme 
would discount its veracity. Moreover, during the ‘Brigade of Guards’ debate 
Brodrick was instructed by Wolseley to state, ‘nothing has reached me which makes 
me think that it [the scheme] will be otherwise than popular with the men.’78  
Most of the service parliamentarians accepted the proposal although a concern 
was voiced that they were about to alter the conditions of a ‘Guardsman’s 
amusement.’79 Although the scheme’s critics made a determined effort the scheme 
had the sympathy of the Queen, who accepted the proposal but sought a delay for 
further enquiry,
80
 and the Duke of Cambridge and some senior ex-Guardsmen 
including Lord Wantage. With such influential support Lansdowne and Brodrick 
succeeded in passing the measure through Parliament. By utilizing the Guards 
Lansdowne enabled three line battalions abroad to return to Britain allowing three 
others abroad to then have a home battalion to support them. To establish parity it 
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was also announced that the Cameron Highlanders, which had only one battalion, 
would be given a second battalion thereby raising the infantry total to one hundred 
and forty-two, forming seventy-one linked battalions.  
In defending Cardwell’s system and re-establishing parity between the 
battalions Lansdowne respected the views of his military advisers. There is no 
indication that he underrated or attempted to undermine their proposals. When 
Wolseley suggested extending the four battalion system which already existed in the 
Rifle Corps and Rifle Brigade Lansdowne recognised the potential advantages of 
having a larger grouping which, in the event of an emergency, could remain in 
Britain and continue to draft recruits while the other three fought abroad.
81
 
Essentially, the scheme provided for the transfer of a small force abroad without the 
help of the Army reserve. Lansdowne instructed Knox, Stopford and Wood to 
examine the matter. On 2 December, the Army Board met and urged caution 
recalling the disruption caused by the establishment of linked battalions during 
Cardwell’s time.82  
In attempting to find the necessary drafts for overseas battalions and reducing 
the strength between those at home and those abroad Wolseley also suggested that 
extra men should be added to the infantry battalions in multiples of one hundred and 
fifty. Battalions abroad were generally kept at strength of 1,000 men and at home of 
seven hundred and twenty men. After Lansdowne and the senior officers discussed 
the matter it was decided that eighty should be added to the battalions raising the 
establishment to eight hundred men each. At the same time as Lansdowne brought 
forward this proposal he also introduced a scheme to enlist one hundred men from 
each of the newly strengthened battalions for a term of three years. This period of 
enlistment was four years shorter than the existing short service which comprised 
seven years with the colours and five with the reserve. This ‘experiment’, as 
Lansdowne described it, was adopted with caution as a fear prevailed that if the men 
chose to leave the Army at the end of the three years and go into the reserve this 
would diminish the drafts necessary for the Army in India.
83
 While he accepted this 
was a possibility he also believed that men would willingly make a ‘trial of the Army 
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for a short time, with the option of extending their service if they found their 
profession agreeable.’84 The press held that the measure was ‘admirable’ and the 
reforming civilians believed a good proportion would re-enlist at the end of three 
years. Haliburton and some of the strict Cardwellians were less optimistic.
85
 
Modifying the Army reserve had been the subject of a controversial debate 
prior to Lansdowne’s arrival at the War Office and had incited divisions among its 
officials. Being strongly opposed to any form of long service and regarding a 
moderate period of service with the colours as more than adequate Lansdowne 
valued the reserve as a significant asset to the British Army. He believed that the 
public were misinformed about it and that it was not a bogus organisation existing 
only on paper. It was his wish to provide a greater role for the reserve Army which 
had been founded by Cardwell during Lansdowne’s earlier period at the War Office 
in 1872. Lansdowne was determined to make it an essential part of the home  Army. 
In this pursuit he was supported by Buller and Wood who shared the view that men 
who were five years or less out of the colours had ‘not forgotten their work or lost 
their smartness.’ Maintaining the reserve was economically prudent. Per man they 
cost the country £9 a year against £55 for a soldier serving with the colours and for 
£700,000 a year the country obtained 80,000 seasoned men fit to take their places in 
the line. He believed that even if 12,000 of them were medically unfit, that still left 
53,000 to complete battalions to war strength and 15,000 to replace casualties. He 
estimated that to maintain a force of long service soldiers in the army equal in size to 
the force which with the reserves could be then mobilised would cost the taxpayer £5 
million more than that already voted for in the army estimates.
86
 Use of the reserve 
was, however, subject to law which prevented its use for minor military operations 
which could not be treated as ‘of imminent national danger or of great emergency.’87 
On such occasions experienced men were raised into expeditionary forces by 
stealing them from different battalions. This practice was against the concept of 
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regimental esprit de corps and was controversial. There was also no guarantee that 
sufficient men would be found.
 88
 
Lansdowne and his colleagues recognised that with Parliamentary approval 
they could address some of these controversial issues and make greater use of the 
reserve. By amending the Reserve Forces Act of 1882 Lansdowne believed he could 
increase the liability of the reserve so as to make a sufficient number of men 
available in circumstances that stopped short of the emergency conditions without 
which the force could not engage. By making the men liable for compulsory service 
during their first year in the reserve he also believed the War Office would obtain 
sufficient recruits.
89
 His first attempt in 1896 was objected to by Parliament and the 
press. Arnold-Forster took strong objection and The Broad Arrow noted, ‘it was a 
makeshift of the worst kind’ and required modification.90 In the spring of 1898 
Lansdowne sent a modified bill to Parliament and Dilke thought the measure one of 
‘the worst points in the present policy of Lord Lansdowne.’91 Although the bill did 
not satisfy Dilke it met little resistance within either Houses of Parliament and 
received the Royal Assent in July 1898. Under the terms of the bill reserve men were 
in their first year of service liable to be recalled for active service. It was limited to 
5,000 Reservists at a salary of 1s per day for their first year.  
In order to have a reserve and continue to attract men to the line Lansdowne 
was determined to improve the conditions of service and the image of the Army. The 
success of his military policy depended entirely on his ability to find recruits. In 
order to achieve a constant flow of recruits into the Army he had to address the 
popularity of the Army and persuade employers to employ Reservists and men in the 
Auxiliary Army.
92
 In contrast to the huge demand and fascination of war literature 
and military exploits a career in the Army was still shunned by the large majority of 
the populace. Soldiers were often subject to discrimination. In 1891 the Airey 
Committee found that soldiers were prevented from taking omnibuses because they 
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were dressed in uniform. Moreover, the sight of old soldiers begging in the streets 
only served to lessen the appeal of an Army life. Widespread rumours that the ranks 
of the Army were filled from ‘our gaols’, and that ‘the conditions under which our 
soldiers lived were scarcely consistent with common decency,’ were rumours 
Lansdowne assured the public ‘we are trying to kill.’93 He strongly believed that if 
voluntary service was to survive a soldier’s life should be ‘as attractive as it can be 
made, consistently with sound economy.’94 Lansdowne’s first measure for improving 
conditions in the Army was the modernization of Army accommodation. Guided by 
Florence Nightingale and her representations to the War Office, Lansdowne was 
determined to rid the Army of insanitary and old Army huts.
95
 He believed that 
nothing was so detrimental in respect to the health of the troops, their efficiency, 
comfort and the popularity of the service.
96
 He was also against constantly patching 
up old buildings as his predecessors had done.  
Besides improving the accommodation for a soldier Lansdowne also raised his 
level of pay. Among the incentives offered to soldiers to enter the Army pay was one 
of the most contentious, and no other issue divided the civilian and military officials 
more. Among Lansdowne’s proposals in December 1897 to reform the Army none 
raised Wolseley’s anger more than his comments on pay and the conditions of 
service. Lansdowne claimed soldiers were treated generously but Wolseley believed 
that they were being tricked.
97
 In 1892 Wolseley told the Wantage Committee that 
‘unless we can give a very high rate of pay we should always be obliged to take in 
“the waifs and strays”. I think that there are very few tramps in England who at some 
time or other have not been in the Army.’98 Haliburton doubted whether an increase 
in pay would have any effect on recruitment unless it was an extremely large one.
99
 
Campbell-Bannerman and Stanhope were of the same view. In fact Campbell-
Bannerman believed the inducement to enlist was not pay but ‘the military life.’100 
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Lansdowne also shared this view advocating that the ‘popularity of the Army was 
not merely a question of pay.’101 It was also his view that to retain soldiers ‘if we had 
to rely merely upon increased pay, I confess that I should look forward to the future 
with considerable misgivings…’102 
In his review of Army pay Lansdowne proposed awarding different levels of 
remuneration. While he recognised that the ‘benefit in kind’ of 15s a week for 
accommodation, food and clothes in addition to the soldier’s pay was adequate for an 
immature youth, the Army should offer better terms to adults fit for active service.
103
 
As such, marginal increments, including the abolition of grocery stoppage and 
deferred pay, were announced by Lansdowne in December 1897. It was his view that 
the Army should end grocery stoppage for tea, sugar, milk, vegetables and other 
articles which were not luxuries but common necessities. As established under the 
regulations then in force a deduction was made to soldiers’ pay of 3d a day for these 
items and it was compulsory. In effect the Army promised 1s and paid 9d, 
Lansdowne proposed to pay soldiers a clear 1s as soon as they were fully qualified.  
Lansdowne also questioned the value of deferred pay. This was the proportion 
of pay set aside and deferred until a soldier entered the reserve. The Army had first 
resorted to deferred pay in 1876 when Colonel Frederick Stanley (later 16
th
 Earl of 
Derby), the then Secretary of State for War, and his advisers, ‘got frightened at the 
prospect of the first batch of short service men being dismissed to civil life with 
nothing. In those days no extensions were allowed. A ‘howl’ was brewing. Stanley 
was told that the marine system was very popular. It was in servile imitation of that 
much vaunted marine system that the much abused deferred pay system was 
instituted!’104 It was believed by many civilians and military men, including Roberts, 
to be a temptation for men to leave the Army and should be abolished.
105
 Under the 
terms of deferred pay men were credited with 2d a day for up to twelve years’ 
service, or they could take a lump sum of £21 on leaving after seven years; it had to 
be repaid or renounced if a man re-enlisted. Although Lansdowne did not believe 
that the War Office should go so far as to abolish deferred pay, he thought it should 
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be reduced. He proposed a reduction of three quarters of the amount then paid to a 
soldier on leaving the colours. Hicks Beach wished to reduce it by even more and 
Lansdowne had to convince him, ‘if we reduce deferred pay…the soldier at home 
would gain by his free ration…but not much more than he would lose by the loss of 
three quarters of his deferred pay.’106 Wolseley told Lansdowne that his proposal 
would not do, ‘it will be howled at in every mess, and even the small minded officer 
who wants to keep the soldier, if he can do so, from leaving the colours at seven or 
eight years’ service, will scoff at the arrangement…to my mind it is cruel to the 
soldier to interfere with his deferred pay. You might add to it, but certainly not 
decrease it…there is a strong agitation against the War Office in the air…it has not 
friends, and as far as I am able to gather of these proposals about deferred pay and 
the ration stoppage, they will intensify the feeling.’107  
In late December 1897, Lansdowne was unable to prevent the Cabinet voting a 
large reduction in deferred pay. Welby, his Private Secretary, told him, ‘I do not 
think that £5 is a fair sum to start a man in civil life, and though we may have erred 
too much in the other direction, we surely don’t want to make it difficult for a man to 
pass to civil life and the reserve.’108 On 2 April 1898, the War Office announced 
basic pay would be 1s 3d before stoppages. Deferred pay was replaced by a messing 
allowance and a gratuity of £1 for each year’s service up to a maximum of £12.109 
Men transferred to the Army reserve after three years and men entitled to a pension 
received a gratuity of £2.
110
 Salisbury informed the Queen ‘the Army will be larger 
and better paid and the Cardwell system will be rendered rather more elastic. But the 
Cardwell system remains still there.’111 Wolseley made the analogy ‘you want to add 
half an inch to the height of a man’s collar and you recoup yourself by cutting the 
same amount from the tail of his coat.’112 
Starting an ex-soldier in civil life with adequate funds was part of 
Lansdowne’s policy to encourage society to look at military service as a path rather 
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than an obstacle to civil employment. Ex-soldiers when seeking employment were at 
a disadvantage owing to their age and lack of transferable skills.
113
 It was 
Lansdowne’s belief that the government should set an example to the private 
employer. In June 1896 he directed a letter to all government departments requesting 
them to state whether they would be prepared to reserve posts for discharged soldiers 
and Army reserve men.
114
 His scheme had the support of the service 
parliamentarians, although Cecil Norton wished it would go further: ‘I observed with 
satisfaction that the Secretary of State for War stated that there were some two 
thousand posts open to the soldier after he has served in the Army. Well, in my 
opinion, there ought to be at least five times that number.’115 The scheme also 
received support from the heads of the civil departments for the ‘2,000 posts 
annually’,116 but interestingly it was later revealed that the War Office itself 
employed very few of the ex soldiers.
117
 Although Lansdowne received little support 
for this scheme from his War Office colleagues, the energy with which he pressed 
for its adoption was indicative of his genuine belief in the importance of the measure 
and of his patrician ‘liberal’ nature.118  
Lansdowne also maintained that developing better conditions in the Army 
could be achieved by improving the relations between officers and soldiers. He 
believed that it was the responsibility of every officer to ‘raise the tone of the private 
soldier in the British Army.’119 His views were also shared by Wolseley. Explaining 
their position to Salisbury, Lansdowne remarked, that they were both determined to 
get rid of incompetent high military officers and ‘we are now very particular not only 
as to the colonels, but as to the seconds in command of regiments.’120 Officers that 
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exhibited an ever increasing interest in the welfare of their men were regarded by the 
military authorities as more deserving of advancement than those who did not.
121
 
For these improvements in the Army to succeed Lansdowne was dependent not 
just on obtaining recruits but retaining them too. Resolving the large annual efflux 
from the Army was of greater concern to him than the influx to the Army: ‘A sudden 
influx of recruits at one moment is followed by a sudden efflux at another, and 
thereby we depart from the sound maxim laid down by Lord Wantage’s Committee, 
that we should endeavour to maintain a constant and regular flow of recruits into the 
Army.’122 He was no stranger to the difficulties of recruiting. While at the War 
Office between 1872 and 1874 recruiting was in a most unsatisfactory condition and 
the ‘case of recruits is not what it formerly was but is far below what is desirable.’123 
By the end of the nineteenth century the nation expected a great deal more from its 
soldiers than in the 1870s and having voted to raise the establishment, Parliament 
and the taxpayers expected to see results. One of the ways of satisfying these 
demands was for the War Office to lower its physical standards and find recruits 
from beyond agricultural labourers in the urban slums. Among those recruited in 
1897, twenty percent were in their twentieth year, thirty percent were over twenty 
years of age and fifty percent enlisted at eighteen. The standard height for recruits 
was five feet and three and a half inches but thirty percent were admitted below that 
under the assumption that they would reach it within a reasonable time. 
It was the view of the public that the War Office was swamping the Army with 
immature boys of poor physique.
124
 Although Lansdowne, who was himself short in 
height, attempted to humour the public that ‘I confess to being myself in favour of 
the more moderate size, if for no other reason, because we smaller men present a 
smaller surface to the enemy when in action,’125 he was unable to humour his War 
Office colleagues, the service parliamentarians, the defence intellectuals or the press. 
While the average annual intake of infantry recruits in the years before ‘the War’ 
                                                          
121
 Lansdowne, ‘Lord Lansdowne on the Army’, The Times, 14 July 1898, p.10. 
122
 Lansdowne, ‘Lords Debate’, ‘Army (Increase in Strength), 4 February 1897, Hansard 4th Series, 
Vol.45, c.1257. 
123
 ‘Lord Sandhurt’s Motion in the House of Lords’, The Morning Post, 1 June 1874, p.6, BL. (5) (5) 
Lansdowne MSS, Add MS. 88906/13/9. 
124
 Lansdowne, ‘Lord Lansdowne on the Army’, The Times, 14 July 1898, p.10 
125
 Lansdowne, ‘Lord Lansdowne on the Army’, ibid., 10 December 1897, p.10. 
129 
 
was 33,815,
126
 and the additions to the line amounted to nine battalions, five of 
which were raised by March 1899,
127
 this concealed the reality that there was in 
Britain both a manpower crisis and an Army unfit for war. In May 1897 the sixty-
five service MPs drafted a memorandum on the state of the Army for Salisbury. 
‘Couched in moderate and patriotic language’ and without wishing to recast the 
existing system it noted that that system had reached its ‘full development’ and was 
unsatisfactory.
128
 It was the opinion of the military press that, ‘the whole subject 
bristles with difficulties in a country where enlistment is voluntary and in which 
general prosperity is diametrically opposed to recruiting.’129 As the situation 
worsened Lansdowne was informed by Brodrick that ‘we are in a bad way about the 
line battalions…Recruits are coming in fast though not so fast for the Guards as is 
necessary to make the number. But the number of specials [immature youths below 
the physical standard required to reach efficiency] is very large and the extra strain 
of South Africa coupled with the number of young soldiers in the Med[itteranean] 
leaves us with no battalion to send anywhere.’130 Lansdowne accepted Brodrick’s 
arguments. He was aware of the recruiting difficulty and that the quality of recruits 
was unsatisfactory.
131
 But he also believed that ‘although many specials were 
enlisted most reached the standard within a few months.’132 Wolseley was even more 
concerned than Brodrick and Lansdowne, informing Buller, ‘over one third are 
below even the low physical standard laid down for recruits. In fact at this moment 
over one half of the home Army are unfit to carry a pack or do a week’s - I might say 
a day’s - hard work in the field.’133 He and the other members of the Army Board 
could see nothing for it but a significant increase in pay. To Dilke there were too 
many boys in them [the battalions], and they were there for too short a time.
134
 To 
Arnold-Forster the War Office was suppressing the truth about the number of 
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soldiers in the colours: ‘They tell us they have got them, but I say they have not; they 
do not exist, and the battalions the War Office pretends to have got are not battalions 
in any just and fair sense of the word.’135 It was his view that the additions 
Lansdowne proposed making could not have been recommended by Wolseley 
because ‘he knows they are not enough.’136 Although both Lansdowne and Wolseley 
were motivated to increase the size of the Army Wolseley’s demands for infantry 
and artillery increases were far greater than Lansdowne’s; the latter’s willingness 
and ability to sanction increases being influenced by financial considerations.  
In January 1897 suffering from a throat infection which was complicated by an 
attack of jaundice, Wolseley’s health declined and he was forced to take a leave of 
absence from the War Office. When he was able to resume work in September his 
memory was impaired and many of his colleagues noticed that he often failed to 
remember having met people or having written memos and minutes.
137
 On a rare 
visit to the War Office during his period of recovery he noted ‘there was an air of 
universal languor everywhere.’138 Alarmed by the situation that was developing 
within a month of returning to work, he publicly announced his concern for the state 
of the Army remarking. ‘Our Army machinery is overstrained and is out of gear. I 
speak in the presence of many whose technical knowledge will enable them to 
contradict me if I am wrong, when I say that, if a machine which is calculated to 
manufacture a certain amount of stuff annually has some twenty per cent extra work 
forced upon it, the machine will sooner or later, certainly break down. Yet that is 
what we are risking with our Army. Our Army machinery is no longer able to meet 
effectively the demands now made upon it.’139  
The following week Brodrick wrote to Lansdowne with an idea, ‘to put a 
certain number of facts before the public as a grave problem for the government and 
the country to discuss. This will rouse people and get the mind of the Cabinet into a 
channel which will prepare them for any proposal you may make.’140 These ‘facts’ 
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Brodrick publicly raised at Guildford on 13 October. Echoing the concerns of 
Wolseley’s speech he stated that the calls upon the Army had become incessant with 
50,000 men engaged on the North West Frontier of India, two battalions on service 
in Crete, two additional battalions and a force of artillery stationed in South Africa 
and British troops engaged in Egypt. It was his conclusion that the Cardwell balance 
was unhinged.
141
 As public attention caught on to the crisis the Queen also noted that 
the Army was in a bad state.
142
 Seizing the opportunity to reinvigorate the reform 
discourse Arnold-Forster initiated an attack on the War Office timed to coincide with 
the annual discussion among the Army Board and Cabinet of the Army estimates. In 
seven letters, he set out to show that the principles of Army organisation were 
contrary to common sense. ‘The system has broken down at every point, the linked 
battalions do not perform their mutual offices, the depôts do not fill up their gaps, the 
required recruits are not forthcoming, those who are obtained are not of the right 
stamp or quality.’143 His case against the War Office was that ‘the Army system has 
broken down.’144 Initially Lansdowne hesitated to refute the indictment. It can be 
speculated this was prompted by Roberts who informed him ‘that although Mr 
Arnold-Forster’s facts and figures in his letters to The Times may not be strictly 
accurate in all their details, his statements are substantially correct. It will be difficult 
to reply to his indictment.’145  
After Arnold-Forster published his third letter, Lansdowne wrote to 
Haliburton, who by then had retired from the War Office, saying, ‘Arnold-Forster’s 
“facts” are so damaging that it will scarcely do to leave them unchallenged.’146 He 
suggested that Haliburton take up the ‘cudgels for us’ and write to The Times, though 
not as too uncompromising a partisan of the status quo.
147
 Not since the Crimean 
War were the public showing such anxiety about the state of the Army and the fact 
that it was not what it ought to be. As events developed Lansdowne used the 
situation and the public’s anxiety as a negotiating tool with the Cabinet to obtain 
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new measures for the Army. These he set out for the Cabinet in his ‘Outlines of 
Army Proposals.’148 These proposals which were framed in consultation with the 
senior officers were supportive of Wolseley’s view that a numerical increase was 
‘urgently, I may say imperatively necessary.’149 It was Wolseley’s view at this time 
that twelve additional battalions were required as neither home defence nor the 
requirements of colonial defence had been covered adequately in his earlier minute 
of 30 October 1896.
150
  
While Lansdowne negotiated with the Cabinet for his Army proposals he 
spoke at the annual meeting of the Primrose League in Edinburgh and set out the 
position of the government’s military policy. The Queen was ‘quite pleased’ at the 
way in which Lansdowne ‘laid the case before the country.’151 The Times noted ‘Our 
correspondent “Reform” agrees with us in regarding Lord Lansdowne’s speech…as 
the most hopeful symptom that has yet appeared of a disposition in high quarters to 
look military facts in the face and shows that the Secretary of State for War is not yet 
dominated by the habit of mechanically repeating machine made opinions which is 
so painfully conspicuous in the letters of Sir Arthur Haliburton.’152  
While the proposals were acceptable to the press, they met resistance in 
Cabinet and the general tone was unsatisfactory to Lansdowne. Chamberlain, who 
disliked the system of linked battalions, was against Lansdowne’s attempt to add ten 
new infantry battalions to the Army. He was in favour, ‘(1) Of any increase in the 
artillery believing the Army should be especially strong in that arm. (2) Any 
expedients to improve the terms of the services and to secure a better class of 
recruits. (3) Of doing all necessary to make the Militia and Volunteers a really 
effective force. In my judgement Lansdowne’s scheme does not do any of these 
things.’153 He made no attempt to conceal ‘his utter disbelief in the policy which he 
described as an attempt to prop up a rickety and useless system.’ Lord James of 
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Hereford, Long, Akers Douglas, Ritchie and others expressed similar views.
154
 
Hamilton who did not believe it was possible to set up any better system than that 
which existed believed Lansdowne’s proposals would ‘not altogether meet the 
difficulties.’155 Hicks Beach was unwilling to defend the proposals and Salisbury 
was ‘frankly incredulous’ and unwilling to speak up during the debates.156 
Lansdowne believed the Cabinet could demolish their critics who ‘were clamouring 
for the abandonment of the present system’ but it was his concern that ‘if others find 
out that we are half hearted and they will find it out, the task is hopeless.’157 Rather 
than raise unnecessary difficulties he offered to resign. Salisbury refused the offer 
stating, ‘I do not think you need anticipate any adverse vote on any essential portion. 
Some modification of figures may become necessary, but on them Governments 
have always to discuss and, if possible, to compromise.’158 In the compromise that 
followed the Treasury decided to sanction six of Lansdowne’s ten battalions and 
£115,000 less than he had requested for the abolition of the grocery stoppage: a sum 
which Wolseley received with ‘very great satisfaction.’159 Although Wolseley was 
satisfied by this concession he remained steadfastly of the opinion up until the 
outbreak of war in South Africa that the Regular Army was not strong enough to 
fulfil the objects of Stanhope’s Memorandum and recruiting would remain a 
difficulty unless sufficient wages were paid to the soldiers.
160
 Lansdowne was also 
satisfied with the Cabinet’s offer. Recalling the incident a few years later he 
remarked ‘how very thoroughly in what a favourable spirit Wolseley’s proposals 
were dealt with by himself and the Cabinet.’161  
By demonstrating his willingness to listen to his critics and adapt Lansdowne 
conciliated many of his critics’ complaints. Dilke believed ‘if honestly worked out 
and not spoiled by the War Office ‘Jacobins’ the three year enlistment may perhaps 
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lead to the right modifications of the system,’162 and even Arnold-Forster recognised 
that he ‘got a series of promises’ from Lansdowne.163 It was his belief, however, that 
he was not quite sure they would all be accomplished, but that there would be an 
attempt to carry them out which was vouched for by the fact they were made by 
Lansdowne. He remained critical that no promise to reform the War Office was 
made and that the linked battalion system would continue.
164
 In a letter to 
Lansdowne the service parliamentarians expressed ‘with satisfaction,’ his proposals 
while imploring him to give greater attention to regimental esprit de corps and the 
‘reorganisation of all the land forces of the Empire with a view to their effective 
preparation for war.’165  
The demands put forward by the service parliamentarians had been 
‘constantly’ before Lansdowne since he had started work at the War Office. 
Although much of his first two years were spent defending the short service system 
as established by Cardwell at no point during that period did he neglect the other 
Army services.
166
 Under Cardwell’s original scheme neither the artillery nor the 
cavalry were affected by short service and localisation, though seven years in the 
colours and five in the reserve were gradually extended to those forces. Territorial 
localisation was difficult to introduce because both forces enlisted men for general 
service and both sought smaller numbers of men who could perform specialist 
duties. But these forces had to supply drafts for units overseas. 
‘Of all the puzzling problems the War Office’ had to cope with, Lansdowne 
did not know any ‘more difficult or more puzzling’ than cavalry organisation.167 In 
1896 he approved an Army Board scheme to reorganise the cavalry dividing the 
twenty-eight regiments of that force into nine brigades of three regiments each: one 
regiment out of each brigade being in India, one at home on a higher establishment 
and another at home on a lower establishment. In each brigade the regiment at home 
on the lower establishment prepared the draft for the sister regiment in India and the 
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regiment on the higher establishment was ready to take the field at once.
168
 The odd 
regiment was used ‘with advantage in the colonies, another battalion of infantry 
being brought home in its place.’169 The proposal was believed by Campbell-
Bannerman to be ‘a step in the right direction.’170 The following year cavalry depôts 
were abolished and ‘brigading’ was introduced to supply drafts more efficiently for 
the overseas regiments. In 1898 the new organisation broke down and the depôts 
were re-established. To one of the service parliamentarians the home regiments were 
deficient in men and horses and the strain of sending men from one regiment to 
another was very great.
171
 In 1899 a new scheme was proposed so as to protect the 
eight regiments on the higher home establishment which contrary to the 
reorganisation of 1896 had been called on to provide drafts for Indian service. As in 
1896 it was the government’s policy that the balance of drafts would be taken from 
the eight regiments on the lower establishment.
172
 Each one of these regiments was 
also increased by sixty men and twenty horses. On the outbreak of war in 1899 the 
regiments of the cavalry were sixteen at home and twelve abroad.
173
 
Lansdowne also set himself the task of improving the Royal Regiment of 
Artillery. At this time nearly half the horse and field artillery batteries served in India 
while the other half remained at home and the garrison artillery batteries were 
divided into roughly equal numbers between home, India and the Colonies. The 
force was highly inefficient and according to Dilke, ‘we had not a field artillery 
which was equal to the needs of the Empire.’174 Lansdowne’s motivation to 
reorganise the force was partly driven by a concern that in the event of an invasion 
‘the Army would need to place a large number of Auxiliary troops in the field whose 
efficiency would not be as great as that of the Regular Army and it was incumbent 
that these troops should be supported by an ample force of artillery.’ His 
reorganisation was also partly driven by political reasons. The artillery had been 
reorganised by the Liberals and in his view ‘there are reasons for doubting whether 
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the new organization is in all respects a success.’175 In 1897, Lansdowne added a 
new battery of field artillery to the establishment bringing the total to forty-five 
which was the full complement for the three Army Corps authorized for home 
defence. He also rearmed the horse artillery with a new ‘12 pounder gun’ and the 
field artillery gun, commonly called the ‘12 pounder’, was converted into the ‘15 
pounder.’176 The War Office reverted to the depôt system, abandoned in 1893 for the 
purpose of drilling artillery recruits before they were posted to the batteries.
177
 
In 1898 Wolseley proposed a further reorganisation of the Royal Regiment into 
mounted and dismounted branches. It was his opinion that the force had so largely 
increased that it had become too unwieldy an organisation to be managed from 
headquarters and that the system of promotion throughout one large body of men 
gave rise to constant shifting of officers between stations that were often widely 
apart and this was costly and inconvenient. His scheme involved the creation of six 
regiments of field artillery, five of which contained horse batteries and the creation 
of six field artillery depôts, two at Woolwich and one at Aldershot, at Colchester, at 
Shorncliffe and in Ireland. His reorganisation also provided for the relief of the 
batteries by brigade divisions and the finishing of drafts to the batteries abroad partly 
from the batteries of the same regiment at home and partly from the depôts after 
training with the batteries. The garrison artillery he proposed dividing into seven 
regiments each of which would contain one or more batteries of mountain artillery. 
The existing depôts would be abolished and the recruits received and trained by the 
companies.
178
 Edwin Markham, the Inspector-General of Ordnance, doubted the 
advisability of making the change. Lansdowne also believed that if the artillery was 
divided into regiments a smaller number than six (horse and field) would be 
convenient.
179
 The following year the Royal Regiment was separated into two corps 
of men and two distinct cadres of officer. The office of Deputy Adjutant-General 
Royal Artillery was abolished and officers going into either corps from 1 June 1899 
could no longer be transferred to other corps without their own consent.
180
 In 
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implementing Wolseley’s proposals Lansdowne authorised fifteen new batteries of 
field artillery, five of which were raised by March 1899 and the others in hand and 
due for completion by the end of 1900. Progress was also made to build up the re-
established depôts of field and horse artillery.
181
 To one section of the press ‘a stroke 
of pen cannot effect reorganization as drastic as this.’182 To another section 
Lansdowne’s reorganisation ‘was a confession that the proportion of artillery had 
been unduly reduced by some of his predecessors.’183 
While determined to maintain in a high state of preparedness the strength and 
organisation of these arms of the Regular Army Lansdowne was also keen to 
increase the efficiency of the Auxiliary Army. It was one of the demands of the 
reformers in and out of Parliament to draw more closely together the different forces 
of the Army. By framing his reorganisation of the Volunteers and Militia to meet this 
aspiration, Lansdowne not only appeased his critics but was able to influence the 
direction of the reform discourse. His reorganisation of the Auxiliary Army largely 
excluded changes to the Yeomanry until the events of ‘Black Week’ made it 
necessary to re-examine the British Army’s strategy for the prosecution of ‘the War’ 
and the Yeomanry was restructured accordingly. The discussion of Auxiliary 
reorganisation in this chapter will therefore be devoted to the Militia and Volunteers 
forces. 
It was Lansdowne’s opinion that in the case of a great national emergency 
Britain would need to look outside the Regular Army for reinforcements. The 
auxiliary Army was far more visible to society than the Regular Army and it was his 
opinion that in a nation free of compulsory service, society should ‘give every 
encouragement and facility to those who were prepared to undertake military 
service.’184 As a bridge between the Army and society, in purely political terms, they 
also made conscription less urgent, a fact that Lansdowne was aware of. Speaking at 
a dinner given by the Lord Mayor of London at the Mansion House in July 1898 he 
recalled a conversation with an advocate of compulsory service, in which the latter 
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said his ‘chief complaint against the Volunteers was that their existence stood in the 
way of the introduction of compulsory service.’ 185  
Likened to that ‘proverbial old maid who is always ready but never wanted,’ 
the Volunteers had a ‘checkered career.’186 In 1873, Lansdowne informed Cardwell 
‘there can be no doubt that the Volunteer movement is in many parts of the country 
losing vigour and in some instances probably on its way to extinction.’187 Although 
it was his view twenty-three years later that the force had improved,
188
 The Times 
was less convinced reporting that they were below their establishment number and 
there was a very serious lack of officers ‘which taken in conjunction with the 
comparative inefficiency of some of those now serving, must materially affect the 
military value of these Auxiliaries.’189 In the years before ‘the War’ Lansdowne 
attempted to address these issues with the support of Wolseley and the civilians at 
the War Office. It is notable that in 1896 Lansdowne held the view that the 
Volunteers ‘could not have a better friend’ than Wolseley,190 and yet after leaving 
the War Office one of his principal criticisms of Wolseley was that, ‘if he had paid 
more attention to the duties assigned to him by Order-in-Council…he might…have 
enabled us to turn to better account that large number of Auxiliary forces that we 
have in this country, and which…have been not a little neglected during the last five 
years.’191 At this time the Volunteers comprised around sixty-seven percent of the 
total Auxiliary Army and with over half their battalions defending the ‘great base 
around London.’ 192 Although the Volunteers prided themselves on their self-
sufficiency, that they received an average annual allocation of £624,500 from the 
Army estimates disguised the fact they were controlled by government. In his first 
estimates Lansdowne paid them a full year’s capitation allowance to clear their 
                                                          
185
 Lansdowne, ‘Lord Lansdowne on the Army,’ ibid., 14 July 1898, p.10. 
186
 Dartmouth, ‘Lords Debate’, ‘Volunteer Rifle Ranges’, 17 July 1899, Hansard 4th Series, Vol.74, 
c.978. 
187
 Lansdowne to Cardwell, ‘Minute’, ‘Reports of Generals of Districts on Auxiliary Forces’, 18 
March 1873, BL. (5) Lansdowne MSS, Add MS. 88906/13/9. 
188
 Lansdowne, ‘Lord Lansdowne and the Volunteers’, The Times, 17 February 1896, p.11. 
189
 ‘Editorial’, ‘The Army Estimates’, ibid., 10 March 1896, p.10. 
190
 Lansdowne, ‘Lord Lansdowne and the Volunteers’, ibid., 17 February 1896, p.11.  
191
 Lansdowne, ‘Lords Debate’, ‘War Office Administration - Duties of Commander-in-Chief’, 4 
March 1901, Hansard 4
th
 Series, Vol.90, c.352. 
192
 Wyndham, ‘Commons Debate’, ‘Number of Land Forces’, 12 February 1900, ibid., Vol.78, 
c.1264. 
139 
 
existing debts, and £10 to each officer for a new outfit.  They also received £10 to 
attend a course of instruction.
193
  
The dearth of officers in the Regular and Auxilary Army was a ‘serious 
drawback’,194 and ‘one of the most formidable difficulties which military reformers 
had to consider.’195 In regard to the Auxiliary army Lansdowne and Brodrick 
introduced a ‘great change’ which fixed the Volunteer officers’ period of command 
at four years with power of renewal.
196
  Recognising that ‘practice with the rifle is 
absolutely essential to the efficiency of the Volunteers,’197 he also did ‘everything 
within reasonable limits to afford’198 them opportunities for improving musketry. In 
1896 they were issued with the new Lee-Metford rifle which had an improved range 
and accuracy. It, however, added ‘to our difficulties’ by focusing public attention on 
whether rifle ranges in their locality ‘are or are not safe.’199 Of the 1,200 ranges in 
Britain in 1897 no fewer than 1,130 were ranges used solely by the Volunteers. It 
was Lansdowne’s personal contention that there should be an inquiry into the 
condition of those ranges. Responding to public concerns and acting on his inquiry 
Lansdowne passed through Parliament an amended Military Lands Act and Military 
Works Act to provide funds for the Volunteers to purchase or share ranges with the 
Regular Army and Militia. Lansdowne also granted the Volunteers legislative means 
to recover fines under the Summary Jurisdiction Act.
200
   
His ability to manage the reform discourse through increasing the efficiency of 
the Volunteers was mirrored in his modification of the Militia, a force which he 
believed stood between the ‘Regular forces and Volunteers.’201 In 1874, he found the 
Militia Army, which was not then under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, 
was threatened with low recruitment numbers. Its popularity suffered because of 
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poor accommodation and clothing described as ‘bad in quality and ridiculous in 
appearance.’202 Similarly, in 1895, Lansdowne found the Militia below its 
establishment and short of officers. While he could claim no ‘practical acquaintance’ 
with the Militia,
203
 he believed it had suffered most from the fact the Army had never 
been constructed on a scientific basis and had ‘grown with the growth of the 
nation.’204  It had been plundered at one end by the Regulars and encroached on at 
the other by the Volunteers.
205
 This had occurred principally due to one of 
Cardwell’s schemes which moved the Militia from its old constitutional purpose as a 
county force, into a role where its primary function was as a source of supply for the 
Regular Army. The Report of the Localisation Committee of 1872 made it clear that 
the Cardwell scheme contemplated the systematic use of the Militia as the reserve 
for the Regular Army.
206
 In his attempt to redress the popularity and purpose of the 
Militia Lansdowne encouraged an existing trend which saw the force as a stepping 
stone to a Regular commission. Many young candidates preferred to join the line 
through the Militia rather than Sandhurst. By establishing interchangeability of 
officers between the two arms he believed the War Office would render the Militia 
more attractive. To achieve this the War Office offered a large number of 
commissions. In 1898, three hundred officers of the line were provided from the 
Militia. The War Office also made an arrangement whereby officers of the line could 
end their service with the Militia.
207
  
In attempting to strengthen the Army and resolve the recruiting difficulty 
Brodrick suggested making selected Militia battalions available for service abroad to 
meet emergencies. This idea had first been proposed by Lord Raglan with the full 
approval of the service parliamentarians during the administration of the Liberal 
government.
208
 Lansdowne approved of the idea as did Wolseley, although the latter 
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noted that such regiments to be of any use for such service would have to be much 
more fully trained.
209
  
It was believed that by establishing closer links to the Regular Army in a time 
of peace would smooth their expansion of the Regulars in a time of war. In June 
1898 Lansdowne introduced a measure whereby certain Militia battalions or 
individual militiamen could serve as ‘a special section’ for service abroad. Under the 
provisions if seventy-five percent of a battalion were willing to accept the liability 
then the whole battalion would become available and receive additional training and 
an extra bounty of £1. If the whole battalion did not accept liability then an 
individual Militiaman could accept to serve abroad with a Regular battalion of his 
territorial regiment for a year for an extra bounty of £1.
210
 It was anticipated that by 
accepting the terms the Militia would voluntarily convert itself into an offensive and 
defensive organisation. By this proposal it was envisaged the status of the force 
would be raised and it would command respect from the public and be an attractive 
proposition to recruits.
211
 
Among the service parliamentarians the strongest critic of Lansdowne’s 
attempts to improve the Militia force was Lord Wemyss who, as a traditional Militia 
Colonel, believed ‘it is the basis of our military system.’212 It was his view that the 
government should not wait until an emergency arose before making use of the 
power which they possessed in the Militia but that they should raise it compulsorily 
by ballot.
213
 Lansdowne believed ‘it may be that we shall someday be driven to 
Compulsory Service, but I do not think I am wrong in saying that the instincts of our 
countrymen are too strongly opposed to it.’214 Lansdowne’s sentiments were shared 
by his Cabinet colleagues. Salisbury believed passing the Militia ballot would ‘carry 
excitement at least, possibly consternation, into every house and every cottage where 
there is a family in this country.’215 And as regards conscription ‘I do not think for 
the present, so far as our eyes can reach, that that kind of legislation or that species 
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of defence is open to us.’216  While Lansdowne had no desire to pass the Militia 
ballot measure through Parliament he accepted the machinery was largely obsolete 
and troublesome, and offered to have it examined and revised.
 217
 By conciliating 
Wemyss in this way the service parliamentarian was satisfied he was getting 
something by degrees. As the bill was withdrawn in 1897, Wemyss noted: ‘We are 
getting an admission.’218 Although Wemyss made further attempts to pass the Militia 
Ballot Bill through Parliament, public antipathy to compulsion remained firm and 
Lansdowne’s position was unchallenged.  
One of the most obvious areas in which Lansdowne was able to demonstrate to 
the public the benefits of bringing the Auxiliaries into greater alignment with the 
Regular Army was through training and manoeuvres.
219
 His first attempt to introduce 
a Manoeuvres bill in 1896 was abandoned owing to Parliamentary delays during the 
Committee stage. The following year he introduced a new bill which was passed by 
Parliament; balancing as fairly as possible between ‘military considerations’ and ‘the 
interests of the public.’220 Around this time he also obtained funds to purchase sixty 
square miles on Salisbury Plain for use as a manoeuvring ground
221
 and camp where 
a large part of the Army would find a permanent domicile.
222
 As a landowner he took 
a close interest in the purchase of the site and maintained that the land purchases 
should cause minimal disturbance to farming and farmers.  
Among those estates purchased by the government was Hicks Beach’s estate at 
Netheravon. Given notice of the compulsory purchase of the land for military 
purposes he wrote to Lansdowne ‘I will put my feelings and wishes, as a landowner 
entirely aside in considering the matter. If it be best for the War Office to take the 
area now suggested by the soldiers, by all means do it.’223 The Netheravon affair was 
a political embarrassment to Hicks Beach.
224
 It was alleged that the site was grossly 
overvalued. Arnold White, a gad-fly journalist, complained ‘Sir Michael had failed 
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in his responsibilities and this failure had cost the taxpayer a large sum of money, 
while he himself had benefited to the tune of £55,700.’225 As the government 
continued its acquisitions on Salisbury Plain, Lansdowne remarked ‘people will be 
disappointed if there are no manoeuvres in 1898 and I should like to have them on a 
grand scale. I have often wished that we could have combined Naval and Military 
manoeuvres - the landing of the Army corps in Bantry Bay or something of that 
sort.’226 In September 1898 manoeuvres were held in front of a crowd of 80,000 
spectators. To Lansdowne ‘the troops have come in for a good deal of praise and 
even The Times civil. But amongst the leaders of the others there has been flying 
about much envy, hatred, malice.’227 Two months later he remarked ‘I have seen it 
said that these manoeuvres which cost the country something like £150,000 were a 
great waste of public money. I incline to the view…that the manoeuvres would have 
been cheap at any price. It is at any rate, the first time in the history of this country 
that 50,000 men have taken the field in peace time.’228 Wolseley praised the 
performance of all ranks, but noted ‘the need of considerable additions to our supply 
and transport establishments’ and ‘the general unsuitability of civil transport for 
military purposes.’229  
Although Lansdowne understood the importance of preparing the Army for 
war and addressing the demands of the service parliamentarians on this subject, he 
did not do enough to reform the tactics of the Army. This became evident during ‘the 
War’ when one of the many criticisms made against him personally was the failure 
of the War Office to prepare the Army for war. While this criticism will be discussed 
further in the thesis, the archival record substantiates that he did understand the 
importance of being prepared. Moreover, it should be noted that he did not act in a 
vacuum. In the years before ‘the War’ Wilkinson claimed that the treatment of Army 
questions by the Government and by Parliament ‘is that neither the Cabinet nor the 
majority of members of Parliament believe that there will ever be another war in 
which this country can be concerned.’230 Such claims of political complacency, 
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however, overlook the extent of military complacency. That Lansdowne did not do 
more to improve the tactics which rapidly changing defence strategies required was 
because on matters of military expertise he was willing to defer to the advice of his 
generals. While methods of training were publicly questioned both in and out of 
Parliament, the generals themselves and Wolseley in particular were uncertain how 
to adapt. As Howard Vincent, one of the service parliamentarians noted, ‘to take 
musketry alone; nothing is more certain than that firing by volleys is absolutely 
ineffectual.’231 Similar sentiments were also made public by military thinkers at 
lectures at the Royal United Services Institution in 1899 and 1900. Wolseley was not 
temperamentally suited or willing to adjust his role as Commander-in-Chief to that 
of a Chief of Staff,
232
 and, although he appreciated better than Lansdowne that ‘we 
train for war not drill’, he did not transform that into practice.  To quote one of the 
service parliamentarians on the lessons of the war, ‘tactics and formations will have 
to be revised - the close order is done.’233 Unwilling to accept his own responsibility 
for the situation that developed, Wolseley claimed that the problem lay with the 
generals. They were ‘the old fashioned lot who were promoted by seniority before I 
came into office and are mostly poor creatures as regards knowledge of war.’234 To 
The Times correspondent Leo Amery the performance of the Volunteers and 
Yeomanry in South Africa ‘do[es] not prove that the art of war is a thing which 
requires no training, but they do prove that general intelligence is so useful an 
element in the composition of a soldier that even a very short training will enable an 
intelligent man to equal inferior men who have been trained on unintelligent and 
routine lines.’235 
While wishing to improve the training for the Army, Lansdowne also wanted 
to educate it and with Wolseley’s assistance military education was reorganised and 
a stimulus given to the Staff College. Lansdowne acknowledged the great value of 
education to soldiers of all ranks and particularly in ‘the case of a private soldier…as 
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a means of fitting him for civil employment at the conclusion of his Army career.’236 
He also believed that ‘education in the Army must be supervised and directed from 
the Headquarters, but such direction might…be exercised by any member of the 
Headquarters staff whose standing and knowledge of the Service gave him the 
requisite amount of authority.’237 It was Wolseley who first mentioned to Lansdowne 
that the whole question of Army Schools required re-consideration.
238
 After further 
discussion on this subject Lansdowne was convinced that the War Office could 
dispense with Army Schools and position those they wanted to retain under the 
control of the general officers commanding. In 1898 he proposed a committee to 
report on the subject.
239
 Before the end of that year the existing arrangement of an 
Officers’ Education subdivision and a Soldiers’ Education subdivision were 
reorganised such that the former became part of the Military Secretary’s division and 
the latter became the Army School Subdivision of the Adjutant-General’s 
department.
240
 
As well as improving the standard of the Education Department, Lansdowne 
also reorganised the Army Medical Department. Inspired by Florence Nightingale, 
with whom he had been acquainted since 1865, Lansdowne approved the 
amalgamation of various nursing societies to support the Army Medical Department 
in time of war. While assisting the nurses Lansdowne also altered the conditions of 
service for doctors. His interest in and desire to improve the service was an issue he 
and his wife were closely involved with throughout their careers. While in India he 
implemented some of Florence Nightingale’s sanitary recommendations and 
continued the Dufferin’s nursing scheme. During ‘the War’ and the First World War 
Lansdowne House was headquarters of ‘The Widows and Orphans of Soldiers and 
Sailors Fund’ and during the First World War Lansdowne was also President of the 
British Red Cross and converted the stables at Bowood into an Army hospital. He 
once remarked ‘if we had to choose between the credit belonging to the artillerist 
who has, let us say, invented a new form of dum-dum bullet and the credit belonging 
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to the surgeon who has contrived the means of extracting it painlessly and saving the 
shattered limbs, we should not hesitate in deciding whose part we should prefer.’241  
The Army Medical Department was predominantly a male preserve divided 
into two distinct organisations.
242
 So short of doctors was the department that 
civilian medics were employed to ‘fill up the gaps’ at many military stations.243 
‘Giving serious consideration to the causes,’ Lansdowne received ‘various 
deputations’244 and consulted with his advisers. The grievances complained of were 
both sentimental and practical. Complaints of the former kind were that the status 
and duties of doctors were not recognised, and those of the practical kind were of the 
inordinate amount of Foreign Service and the constant changes to the service. 
Although Lansdowne was aware of the complaints made against this department in 
1896 it was not until 1898 that legislation was enacted in Parliament to bring them to 
effect. Informed by his advisers that the concession of rank would settle the matter 
he took ‘the profession at its word.’245 He believed that it would be impossible to 
render service in the Army really popular with the profession unless the Army 
Medical Staff and the Medical Staff Corps were formed into a single corps and the 
officers within that corps given military titles corresponding to their rank and 
precedence in the Army. He obtained the Queen’s consent to style the new corps the 
Royal Army Medical Corps in the belief that the medical profession would welcome 
the compliment.
246
 Under the warrant instituting the new corps as a single corps 
officers were given combatant titles of the same rank structure as the rest of the 
Army and delegated full executive and administrative responsibility. 
As rapid changes in social conditions developed during this period so profound 
changes occurred in military technology. These changes included improvements to 
the machine gun, the use of breech-loading rifles and the introduction of smaller 
calibre ammunition.
247
 Lansdowne was not only responsible for providing the Army 
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with the best guns available but also with providing armaments for coaling stations 
and fortresses both in the Colonies and nationally. Whereas previous Secretaries of 
State used military loans to fund arms and armament requirements Lansdowne 
discontinued this practice. He believed that ‘there is so much uncertainty as to the 
life-time of a gun and changes are so frequent in the type of our artillery  - the 
weapon which represents at one moment acme of perfection becomes so suddenly 
and so rapidly obsolete.’248 These factories for the production of guns (The Royal 
Gun Factory), carriages (The Royal Carriage Department) and ammunition (The 
Royal Laboratory) were all in the Woolwich Arsenal. The War Office also produced 
explosives at Waltham Abbey and small arms at Enfield and Sparkbrook, 
Birmingham.
249
 Even with this output the War Office depended on the additional 
capacity of the private sector or the ‘trade.’ This use of the trade included the major 
munitions contractors including Armstrong, Vickers and Whitworth who produced 
artillery; the Birmingham Small Arms Co. and the London Small Arms Co. which 
manufactured service rifles; and Webley, who made the service revolvers. 
The Ordnance Factories at Woolwich were in a ‘muddle’ when Lansdowne 
started at the War Office in 1895.
250
  Blamed for ‘delay, extravagance, and 
unreliability’ they were unable to compete with the trade and custom fell away.251 
Friction and confusion between departments were rife. Changing the status quo was 
slow and until 1898 the only notable reform made was when the Director of Artillery 
was retitled as Inspector-General of Factories in 1896. Lansdowne was not unaware 
of the difficulties but owing to financial considerations it was not until 1898 that he 
took steps to reorganise the factories and the Ordnance Department which conceived, 
designed and manufactured warlike stores.
252
 In March 1898 Powell Williams, the 
Finance Secretary, announced the appointment of Frederick Donaldson, a civilian 
with a background in mechanical engineering, as Deputy Director-General of the 
Ordnance Factories and the abolition of the separate design branches managed by 
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military superintendents.
253
 The appointment was opposed by the press who felt the 
exclusion of a military officer ‘is not only a reflection but a direct injustice to the 
service.’254 To the service parliamentarian James Bevan Edwards the ‘transference of 
the Ordnance Factories from the military to the civil side of the War Office is the 
gradual divorce of these factories from the Army.’255 The death of William 
Anderson, the Director-General, the following December naturally opened a large 
field of discussion as to his successor and provided Lansdowne with an opportunity 
to mollify his critics. With Brodrick’s advice he decided to give the appointment to a 
man of military background to ‘meet any dissatisfaction there has been with the 
present regime.’256 He also proposed to reduce the responsibility for the factories 
held by the Financial Secretary to that of finance alone. At the time the Director-
General and his deputy were immediately responsible to the Financial Secretary and 
through him to the Secretary of State. It was Lansdowne’s view that by reducing his 
responsibility he would lighten the extreme work load of the Financial Secretary. It 
can also be speculated that he was partly driven to adopt this proposal because 
Powell Williams was not highly thought of. Balfour passed him over for promotion 
in 1898 telling Lansdowne that ‘he would never have got even his present place 
except as the immediate personal friend and follower of Joe [Chamberlain].’257  
As part of his reorganisation of the Ordnance Department and the Factories 
Lansdowne proposed replacing the title of Director-General for Chief Superintendent 
of the Ordnance Factories and retitling the Inspector-General of Ordnance as the 
Director-General of Ordnance.
258
 Opposed to retaining Edwin Markham, the then 
Inspector-General, who was ‘weak’259 and had not been a success,260 Lansdowne 
appointed Brackenbury to replace him. Brackenbury who was, in his view, ‘head and 
shoulders above all competitors’ had made sure that he was appointed to the new 
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post.
261
 He also made it a pre-requisite of taking the appointment of Inspector-
General that the Ordnance Factories be placed fully under his control. He told 
Lansdowne, ‘Believe me there is no rest or peace for you outside putting the DGOF 
under the IGO.’262 Powell Williams, who feared that it would discriminate against 
the trade was strongly opposed to giving control in manufacture to the same officer 
responsible for its inspection. ‘Experience has shown that, under that arrangement, 
very defective munitions of war were often passed into the service.’263 He also 
thought that the factories should continue to be administered and their workmen 
controlled by civilians and not military officers.
264
 Among Lansdowne’s Cabinet 
colleagues, Hicks Beach and Chamberlain shared his views. The Chancellor opposed 
it for its implied sleight on civil control of military expenditure and Chamberlain for 
weakening the responsibility of his colleague. In his defence of Powell Williams he 
remarked that Lansdowne’s scheme was ‘most mischievous’ and that Lansdowne 
was ‘Brackenburyridden.’265 Brodrick, who as a former Financial Secretary 
understood the system, was also against Lansdowne’s proposal.266 He believed that 
‘this change, if made, will content a very small number of military members of 
Parliament, who have worked up “The Times” – but it will be directly in face of 
experience, and of the decision of the Cabinet in 1888, when the previous difficulties 
were fresh in mind.’267 Devonshire, who had recommended the transfer of the 
Ordnance Factories to military control during the Hartington Commission, could not 
see why, with ‘good will and a desire to avoid difficulties, it should not succeed.’268 
Goschen also agreed to the change. Salisbury shared this view but suggested the 
Defence Committee of the Cabinet should investigate the matter and decide. 
Lansdowne defended the transfer of duties stating he was following the advice 
of four separate commissions
269
 that had reviewed the question and that financial 
                                                          
261
 Lansdowne to Wolseley (private), 29 November 1898, BL. (5) Lansdowne MSS, Add MS. 
88906/19/28. 
262
 Brackenbury to Lansdowne (private), 13 January 1899, ibid., Add MS, 88906/16/24. 
263
 Powell Williams to Lansdowne (private), 31 January 1899, ibid., Add MS. 88906/16/23. 
264
 Powell Williams, ‘Minute’, 26 December 1898, ibid. 
265
 Chamberlain to Balfour (private), 2 February 1899, BL. Balfour MSS, Add MS. 49773, f.158. 
266
 Brodrick to Balfour (private), 18 January 1899, ibid., Add MS. 49720, f.56. 
267
 Ibid. 
268
 Devonshire to Lansdowne (private), 30 January 1899, BL. (5) Lansdowne MSS, Add MS. 
89906/16/24. 
269
 The four commissions were the Stephen Royal Commission on Warlike Stores (1887), the Ridley 
Royal Commission on Civil Establishments (1887), the Morley Commission on the Organization and 
150 
 
control would still remain with the Financial Secretary but the Director General 
Ordance Factories would draw up proposals and calculations.
270
 He disagreed that 
military control would lead to discrimination against the trade as Powell Williams 
feared. The committee which then consisted of Devonshire, Lansdowne, Goschen 
and Hicks Beach reported in favour of Lansdowne’s proposal.271 Brackenbury was 
officially appointed Director General Ordnance in January 1899 and the following 
month Colonel Edmond Bainbridge became Chief Superintendent Ordnance 
Factories. The decision to place the Ordnance Factories under military control 
necessitated an amendment to the 1895 Order-in-Council. Under the Order-in-
Council of 7 March 1899 the Director General, ‘Is charged with supplying the Army 
with warlike stores, equipment and clothing; with the direction of the Ordnance 
Committee and the manufacturing departments of the Army; with dealing with 
questions of armament, patterns, inventions, and designs; and with the inspection of 
all stores, whether supplied by manufacturing departments or by contractors.’272 
With Lansdowne’s reorganisation the department was given wider responsibilities 
intended ‘to bring the services (Army and Navy) into closer touch with the factories 
whose business it is to supply them with their equipment and to do that without in 
any way abandoning the idea that the factories must be managed on business 
principles and kept under strict financial control.’273 
In reforming the Ordnance Factories along business-like principles Lansdowne 
removed some of the red tapeism that made the department inefficient. Applying a 
similar approach to improving the efficiency and lessening the bureaucracy of the 
War Office Lansdowne initiated a scheme of decentralisation. The War Office he 
entered in 1895 was governed by many minute regulations. In executing the general 
business of Army administration the department carried on a vast correspondence 
with District Commands where high military officers were unable to make decisions 
over minor matters without documents passing up and down the War Office 
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hierarchy. Frustration and inefficiency were commonplace. To Grove, the Military 
Secretary, ‘the Army was not the Army we ought to have.’274  
To investigate whether any War Office business could be better transacted in 
the districts without reference to the War Office and whether it was desirable to 
delegate to the local military authorities further expenditure incurred in the districts, 
Lansdowne established a Departmental Committee. The Departmental Committee 
was established in December 1897 with Brodrick as President, Powell Williams, 
Major-General William Butler, Brackenbury, Major-General Burnett, and Sir George 
Lawson to report on decentralisation of War Office business. The Committee on 
Decentralisation of War Office Business reported in March 1898, having held eleven 
sittings and examined twenty witnesses including Roberts, Connaught, Colonel 
Grierson and General Sanford. Finding that the main work of the War Office was 
conducted on a highly centralised system, they suggested that a large amount of the 
business transacted between the departments of the War Office, between the War 
Office and the districts, and in the districts themselves, by written minutes or 
despatches, should be conducted orally by personal communication. It was their 
view that greater financial responsibility should be given to the general officers and 
that this ‘should be accompanied by more complete association and union between 
the military and civil departments of the War Office.’ They concluded that ‘unless 
the Treasury will consent to dispense with the control over small matters of 
expenditure which they now exercise any large measure of decentralisation of 
financial responsibility is impossible.’275 While the advice of the commissioners ‘in 
the main’276 met Lansdowne’s approval, he believed more could probably have been 
done ‘to simplify our regulations’ ‘if we had had leisure to take up such subjects.’277 
The report did not satisfy Dilke who believed ‘the little changes recommended are 
merely pottering suggestions, which only touch the fringe of an enormous subject 
which really cannot be dealt with at all until we have the revolutionary changes 
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which some of us advocate.’278 To Arnold-Forster, who had pressed for a 
reorganisation of the War Office, the report did not go far enough. He believed it 
was ‘a condemnation of the men who make it and the processes they have been 
working.’279 The report raised few objections from the service parliamentarians or 
the Liberal opposition. Henry Blundell ‘trusted that the reforms suggested in the 
Report, which would be a great improvement, would not be overdone.’ 280 The 
military press remarked it had ‘entirely missed its purpose,’ and the 
recommendations ‘are for the most part so crude as to be unworkable.’281  
While removing the internal obstacles to effective Army administration at the 
War Office Lansdowne also addressed the physical separation of the different 
departments which made transparency problematic. In 1896 he persuaded Parliament 
to agree to a new building on a site east of Whitehall to bring the department under 
one roof. An architect was appointed in 1898 and the foundation was started the 
following year. In order to carry the weight of the building, a huge tank with 
concrete walls and base up to six feet thick and thirty feet below road level was 
constructed. The first brick was laid in September 1901, ten months after Lansdowne 
left the War Office. The building was completed in 1906 at a cost of £1.2 million and 
used some 26,000 tons of Portland stone, 3,000 tons of York stone and 25 million 
bricks.
282
 
Most of Lansdowne’s Army reforms were designed to be implemented over 
three or more years and it was his view that until given a fair trial further changes 
were unjustified.
283
 However, where changes did not bring an immediate 
improvement in the military system as with the cavalry reorganisation Lansdowne 
introduced further modifications. While Lansdowne’s measures were still in their 
infancy in October 1899, with the outbreak of war in South Africa they were put to 
the test and had a profound impact on how he subsequently managed ‘the War’. 
Although the descent into ‘the War’ which will be explored in the next chapter 
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overshadowed much of Lansdowne’s subtle attempts to loosen the existing military 
system while retaining its principle, it was largely because such subtle changes were 
in place that Britain was able to mobilise and send to South Africa the largest force 
to ever leave Britain’s shores. 
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Chapter Five - The War Office and South Africa 1895-1899 
It was suggested by commentators at the time and subsequent historians that 
Lansdowne’s approach to Army policy and administration while at the War Office 
was to blame for the errors of ‘the War’1 As a trial of the Cardwell system and the 
purpose for which the Army existed as established by Stanhope and Wolseley and 
adapted by Lansdowne ‘the War’ had no precedent. The origins of ‘the War’ were 
deep rooted and the strength of sentiment on both sides preceded Lansdowne’s term 
of office. Moreover Lansdowne’s decisions were not made in a vacuum but were 
taken after consultation with his Cabinet colleagues and military advisers.
2
 The path 
to war was littered with decisions taken by individuals with conscious objectives 
based on their individual beliefs and the information they had available to them.
3
  
This chapter will explain how Lansdowne managed the situation he inherited 
and dealt with it as it evolved. It will be demonstrated that in terms of civil-military 
relations the prewar crisis clearly highlights the friction within the War Office, both 
the inability of the soldiers to fully grasp the political aspect of the situation and the 
inability of the civilians to give the soldiers autonomy to make military decisions. 
Through an examination of these dynamics this chapter aims to show how politicians 
and soldiers formulated military policy before the war. It will be shown that 
Lansdowne was not found wanting in the prewar period. Lansdowne’s approach to 
‘the War’ was pragmatic. It was influenced by financial considerations, the power of 
public opinion and his belief that Britain would ‘not command the respect of the 
world unless we can make ourselves felt as well as heard’ and ‘while we love 
peace…we love it only so long as it can be maintained consistently with our self-
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respect as a nation and with the honourable traditions of a great empire.’4 In line with 
many of his Cabinet colleagues including, Chamberlain and Salisbury who both 
disliked the use of coercion as a tool of diplomacy,
5
 Lansdowne believed that the 
Boer threat was exaggerated and that until it became unavoidable the government 
should not precipitate a war. Up until 1898 Wolseley was also determined to avoid 
war with the Boers.
6
 But whereas Wolseley believed the best way to ensure peace 
was to increase the military presence in South Africa, Lansdowne did not. 
Wolseley’s motivation was principally influenced by his belief that, ‘demands for 
more troops in South Africa were also demands for extra troops for the home  
Army.’7 
By 1895 the demands of the gold mining industry, the disenfranchisement of 
the 60,000 Uitlanders, many of whom were British, and the possibility of Germany 
allying with the Boer republics were of concern to the British government. The 
failure of the Jameson Raid in December 1895 to empower the Uitlanders and 
overthrow Kruger’s State polarised the two white races in South Africa and 
worsened relations between Britian and the Transvaal. Lansdowne believed that it 
‘certainly had the effect of creating deep-seated mistrust of us in the mind of the 
South African Republic.’8 Suspecting that the British government was involved 
President Kruger began to make preparations for a war with Britain. It was the view 
of the War Office Intelligence Department that the Boers would attack the British as 
they coveted the Port of Durban and had sufficient armaments to do so.
 9
  
While the Jingo supporters focused attention on Anglo-Transvaal differences 
in terms of the political rights of the Uitlanders, many of these Uitlanders and their 
financial supporters were not model agents of the state. Some, like Alfred Beit and 
Julius Wernher, were not even British and others were self-made adventurers. Nor 
was the British government’s claim to be uninterested above suspicion. Critics noted 
harshly that Hercules Robinson (Lord Rosemead), the British High Commissioner in 
Cape Colony since 1880, was a friend of Cecil Rhodes and had been a director of his 
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De Beers Company. Such ties led some people at the time to assume that British 
policy in South Africa was, if only indirectly, driven by a ‘kind of buccaneering 
capitalist, working for his own private agenda.’10 Public opinion would not support a 
war started by Britain on these grounds and consequently any desire on the part of 
the Cabinet for a pre-emptive strike in South Africa needed careful consideration. 
Strongly in favour of a policy of wait and see, Lansdowne believed the Boers had got 
‘wind in their heads’ and that ‘we can afford to wait longer than Kruger can.’ 11 
While the government was willing to wait, the War Office began to redirect its 
policy in South Africa from one of Imperial defence in a strict sense to, as 
Lansdowne told the Royal Commission, maintaining ‘the safety of the Colonies.’12 
This change of direction intensified the existing divisions between the civilians and 
the soldiers in that department and their views on questions of reinforcements and 
military strategy. Influenced by Chamberlain’s call for action Wolseley directed 
Lansdowne’s attention to the strategic importance of South Africa and the need for 
additional reinforcements. Harbouring a belief that Jameson’s recent surrender and 
the policy forced on Britain as a result had strengthened the Boers’ belief that his 
superiority was greater than that of the British Wolseley recommended strengthening 
the Cape garrison, ‘not only to resist attacks from without, but to put down at once 
any internal troubles fomented amongst the Boers by our enemy.’13 He 
recommended strengthening the garrison by one regiment of cavalry, one battery of 
horse artillery and two battalions of infantry.
14
  Lansdowne questioned the need to do 
more than make it ‘safe as a coaling station and naval base.’15  
While reflecting on Lansdowne’s reply Wolseley drafted a further minute on 
reinforcing the Natal garrison and adopting a strategy that in the event of war Britain 
should march through Natal as the line of advance to Pretoria.
16
 Many of the senior 
officers including Buller, Wood and Ardagh disagreed with this strategy. They were 
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all in favour of adopting a route through the Orange Free State, whether it remained 
neutral or not, as the most effective means of reaching Pretoria. Ardagh was 
convinced that on the outbreak of war the Free Staters would give military assistance 
to the Transvaal. He advised against taking the Natal route.
17
 Lansdowne, who often 
bypassed Wolseley and approached Ardagh directly for information on intelligence 
matters, dismissed Wolseley’s proposal.18 He did not believe that Wolseley would 
press the matter further. Informing the Cabinet of his decision he explained ‘he could 
not propose any scheme for adding to Britain’s military expenditure until the need 
for that expenditure had been demonstrated and in his opinion it did not seem such a 
demonstration was forthcoming.’19 Salisbury argued that, if the question were purely 
military, the weight of opinion was in favour of strengthening the garrison of Natal. 
However, with the present tension between Britain and South Africa, any troop 
movement would be taken as hostile to the Boers and ‘If the Jingo party in the 
Transvaal contrived some act of aggression it would generally be said that our 
agitating policy had driven them into it. Assuming that the Boers mean war, which 
seems to be improbable I think the moral advantage we should lose by divided 
councils at home would be greater than the military advantage we should lose by 
deferring measures of precaution till the hostile intention of the Boers becomes 
evident.’20 Chamberlain accepted Lansdowne’s and Salisbury’s opinions as 
conclusive. In 1896 the Cape naval base which then held in round figures 
approximately 1,900 was increased to 3,400 and the garrison for the rest of South 
Africa which was then 1,800 was raised to 3,000, amounting to a total number of 
6,400 troops in South Africa.
21
 When Wolseley did press the matter further in 
November suggesting an additional 5,000 men should be sent to the Cape, 
Lansdowne had to point out that the Army was already overstretched in matching 
home battalions with overseas garrisons and they would have to ask Parliament for 
more men than the British Army’s present establishment gave them.  
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During 1897 tensions in South Africa escalated. Fearing a further attempt to 
subvert the Transvaal, the Volksraad legislated against publications that endangered 
the peace of the Republic. In December 1896 this law was applied to The Critic, an 
English language Johannesburg newspaper. At the same time an Aliens Expulsion 
Act and an Aliens Immigration Act were introduced. Chamberlain argued these 
measures breached the spirit of the London Convention and should be instantly 
challenged.
22
 In April, the Colonial Office informed the War Office that they 
intended sending ‘certain despatches to Kruger’ and that a Boer military response 
could not be ignored. On 8 April, a meeting between Lansdowne, Chamberlain, 
Balfour, Goschen and Hicks Beach was held at the Admiralty to discuss the South 
African situation. Salisbury was absent owing to illness which during the subsequent 
months became an increasingly frequent occurrence. During the meeting 
Chamberlain intimated that his hands had been weakened by the small size of the 
Cape garrison and the lack of confidence of loyal colonists in response to British 
inactivity. Pressing for reinforcements which included a brigade of cavalry, a 
regiment of infantry and field  batteries, altogether about 3,500 men, he concluded if 
‘they see we are in earnest…they will give way as they have always done.’23 
Lansdowne accepted the garrison could not defend the colony but he believed it was 
better to leave matters alone and send an ultimatum followed by an overwhelming 
force when the moment for putting their foot down had arrived.
24
 His opinion was 
overruled by his colleagues. Hicks Beach thought a force should be sent for political 
reasons alone and Balfour and Goschen agreed.
25
 Balfour later wrote that ‘my own 
view is that a Boer attack is exceedingly improbable and that it will only take place if 
the Boers come to the conclusion that we are fixed in the determination to attack 
them and that what must come had better come soon.’26 Faced with an estimated cost 
for reinforcing the garrison of £585,000 and wishing to avoid any appearance of 
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aggression they scaled the proposal down. Hicks Beach insisted on limiting transport 
costs to £200,000.
27
  
While the Cabinet were divided over South African matters, so were the 
soldiers. Whereas Wolseley agreed with Chamberlain, Buller and Wood were with 
Lansdowne. After further discussion, on 12 April, Lansdowne proposed sending 
‘three battalions of field artillery and another battalion of infantry…the field artillery 
without loss of time.’28 ‘Rather than send troops to the Northern Frontier of the 
Cape, it was agreed to strengthen the garrison of Natal and occupy in force Laing’s 
Nek.’29 Lansdowne’s proposal met with his colleagues’ approval. It was not only 
economical, meeting the £200,000 allowance set by Hicks Beach, but logistically it 
avoided crossing the Orange Free State. There is no record of what Buller and 
Wolseley thought. However, the following day Ardagh, mentioning letters recently 
received from South Africa, informed Lansdowne that even if the Orange Free State 
remained neutral 5,000 Free-Staters would join the Transvaal and that would warrant 
a declaration of war.
30
 His views were shared by Wood. Salisbury was astounded by 
Ardagh’s recommendations: ‘I suppose he reflects the dominant view of the Horse 
Guards. He counsels our forcing the Orange Free State into the position of enemies 
unless they will take our side, and further recommends us to go to war with Portugal 
unless she will stop Boer importation of arms through Lorenzo Marques. I cannot 
conceive a more unwise policy.’31  
Among the civilians at the War Office Haliburton was anxious that, since the 
Colonial Office had never directly asked the War Office to send reinforcements, 
Lansdowne might be held responsible for the decision. He advised that, before any 
force was put under orders, Lansdowne should make known that, ‘the effect that 
those orders will have on S[outh] A[frica] should be fully considered - whether they 
will tend to prevent war or whether they will render war inevitable. The 
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responsibility for deciding that issue must rest with the Colonial Office.’32 Salisbury 
supported the proposal. He valued the Laing’s Nek plan ‘both for its intrinsic merits 
and for its effect upon English opinion. It is essentially and on the face of it a 
defensive measure. It is the natural reply to the excessive armaments of the Boers 
and implies no aggressive tendencies whatsoever.’33 At the same time that 
Lansdowne’s suggestions were under discussion the government set in motion a 
series of diplomatic moves to avert the growing crisis. Alfred Milner was sent to 
South Africa to replace Hercules Robinson (Lord Rosemead) who was suffering 
from dropsy and a British naval force was put under sail for Delagoa Bay. In light of 
the government’s response, the Transvaal revoked the Immigration Act on 6 May 
and amended the Expulsion Act on 14 July to allow an appeal to the courts.
34
 With 
the crisis averted Lansdowne’s political position was strengthened. In June the 
reinforcements arrived in South Africa and the force in Natal was strengthened by 
2,460 to 4,347 and in the Cape by 279 men to 3,807 bringing the total then in South 
Africa to 8,154. Although the effect was positive and did not trigger a hostile 
reaction from the Transvaal, Milner believed to be really secure the Cape garrison 
should be nearer 10,000, and that it could be ‘quietly accomplished.’35  
Milner’s opinion was shared by Wolseley and Ardagh. While Milner pressed 
for additional reinforcements, Lansdowne believed the demands from South Africa 
involved a serious departure from the hitherto accepted policy of concentrating 
British troops at home and leaving the Colonies to look after their own defences.
36
 
His concern was that the War Office was ‘making a very heavy demand upon the 
limited class from which our recruits are drawn and it is useless to pretend that the 
quality of them is satisfactory.’37 He hoped the situation was temporary. It was his 
opinion ‘that the responsibility of the Imperial Government should be limited to the 
defensive requirements of the naval stations and that Imperial troops should not be 
called upon for the defence of colonial land frontiers.’38 Privately he mentioned to 
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Hicks Beach that the South Africans were not doing as much as they should for their 
own security. He doubted they ever would while the British maintained a large 
garrison there.
39
 
By the autumn of 1898 Wolseley was convinced war was inevitable and the 
War Office should make adequate preparations. He was alarmed and frustrated by 
Lansdowne’s cautious policy and believed we were not organized for the ‘storm.’ In 
a letter to Lansdowne he remarked ‘I fully endorse the serious view taken by the 
government of the Cape upon our position in South Africa. We may go on for years 
as at present, but sooner or later we shall have a violent explosion there…are you 
prepared for it? Any student at the Staff College would say “No” to such a question. 
There is no good reason that I know of why we should not be thoroughly prepared 
for it.’40 Finding his work ‘most uncongenial’, he noted ‘As a soldier, I know what 
the Army wants. Lord L. does not and besides political exigencies influence him 
more than any Army wants even if he could appreciate what they are.’41 It is 
interesting to note that in his evidence to the Royal Commission Lansdowne stated 
that in the years between the raid and ‘the War’ he never received from his military 
advisers any joint remonstrance for not strengthening the garrisons in South Africa.
42
 
Evidently Wolseley was prepared to criticize Lansdowne in private but not in public.  
Infact Lansdowne knew exactly what the army wanted. In collaboration with 
the Colonial Office in mid 1898 he informed Hicks Beach that the troops sent out in 
1897 were without transport and ‘are now “immobile” therefore almost useless, 
either for offense or defence.’43 Estimating transport would cost £60,000,44  he noted 
that the matter should be put in hand as soon as possible and the horses replaced or 
‘we might get into a serious mess there.’45 Among the senior officers Wood had been 
making enquiries on the transport question since 1897 and had advised Lansdowne 
that the British required £36,000 for horses and for mounted infantry. He believed 
that one company should be mounted in each battalion and that they would require 
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six mules for every seven men in the field.
46
 Lansdowne’s inability to act more 
swiftly on Wood’s advice added to the mounting tension in the War Office. By the 
summer of 1898 the escalating tension in relations between the civlians and the 
senior officers was well developed.   
As the various boundaries between individuals widened further in London so 
in South Africa relations were strained. During the autumn General William 
Goodenough, the general officer commanding in South Africa, fell ill. Lansdowne, 
not wishing to leave the Cape vacant, lost no time in making a new appointment. He 
submitted Sir William Butler’s name to the Queen: ‘I don’t suppose you could have 
a general fitter for the post or more likely to be equal to an emergency.’47 Butler was 
part of Wolseley’s ‘Ring’, having served with him at the Red River, Ashanti and Tel-
el-Kebir. He had also been ADC to Queen Victoria. Lansdowne’s eagerness to find a 
replacement can be explained by a War Office intelligence report. This document 
highlighted that the defence problem was still serious, and that the War Office 
should make a comprehensive plan for the despatch of reinforcements and supplies 
from England and for the action the general officer commanding should undertake in 
the event of war.
48
 The report also warned that in the event of war Britain would 
initially be outnumbered and that at least four to six weeks would elapse before 
reinforcements would reach South Africa from England or India.
49
  
The gravity of the defence problem escalated a few months later when violence 
between the Uitlanders and the Boers broke out in early 1899. On Christmas Eve 
1898 some of the disgruntled Britons in the Transvaal called on British subjects to 
petition the Queen over the death of an Uitlander called Thomas Edgar. Butler 
refused to accept the petition, telling Chamberlain that it was ‘all a prepared 
business’ stirred up by the South African League, a pro-imperialist pressure group of 
British professional men and a descendant group of the 1895 Johannesburg Reform 
Club. After the Transvaal authorities arrested some of the leaders of the Edgar 
demonstration a second Uitlander protest took place on 14 January 1899. Late in 
February, James Percy Fitzpatrick, an employee of Beit and Wernher and an 
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acquaintance of Milner circulated privately a second petition for Imperial 
intervention which was signed by 21,684 Uitlanders, detailing their grievances of 
high taxes, inadequate schools and corrupt administration. Milner accepted the 
petition and forwarded it to Chamberlain. During March 1899 Kruger’s government 
began the Great Deal negotiations with the mining industry, essentially to resolve the 
Uitlander issue and to secure the support of the mining industry. To some on the spot 
the deal was seen as an attempt to undermine the close relations which existed 
between the British government and the mining industry, which had been 
strengthened by the government’s offer to support the Uitlanders’ cause for 
increased reforms. The failure of these negotiations, which the government was not 
involved in, proved to be a defining moment in the Transvaal conflict and 
recognition that the complaints of the mining industry were inseparably linked with 
Uitlander enfranchisement.  
Although the government was not involved in the negotiations its support for 
one of the mining industry’s principal grievances against Kruger’s government, the 
dynamite monopoly, added to the uneasy tension in South Africa. When an attempt 
in June by some of the Cape politicians to bring Milner and Kruger together at 
Bloemfontein to settle matters failed badly, war became more of a possibility and 
Milner believed that it was time to turn the screw. But Butler, who was prejudiced in 
favour of the Boers, disagreed. Butler’s opposition upset Milner, who wanted him 
replaced with someone else. In late June he wrote in his diary: ‘Things have become 
critical now. Butler or I will have to go.’50 That Butler sympathised with the Boers 
was not a good enough reason for his dismissal. Only professional misconduct would 
bring that about. Although Butler had left England with no instructions from the War 
Office as to what was expected of him, under the departmental system then in place 
he was expected to submit a plan for offensive and defensive operations in South 
Africa.  Convinced that some politicians and soldiers were trying to bring about a 
war at an early date, he delayed sending this military strategy until June 1899.
51
  The 
delay made those in London anxious. Chamberlain, who had been made aware by 
Selborne, the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, of the personal differences 
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between Milner and Butler,
52
 took the opportunity to suggest to Lansdowne that 
Buller might take his place. Lansdowne refused, remarking, ‘his suppression just 
now would be difficult to explain. He has I have no doubt been indiscreet, but his 
removal would imply that he misconducted himself gravely. I have seen no evidence 
as yet which really establishes this. He is, I daresay prejudiced in favour of the 
Boers, but he evidently thinks Milner is too much imbued with the ideas of the other 
side and does not accurately estimate the value of the forces which are at work in 
South Africa. It would in my opinion be better to leave him alone unless he does 
something outrageous.’53  
Lansdowne’s decision was taken with a consideration of how public opinion 
was positioned for a war in South Africa and would react to the removal of a 
Lieutenant-General advocating a peaceful resolution to the conflict. In his evidence 
to the Royal Commission he stated that, ‘I do not think I misrepresent it when I say 
that throughout that correspondence [Butler’s with the War Office] there runs a note 
of genuine and deep alarm lest anything should be done that might make the embers 
which were smouldering in South Africa break into a blaze.’54 ‘We had also to 
consider that at the same time public opinion in this country was not prepared for a 
great war or for the large expenditure in preparing for a great war.’55 Butler, 
however, did not need to do anything outrageous. On 4 July having learnt from a 
colleague at the War Office 
56
 that he was unpopular both in that Office and in some 
British newspapers and aware that his presence had become an embarrassment to 
Milner,
57
 he offered to resign.
58
   
Three days after the collapse of the Bloemfontein Conference Wolseley sent 
Lansdowne a minute on the British Army’s position in South Africa and strategy in 
the event of war. He advised mobilising ‘at once on Salisbury Plain under the 
general who it is intended should command in South Africa in the event of war one 
of our three Army Corps…as it might probably wake up the Transvaal to the fact 
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that England was at last serious and by doing so prevent war altogether.’ Suggesting 
possible lines of advance he concluded operations should begin as soon as possible 
so as to be ‘over by next November.’59 Lansdowne’s view of the situation differed. 
He continued to oppose sending large reinforcements to South Africa and in replying 
to Wolseley’s June memorandum on that subject stated that ‘there is now I think a 
general agreement that if there is to be a serious demonstration it should take a 
different shape. The proposal need not be further pursued.’60 Lansdowne’s caution 
disappointed Wolseley who told his wife that, ‘little Lansdowne…is an obstinate 
little fellow, very conceited, and his obstinacy is born of ignorance - I spend my day 
struggling with my little gentleman…Such a small minded man it would be difficult 
to imagine. I am sure some little Jew must have “overtaken” his mother before he 
was conceived.’61  
 George Wyndham, Lansdowne’s Under-Secretary, was also upset at the 
decision. Part of his disappointment was that Lansdowne’s inaction seemed at odds 
with the ideals of conservative imperialism he admired in men such as Joseph 
Chamberlain, Cecil Rhodes and Dr Jameson. As a founder member of the South 
African Association in England he often spoke so strongly for the interests of 
colonials that he was known as the ‘Member for South Africa.’62 Frustrated by the 
diplomatic situation he complained that he was ‘stuck in the morass of the War 
Office’63 and disappointed not to have persuaded Lansdowne to send out large 
numbers of reinforcements.  Lansdowne’s caution at this time was also mirrored by 
the Cabinet who as one observer noted ‘will keep out of war if possible.’64 
The ‘different shape’ that Lansdowne was pursuing in order to maintain the 
safety of the Colonies required making preparations in stages and was subject to his 
view that public opinion had to be supportive of a war in South Africa. As he later 
told the Royal Commission, ‘I doubt extremely whether if we had gone, as I 
conceived prematurely, to Parliament in the month of June 1899, and asked for a 
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large war expenditure, we should have got it,’65 and even if the British Army had got 
it he believed that it would have enabled Britain’s enemies to claim Britain provoked 
‘the War’ herself. It was his contention that by forcing the pace they would have 
brought on hostilities sooner. He was aware that the Boers were armed and in a 
position to commence hostilities but by sending to South Africa large numbers of 
reinforcements early in 1899, or even before that, he believed the preconceived 
mistrust of Britain would have been increased and they would have precipitated 
war.
66
 
Although Lansdowne was moving slower than his senior officers would have 
wished he continued to approve activities designed to secure the safety of the 
colonies. In July the War Office sent two officers to the Cape to purchase 1,340 
animals,
67
 to complete two months’ reserve supplies of rations for the Cape and 
Natal garrisons,
68
 as well as sending out ten ‘special service’ officers to South 
Africa.
69
 In August in consultation with Wolseley Lansdowne summoned Buller 
from his command at Aldershot to inform him, in Buller’s own words, ‘in a most 
ungracious manner, that if there was a war in South Africa I was selected as the 
Commander.’70 It was Buller’s view that Lansdowne did not want any serious 
preparations for war put in hand and that his appointment was merely a ‘party move 
in a political game.’71 He told Lansdowne that he had never held an independent 
command and that he had always considered himself as a better second in command 
than commander in anything complex.
 
He concluded that in the event of war in 
South Africa it would be for Wolseley to be in charge with him as Adjutant-
General.
72
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Wolseley, whose relations with Buller were not always amicable, later 
questioned the appointment twice, telling his brother George that Buller then aged 
sixty had ‘grown fat and bloated and was not the man he had been ten years earlier.’ 
Wolseley would have liked to have taken command for himself but it was obviously 
made clear to him that aged sixty-six he was not acceptable.
73
 After further 
discussion Buller accepted the offer. Among the other senior officers who had 
wished to be have been appointed to command in South Africa were Wood, who 
Buller believed would have been a better choice than himself, and Roberts, who had 
offered his services in March 1896 and April 1897.
74
 Kitchener had not expressed 
any view but Queen Victoria pressed for his appointment to command.
75
 On 3 July 
Buller was again summoned to the War Office and Lansdowne told him he proposed 
sending 10,000 men to South Africa.
76
 Buller still believed that there was no definite 
object.
77
 Summarising the views he discussed with Lansdowne at their meeting in a 
memorandum for Wolseley, he mentioned the need to reinforce the Cape and Natal 
garrison and arrive at decisions as to relations between England and the Orange Free 
State and the line of advance the British should take. It was his wish to send an 
‘overwhelming force’ once hostilities became inevitable.78 Wolseley was broadly in 
accord except as to his line of advance. He questioned taking the route through the 
Orange Free State: ‘there are many serious military objections to it,’ although he 
acknowledged that he had confined his own study to the Natal route. His plan also 
differed from Buller’s in respect of the number of reinforcements and the timing of 
their despatch. He favoured an earlier despatch than Buller.
79
  
A further difference of opinion between the two senior officers was recorded 
on 18 July at a meeting with Lansdowne at the War Office when, according to 
Wolseley, Buller announced that, in the event of an ultimatum to Kruger and the 
need to augment the garrisons, ‘he had complete confidence in Butler’s ability and 
forethought, and that as long as clever men like Butler and Symons, on the spot, did 
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not say there was danger, he saw no  necessity for sending out any troops in advance 
of the Army Corps to strengthen our position against any possible attack by the 
Boers on the frontiers.’80 Buller’s biographer has suggested that this was a most 
unlikely comment for Buller to have made and, if he did say something on these 
lines, it was more likely to have been an expression of his reluctance to send out any 
part of his own Army Corps ahead of the rest. It is probable that Wolseley’s failing 
memory was to blame for the way the story was reported.
81
 During the Royal 
Commission Lansdowne admitted not recollecting the conversation, but did not 
‘question the substantial accuracy.’82  
With the Cabinet and Lansdowne moving slower than they would have liked, 
the senior officers formed themselves into a mobilisation committee and began 
making preparations for a war in South Africa.
83
 While diplomatic and military 
necessities shaped the pace of preparations in London, the Transvaal government 
offered new concessions over the franchise question. Lansdowne believed that 
‘Transvaal affairs have passed out of the acute stage and I anticipate a long period of 
haggling…which this office has to keep up without the support which it would 
receive if it were clear that we were in for a big fight.’84 While the Cabinet 
recognised that public opinion would not support a resort to war over the franchise 
question alone the government informed Kruger that his offer would only be 
accepted if its provisions were agreed on by both governments and supported by a 
Joint Inquiry. As the Cabinet waited for a reply Lansdowne informed them that 
Symons, the general officer commanding in Natal, had requested additional soldiers 
to secure Natal from raids and that he was in favour of sending 2,000 men 
immediately. He maintained the reinforcements would strengthen Britain’s own 
position, reassure the Colonists and strengthen British diplomacy during the new 
phase that had started.
85
 The Cabinet was divided with some pressing for a larger 
number to be sent out. Against incurring any more expenditure for the despatch of 
soldiers than was necessary, Lansdowne was supported by Hicks Beach and after a 
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long discussion the Cabinet voted to send 2,000 men to Natal.
86
 The increase pleased 
Wolseley. He believed ‘it will make our position North of the Tugela River and at 
Ladysmith particularly much more secure than it is at present.’87  
In mid-August while the government maintained their pressure on the 
Transvaal and brought public opinion along with them, Lansdowne produced a 
memorandum as to ‘the time which would elapse between the occurrence of an event 
rendering hostilities with the Transvaal inevitable and the concentration in the North 
of Natal of the force which we should probably send out.’ He estimated it would take 
three or four months if nearly £1 million worth of mules, carts and clothing was 
ordered immediately. As to the landing facilities at Durban and the railway transport 
from that place to the point of concentration, he noted the line ‘is a single line with 
steep gradients and its carrying capacity is very limited but the landing capacity at 
the port is still more limited. It is calculated that the disembarkation of an Army 
Corps and cavalry division could not be done in less than a month. A margin of two 
weeks should be provided to allow troops to take over local transport on arrival and 
for the recovery of horses after the sea voyage.’ He concluded that the force already 
in Natal and the additional 2,000 troops which the War Office was adding to it, if 
attacked by Boers, would have to fall back but there was no danger of it being 
overwhelmed. ‘The long delay anticipated in this memorandum would therefore not 
involve any risk of a military reverse, although its political effects might be serious 
and inconvenient.’88  
While the senior officers advised him to incur the additional expenditure to 
save time, he did not recommend that course to the Cabinet. As he later told the 
Royal Commission, ‘I pointed it out to the Cabinet I wished to lay the problem 
before the Cabinet. That must not be taken as a recommendation of mine that the 
thing should be done immediately.’  It was his view that ‘I placed the Cabinet in full 
possession of the problem which lay before us. I gave them this “timetable” so that 
they might know what risk was incurred by the postponement of the expenditure, but 
I take my full share of the responsibility of the Cabinet for not having incurred that 
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expenditure at the time.’89 He accepted it was only political considerations which 
delayed those preparations being made.  
Although the information contained in Lansdowne’s memorandum was widely 
known by the senior officers, including Buller who in his 6 July ‘memorandum’ had 
also stated ‘it is evident that in any case a considerable period will necessarily elapse 
after a state of war has been declared or established by one side or the other before 
the English force can be ready to commence an advance on Pretoria,’90 it was a 
surprise to the Cabinet. The implication of Britain’s military unpreparedness also 
angered them. Salisbury told Chamberlain he had never doubted the ‘futility’ of the 
War Office but he thought it ‘uncivil’ to criticise it just then. Recognising the 
‘scandal which will certainly be created by the conditions of our military 
preparedness’, he held they should not spend any more money until it was certain 
that ‘we are going to war.’91 Chamberlain was alarmed by the timescale envisaged 
by Lansdowne. He observed the War Office, ‘are hopeless and it will be a mercy if 
they do not land us in a catastrophe.’92 Goschen thought the four month delay was 
preposterous.
93
 He and Balfour urged Hicks Beach to sanction the money required, 
but no one else in the Cabinet did. Beach thought Britain ‘may have to prepare for 
the worst,’94 but he was still strongly opposed to further expenditure and no positive 
decision was taken. After the Cabinet meeting the Cabinet broke up for their holiday. 
Lansdowne went to Ireland while others went to Scotland for the grouse shooting or 
the golf in the belief that war was improbable. 
Not long after his arrival in Ireland, Lansdowne received a minute from 
Wolseley, mentioning Milner’s anxiety about the weakness of the military forces in 
South Africa. Against a Dutch rising in the Cape and for protection of the diamond 
mines he suggested strengthening the Cape garrison and for the defence of Natal he 
recommended sending out 10,000 men.
95
 He believed that ‘we should not require 
either to call out the Army reserve or to bring any troops from India to give effect to 
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the scheme.’96 He believed that an Army from India would be ‘afflicted with 
venereal, drink and fevers’, moreover he reminded Lansdowne that the force that 
‘lost us Majuba was an old one from India.’97 As mentioned in Chapter four, 
Wolseley strongly disliked the Indian Army. Lansdowne did not share Wolseley’s 
view on not using soldiers from India. ‘I quite understand your wish that the Army 
Corps and cavalry division which we shall send out in certain eventualities should be 
exclusively British. We are all agreed as to this. But I see no reason why we should 
not use the 10,000 troops which India is holding in readiness for the purpose of 
strengthening Natal. To send out one division of the Army Corps without Reservists 
would, I cannot help thinking, be awkward. India is ready and could get there first.’ 
Moreover ‘if your anticipation is realized, and the Orange Free State takes no 
measures to prevent its frontier from being violated by the Transvaal Boers, we 
should, I hope certainly regard ourselves as free to go through the Orange Free State 
- the route which I know you prefer. In this event we should be better off if we had 
not committed a part of our force to effect a valuable diversion.’ By adopting this 
approach he believed Britain would be in a position to launch its Army Corps against 
the Transvaal by whatever route was selected.
98
 While Lansdowne never publicly 
showed any irritation with Wolseley during their years at the War Office together, he 
was upset by Wolseley’s letter and sorry that Wolseley had not put his views in 
writing before the Cabinet separated. He thought Wolseley had underrated the ability 
of the British force already in Natal to take care of itself and its communication.
99
 
When the Transvaal government rejected the Joint Inquiry and offered various 
proposals initiated by Jan Smuts, the South African statesman and military leader, 
expressly conditional upon three guarantees,
100
 Lansdowne believed the government 
could not possibly entertain the conditions. He believed that Smuts’ original 
proposals merited ‘benevolent examination’ but the conditions as to suzerainty and 
future non-intervention were ‘obviously’ inadmissible, and ‘if literally persisted in 
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will render a peaceful solution to my mind, impossible.’101 He believed the offer was 
framed so as to save the face of the Transvaal Government which had climbed down 
a long way since Bloemfontein and would have been more human had it not tried to 
cover its retreat. But unlike Chamberlain, who argued that, if Britain did not arrive at 
a settlement within a week or ten days, an instalment of 10,000 men should be sent 
from India,
102
 Lansdowne did not find sufficient evidence of bad faith to justify such 
an action.
103
 He recognised that public opinion ‘would I suspect be lukewarm were 
we to pronounce a collision.’ He did not, however, altogether dismiss the need to 
send reinforcements if the negotiations broke down. He believed ‘we must insist on 
knowing how the new concessions will really work out.’ Part of his concern was that 
Milner, who was feeling the effects of the prolonged tension, might force war on the 
British.
104
 He continued to believe that they should avoid ‘hurrying the pace and 
forcing on hostilities’ as Wolseley would have wished.105 It can be speculated that 
Lansdowne’s position at this time as to what course the Cabinet should adopt in the 
light of their past claims was clearer than any of his other colleagues.
106
  
Among most of the Cabinet war remained a distant possibility. Balfour was 
convinced that war would be avoided.
107
 While Lansdowne’s appraisal of the 
situation appeared reasonable, his August memorandum still rankled with some of 
his colleagues. As the political tension increased towards the end of August Hicks 
Beach noted, ‘the War Office people are really going to pay us out if they can, for 
taking the Sudan Office off their hands.’108 Goschen hoped that Chamberlain would 
take a lead in challenging the slow-moving assumptions of the War Office,
109
 but he 
did not.  
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London’s official reply to the Smuts’ proposals was formulated by Salisbury 
and Chamberlain on 28 August. The government was willing to accept the franchise 
concession and arbitration while still demanding a Joint Inquiry and, if the reply 
from the Transvaal was unsatisfactory, it would draw up a new settlement - in other 
words, an ultimatum.
110
 As far as the reinforcements were concerned, Salisbury 
informed Lansdowne that he was in favour of sending Indian troops to Natal, 
believing that they will be ‘a little cheaper and quite as good and they are less 
hampered by Parliamentary regulation.’ He was sorry that both Milner and Wolseley 
were pressing for a larger garrison for the Cape which he believed was a mistake. It 
was his view that what Milner ‘has done cannot be effaced. We have to act upon a 
moral field prepared for us by him and his Jingo supporters. And therefore I see 
before us the necessity for considerable military effort - and all for people whom we 
despise, and for territory which will bring no profit and no power to England.’111 
Lansdowne would have probably agreed with the first part of Salisbury’s comment. 
He also believed that Milner had caught South African fever and was overstating the 
urgency.
112
 
In early September the Transvaal government withdrew the Smuts proposal 
and fell back on their earlier franchise offer which was the seven-year retrospective 
franchise and four extra seats for the Rand. They were not interested in Kruger 
meeting Milner and they continued to reject Britain’s suzerainty of the Transvaal.113 
The consequence of their action was that the military option resumed paramount 
importance. It was, as Lansdowne later told the Royal Commission, at this stage that 
he understood war was imminent.
114
 He believed that ‘things would come to a head 
before we are many days or hours older and I shall be glad when our suspense is 
terminated.’115 Though the senior officers did their best to hinder the politicians over 
mobilising Indian troops,
116
 Lansdowne refused to make any concessions on their 
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behalf.
117
 In making their preparations they failed to impress George Hamilton, the 
Secretary of State for India, who told his brother-in-law, ‘your military men are very 
tiresome. They insist on setting up a military machine which will not work for four 
months and during that interval they assume that the enemy is going to sit still. I am 
very reluctant to move troops out of India, but I see no alternative.’118 Wolseley’s 
anger was obvious as he told his wife, Lansdowne ‘looked more like a Jew today 
than ever. I can now assert from four years constant work with him that his mind is 
smaller than his body.’119 By early September the view that the War Office was 
being inept and slow continued to get abroad. Whereas the soldiers had previously 
found the politicians dilatory, they now complained they were moving too fast. On 5 
September Buller was encouraged by Salisbury’s private secretary, Schomberg 
‘Pom’ McDonnell, whose views on Lansdowne matched his own, to go behind 
Lansdowne’s back and give Salisbury a memorandum ‘to startle the Cabinet.’120  He 
believed that there must come a point when the military and diplomatic or political 
forces were brought into line. Before the diplomats presented an ultimatum the 
military should be ready to enforce it.
121
 Referring to himself and his military 
colleagues at the War Office he complained that they had no idea how matters were 
proceeding, had not been consulted and did not know how fast diplomacy was 
moving.  
Wolseley echoed Buller’s concerns telling Lansdowne that the ‘first intimation 
I have had that our negotiations with the Transvaal…have reached an acute stage has 
come to me from Sir Redvers Buller…we have lost time…we have committed one 
of the gravest blunders in war, namely, we have given to our enemy the 
initiative…The government are acting without the complete knowledge of what the 
military can do while the military authorities on their side are equally without full 
knowledge of what the government expects them to do.’122 Senior officers’ claimed 
that they were not taken into confidence by Lansdowne. While Wolseley and Buller 
were not in complete accord with the ‘secrets of the Cabinet’,123 it is inaccurate to 
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suggest that Lansdowne did not listen to or discuss matters with his military 
advisers. From the date of his appointment in June, Buller was ‘freely consulted’ by 
Lansdowne at the War Office. Moreover, while working there, he was given wide 
latitude.
124
 
Political necessity forced the politicians at this stage to deal with the situation 
in terms of what public opinion in the country was willing to stand. At 
Chamberlain’s request the Cabinet agreed to meet on 8 September. Prior to this 
meeting he drafted two Memoranda. The first written on 5 September stated that he 
believed ‘the time has fully come to bring matters to a head. In contrast to Buller’s 
and Wolseley’s view that the British Army would have difficulty in holding their 
own if Kruger took to the offensive he noted their [Transvaal] forces are 
exaggerated. ‘If 12,000 English troops, with some thousands of Volunteers, cannot 
successfully resist an offensive movement in the Colonies by the Boers, it seems to 
me the British Army must be in a very bad way.’ In light of War Office reports he 
suggested Indian forces should ‘start for Natal as early as they can be moved.’125 On 
6 September, in his second memorandum entitled ‘The South African Situation,’ he 
set out a history of events up to that date, stating that the matter was larger than the 
franchise question and that its resolution would affect ‘the estimate formed of our 
power and influence in our Colonies and throughout the world.’ He reckoned that 
while an expedition of 3,000 men was sufficient in 1884 to secure the fulfilment of 
the obligations of the Conventions, ‘it is now considered that 50,000 men are 
required to enforce our claims at the present time. The result is that unless a 
complete change of policy is secured we shall have to maintain permanently in South 
Africa a very large garrison, at a great expense to the British taxpayer, and involving 
the utter disorganization of our military system.’126 He reiterated these comments at 
the Cabinet meeting at the Foreign Office on 8 September. Despite Hicks Beach’s 
protests (the cost of sending the first 10,000 troops was at least £350,000 and for the 
second part of Buller’s invasion force over £5 million), they agreed with 
Chamberlain’s plan that 10,000 men should leave for Natal as soon as possible. They 
also sent a note to Kruger re-emphasising their earlier demands and that they would 
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accept the Smuts proposals taken by themselves without conditions and subject to a 
joint inquiry.
127
 United on delaying events until reinforcements arrived in South 
Africa they resolved to test the Orange Free State by also demanding that Martinus 
Steyn, its President, maintain neutrality in the event of war.
128
 Salisbury warned, ‘we 
must remember this is the first occasion we have gone to war with people of 
Teutonic race.’129 He advised his colleagues that they should get away from the 
franchise issue, which he imagined would be, ‘troublesome in debate - and to make 
the break on a proposal to revise or denounce the [1884] Convention on the ground 
that it has not been carried out as we were promised: and because it has been worked 
out to benefit not the people of the Transvaal with whom we were contracted, but a 
very limited minority of them who are hostile to the rest.’130  
After the Cabinet broke up on 8
 
September, Lansdowne informed the Queen 
that he earnestly ‘trusts that the government of the South African Republic will do 
nothing to precipitate hostilities. Should they do so after the arrival of these 
reinforcements there need…be no apprehension for the safety of the Colony.’131 To 
command the additional 10,000 troops and those already in Natal, Lansdowne, in 
consultation with Wolseley and Buller, appointed George White, the Quartermaster-
General. Of the Cabinet only Chamberlain doubted that White, who was sixty-four, 
was the best choice for the task. On 8 September Lansdowne also had a stormy 
interview with Buller at the War Office.
132
 He cautioned him for ‘going behind his 
back’ by writing to Salisbury and pressing for the despatch of troops.133 In his 
evidence to the Royal Commission Lansdowne stated ‘he [Buller] was perfectly 
aware of what was passing, if he was not aware it was his own fault, as he had ample 
opportunities of making himself aware.’134  
Buller was still unhappy with the Cabinet’s decision and wanted many more 
troops sent to Natal. He told Lansdowne that it would be wise to make immediate 
provision for a further force in Natal. ‘I cannot help feeling that if we let things drift 
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until we are in a very uncomfortable military position and if the Boers are 
bold…they have now the chance of easily inflicting a serious reverse upon us in 
Natal.’135 Taking account of what the Cabinet had already decided, Lansdowne did 
not see that the War Office could be expected to do more.
136
 Furthermore, Wolseley 
had said he would stake his reputation that, after the reinforcements had arrived, 
everything south of the Biggarsberg would be safe. In view of this, Lansdowne 
believed that, even if they sent no further forces, the worst outcome would be that 
the British had to remain on the defensive longer than might be desired.
137
 As the 
reinforcements left for Natal, Hamilton reported to Curzon that: 
The ease and rapidity with which the Indian Contingent has been told off 
and despatched contrast very favourably with the procrastination and 
want of decision of the War Office. Wolseley is quite played out; he has 
lost his memory, and his governing motive in arrangements for the 
Transvaal seems to be jealousy of the Indian establishment. Wood is half 
cracked and wholly deaf; White is to command in Natal, and Buller is 
hardly on speaking terms with the higher military authorities. The 
Department is a real danger to the nation, and until it is reorganized on 
the Admiralty system, civil and military being blended together, and 
working loyally together, we shall have no effective War Department. 
What disgusts me is the jealousy of the Indian Army, so constantly 
shewn … Buller is, or rather was competent, but he lives too well, and 
from what I have seen of the War Office generally, I look with 
considerable apprehension upon the earlier stages of any active campaign 
in South Africa … Both Chamberlain and Milner believe that, without 
war, no satisfactory settlement can be arrived at. I am not certain that 
they are right; time is on our side, railroads are being rapidly pushed on 
that will entirely circumvent the Transvaal, and the influx of the British 
element must year by year increase.’138   
Hamilton’s view of the situation was no different at the end of September when he 
informed Curzon: 
I am very much amused at George Wyndham writing to you so 
enthusiastically concerning the ability of the War Office to place 35,000 
men at once in the field. He perhaps did not tell you that the first 
preliminary to obtaining these 35,000 men is to call out the reserves, and 
that when the reserves are called out they have to be clothed and 
accoutred, and then to be put through a short course of musketry, in order 
that they may know how to handle rifles which they have never before 
had in their hands…the more I see of that Office the more despondent I 
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am. It is not that there is a lack of ability on the military side, but they, 
none of them, seem to pull together, or know their own or other’s minds. 
A confident opinion is given one day as to the impossibility of 
proceeding by a particular route: a week afterwards that route is the one 
route by which an expedition should go.
139
  
It might be considered that Hamilton was being politely silent in not criticising 
his brother-in-law but he had been strongly critical of him during the Riel affair 
while serving as Governor-General in Canada.
140
  
After Kruger rejected the government’s further offer Lansdowne sought 
Cabinet authority to make immediate arrangements to collect in South Africa the 
land transport and food supplies for an Army Corps. Given that it would take thirteen 
weeks to arrange he considered this ‘really urgent.’141 While his proposal was 
discussed and agreed upon, a further note was sent to Kruger and his government. 
Even though Wolseley was given £640,000 to spend on transport for the Army 
Corps he was disappointed the decision had not been taken earlier. Sharing his view 
with Ardagh he stated, ‘I am sick of urging a set of foolish men - whom by the bye I 
can only approach through Lansdowne, for he takes care that I have no access to 
them - to buy the mules, wagons, and harness we shall want for war but to no 
purpose. We have lost two months through the absolute folly of our Cabinet and the 
incapacity of its members to take in the requirements and the difficulties of war. 
Now we shall not be in a position to move forward seriously before Christmas Day!! 
This is strictly between you and me. Lansdowne’s little mind - his jealousy - want of 
decision is trying to a soldier who knows his own work as I do. It is no wonder we 
never achieve much in war and have to struggle through obstacles created by the 
folly and war ignorance of civilian ministers and war office clerks.’142 He told his 
wife ‘if the government could (I mean politically) and would have done in July what 
they will now have to do with much moral effect, I believe the Boers would have 
given in and we should have saved millions.’143 Ardagh was also alarmed by events. 
‘I cannot, from what I know defend their [Cabinet] attitude as being the course most 
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likely to end in peace with honour.’144 The politicians had a different view. St John 
Brodrick believed that ‘the military preparations are at least a month behind hand. 
The soldiers he says habitually underestimate the real time wanted for everything, & 
on this occasion everybody was anxious to accept their estimate so to postpone the 
commencement of irrevocable expenditure and action.’145 
While the politicians waited for Kruger’s reply the War Office had further 
discussions as to the line of advance to take in South Africa. As in 1896 the 
Intelligence Department remained convinced the Orange Free State would most 
likely support the Transvaal and preparations should be based on ‘the definite 
hypothesis of a hostile Free State.’146 Altham’s views were also shared by Forestier-
Walker, who on arrival in South Africa noted ‘it was virtually certain the Orange 
Free State would join the Transvaal as would Afrikaners living along the Cape 
border with the Orange Free State.’147 Whereas Milner favoured the occupation of 
Laing’s Nek, Wolseley, Buller, General Forestier-Walker, White and Wood were all 
against such an action.
148
 
After agreeing on a line of advance Lansdowne informed the Cabinet of his 
military advisers’ recommendations as to ‘(1) the importance of an early decision 
with regard to the line of advance to be adopted in the event of war with the South 
African Republics and (2) the superiority of the line leading through Cape Colony 
and the Orange Free State over any other line.’ He stated that ‘if we continue to 
make all our preparations for attacking by way of Natal, we shall find it virtually 
impossible to alter our plans should the Orange Free State at the last moment declare 
itself hostile.’ He judged, from Steyn’s recent statements, that there was little hope of 
a friendly understanding with the Orange Free State and if there was war Britain 
should have to reckon with both Republics. He added ‘it does not seem as if in the 
present temper of the Orange Free State much would be gained by an attempt to 
arrive at a friendly understanding with it.’ But he trusted that somehow or other it 
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would be open to Buller to make his way to Pretoria across the Orange River.
149
 
Buller believed that if Bloemfontein declared for the Transvaal, the Army should 
take Bloemfontein on the way to Pretoria, and if the Orange Free State stayed 
neutral, it should be forced to give sureties they would preserve that neutrality.
150
 
Wolseley endorsed Buller’s opinion that the best way to Pretoria would be from the 
Orange River by the railway through Bloemfontein.
151
  
On 29 September the Cabinet met again and agreed on wording the ultimatum. 
By this stage they were agreed the matters had got to the point where it was 
‘dangerous.’152 Hicks Beach reported to Lady Londonderry that ‘none of us (except 
possibly Chamberlain though I am by no means sure about him) likes the business. 
But we all feel that it has to be done.’ Like many of his colleagues and the soldiers 
he was uncertain over how long war would last, but he expected a short war, noting, 
‘war preparations go on, and any amount of money is being spent.’153 Salisbury’s 
diplomacy at this stage was guided by his need to retain a free hand in South Africa 
and his hope that the Boers would take the offensive first. While his Cabinet 
colleagues were questioning his ability to lead the country and the efficacy of his 
‘traditional foreign policy’, he refused to be drawn into rows with Russia or 
Germany over China, and succeeded in completing a secret treaty with Portugal 
effectively preventing that country from supplying the Transvaal via Delagoa Bay. In 
the delicate international situation which was developing he achieved a remarkable 
feat of diplomacy, effectively maintaining the status quo.
154
 
As the Cabinet deliberated over the text of the ultimatum, Chamberlain, Hicks 
Beach and Goschen raised concerns of how such a document would be regarded by 
public opinion while Devonshire, Balfour and Lansdowne had little to say except 
approve. They also agreed to continue with preparations for mobilising the Army 
Corps, to call up the reserves and to summon Parliament for 17 October. Lansdowne, 
who was still hesitant, believed, ‘it may not be desirable to call out the reserves a day 
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sooner than is really necessary.’ But they should be called out in time to enable the 
War Office, ‘to equip them, perhaps to give them a little course of musketry, to 
embark them, and to deliver them at their destination by a date not later than that at 
which their land transport and supplies will be ready for them in South Africa.’155 He 
told Salisbury that, if the latest date for the Queen to sign the proclamation for 
calling up the reserve was 7 October, all the reserves would have joined by 
21 October.
156
 
While these preparations were made, the Orange Free State declared an 
alliance with the Transvaal and expelled its British subjects. Likewise the Transvaal 
mobilised its forces and adjourned the Volksraad. As the spotlight fell on the War 
Office in early October there were signs that the principal individuals were pulling in 
the same direction. On 3 October, referring to the surprise expressed by some of the 
Cabinet at the size of the force assembling for employment in South Africa, 
Lansdowne presented his colleagues with a memorandum in which he explained the 
War Office had definitely decided to adopt the Cape Colony and Orange Free State 
route and that Wolseley and Buller were of the opinion there should be no reduction 
in the strength of the Army Corps being sent from Britain and that no part of the 
force on its way to South Africa should be reckoned as part of it. Buller in his 
‘memorandum’ of 5 September recommended that the ‘whole of the Army Corps 
should be mobilized but stated that if it was decided to adhere to the Natal route, the 
troops already in Natal might be taken as equivalent to one infantry division and one 
cavalry brigade and the Army Corps reduced accordingly.’ He mentioned a force of 
50,000 soldiers. 
Lansdowne believed that the soldiers were right and that Britain would make a 
‘grievous mistake if, from motives of economy, we were to reduce the number of 
troops for which we are asked to provide.’ ‘We are going to fight an enemy more 
formidable than any whom we have encountered for many years past…the adhesion 
of the Orange Free State has added very largely to the Boer Force.’157 Lansdowne’s 
principal concern at this stage was having sufficient animal transport and supplies for 
the Army Corps. In South Africa the rainy season was about to begin which meant 
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that there would be sufficient grass for the transport animals to feed on.
158
 However, 
insufficient numbers of mules on the spot required having to import them from 
Spain, Italy, and America. Though the timing for this had been factored into his 
‘memorandum’ of 12 August he now doubted that the whole force would be 
concentrated and equipped before the third week in December.
159
 
On the eve of war Kruger announced to the newspapers in South Africa that, 
‘War is certain. The Republics are determined, if they must belong to Great Britain, 
that a price will have to be paid which will stagger humanity. They have, however, 
full faith, the sun of liberty will arise in South Africa.’160 Filled with patriotism and 
apprehension, the South African press fanned the flames of strife further. John 
Merriman noted, ‘On our side there is panic and alarm everywhere. Johannesburg 
has been literally denuded of its inhabitants…the well-to-do, far from offering to 
take up arms in what is professedly their cause are crowding the hotels, pouring forth 
their woes over cigars and champagne and waiting till the ‘market drops’ to enable 
them to buy shares for nothing, that will be rendered valuable by British blood and 
bayonets. The Boers have mobilized with incredible celerity and efficiency and are 
with great difficulty restrained from the offensive.’161 Making light of the chaotic 
situation in South Africa, Chamberlain remarked that Milner and the inhabitants in 
Cape Colony were scared by the rumours of enormous Boer preparations, 
exaggerating the probability of their taking the offensive and of a British reverse if 
they did.
162
  
While Chamberlain played down the extent of the conflict, White had fewer 
illusions. Then on his way to Durban, he remarked, ‘the Cabinet have incurred the 
heaviest responsibility in not having sent quietly into this country more troops. If the 
military preparations had from the first kept pace with the political negotiations the 
Boers would never have assumed the…attitude they now have committed themselves 
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to…All this may be traced to the want of military advice in the Cabinet.’163 On 9 
October the Transvaal government handed the British an ultimatum which demanded 
by 5pm on 11 October immediate assurances to the Transvaal. It demanded that 
British troops on the borders of the Republic should be instantly withdrawn and that 
all British reinforcements that arrived in the last year should be withdrawn from 
South Africa and that those troops which were then on the sea should not be landed 
in any port of South Africa.’164 Milner forwarded the ultimatum to London, where it 
was received with ‘derision, delight, dismay - and indifference.’165 Salisbury was 
pleased with the document, warning Chamberlain that the government must not be 
seen as ‘doing work for the Capitalists.’166  While Salisbury replied that ‘the 
conditions demanded…are such that Her Majesty’s Government deem it impossible 
to discuss,’167 Lansdowne congratulated Chamberlain, ‘accept my felicitations! I 
don’t think Kruger could have played your cards better than he has.’168 Wolseley 
rejoiced ‘beyond measure to think war must now come. Come it would most 
certainly sometime or other and now is best for us…Buller will, I am sure, end the 
war with complete success for England.’169 
On the eve of war public opinion had largely rallied behind the government for 
its policy in South Africa but it was not in complete accord. It was Selborne’s view 
that only four fifths of the public were with the government due to ‘our hesitancy 
(militarily almost criminal) in making early preparations.’170 Lord Edmond 
Fitzmaurice, Lansdowne’s brother and Liberal MP for Cricklade, thought that 
Chamberlain’s policy had been wrong. In a plea for patience he argued the British 
should at least try to understand the Boers.
171
 In contrast Walter Long, a Unionist 
politician and Wiltshire neighbour of Lansdowne’s, believed the universal cry was 
that ‘we must fight - we must win, and we are ready to pay the bill.’172 It was now 
incumbent on the government to make sure that those that were in support of their 
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policy did not turn against them.
173
 Public expectation was high. Having recently 
seen British victories at Ashanti and Fashoda the public had no reason to suspect that 
a war against the Boers would be different. The opposition Liberal party leaders 
were also broadly supportive of the measures. Rosebery, addressing the House of 
Lords, said ‘in the face of this attack, the nation will, I doubt not, close its ranks and 
relegate party controversy to a more convenient season.’174 In the House of 
Commons Campbell-Bannerman said that his party would vote supplies and powers 
necessary to secure a rapid and effective prosecution of a war rendered absolutely 
necessary by the terms of the Boer ultimatum and the subsequent invasion of the 
British colonies.
175
 
In international politics Salisbury had limited Britain’s exposure to an attack 
from one or other of the European powers and, though the situation in China was 
unsettled, the risk of large scale British military involvement was minimal. While 
both civil and military opinion appeared to be united this was temporary. In the next 
chapter it will be demonstrated how the lack of cooperation between civilians and 
senior officers at the War Office was reflected by the generals in South Africa and 
how Lansdowne managed the blunders of ‘the War’ and responded to the lessons of 
the war. It will be shown that neither the War Office system of 1895 nor the Army 
system broke down under the pressure of war but that the system of ‘short service 
and reserves’ stood the nation in ‘good stead.’176 
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Chapter Six - The War in South Africa 
In debate, at the time of the South African War, the Duke of Bedford claimed the 
administrative machinery of the War Office under the test of war turned out ‘a 
disaster and humiliation.’1 Infact had the War Office system Lansdowne established 
in 1895 not existed it would have been ‘impossible to place and maintain in the field 
that Army that went to South Africa.’2 The policy of Britain was not fixed upon lines 
to make the country a great military power. Having never expected to face an enemy 
of this type and scale the fact that the War Office kept up a force of over 180,000 
men 6,000 miles from Britain was an achievement. Although the lessons of ‘the 
War’ revealed limitations in Lansdowne’s prewar Army system he did not believe 
reform during war would be effective. As such he introduced temporary and 
permanent emergency measures designed to strengthen Britain’s denuded defences 
and increase the size of the Army while maintaining the principles of the Cardwell 
system. Lansdowne’s loosening of the grip held by the civilians over the senior 
officers, his ability to appease his critics in the reform movement and the opposition, 
and his belief that as Secretary of State for War he alone must be responsible to 
Parliament for the Army were reasons why the War Office and Army system did not 
break down under the pressure of war. 
In the extant literature different contours of ‘the War’ have been examined 
from the broad history of ‘the War’ to detailed aspects of it.3 With the exception of 
Keith Surridge’s examination of Lansdowne no proper account has been made of 
Lansdowne at the War Office and the measures he took to manage ‘the War’.4 By the 
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unique opportunity provided by the events of ‘the War’ and their effect this chapter 
will demonstrate how Lansdowne diverted his critics away from the controversy 
raging about the Regular Army, and focused their attention on how to turn the 
Auxiliary Army to ‘best account’,5 made further increases and improvements to the 
British Army and established stability in South Africa. This chapter will suggest that 
by the time Lansdowne left in November 1900 the War Office had ‘forgotten its 
traditions’6 and earned a character: ‘its machinery heavy and cumbrous, as some of it 
is, has worked steadily and at a speed of which it was supposed to be incapable.’7  
Having secured the support for a war in South Africa the government had to 
ensure that public approval and enthusiasm remained strong. To achieve this, the 
government had to deliver a quick victory. Lansdowne and his advisers had no doubt 
this was possible. It was their belief that the Army was more efficient than at any 
previous moment. Wyndham believed, ‘the Army is more efficient than at any time 
since Waterloo.’ His sentiment was also shared by Lansdowne and Wolseley.8 The 
latter stating that ‘no Army has ever left our shores composed of finer soldiers.’9 
Such complacency was widespread and encouraged the view held by one of the 
generals that, ‘we were all rather afraid the war might be over before we arrived in 
November.’10 On 7 October, a Royal Proclamation called up the reserves. During the 
following two weeks while the reserves mobilised Lansdowne’s adaptation of the 
Cardwell system was put through its first test in time of war. Doubting ‘whether they 
will be as strong as we expected,’11 he was proved wrong when the War Office 
received a ninety-eight percent return rate.
12
 The success was attributed to the War 
Office’s respect for ‘regimental feeling.’13 To one of the service parliamentarians the 
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belief he himself had always had that ‘the proposals of Mr Cardwell…would 
eventually bear good fruit…has been fully justified.’14 Such praise of Cardwell’s 
legacy was echoed by Haliburton who later noted, the British would not have been in 
South Africa had it not been for the reserve.
15
 The need to send infantry battalions to 
South Africa meant that the ability to train men and instruct officers in their simplest 
duties became temporarily impaired. Unwilling to shatter the machine, functioning to 
provide for home defence and training men for overseas duties, the War Office 
decided to embody thirty-three of the one hundred and twenty-four Militia infantry 
battalions.
16
 In the same way that the successful call up of the reserves silenced 
many critics of the Cardwell system and the War Office, so too did the partial 
embodiment of the Militia. 
Embodying the Militia, calling up the reserves and preparing the Army for 
embarkation to South Africa added enormously to the military expenditure of the 
country. Some senior officers, including Wolseley, held it as axiomatic that ‘when 
war is upon us, then money is to be had easily and for the asking.’17 The Treasury 
and Hicks Beach thought otherwise. Having consulted his War Office colleagues and 
discussed Wolseley’s minute of 30 September in which he had recommended 
measures for strengthening the Militia, cavalry and horse and field artillery as an 
‘indispensable minimum,’18 Lansdowne informed the Cabinet that the cost of forces 
to the end of 31 March 1900 was estimated at £11 million. Faced with this amount, 
and the possibility of having to impose new taxes to meet the cost of the war, Hicks 
Beach’s first reaction was to threaten to resign. Although neither scenarios 
materialised and new taxation was delayed until the budget the following year, that 
the Cabinet contemplated a penny on income tax and 6d on beer to meet the 
demands for war expenditure was an indication of their optimism that ‘the War’ 
would not last long. When Parliament met on 17 October, for the first time since the 
outbreak of the war, the House of Commons voted to pay £10 million for 
expenditure.  
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With the expenditure for the embarkation secured, the whole force of one 
Army Corps, except one regiment of cavalry, roughly 41,000 soldiers began to 
embark.
19
 Among their number preparing to embark with their regiments for active 
service were Lansdowne’s two sons. Owing to effective working relations between 
the War Office and the Admiralty the mobilisation was generally regarded as a 
success.
20
 While most troop transports averaged fourteen knots Goschen secured the 
use of the Majestic (White Star Line) and Campania (Cunard Line) as transports for 
2,000 and 3,000 men respectively. He believed the extra £44,000 was justified, ‘to 
show to the world of sending out 5,000 men in two 20 knot ships is worth 
something.’21 According to Frederick Robb, the Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General, 
‘I have never known such a quiet time at the War Office as immediately after the 
issue of the mobilization orders. Of course, mobilization on such a large scale as that 
was an absolute experiment, and we quite anticipated that there would be a very 
large number of questions asked…but I can say from experience and a lot of us 
noticed it, that we were perfectly surprised at the calmness and quietness with which 
every detail worked out.’22 The quietness was short-lived as within a few weeks of 
the outbreak of war demands for more men escalated. By the end of October, after 
the battle of Nicholson’s Nek, Wolseley recommended that three more battalions and 
a mountain battery set sail for South Africa to make good the loss of 2,300 men 
killed, wounded or captured.
23
 Bad weather at sea caused problems, horses died and 
the Persia was temporarily disabled with one hundred and fifty dragoons and horses. 
Goschen remarked that ‘with 100 ships some are sure to have…troubles, however 
good they are.’24 Queen Victoria was distressed about the horses and questioned 
whether it would not be better to get them at the Cape.
25
 Lansdowne replied that 
suitable horses could not be obtained in sufficient number there.
26
 
During November there was no let up in the embarkation of the Army. 
Lansdowne observed that he was ‘spending money at an appalling rate but I believe 
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nothing to be more costly in the end than an unnecessary prolongation of war.’27 In 
calculating the many implications of being at war he believed that ‘it is desirable that 
the troops should reach South Africa as soon as possible in view of the state of 
public feeling in the two colonies.’28 Wolseley realised that ‘the War’ would be a 
much longer affair than was anticipated and the cost would be extremely great.
29
  
One of the principal costs of ‘the War’ was for the large numbers of men 
required to fight it. To officials at the War Office and the Admiralty the constant 
demands for more men made by Buller during the first few months of ‘the War’ 
came as a surprise. There was some doubt that he even knew why he needed them. It 
was Knox’s opinion that ‘our doings here are perfectly wonderful everything going 
so smoothly and Division after Division is mobilized by the turn of a handle…What, 
however, I do not understand is our generals wanting such numbers of men. Two 
Army Corps! We have nearly three there already with all the colonials…“Let em all 
come” is their word and I do not believe they know why.’30 Similar concerns were 
voiced by the Admiralty where Goschen, on informing Lansdowne that the Navy 
was in a position to re-employ some of their fastest transports and save hiring new 
ones, remarked that he was disturbed by Buller’s demand for more men of war.31 
Salisbury proposed editing his communications. Lansdowne disagreed, remarking 
that the telegrams should be shown to the Cabinet as they justified the military 
preparations the War Office was making, ‘which they would do only partly if the 
government suppressed many of Buller’s remarks on the situation.’32 
Between October 1899 and February 1900 Wolseley estimated 114,000 
Regular troops were on their way to South Africa and 28,800 Auxiliaries and 
colonials. The total of all ranks made it the largest Army that had ever left Britain for 
any war.
33
 There was some discrepancy between the exact figures reported to the 
public and the War Office. During the Commons debate on the Queen’s speech on 1 
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February 1900, Wyndham declared there were some 180,000 troops in South 
Africa.
34
 Roberts was somewhat concerned when he arrived in South Africa and 
found the actual total was 79,000 infantry and cavalry which with the Royal 
Artillery, Royal Engineers, Army Service Corps and Royal Army Medical Corps, 
totalled 86,503 Regular soldiers in addition to 11,195 colonial troops.
35
 Lansdowne 
noted that Roberts’ finding was disappointing. ‘The way in which a huge force ‘cuts 
to waste’ when it is scattered as your troops are, is melancholy.’36 
The mobilisation succeeded not only because of the efficient cooperation 
between the War Office and the Admiralty but also because of the willingness of the 
Treasury to provide expenditure for the war. After Hicks Beach’s initial reluctance to 
sanction money for ‘the War’ and his belief that Lansdowne should limit himself to 
£9 million,
37
 he raised no significant further objections to demands from the War 
Office and Admiralty. He later informed Salisbury:  
Every matter of importance from the sending of reinforcements in June 
last, the preparations for and mobilization of the Army corps down to the 
latest additions to our forces in South Africa has been decided by the 
Cabinet or the Cabinet Committee. All the expenditure prepared by the 
War Office in order to carry out their decisions has been accepted as a 
rule. Lord Lansdowne has had a completely free hand with regard to all 
the details of the military expenditure as has Mr Goschen with regard to 
the transplants and there has in no case been any greater delay than was 
required for a preliminary discussion of a few of the largest items 
between Lord Lansdowne and myself or between the permanent heads of 
the two departments.’38  
Against the success of the mobilisation Lansdowne’s critics had few reasons 
for complaint. Campbell-Bannerman, who had some initial reservations of the War 
Office system Lansdowne adopted and in particular the Army Board,
39
 noted that ‘it 
has completely fulfilled the purpose for which it was created,’ and, although Dilke 
took exception to the cost of mobilisation and questioned the need of a home Army 
to defend Britain, he did not have the ‘slightest doubt’ of the reserves coming up in 
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answer to the call and that embodying the Militia was the ‘proper step.’40 The service 
parliamentarians had no objections to the steps taken to embark the men for South 
Africa and Frederick Rasch noted that the ‘War Office have disappointed the fondest 
hopes of their bitterest enemies…’41 
While the War Office facilitated a smooth mobilisation, the generals in South 
Africa fared less well meeting with determined resistance from the Boers. It can be 
argued that in certain cases their situation was undermined by political interference. 
In Natal civilian and military opinions clashed as Walter Hely-Hutchinson, the 
Governor of Natal, and White disagreed over the movement of soldiers. The incident 
upset the soldiers on the spot.
42
 In resolving the dispute Lansdowne informed White 
‘we expect you to act strictly in accordance with military requirements of the 
situation. Governor is within his right in directing your attention to political 
consequences of your arrangements, but responsibility for the decision rests entirely 
with you. You may find steps necessary which may run counter to public opinion 
here and in the colony but we shall unhesitatingly support you in adhering to 
arrangements which seem to you militarily sound.’43 His response was a clear 
indication that in bringing ‘the War’ to a successful conclusion neither he nor the 
government would interfere with or attempt to control the generals and that the 
government was willing to relinquish some of their need to control them. 
The Army’s performance in the early stages was unimpressive and by the time 
Buller arrived on 30 October White was trapped in Ladysmith, Cecil Rhodes and 
Colonel Kekewich were surrounded at Kimberley and Robert Baden-Powell was cut 
off at Mafeking. Buller regarded the situation as one of extreme gravity.
44
 
Lansdowne who had known White since India noted that in England there was a 
great desire ‘to get the knife into him [White].’45 He was glad Buller did not press 
for his dismissal and was confident he would hold out. Brackenbury saw White’s 
capture as the fortune of war. Some reverses in a campaign were inevitable and, with 
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inferior forces, the British could not always be successful.
46
 Buller believed, ‘to 
forecast the future is difficult, we are still hanging on by our eyelids.’47 Having 
previously agreed with the War Office to take the Orange Free State line of advance 
to Pretoria he now decided to split his Army Corps into three. He ordered Methuen 
to relieve Kimberley, Gatacre to secure the Northern Cape while he himself would 
proceed to Ladysmith. Informing Lansdowne of his decision he remarked that the 
‘advance in Natal with infantry who are just off the ships and are short of cavalry 
and artillery, on the Boers in positions carefully prepared, will be a risk, but it is a 
greater risk to leave Ladysmith alone.’48 Lansdowne was ‘not astonished’ that Buller 
altered his plans, but he was concerned at Buller’s choice of generals to execute the 
plan. Although Methuen was an old friend and Wiltshire neighbour and ‘able and 
painstaking’, Lansdowne did not believe that ‘he is strong enough for an almost 
independent command…Forestier-Walker [Methuen’s second-in-command] is I am 
told safe and steady but I don’t think the  Walker-Methuen combination sufficiently 
good.’49 Salisbury advised Lansdowne, ‘my earnest advice is to leave the matter 
entirely to Buller…the responsibility must be his own.’50  
The subsequent failure of Buller’s plan and the defeats of Gatacre, Methuen 
and Buller himself all within five days of each other in mid-December dealt a 
collective shock to both the British authorities and public. The Black Week, so called 
by Herbert Asquith, also shattered Britain’s complacency as to a quick victory. Only 
the previous week, on 8 December, the Cabinet had met and considered what to do 
‘assuming that we are successful in the war.’ One idea was that a small, landlocked, 
mainly Dutch colony could be formed within the Empire.
51
 St John Brodrick, the 
then Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had bet Milner a case of champagne that, 
‘serious fighting (defined as an engagement or siege in which 3,000 men were 
employed on either side) will be over by Xmas Day!!!!’ Brodrick had been the person 
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at the Foreign Office most closely in touch with the War Office.
52
 When Buller 
informed Lansdowne on 15 December ‘a serious question is raised by my failure 
today. I do not now consider that I am strong enough to relieve Ladysmith…I 
consider that I ought to let Ladysmith go,’53 Lansdowne was unable to ignore ‘its 
gravity or the effects which the succession of misfortunes may have.’54 Replying to 
Buller’s telegram he stated ‘the abandonment of White’s force and its consequent 
surrender is regarded by the government as a national disaster of the greatest 
magnitude.’55  
If public opinion had generally been supportive of the government’s decision 
to go to war, by the end of December ‘a strong reaction of disgust with the want of 
(military) foresight on the part of the Ministry has set in and much criticism imposed 
on Lansdowne and Wolseley and Hicks Beach - quite undeserved I should think of 
the two latter.’56 Lansdowne and Balfour, who had joined him at the War Office the 
previous month, became bywords for weakness and Salisbury was described as a 
man of the past.
57
  Although the public were shocked by the defeats most of the 
opposition maintained their broadly non-partisan attitude to the situation in South 
Africa. Campbell-Bannerman told an audience at Aberdeen on 19 December: ‘We 
have in the field the largest Army that ever left these shores…we have a united 
people in the country and in every part of the Empire and with these forces on our 
side - moral and material - success is certain’.58 Asquith warned that it would be 
‘grotesque’ to get these reverses out of proportion. He compared the present 
‘humiliations and mortifications’ with periods of real national crisis during the 
Napoleonic War or Indian Mutiny.
59
 
The defence intellectuals held Lansdowne responsible for the military defeats 
in South Africa. Perceived flaws in his personality led Wilkinson to accuse him of 
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‘an unbusiness-like way of playing with national affairs,’60 and that ‘the present 
distressing situation appears to me to be attributable to the want of harmony between 
policy and military preparations which is essential to success in war but which Lord 
Lansdowne thinks unattainable.’61 Wilkinson’s remark referred to a speech made by 
Lansdowne on 2 November, in which he stated that ‘If our naval and military 
preparations and our diplomatic negotiations are always to keep exactly abreast our 
diplomacy will on the one hand have to be hesitating and dilatory, while on the other 
hand the military and naval authorities will have to commit overt acts of warlike 
preparations, acts of the most provocative and threatening description, not because 
an international difficulty has arisen, but because such a difficulty may arise. I doubt 
extremely whether public opinion will allow us to conduct our negotiations in this 
manner. It would be diplomacy with a vengeance.’62 Lansdowne did not think it was 
unattainable but that it was not practical politics. As he later noted and as described 
in the previous chapter, ‘While negotiations were still in progress we determined to 
restrict ourselves to those purely protective measures which seemed to us sufficient 
for the purpose and which, in our belief, were not calculated to provoke a rupture of 
the negotiations which were proceeding.’63 
The personal attacks made against Lansdowne’s character by the defence 
intellectuals were as nothing when compared to those made by some sections of the 
press.  Unlike in previous wars, ‘the War’ attracted a mass readership, made possible 
in part by technical advances in telegraphy and news gathering which had 
transformed the methods and scope of the British newspaper industry. The majority 
of the Conservative press firmly supported the war, whereas, the Liberal press, like 
the Liberal Party, was divided. The Westminster Gazette, Daily Chronicle and Daily 
News followed Rosebery and the Liberal Imperialists in support of the war, whereas 
The Morning Leader, The Star and The Manchester Guardian endorsed pro-Boer 
views. Editors had expected a prompt and decisive victory and despatched war 
correspondents in unprecedented numbers, including Dr Arthur Conan Doyle, Leo 
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Amery and Winston Churchill. Much of the press reporting from the front was 
unreliable and inaccurate,
64
 and Lansdowne was quick to make arrangements for a 
strict censorship of the telegrams sent home from South Africa.
65
 Wolseley was 
strongly of the opinion that giving any information, stating the place at which 
preparations were being made or giving any details, all of which were valuable to an 
enemy, should be forbidden. Lansdowne, reminded of his experience with seditious 
press reports in India, agreed. He believed that an appeal to the leader representatives 
of the press would be a more favourable approach than legislation.
66
  
During the summer of 1899 Lansdowne had instructed Wolseley to draft a bill 
for parliamentary legislation to control the press during time of war. The Cabinet 
rejected the draft ruling that the government could not expect to introduce such a 
measure in peace time. On 6 October Lansdowne invoked the 1875 International 
Telegraph Convention of Berne to impose censorship and not long after Lord Stanley 
(17
th
 Earl of Derby) was sent to South Africa to become Chief Military censor.
67
 The 
Times complained bitterly about censorship asserting it was ‘inconsistent, arbitrary 
and vexatious.’68 Its editor, Moberley Bell, complained to Lansdowne about the 
manner in which the censors did their work. Lansdowne accepted ‘some of them are 
no doubt wanting in tact and intelligence…It seems to me all wrong that the censor 
should add anything of his own to the correspondent’s message, in one case the 
censor is said to have insisted upon the insertion of some words complimentary to a 
certain general.’69 Such was the power of the press on the spot in South Africa that 
reporters had their favourite generals whom they portrayed as heroes fighting a 
‘gentleman’s war.’70 Such adulation made it difficult for Lansdowne and the 
government to criticise them in public. By February 1900, the power of the press in 
directing public opinion on ‘the War’ was such that the government decided to end 
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the censorship of letters.
71
 Roberts, who was then in command in South Africa and 
was popular with newspaper reporters, was strongly in favour of relaxing the censor 
noting, ‘write what you like, because it is by your writings that I shall see what 
mistakes have been made.’72  
Lansdowne’s unpopularity with the press made him an easy target of press 
sensationalism for the military blunders in South Africa. As Haliburton noted ‘if the 
Times and the Post at all reflect the mind of the nation, it is to be feared that we are 
in for a fit of national frenzy and not a very suitable frame of mind to conduct a great 
war.’73 Among those to question Lansdowne’s ability to conduct ‘the War’ The 
Spectator suggested that ‘a great nobleman is not the person to whom the country 
can look for a really thorough and merciless exposure of the causes of our present 
inefficiency. We require a man brought up, not like a man of vast estates usually is, 
to consider serenity and absence of detailed work the principal conditions to conduct 
a department with success.’74 ‘We fear that he has unconsciously no doubt regarded 
his duties rather as those of a figure-head chairman of a great charitable or 
ornamental corporation than as those of the Minister on whom the efficiency of the 
Army depends, and on whose exertions was staked the safety of the nation…he will 
show none of the tiger-will, none of the tireless vigilance and resource which are 
wanted now.’75 
While the country was looking for a scapegoat it was also gripped with 
astonishment, frustration and humiliation. Self-confident music hall songs jarred 
with the harsh reality. The atmosphere of gloom in England was even deeper than at 
the Cape. Many theatres closed due to lack of audiences and social life fell to a 
minimum. London was plunged into depression.
76
 Beatrice Webb commented, ‘the 
dismissal of Massingham from the editorship, and of others from the staff of the 
Daily Chronicle, reflects the strong patriotic sentiment of its readers. Any criticism 
of the war at present is hopelessly unpopular. The cleavage of opinion about the war 
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separates persons hitherto united and unites those who by temperament and training 
have hitherto been divorced. No one knows who is friend and who is enemy…and 
who can fail to be depressed at the hatred of England on the continent.’77 A journalist 
told Rosebery, ‘I trust I may never experience another black week like that…perhaps 
it was worst of all in newspaper offices for the news came so late. The paper on 
Friday had almost been “put to bed” (with articles speculating &c on what Buller 
would do) when the news of his defeat came in after 1 o’clock.’78  
The news of the defeats in Black Week were less sensational to Queen Victoria 
who remarked, ‘please understand that there is no one depressed in this house. We 
are not interested in the possibilities of defeat, they do not exist.’79 She urged on 
Balfour ‘very strongly the necessity of resisting the unpatriotic and unjust criticism 
of our government and of the conduct of the war. If the government are firm and 
courageous the country will support them.’80 Salisbury shared her sentiment ‘I have 
always thought the Cabinet rather underrated the Boers but “all will come right”.’81  
While it was difficult for the Cabinet and the civilians at the War Office to 
criticise the generals in public, in private Hamilton noted, ‘Making all allowance for 
the inevitable shortcomings of organization, transport and supply, it is not the defects 
associated with these branches of military supply, that have been the primary cause 
of our reverses. It is the lack of brains and foresight shown by our generals. This we 
cannot say in public, or even in private, as it would discourage those under their 
command, and would look like an attempt on the part of the politicals at home at 
saving themselves at the expense of those in the firing line.’82 It is notable that in the 
immediate aftermath of Black Week Lansdowne made no public defence of the War 
Office or his own conduct and it was Balfour that first attempted to deny War Office 
responsibility. But in three speeches at Manchester in early January 1900 he failed to 
win public support, and showed a distinct lack of understanding of popular 
awareness. The Times reported that he had ‘utterly failed to understand the present 
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temper of the British people, or to realize that, while there is no desire to hamper the 
Cabinet or the War Office at the moment of dire distress, the time is not far distant 
when the nation will demand to know why departments of state to which it trusted 
have permitted to be caught unprepared.’83  
Wolseley warned that ‘we are now face to face with a serious national crisis 
and unless we meet it boldly and quickly grapple with it successfully it may…lead to 
dangerous complications with Foreign powers.’84 He blamed Lansdowne for not 
listening to him,
85
 and for thinking that he could do all his business without his 
assistance.
86
 He resented that he had been allowed no part in ‘the War’ and ‘that an 
older man than I has been allowed to command.’87 Interpreting the blunders as proof 
of his ineffectual stand against the subordination of his office to civilian control, he 
took a ‘certain gloomy satisfaction in the guilt and remorse which he imagined that 
Lansdowne must be feeling.’88  
Although the question of intervention was discussed by some of the Great 
Powers, in Britain it was considered to be very remote. Germany took advantage of 
the situation to enact a naval bill in the Reichstag enabling her to double the size of 
her Navy. The Russian Emperor at a meeting with Sir Charles Scott, the British 
Ambassador at St Petersburg, expressed his deepest sympathy with the nation. He 
desired the Queen to be assured that he was filled with the most ‘friendly feelings to 
us in this long hour of trial and that nothing was further from his thoughts than to 
take any advantage of our difficulties or to countenance any step likely to increase 
them.’89 Nonetheless crowds in Dublin cheered the news of British defeats and it 
‘was not possible to ignore the danger that might arise from any sudden or 
unforeseen event which might set fire to public opinion in France, where the wound 
of Fashoda still rankles.’90 The darkest hour of ‘the War’ was not in fact Black Week 
and its impact militarily was fairly insignificant. Neither Kimberley nor Ladysmith 
surrendered when the British forces were defeated at Colenso and Magersfontein and 
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Stormberg did not incite an uprising in the Cape. The sieges of Kimberley and 
Ladysmith just continued. Moreover by invading Natal rather than the Cape and 
directing their energy and strength in operations against the besieged garrisons the 
Boers wasted valuable resources for use elsewhere.
91
  
The set-backs of Black Week convinced Lansdowne that Buller should be 
replaced. His view was strengthened by the fact he could replace him with Roberts, 
who had indicated his willingness to go to South Africa and that ‘my want of 
knowledge of the country would be made up by the many good men well acquainted 
with it whom I should have to assist me.’92 It was Roberts’ opinion that Buller’s 
mismanagement made it clear that British strategy and tactics were both at fault, ‘and 
that unless change is made at once our Army will be frittered away and we shall have 
to make ignominious peace.’93 Roberts did not think Buller would have any reason 
to consider himself ‘superseded’ if he himself went out in supreme command. He 
‘would still hold an extremely responsible position as second in command, while he 
would be available to direct operations in any part of the country where most needed, 
and thus leave the officer in supreme command to exercise effectual general 
supervision.’94 Lansdowne was persuaded. He was convinced that Roberts, assisted 
by Kitchener, should take command of the Army in South Africa. On the evening of 
15 December, having received the news of Colenso, he summoned Balfour from a 
dinner party to the War Office to discuss the situation and spoke openly in favour of 
a Roberts-Kitchener combination. Balfour concurred that Buller should be replaced. 
Secrecy was essential as Kitchener was not popular with Wolseley and his ‘Ring’ 
within the War Office.
95
 Although Salisbury was initially doubtful of Lansdowne’s 
idea, the proposal to send Kitchener reconciled him. On the evening of 16 December 
the Defence Committee of the Cabinet confirmed the decision that Buller must 
resign his command to Roberts.
96
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The following day Lansdowne met Roberts alone at Mackellar’s Hotel in 
Dover Street, where he was staying, to discuss his appointment. Describing the 
incident to Roberts’ daughter years later he noted, ‘By that time it was known that 
your brother [Freddy Roberts] had been wounded. I asked your father, who was 
much distressed, whether he still felt physically fit for such a tremendous enterprise. 
He made no secret of his feelings as to Freddy, but was hopeful and ready to go 
on.’97 Later that day Lansdowne learnt from Herbert Scott, Roberts’ ADC in Ireland, 
that Freddy had died. As Lansdowne explained, ‘I had to go and find your father and 
break the news to him. The blow was almost more than he could bear, and for a 
moment I thought he would break down, but he pulled himself together. I shall never 
forget the courage which he showed, or the way in which he refused to allow this 
disaster to turn him aside from his duty. Your father, throughout these sad 
conversations, made it quite clear that Kitchener’s assistance was essential to him.’98  
Although the decision had already been taken and agreed by the politicians 
neither Queen Victoria nor Wolseley were aware that Buller was to be replaced.
99
 
When Wolseley learnt about the decision he was ‘dumbfounded.’ He told 
Lansdowne that Buller would rather resign than suffer the humiliation and, even if he 
had made mistakes, he was a better man than Roberts. Queen Victoria intimated her 
astonishment through Arthur Bigge, her private secretary, who was a close personal 
friend of Buller’s. It was his view that, ‘Her Majesty was deeply aggrieved at the 
Cabinet’s behaviour on numerous grounds. For not telling her of the decision to 
appoint Roberts, not seeking her advice, not consulting her before cabling Buller, 
and failing to consult Wolseley.’100 After Kitchener accepted the appointment, 
Lansdowne informed Salisbury, ‘I assume this clinches the business and I have told 
Roberts that he must make arrangements to start by next Saturday’s mail. He is very 
keen and is confident of being able to get on with Buller.’101 In the event of Roberts 
being incapacitated Kitchener agreed to serve under Buller. As to his title it was 
decided that rather than put him above all the generals except Buller, which would 
have involved superseding four Lieutenant-Generals and two Major-Generals, ‘a 
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rather violent measure’in Lansdowne’s opinion, so long as Roberts was to the fore, 
Kitchener would be his Chief of Staff and ‘owe allegiance to no one else.’102  
On 18 December, Balfour was summoned to Windsor to discuss the 
appointment with the Queen. Salisbury had told Lansdowne the day before to submit 
Kitchener’s appointment to the Queen before it got into the newspapers as, ‘she 
loves Buller and does not love Roberts or rather his wife.’103 Although she accepted 
Balfour’s reason for haste in the change of command and approved, she could not 
help feeling that Roberts then aged sixty-seven was rather old and Wolseley would 
have been preferable. Reporting the meeting to Salisbury, Balfour mentioned the 
Queen’s feelings about not having an opportunity to express an opinion about 
Roberts’ appointment, adding that he could not understand why Lansdowne had not 
sent a messenger to the Queen by special train the previous day. Lansdowne’s 
oversight occurred, as it was later reported, because he contented himself with telling 
‘Bigge who was in London the whole story, and asking him to convey it to Her 
Majesty.’104  
Roberts’ appointment left the post of Commander-in-Chief in Ireland vacant 
and the Queen hoped her son would fill it.
105
 The Duke of Connaught himself was 
more interested in serving in South Africa, a wish that his brother, the Prince of 
Wales, also strongly supported. ‘It is the ruin of his military career if he has no 
employment during the most important war we have ever been engaged in,’ he told 
Lansdowne.
106
 But Roberts, who met the Queen on 22 December, did not wish the 
Duke to go to South Africa, because his seniority meant he could go only in a 
position suitable to his rank.
107
  Attaching him to the staff would put the Duke in a 
false position.
108
 As he was leaving for South Africa on 23 December, the Duke told 
Roberts at Waterloo Station that the Prince of Wales was very annoyed. Roberts 
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feared the Prince would return to the attack during his campaign in South Africa.
109
 
Lansdowne smoothed the situation over by sympathising with the Queen that her son 
had not obtained the service he so desired and informing her that his selection as 
Commander-in-Chief in Ireland ‘would be an excellent one in the interest of the 
Army.’110 After Balfour’s meeting with the Queen, Lansdowne telegraphed Buller to 
tell him of Roberts ‘appointment as Commander-in-Chief South Africa, his Chief of 
Staff being Lord Kitchener.’111 Buller was as surprised to learn the news as the 
Queen had been. Receiving Lansdowne’s notification of the change of command he 
remarked, ‘that it read like one to a girl who was being put in charge of a strict 
governess.’112  
While Lansdowne’s telegram upset Buller, so Robert’s appointment grated on 
Wolseley. In the months following the appointment he gradually lost interest in his 
work at the War Office. After producing a Memorandum on 29 December 1899 on 
the possibility of an invasion by France and measures to counter that,
113
 and another 
on 30 January 1900 on what had been done in England and the Colonies and India to 
place a fighting Army in South Africa,
114
 he took a noticeably less active role in the 
prosecution of the war.
115
 It can be speculated that the reasons for his uninterest in 
War Office matters were his ill health and his anger that a man whom he considered 
to be a ‘charlatan’116 and a ‘cheat’117 had obtained the South Africa command he had 
coveted. His jealousy must have been further heightened by the public adulation 
Roberts received as he turned the tide in South Africa and prosecuted ‘the War’ 
successfully. While the Roberts’ appointment caused Wolseley notable distress, to 
some sections of the press it restored their faith in the government’s seriousness to 
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bring ‘the War’ to a successful conclusion, ‘in sending out Roberts and Kitchener the 
government have done the best thing for restoring public confidence.’118  
If the press thought that the personnel taking command of the Army in 
December ‘remains all that we could wish it to be,’119 the deficiency in stores was 
certainly not. That the stores of warlike materiél were found lacking triggered a 
further barrage of attacks against Lansdowne. It was reported that the ‘military 
machine has never been kept in full working order’ and ‘war found us wanting in 
most essential preparations.’120 Lansdowne accepted this criticism and as he 
managed the crisis purposively concealed nothing from his critics. It was his view 
that ‘we have been struck by the inadequacy of our reserves of many kinds of 
stores.’121 He was prepared for such criticism. 
On the same day that Buller informed Lansdowne of his failure to relieve 
Ladysmith, Brackenbury produced his report on the Ordnance Department which 
Lansdowne had instructed him to undertake the previous January. Brackenbury 
found that the only items for which reserves were adequate were lances, revolvers, 
rifles and carbines. Lances and carbines were rarely used by the cavalry and many 
officers went on service having bought their own small arms. Brackenbury believed 
that the deficiency had occurred principally because items were not replaced and 
because of the belief that in the event of a war output from the Ordnance Factories 
and trade would meet the demands with sufficient equipment. The perception that 
British industry could provide anything at short notice appealed to those eager to 
keep military expenditure to a minimum. The result as Brackenbury observed was 
that Britain was ‘attempting to maintain the largest Empire the world has ever seen 
with armaments and reserves that would be insufficient for a third-class military 
power.’122 
Both Lansdowne and Wolseley were surprised by the magnitude of the 
findings. It is of interest to note that while Lansdowne certainly was aware before 
‘the War’ that the whole question of the Ordnance Department wanted a thorough 
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overhauling and it was to that end he ‘brought in General Brackenbury with the 
Commander-in-Chief’s entire concurrence,’123 he also believed ‘great as our 
deficiencies were, the Army at that moment was probably better equipped than it had 
ever been before.’124 Responding to the Royal Commission on questions of 
deficiency it was his view that responsibility lay with Brackenbury’s predecessor, 
General Markham.
125
 In his defence of Brackenbury he concluded that 
Brackenbury’s hands during the early part of 1899 were full with a War Office 
armament scheme that had been triggered under his predecessor but had 
languished.
126
 ‘What happened when he [Brackenbury] arrived at the War Office is 
that we accelerated the arrangements for making good the deficiency.’127 Wolseley 
also accepted that the department had been inefficient remarking, ‘I am fully 
conscious of our many shortcomings in the way of reserves of clothing and of other 
military stores generally and I sincerely trust that our recent experience will prevent 
us from ever again being found so ill prepared.’128 
By the time Brackenbury’s report was completed the majority of the reserves 
that did exist before ‘the War’ had been despatched to South Africa and in many 
cases what had originally been held in reserve had been sent twice over. That ‘the 
War’ had lasted just two months and was settling into a protracted state forced him 
to order equipment from all over the Empire and to borrow resources from the Navy. 
In his recommendations to improve the department and its lack of reserves
129
 
Brackenbury estimated that roughly £11.5 million was the minimum amount 
required to make good the deficiencies. Lansdowne referred the report to the 
Defence Committee of the Cabinet who considered it at a meeting held on 20 
January. Hicks Beach was opposed to spending so much on the ‘representation of a 
single officer of the War Office.’130 His view was also shared by Lansdowne. 
Interestingly in a speech two years earlier he stated. ‘I should be sorry to be the 
Secretary of State for War who would propose that the pruning knife should be 
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rigorously applied to meet expenditure on stores.’131 Acting on the advice of his 
colleagues Lansdowne decided to appoint two departmental committees. The first, 
under the Presidency of Frances Mowatt, the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, 
was established to examine Brackenbury’s proposals. Interestingly Wolseley was not 
consulted at all about this Committee nor informed of its findings.
132
 He learnt about 
its proceedings from Brackenbury. That neither Brackenbury nor Chamberlain 
served on the committee, Hicks Beach believed, was regrettable and ‘will certainly 
detract from its authority.’133 The committee were supportive of many of 
Brackenbury’s recommendations.134 The second committee with a responsibility to 
examine armaments was chaired by Robert Grant, the former Inspector-General of 
Fortifications. The costs of implementing the recommendations of the two reports 
were £6,482,567 and £1,586,338 respectively.  
Given the findings contained in these reports Lansdowne asked the Treasury 
for £11,621,870 which included an additional sum of £3,552,965 for the completion 
of the coast defences, a scheme that had already had Cabinet approval. Hicks Beach, 
who was against accumulating large reserves, initially offered a little over £300,000. 
He stated that, ‘I believe it to be wasteful. Owing to the rarity of important wars, the 
brief period for which guns, ammunition and stores remain “in fashion” before they 
are condemned as obsolete, and the cost of keeping such reserves in proper 
condition. But I also feel that this is not the moment at which to adopt such a great 
change of system.’135 Urged by his Cabinet colleagues and Mowatt himself to 
change his mind, he later reluctantly agreed to provide £10,500,000 over three years 
starting in 1901. Lansdowne was disappointed by his offer but after further 
conversations on the matter recognised that it was ‘useless to press him to increase 
the amount.’136 It is notable that even though the deficiencies at the beginning of ‘the 
War’ were significant Kitchener later reported that he had no reason to complain of 
delay on the part of the War Office in complying with requisitions for ordnance, ‘the 
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stores and the equipment all came out, and we had at times one hundred and twenty 
days’ supply on hand.’137  
Lansdowne’s willingness to accept the deficiency in reserves of stores did little 
to soothe the temper of his critics and only fed their view that he was unsuited to his 
position as Secretary of State. While it was easy for them to collectively moralise 
about his unsuitability, his critics were less united in attempting to particularise the 
lessons of the war. Three weeks after Roberts arrived in South Africa those critics in 
and out of Parliament who wished to abolish the Cardwell system began asking 
whether the government intended to inquire into the deficiencies of the military 
system.
138
 The Queen herself demanded an answer to the shortcomings of ‘the War’ 
remarking, ‘the War Office is greatly at fault, and that an inquiry should be made; 
“but not now.”’139 Lansdowne questioned the value of such an inquiry stating, ‘the 
result is, a long time passes while the inquiry is proceeding, and you are very 
fortunate indeed if you get advice on which you can act at once without further delay 
and without further investigation.’140 Salisbury thought ‘it is not for us now to 
express any criticism on the military operations, because we cannot hear the opinion 
of those who are justly entitled to be heard on the point.’141 In agreement that during 
a time of war it was inappropriate to examine the blunders in South Africa, the 
government resisted any attempts to initiate an inquiry and Lansdowne for similar 
reasons resisted introducing any ‘great organic changes’ in the Army.142 He was 
keen to avoid large scale reform with ‘the War’ in progress, but in consultation with 
the Cabinet and the senior officers, he accepted the need for a number of emergency 
measures.  
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In spite of the unparalleled scale and smoothness of the mobilisation by 
February 1900, Wyndham believed that ‘it has failed to achieve its object.’143 In light 
of this the emergency measures or ‘expedients’ Lansdowne announced were framed 
to deal with two objects. Firstly what permanent additions it was desirable to make 
to the personnel and materiél of the Army, and secondly what immediate steps were 
necessary for the purpose of strengthening Britain during the period of denudation 
which the country was then experiencing and which would last for some time.
144
  
Largely in reaction to the immediate lessons of ‘the War’ the measures were 
designed so as not to ‘stand in the way of any schemes for the improvement of the 
Army which the experience’ of ‘the War’ might lead the government to consider 
later.
145
  
One question that the government could not ignore until later was the fear of a 
foreign invasion caused by a reduction of resources available for home defence. This 
concern was particularly important to Wolseley who believed that the ‘political 
horizon in Europe may be clear at present, but, as in 1870, it may cloud over 
suddenly without any warning,’146 and that the will of France to attack Britain was 
still possible.
147
 He estimated that an invading French Army would number at least 
150,000 fighting men.
148
 His opinion was not taken particularly seriously by the 
Admiralty, the Cabinet or Lansdowne and among the public it was of almost no 
concern, as Churchill noted ‘the fear of invasion seemed to influence our daily lives 
as little as the fear of death.’149 However, it could not be dismissed altogether and 
among certain members of the press it found followers.
150
 While Wolseley urged the 
government to consider the possibility of an invasion, he also believed in a 
protracted war and that ‘after its conclusion we shall have to keep a very large body 
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of troops there for a long while.
151
 As such he advised Lansdowne that an increase in 
the size of the Army was required. Lansdowne agreed with him. He believed there 
was something ironical in the situation where ‘the greatest maritime Power in the 
world was at war with two little states ‘which do not own a boat’s crew between 
them and which are consequently invulnerable by our powerful Navy.’ This 
situation, he believed, had thrown on the Army ‘exertions of the most arduous 
kind,’152  and made it necessary to strengthen it. Whereas Wolseley proposed 
achieving this with new recruits Lansdowne insisted that ‘we must in the main rely 
upon materials already existing.’153  
Lansdowne’s idea of using resources in hand, notably the Auxiliary Army, was 
shared by Grove, Clarke and Wood.
154
 Although he had introduced measures before 
‘the War’ to improve the Auxiliary Army and bring it into a closer alignment with 
the Regular Army, the Auxiliaries were still regarded as ‘too little taken into 
account.’ To Lansdowne ‘the War’ ‘has been to show us what a great and valuable 
reserve power we possess in our Auxiliary forces.’ He believed that ‘we must…insist 
upon a nucleus of Regular troops for our home Army, but for the bulk of it we must 
depend on the Auxiliary forces.’155  Giving greater prominence to this part of the 
Army he believed would increase their popularity
156
 and weaken the many 
arguments in favour of modified compulsion. He believed that by tapping this 
resource he would raise 70,000 men for the Army.
157
 Although Wolseley raised no 
objection to Lansdowne’s proposal, he was less enthusiastic about modifying the 
Auxiliary Army than he was the Regular Army. It was Lansdowne’s opinion that 
Wolseley underestimated the importance of the Auxiliary Army in the military 
system. After leaving the War Office he remarked that Wolseley had worked ‘fitfully 
and only when the spirit moved him,’ and that if he had paid more attention to his 
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duties, he might have turned to ‘better account’ that force.158 Although Wolseley 
refuted Lansdowne’s claim, during his term as Commander-in-Chief his preference 
for improving the Regulars over the Auxiliaries was readily apparent. He believed 
that an Army could not be created in a few weeks.
159
  
Of the three forces comprising the Auxiliaries, the Yeomanry, Volunteers and 
Militia, Lansdowne believed that Wolseley took ‘too disparaging a view of the 
Militia’s value.’160 The latter believed that the Militia were ‘very bad shots and they 
have very little opportunity of learning to shoot, their training is very imperfect.’ He 
also maintained that the ‘officers of the Militia were not as well instructed in military 
matters as our officers.’161 In February 1900 there were a total of 97,500 militiamen 
in one hundred and twenty four battalions of which thirty-six battalions were or were 
about to serve in South Africa.
162
 To Lansdowne’s critics the fact that the Militia 
were needed in South Africa was seen as an admission of Lansdowne’s failure to 
provide an Army fit for war. In attacking the system they demanded to know why 
was it necessary to send the Militia out of the country when there was a large 
contingent of Regular soldiers in Britain. Lansdowne, who had nothing to conceal 
from his critics, admitted in public that the 92,000 Regular soldiers were ‘in no sense 
a field Army.’ They comprised many young soldiers under twenty years old who 
were unfit to go abroad,
163
 but as Brodrick later noted a considerable number of that 
92,000 embarked the following April.
164
 Although the number of militiamen was 
30,000 men below its establishment and falling, with ‘the War’ this trend was 
reversed. ‘War’, as Lansdowne noted, ‘does not tend to make the Army 
unpopular.’165  
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The patriotic spirit that took hold of the country brought recruiting to a level 
‘which it never reached before.’166 Given the large number of recruits voluntarily 
joining the Army it was not surprising that two attempts by Wemyss during ‘the 
War’ to enforce the Militia ballot found little support. It was Lansdowne’s view that 
‘at this moment when men are coming forward spontaneously in great numbers, 
when there is an amount of enthusiasm, a general and widespread desire throughout 
the Empire to bear a part in its defence, I do not think that this is a time for talking 
about compulsion in any form. What I venture to think is wanted at this present time 
is not compulsion but encouragement.’167  
In using the ‘unique opportunity’ created by ‘the War’ the remaining Militia 
battalions were embodied in May 1900 for training during the spring and summer 
months under canvas and at minimal cost to the Exchequer.
168
 In June Lansdowne 
informed the Cabinet of a scheme to reform the Militia in order to forestall the 
possible exodus which might otherwise occur after the war.
169
 Under the proposed 
scheme, all militiamen would in future enlist with a liability for service abroad and 
in consideration of this receive a consolidated bounty. The Militia reserve and the 
‘special service section’ of the Militia, which Lansdowne believed were ‘cordially 
detested by the whole force’, would be abolished. In its place a reserve composed of 
men who had served six years and who were entitled to receive £2 a year bounty 
would be established. The period of training of all recruits would be extended from 
three to six months, the preliminary training taking place with their own regiment for 
one month and for the remainder of the six months at the depot.
170
 Lansdowne also 
favoured changing the policy about part worn clothing which had been ‘pushed too 
far’ and to take action on the soldiers’ complaints, particularly relating to head 
dresses.
171
 At the time the Militia was the laughing stock of music hall audiences.
172
 
Addressing the complaints of many service parliamentarians and some of the 
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military including Methuen that the Militia was poorly officered,
173
 Lansdowne 
proposed giving such men ‘facilities for attending courses of instruction…under 
financial conditions which will absolutely safeguard them against any inroad on their 
own private means.’174 In wishing to popularise the Auxiliaries he also divided the 
office of Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces and Recruiting into two, appointing 
Major-General Alfred Turner to the former post. A few months later a subordinate 
officer was appointed to Turner specifically to deal with the ‘many intricate Militia 
problems.’175  
While Lansdowne’s measures for improving the Militia met with only slight 
criticism in and out of Parliament, those for reorganising the Volunteers met with 
stronger resistance. Up until Black Week, most of the senior officers objected to 
making use of the Volunteers in South Africa. Wolseley, who had the greatest regard 
for the force as a reserve of the Army and because it did an immense amount for 
popularising it, believed that when tackling a thoroughly disciplined enemy it would 
not be fair to call upon the Volunteer force such as it then was.
176
 After Black Week 
their objections held less force and when Alfred Newton, the Lord Mayor of London, 
Colonel Eustace Balfour of the London Scottish Volunteers, Colonel Howard 
Vincent MP of the Queen’s Westminster Rifles, and Lord Lovat offered to raise 
regiments for overseas service it seemed to Lansdowne a ‘new departure’ but one 
that it was impossible ‘to refuse altogether.’177 Just as the Militia force was below its 
establishment so too was the Volunteer force 43,000 below its own establishment.
178
 
But with the outpouring of patriotic spirit in Britain their numbers increased by 
30,000 men between November 1899 and March 1900, bring their total number to 
249,606 men.
179
  
‘The War’ gave a renewed impetus regarding the military value of the 
Volunteers and with the precarious manpower situation in 1900 the Volunteers were 
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the most ‘highly favoured’ of all the Auxiliary forces.180 Receiving increased grants 
of several kinds they were encouraged to recruit up to their full strength of 1,000 
men per battalion and to recruit second battalions. They were also given a limited 
number of Regular commissions to fill vacancies in twelve new Regular battalions 
and allowed to raise mounted companies to improve musketry. In order to give local 
authorities the means to cooperate with the Volunteer corps in providing them with 
appropriate buildings and with rifle ranges, Lansdowne presented a bill to amend the 
Military Lands Act 1892.
181
 The ninety-eight batteries of Volunteer artillery men 
were also entirely rearmed partly with a semi-mobile 4.7 inch gun. Wolseley was not 
satisfied. He told Lansdowne, ‘when I contemplate the possibility of having to use 
our Volunteer artillery with the absurd guns now in their possession I do not know 
whether to laugh or cry. In fact there is no avoiding the conviction that at this 
moment we are solely dependent upon the fleet to defend…us from invasion and that 
if the French landed 100,000 with 500 or even 400 guns in England we should be at 
their mercy.’182 While Wolseley was dissatisfied that Lansdowne did not do more, 
the service parliamentarians had few objections to these concessions in detail. His 
proposal to give the Volunteers twenty-eight days’ consecutive training under canvas 
was, however, objected to. It was held that such a period was to demand from them 
too much.
183
 He subsequently reduced the period to fourteen days. Out of the two 
hundred and sixteen Volunteer corps in Britain one hundred and seventy-nine agreed 
to go to camp on the new terms.
184
   
The most far reaching and controversial change Lansdowne attempted as part 
of his emergency measures was a bill to amend the Volunteer Act 1863. The Bill 
contained a new definition of the conditions under which the Volunteer force could 
be called out for actual military service. In the previous act the Volunteers could be 
called out in the case of ‘actual or apprehended invasion.’ Lansdowne and his 
colleagues believed that this was a ‘clumsy formula’ and proposed rephrasing it with 
the words used in the Reserve Forces Act 1882: ‘in case of imminent national danger 
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or great emergency.’185 The proposal had been recommended six years previously 
under the Liberal government and was not ‘a new plot to revolutionize the character 
of the force.’ The logic behind the War Office’s proposal to amend the phraseology 
was described by Wyndham. During a time of emergency no government would be 
able to declare by Royal Proclamation that they feared invasion as that would 
precipitate their very fear. Neither could they leave things until an invasion took 
place as that would require turning the Volunteers into an effective field Army in 
forty-eight hours which could not be done.
186
 The second object of the bill was to 
give power to the Secretary of State to accept the services of the Volunteers for 
home  defence in cases which fell short of a great emergency. The third object was 
for the employment of Volunteers on active service ‘in any part of the world.’187 
Largely in reaction to a lesson learnt the previous October the principal aim was to 
consolidate Volunteer efforts in peace so as to avoid the pressure that the War Office 
experienced in war with the on rush of men, some of whom were Volunteers and 
others who were not, and the need to test them, select officers and equip them in 
great haste.
188
  
Although the Volunteer Bill had the full approval of the Volunteer colonels 
and soldiers,
189
 Arnold-Forster, who was one of the principal advocates for the 
Volunteers in the House of Commons, opposed it. Objecting to ‘the proposals it 
contained’ and ‘because its character is such that it should not be brought in as an 
isolated measure at this time,’190 he argued the bill would transform the character of 
the force, a force formed to protect the country from invasion, and create a new class 
of Reservists.
191
 He also maintained that ‘if any considerable number of men 
undertake these obligations they will, by doing so, seriously interfere with their 
employment.’192 Cecil Norton, a service parliamentarian, doubted the scheme on the 
grounds that it was an ‘inopportune time’ to introduce the measure.193 Campbell-
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Bannerman and Kimberley
194
 speaking for the opposition, were also against change, 
the former noting ‘we must bear in mind that the sudden emergency of last winter 
evoked a spirit of self-sacrifice and of patriotism which may not always be preserved 
in the same pitch in time of peace.’195 The Times also objected to Volunteers being 
used for Imperial defence which ‘involves a total change in character of the 
Volunteer force.’196  
In light of the criticism the government abandoned the provision enabling 
Volunteers to agree to serve in any part of the world and the obligation to be called 
out at any time was confined to the United Kingdom. Wyndham justified the 
government’s step down on the basis that it was ‘proper to wait’ before deciding 
such matters until the Volunteers serving in South Africa ‘have come home and told 
their tale.’197 The debate revealed both the reluctance among the service members 
and defence intellectuals to accept broad change and the increase of their power to 
challenge civilian supremacy. 
While it was difficult for Lansdowne to persuade some of the Volunteer 
representatives in the country to accept change he had no such difficulty with the 
Yeomanry. Of the three forces in the Auxiliary Army it assumed an awkward role in 
the scheme of national defence.
198
 Comprising many retired cavalry officers, 
landowners, and fox hunters,
199
 it was undermanned and partially trained. In 1899, 
there were thirty-eight regiments comprising 11,891 officers and men.
200
 To 
Lansdowne, ‘our Yeomanry dwindles just because the best men and officers and 
rank and file feel it is a farce…largely a theatrical reminiscence of the cavalry which 
fought in the Crimea and Peninsular. The best men of all ranks avoid it or leave it 
because they think it an expensive sham.’201 Dealing with the manpower crisis that 
emerged in late 1899 with the resources they had and the popularity of the war, he 
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and his advisers put forward a scheme to make better use of the force. On 16 
December, Buller requested that Lansdowne send him 8,000 irregulars organised in 
companies of one hundred each, equipped as mounted infantry able to ‘shoot as well 
as possible and ride decently.’202 That same day the Army Board discussed the 
matter and agreed to make use of the Yeomanry in accordance with Buller’s request 
under the proviso that they should ‘bring their own horses, receiving the government 
remount price for them.’203  
At the time no large units of mounted infantry existed in the British Army,
204
 
so that the organisation of at least 20,000 such soldiers was a ‘matter of immediate 
urgency and permanent importance.’205 Lansdowne and Wyndham, who had over 
twelve years of service in the Yeomanry, decided that they would create a new unit 
called the Imperial Yeomanry out of both the existing Yeomanry and by recruiting 
good horsemen from the general public. The Imperial Yeomanry was largely 
Wyndham’s creation, as he told his father: ‘It is my child. I invented it after lunch on 
Sunday and it is already in fine bantling. May it live and prosper.’206 Wolseley took 
no part in the creation of the force and later claimed ‘his opinion had not been asked 
for upon the Imperial Yeomanry question.’207 However, it is clear that Wood did 
inform him in the matter.
208
 Although the proposal met with the approval of the 
Yeomanry representatives themselves,
209
 when Wolseley heard about it, he opposed 
the scheme. He was anxious to provide Buller with ‘8,000 trained men accustomed 
to some sort of discipline, but to go into the highway and byways and pick up any 
civilians who will volunteer to go to South Africa quite regardless of whether they 
have…even the rudiments of discipline and to form these into companies of 
battalions in the proportion of three of such men to one of the very imperfectly 
drilled and disciplined Yeomanry men who volunteer is according to my knowledge 
of war, a dangerous experiment.’210 While Lansdowne admitted that the Imperial 
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Yeomanry would ‘include a large number of men who have little experience as 
soldiers’, he knew of no other source to provide for Buller’s request. Moreover, he 
did not share Wolseley’s view regarding the type of recruits the scheme would 
attract reminding him that the senior officers and Wolseley himself had laid down 
certain qualifications to ensure ‘our getting really useful men who with a little 
training and experience in the field will be extremely valuable.’211 
 Among the Cabinet Balfour approved of the scheme, and wrote a letter of 
appeal to the Earl of Haddington which was published in The Times.
212
 Walter Long, 
Lansdowne’s Wiltshire neighbour, also supported it, remarking the feeling in all 
ranks in the Wiltshire Yeomanry was ‘splendid and enthusiastic.’213 Lansdowne 
established an Imperial Yeomanry Committee or ‘Board’ for the organisation of the 
force and for testing the men recruited.
214
 The first contingent was embarked by 11 
February 1900,
215
 and they were enlisted as part of the Regular Army because under 
the Yeomanry Act the War Office had no power over them ‘outside the limits of the 
United Kingdom.’216  Enlistment with the Regular Army was ‘a temporary 
operation’ for the duration of the war.217 Achieving a measure of success and 
enabling more Regular soldiers to be used at the front, Methuen thought they were ‘a 
splendid force.’218 Speaking in the House of Lords seven years later, Lord Harris, 
who presided over the Imperial Yeomanry Committee, recalled ‘I was one of the 
four Yeomanry officers…summoned by [Lansdowne] in the Black Week that 
followed our most serious disasters in South Africa, and as we went out of the room, 
one of my friends said to me, Is this going to make us or break us? As it turned out, 
it made us. But it was not the service we had given; it was not such credit as we had 
gained; the tradition of that would by degrees have died down, certainly in the minds 
of recruits. What made us was the fact that we showed we were worth something in 
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the war.’219 To improve the conditions of service for the remaining Yeomanry that 
did not serve in South Africa Lansdowne’s emergency measures provided for a 
month’s training under canvas, an increase in their contingent allowance and a grant 
for travel to and from training.
220
 
Although Lansdowne devoted most of his attention during ‘the War’ to 
increasing the size and improving the condition of the Auxiliary Army he did not 
neglect to reorganise the Regular Army. While his permanent measures to increase 
the infantry battalions did not go as far as Wolseley wished, he raised twelve new 
battalions which with the three that had previously been authorised, in order to 
supply the reliefs and drafts for colonial stations in India and South Africa, brought 
the total to fifteen.
221
 The new battalions were added as third and fourth battalions of 
the existing line arrangements. He also increased the number of infantry men serving 
on a three year enlistment.
222
 Three months later, in May 1900, these fifteen 
battalions had an average strength of 370 men and nine or ten officers each. 
Although the number of men entering the battalions was respectable, it was 
Lansdowne’s opinion that there were still further directions in which the War Office 
should look to attract more men and ‘perhaps men of a better social class.’ It can be 
speculated from this remark that Lansdowne wished to introduce more educated men 
into the ranks. To maintain a sufficient flow of recruits and retain them in the Army 
was one of Lansdowne’s overarching aims as Secretary of State. He believed that to 
achieve this required an improvement in the condition of service. It was his view that 
‘one of the greatest drawbacks of our present system is that which is to be found in 
the fact that of the men who do enter the Army so large a number waste away and 
disappear in the first years of their service, giving us neither the full period of their 
service with the colours nor the advantage of their presence afterwards in the 
reserve.’223  
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While introducing measures to improve the military life for an infantry man, 
Lansdowne’s emergency measures also attempted to do the same for the other 
divisions within the Regular Army. Despite the importance Lansdowne attached to 
the artillery and his attempts to reorganise it prior to ‘the War’ he was fiercely 
attacked for not doing enough for the force in South Africa. Arnold-Forster remarked 
that ‘the supply of artillery both horse and field, was totally inadequate, and that the 
guns for both these branches and also those assigned to the garrison artillery were 
insufficient in numbers.’224 It was also Wolseley’s view that an increase in the size 
of the force was necessary. Lansdowne agreed but he maintained that Wolseley’s 
proposal to form seven new batteries of horse artillery and forty-one of field artillery 
in the space of a few months would be ‘hopeless.’ During the early stages of ‘the 
War’ artillery of two Army Corps were sent to South Africa and only the field 
artillery of one Army Corps remained in Britain. In light of this Lansdowne decided 
to raise horse and field artillery for two more Army Corps.
225
 He proposed raising 
these men from artillery reservists, from ex-artillery men desiring to re-join the 
service and from a certain number of Volunteer artillery men being allowed to join 
the batteries upon a ‘short one year’s term of engagement.’226  
While Lansdowne’s additions to the artillery were less than Wolseley had 
wished for his additions to the cavalry were broadly in accord with Wolseley’s 
demands. Responding to the view that Lansdowne’s reorganisation of 1895 had 
weakened the force Lansdowne’s emergency measures provided for fifteen 
regiments of cavalry. These were formed from existing regiments left in Britain and 
raised to war strength.
227
 The new measures met little resistance in and out of 
Parliament, although a criticism was made by one of the service parliamentarians 
that the cavalry system was ‘a sham’, and the regiments were ‘skeletons.’228  
Lansdowne disagreed. He believed that he had put the cavalry into ‘a better shape 
than they were a few years earlier.’  But he conceded ‘I do not think under any 
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system we shall be able to keep the whole of our cavalry complete in men and 
horses.’ He believed the mere question of barracks would prevent it. There would 
always be a certain number of horses sick or untrained and ‘the idea of keeping the 
whole cavalry at such a strength of men and horses that you could at any moment 
send it out of the country seems to me illusory.’229 
Among Wolseley’s proposals for increasing the Regular Army discussed at the 
Defence Committtee of the Cabinet on 29 December 1899 was a suggestion to raise 
thirty-two battalions of veteran soldiers.
230
 Lansdowne was favourable to ‘tapping’ 
these discharged soldiers no longer on the reserve,
231
 but he did not believe that there 
would be the ‘slightest chance of raising thirty-two battalions in the next few 
months.’ He also held it was a ‘misnomer to describe them as veterans,’232 although 
this was the term they were generally referred to by.  The proposal to allow these ex-
soldiers to serve in line battalions was discussed and approved by the Defence 
Committee of the Cabinet on 20 January
233
 and formally submitted to the Cabinet on 
8 February. Although the Cabinet approved in principle to using these men they 
could not agree on how much to pay them. Lansdowne thought they should receive 
£30 payable in instalments.
234
 Some of his colleagues supposed that this was too 
generous. Their objections annoyed him.
235
 Balfour remarked that the Cabinet’s 
decision knocked a great hole in the emergency portion of the scheme and that it was 
extremely improbable that any trained soldiers would ‘give up their civil 
employment for the privilege not of fighting but of living in barracks for a year on 1s 
3d a day.’236 He suggested that a bounty of £6 should be offered to them.237 But 
Lansdowne thought that this did not go far enough. The difficulty confronting 
Lansdowne and the Cabinet was that whereas a first class Army Reservist received 
£9 a year a veteran received about £6. While it was fair to discriminate between a 
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man who had been out of the Regular Army for more than five years and was less 
valuable than a man who remembered more of his drill, it did not solve the question 
of inducement and compensation to a man more firmly established in civil life.
238
 
Lansdowne compromised. He proposed paying the veteran an amount equal to two 
years arrears of reserve pay (£12) and allowing them to enrol for one year of service 
only and at the end of that year to pay them a bounty of £10. The amount of £22 was 
almost exactly the difference between the ordinary pay of a soldier for one year and 
the 2s 6d a day which Wolseley had originally suggested veterans should be paid.
239
 
The Cabinet approved Lansdowne’s scheme on 16 February.240 Wishing to raise the 
status of the force, Lansdowne also proposed that the new battalions should be called 
the Royal Reserve Battalions, an idea that Queen Victoria found satisfactory. The 
response to the veteran scheme was ‘magnificent’,241 and by July 24,000 men had 
been recruited to the Royal Reserve Battalions and Wolseley reported that they were 
a force whose ‘presence in the country was and is an invaluable addition to its 
defensive strength.’242  
While Lansdowne was willing to make use of veterans for home defence he 
was also determined to utilise colonial soldiers to help prosecute ‘the War’. In a 
show of support for the Empire the governments of the self-governing British 
Colonies offered men, particularly mounted soldiers, to participate in the conflict. 
The initial reluctance of the War Office to accept this support later became the 
subject of controversy over alleged snubbing of those Colonies which offered 
mounted infantry. Lansdowne refuted such criticism later telling the Royal 
Commission that ‘it is, to say the least, a gross exaggeration to represent the then 
War Office as having repudiated the offers of mounted troops from the Colonies.’243 
The value of the 16,000 colonial soldiers that fought in South Africa from Canada, 
Australia, Tasmania, India, the Cape and Natal was recognised by Lansdowne not 
only because they added to Britain’s military strength but because their presence 
‘impressed on the civilized world “Great Britain” is not an empty phrase and that we 
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should not have obtained this large measure of Voluntary support unless the cause 
for which we are fighting were a just cause.’244 
While Lansdowne’s scheme of emergency measures strengthened the Army at 
home and abroad the measures did not go far enough for Wolseley. Upset by the 
Cabinet’s decision and sick of his position at the War Office245 he offered to resign 
informing Lansdowne ‘as the Cabinet refuse to adopt the measures by which alone I 
believe you could raise the troops I conceive to be essential for national safety, I feel 
compelled to resign my position as Commander-in-Chief.’246 Lansdowne refused to 
accept his resignation. In the same way that the measures, as an expression of 
military strength, failed to satisfy Wolseley they also failed to convince many of the 
critics of Army reform in Parliament and the press ‘who are so numerous.’247 To 
Dilke they were an ‘extravagant makeshift proposal,’248 and to one of the service 
parliamentarians, ‘We have tried raising an Army by Voluntary enlistment and by 
making the Army popular, but we are now trying to raise an Army by invitation and 
imagination.’249 The Times argued the War Office ‘has a rare opportunity’ which has 
‘not yet been properly utilized.’250 
At the same time that Lansdowne was occupied with passing his emergency 
measures through Parliament he was also devoting his energy to making sure the 
War Office was in full support of Roberts’ campaign in South Africa. On his arrival 
in South Africa Roberts began a series of tactical reforms to address the weaknesses 
within the Army and bring ‘the War’ to a conclusion.251  Lansdowne, who did not 
believe in interfering with generals in the field,
252
 made sure Roberts was given a 
free hand to undertake his task. He concluded that if Roberts failed to recover the 
situation the government’s popularity would suffer. He was willing to make ‘almost 
any sacrifice’ in order to bring about a swift end to the war. With minimal loss to 
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civilian supremacy Lansdowne’s willingness to loosen control satisfied the senior 
officers and their wishes to prosecute ‘the War’ without hindrance. In bridging the 
gap between civilians and soldiers both in London and on the spot Lansdowne also 
made certain that as Roberts made his advance towards Pretoria he was protected 
from unwarranted interference and distractions, particularly the possibility of other 
generals acting as a brake on his plan of campaign. ‘Please do not think about our 
Parliamentary difficulties or allow them to affect your plan’,253 he informed Roberts 
during the attacks on the government in early 1900. By maintaining a transparent and 
harmonious relationship with his colleague,
254
 Lansdowne ensured that Roberts was 
given every possible chance to undertake a successful campaign. 
While Roberts was preparing to start his advance to Pretoria, Buller met with 
defeat at Spion Kop. The battle demonstrated more than any other the incompetent 
leadership of some of the generals and their failure to appreciate the requirements of 
modern warfare. It showed that tactics to deal with long-range artillery, and 
magazine rifle fire were lacking, adequate communication and scouting were absent 
and training was deficient.
255
 Whereas 1,500 British soldiers became casualties, 
including two hundred and forty-three dead, the Boers suffered three hundred and 
thirty-five casualties. Photographs of dead soldiers brought to the attention of the 
British public as never before the reality of modern war. What had once been 
thought of as a ‘tea-time war’ was now portrayed as an ‘absent-minded war’256 and 
an appalling demonstration of military blunder.
257
  In contrast to Black Week, when 
the generals on the spot and Wolseley were spared public criticism, the press did not 
hold back after Spion Kop. Although the press were fully aware that military 
incompetence was the cause of the set-backs in South Africa, Lansdowne remained 
the principal focus of their attack on the war. One writer noted ‘the plight of our 
Army in South Africa, the half measures, the manifest hesitations, and the tardiness 
of the despatch of reinforcements, equally condemn Lord Lansdowne.’258 Spenser 
Wilkinson noted that ‘In the crisis of the Nation’s fate we were ungoverned and 
unled, and to all appearance we are content to be so, and the leader writers, trained in 
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the tradition of respectable formalism interpret the Nation’s apathy as fortitude. For 
the state of the Army, for the strategical and tactial training which has resulted in so 
many failures, the politicians of both front benches, who in turn have neglected these 
vital matters, are responsible.’259 
The news coverage of Spion Kop nearly brought down the government. 
Lansdowne believed Buller’s command should be reduced, his Army divided up, and 
given to Roberts,
260
 to whom he wrote, ‘I confess I have no confidence in anything 
but the advance which you will be beginning a few days hence.’261 Wishing to focus 
all their efforts on Roberts’ imminent operation, Lansdowne protested at Buller’s 
demand for further reinforcements. He advised Salisbury that, ‘to weaken him 
[Roberts] in order to pour more troops into the Natal sieve would in my belief be 
sheer folly.’262  
As the implications of Buller’s defeat took shape and the new session of 
Parliament approached, Chamberlain was ‘not quite sure that the government would 
survive: ‘I do not look forward to the Session with much pleasure but perhaps it may 
relieve me of all pressure by turning the government out of office.’263  It was 
Devonshire’s view that ‘without attempting to find scapegoats we ought to know 
who is responsible for this policy.’264 When the situation in South Africa was 
debated in the House of Lords, Salisbury’s defence of his government’s oversight 
was cynical and devoid of sound argument. Failing to give the House a lead his 
speech was deficient in explanations and confidence and allowed Rosebery to 
denounce what was an attempt to ring-fence himself from criticism at his colleagues’ 
expense.
265
 Lansdowne, who spoke after Salisbury, was less sardonic in defending 
the government’s position and intimated that the government had possibly 
underrated ‘not the numbers of armaments of the Boers but their value as fighting 
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men.’ Denying that the government had been unprepared, he stated that his military 
advisers had claimed that it was possible by sending out reinforcements of moderate 
size to secure the two colonies.
266
 Interestingly, in giving evidence to the Royal 
Commission three years later he did admit that the government had been 
unprepared.
267
  Unlike Salisbury’s speech Lansdowne’s went some way towards 
appeasing the irritable mood in the House.  
Taking advantage of the government’s weakened popularity some of the 
opposition and reform advocates initiated a series of attacks during the early part of 
the Parliamentary session calling for reform. Dilke blamed the Defence Committee 
of the Cabinet for having failed and for ‘slackness on the part of those who attend to 
the work,’ and that ‘every precaution recommended by every authority…was 
neglected by the Cabinet.’268 Arnold-Forster argued ‘the country does not care about 
how these difficulties have come upon us, but how they are to be dealt with,’269 and 
Sir Edward Grey held that ‘individual ability in the Cabinet is not denied, but there 
must be some mind which co-ordinates, which guides and controls the individual 
ability and subordinates it to the policy of the whole. We have not seen the work of 
that mind in the action of the Cabinet. We have not felt the confidence which the 
country would feel in a Cabinet controlled by one guiding mind inspiring the 
whole.’270  
Although the government survived these attacks, Lansdowne’s publication of 
the Spion Kop despatch the following April caused them further difficulties. 
Although the despatch contained evidence that the operation was muddled by the 
generals who were in disagreement with each other, Lansdowne believed he was 
justified in publishing the facts. He did not think the House of Commons would have 
stood complete suppression of the case.
271
 At the end of March, he circulated to the 
Cabinet Buller’s despatches about the defeat at Spion Kop, with a letter from Roberts 
of 13 February attached. In his report of the battle, which he had written ‘not 
                                                          
266
 Lansdowne, ‘Lords Debate’, ‘Address in Answer to Her Majesty’s Most Gracious Speech’, 30 
January 1900, ibid., Vol.78, c.41 and  c.42. 
267
 PP, 1904, XLI, Cd.1791, RC, 21417, p.528. 
268
 Dilke, ‘Commons Debate’, ‘Address in Answer to Her Majesty’s Most Gracious Speech’, 1 
February 1900, Hansard 4
th
 Series, Vol.78, c.313 and c.308. 
269
 Arnold-Forster, ibid., c.342. 
270
 Grey, ibid., cc.390-391. 
271
 Lansdowne to Salisbury (private), 19 April 1900, BL. (5) Lansdowne MSS, Add MS. 88906/19/7. 
225 
 
necessarily for publication’, Buller criticised General Warren’s action, and himself 
for not intervening sooner. Roberts was infuriated by Buller’s suggestion that 
Warren was not following instructions and included in his own despatch a censure of 
Buller, which Lansdowne thought was as temperate as possible and gave him credit 
for a well-conceived plan that might have succeeded had he not given his 
subordinates too free a hand.
272
 Balfour thought it noteworthy that Roberts said 
nothing of Buller that Buller did not say against himself.
273
  
On 30 March, Lansdowne and the Cabinet drafted a telegram to Roberts, 
which some of the Cabinet wished ‘more vigorously worded’.274 It stated that ‘your 
despatch of 13
th
 February…puts us in a difficulty. Buller has under him about 50,000 
men. He and his second in command have apparently quarrelled. We gather that in 
your opinion, neither one nor the other have shown competence in recent military 
operations. It does not seem easy to justify keeping them in their present positions if 
they are to be intrusted with difficult operations in the future, or leaving all their 
troops with them if they are not.’275 Although the Cabinet was agreed on the wording 
of the telegram Lansdowne cancelled it as he believed that such action would ‘stir up 
controversy in many quarters, some of them quite exalted.’  It was his view, as he 
later told Roberts, that ‘We had already said enough to show you that you would 
have had our support if you had recommended his supersession, or that of any other 
general.’276 Lansdowne’s cautious approach in dealing with this matter was mirrored 
by Roberts who believed: ‘Personally I should be glad to see both Buller and Warren 
leave the country, but it is not easy to get rid of them without a storm being raised, 
which I would rather avoid for the credit of the Army.’277  
Believing that concealing the despatches would be more damaging to the 
government than their publication, Lansdowne informed Roberts that some of them 
should be made public and that Buller should be invited to write a narrative of 
events.
278
 Buller, however, was opposed to this: ‘I do not at all like the idea of 
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rewriting a despatch for publication. I much prefer to leave it in the hands of the 
Commander-in-Chief, and let him select for publication whatever he thinks 
proper.’279 In light of Buller’s attitude Roberts advised Lansdowne to publish some 
of the despatches as he had previously suggested. He also accepted that his despatch 
of 13 February should be published. When the matter was discussed in Cabinet 
opinions differed. As no minutes were kept at the meeting there was no record of its 
final decision. Believing the Cabinet had made no decision to repress publication, 
Lansdowne authorised the press to publish the selected documents. Prior to the 
publication of the Spion Kop papers Lansdowne warned Roberts of the ‘disagreeable 
comments’ that the press would make. He remarked, ‘I don’t like it, but there is 
nothing else to be done.’280 Neither Roberts nor Wolseley, who was also informed of 
the matter, had any objection. The publication caused a ‘howl’.281 The Times 
reported that ‘It shows us the Secretary of State endeavouring to shift onto the 
Commander-in-Chief in the field responsibility that rightly belongs to the authorities 
at home.’282 Salisbury was puzzled by Lansdowne’s action. He thought the Cabinet 
‘were all of one mind that it ought not to be published.’283 Salisbury was particularly 
upset by the affair as it reflected negatively on the Cabinet as a whole. ‘I am not 
dealing with the substance of your decision which I regret: as the publication should 
have carried with it the suppression of Buller and Warren. But what I demur is that 
the views of the Cabinet were weighed with you so little in a matter of this 
gravity.’284  
With no official record of the Cabinet’s meeting, Lansdowne was quite 
unaware of any such decision to suppress publication. ‘But our decisions are very 
often impalpable and perhaps I ought to have been able to construct one from 
materials afforded by Devonshire’s yawns and casual interjections round the 
table,’285 he informed Balfour. Queen Victoria, who received copies of telegrams 
sent to and from South Africa, was at a loss to understand Lansdowne’s action, and 
informed him that Roberts ‘must not be interfered with by civilians at a distance who 
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cannot judge the exact state of the case.’286 In his reply, Lansdowne concurred with 
her, while maintaining it was ‘within the right of the Cabinet to endeavour to 
strengthen the hands of the general and to make him feel that the responsibility for 
severe measures if taken will not be his alone.’287 Fearing that the affair would lead 
soldiers to lose the respect of their generals, she suggested that Lansdowne should 
resign, but Salisbury was unwilling to agree to this. He anticipated by taking such a 
course the rest of the Liberal Unionists would follow Lansdowne and the 
government would collapse.  
Although to many observers it was not very easy to understand why the 
incident created such a sensation, Lansdowne’s son, who was serving in South 
Africa, noted ‘I suppose the fuss about Buller is really a political one, as he was 
Campbell-Bannerman & Rosebery’s man for the W.O., and it is a fine chance for 
them to make political capital, without apparently being unpatriotic.’288 During the 
debates in Parliament Campbell-Bannerman said the government’s defence was 
utterly insufficient, but, ‘I believe this debate will have done a great deal of good if it 
even induces the Government to look a little round them before they take a step of 
this sort again.’289 Rosebery declared that the government had ‘degraded’ Buller’s 
authority and ‘impaired his position.’290 The government escaped censure by a 
strictly party vote, though many of its supporters abstained. Making an example of 
Buller’s incompetence in South Africa was not Lansdowne’s object although he 
believed that ‘Buller trusted too much to his subordinates and did not take measures 
to satisfy himself that his orders were carried out.’291  
Lansdowne’s position in Cabinet was not seriously affected by the incident. 
However, the press and public’s estimation of him was further damaged and during 
subsequent months he was subjected to intense criticism and satire. To Rudyard 
Kipling, ‘this here home government is about as slack-backed and muddleheaded as 
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they can make ‘em - specially the limp and luckless Lansdowne.’292 Hector Munro, 
alias “Saki”, satirised Lansdowne in ‘Alice in Pall Mall’ as the White Knight. 
Spender, the Editor of the Westminster Gazette, who published the work, said it was 
quoted everywhere and set all of London laughing. He regarded it as symbolic of all 
the War Secretaries who did not expect war:
293
  
‘The great art of falling off a horse,’ said the White Knight, ‘is to have 
another handy to fall on to.’ 
‘But wouldn’t that be rather difficult to arrange?’ asked Alice. 
‘Difficult, of course,’ replied the Knight, ‘but in my Department one has 
to be provided for emergencies. Now, for instance, have you ever 
conducted a war in South Africa?’ 
Alice shook her head. 
‘I have,’ said the Knight, with a gentle complacency in his voice. 
‘And did you bring it to a successful conclusion?’ asked Alice. 
‘Not exactly to a conclusion – not a definite conclusion, you know – nor 
entirely successful either. In fact, I believe it’s going on still…’ 
‘You see, I had read a book,’ the Knight went on in a dreamy, far-away 
tone, ‘written by some one to prove that warfare under modern 
conditions was impossible. You may imagine how disturbing that was to 
a man of my profession. Many men would have thrown up the whole 
thing and gone home. But I grappled with the situation. You will never 
guess what I did.’ 
Alice pondered. ‘You went to war of course-’ 
‘Yes; but not under modern conditions.’ 
‘Now, for instance,’ he continued kindly, seeing that Alice had not 
recovered her breath, ‘you observe this little short-range gun that I have 
hanging to my saddle? Why do you suppose I sent out guns of that 
particular kind? Because if they happened to fall into the hands of the 
enemy they’d be very little use to him. That was my own invention.’294 
 
While Lansdowne was caricatured by the press and public, the progress of ‘the 
War’ with Roberts in command was characterised by mostly successful British 
counter-offensives. This new phase began on 11 February 1900 when Roberts led his 
troops away from the Modder River towards the Orange Free State in a great 
flanking march that ended in the capture of Bloemfontein.
295
 On 15 February, John 
French ended the siege of Kimberley assisted by Roberts who did the initial planning 
of the operation. The Boer line was finally broken between 21 and 27 February at the 
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Battle of the Tugela Heights. The success of Buller’s force in Natal at Pieters Hill, 
Railway Hill and Hart’s Hill ended Boer resistance in that place and they began to 
melt away. On 28 February, Ladysmith was relieved. To Lansdowne the relief was 
‘inexpressible,’296 and ‘the shadow of impending calamity, which has darkened our 
path for so long, is at last removed.’297 On the strength of the good news Lansdowne  
‘ran down here [Bowood] for two days’ rest,’ informing his former Military 
Secretary in Canada, Minto, that it was ‘the first outing I have had since November. 
It has been a weary winter and the suspense was almost intolerable.’298 Brackenbury, 
on learning that the garrison had fired only one third of their 15-pounder ammunition 
and not one twenty-sixth of their small-arm ammunition, told Lansdowne, ‘the 
greatest anxiety I ever had during this war, up to the present, was lest, in the earlier 
stages, I had been too stingy about ammunition and they might run short in 
Ladysmith…it gave me sleepless nights…I might have spared myself the anxiety.’299  
After Ladysmith was relieved and the generals in command in South Africa 
began to sense a turn in their fortunes so their petty jealousies began to materialise, 
straining further the relations between the different cliques. The high military 
officers on the spot were of different traditions, backgrounds and temperaments and 
many were unsuited to their tasks. Even though in the months following the relief of 
Ladysmith Lansdowne noted there was a lot of growling on the part of ‘the man in 
the street’ and ‘I might almost add the man in the Cabinet,’ over alleged failure to 
punish officers who had been responsible for bad mistakes, there were no calls in or 
out of Parliament for such action.
300
 Roberts was less lenient and during the course 
of the campaign took it upon himself to remove from command five generals, six 
cavalry brigadiers, one infantry brigadier, five commanding officers of cavalry 
regiments and four commanding officers of infantry battalions for incompetency.
301
 
With the surrender of Bloemfontein to Roberts on 13 March some of the press 
proclaimed ‘the first half of the Campaign is over.’302 On 31 May, General 
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Pretyman, military governor at Bloemfontein, proclaimed the annexation of the 
Orange Free State as the Orange River Colony. Roberts left Bloemfontein and 
resumed his advance towards Johannesburg on 3 May 1900 in the belief that the 
surest way to disconcert and to discourage an enemy was to go straight to their 
headquarters. Mafeking was relieved on 17 May by Colonel Mahon and two weeks 
later Roberts captured Johannesburg. On 5 June Roberts entered Pretoria and 
although there were still two set piece battles to be fought he could declare ‘the War’ 
over. On 3 September, he proclaimed the annexation of the South Africa Republic 
and Britain was nominally in control of both Republics apart from the Northern 
Transvaal. While Roberts thought ‘the War’ was over, Lansdowne supposed that 
none of the Cabinet, himself included, ‘had an idea whether they were near or still 
far from the end.’303  
Whilst ‘the War’ entered this new phase and the situation stabilised, 
Lansdowne’s task as Secretary of State was no less challenging. Among the stories 
that reached Britain none was more shocking to the public than that of medical 
negligence. Disease was a major problem for the Army Medical Department and 
high profile deaths such as that of Prince Christian Victor of Schleswig-Holstein, 
Queen Victoria’s nephew, of typhoid, attracted public attention. The Times sent 
William Burdett-Coutts MP to file reports on the outbreak of the disease. The 
publication of his report created a public sensation. It appeared to be an attack on the 
government, but Lansdowne understood it was really aimed at the War Office. It was 
commonly said that the attack was largely instigated by disappointed doctors and 
well-meaning but also disappointed ladies.
304
  
Lansdowne questioned some of the contents of the report, but privately he 
realised there had clearly been cases of great suffering because it was impossible to 
cope with the phenomenal outbreaks of disease that followed Roberts in his rapid 
advance. Among the criticisms included in the report was that the War Office should 
have sent more nurses. The question of nurses took up much of Lansdowne’s 
attention during ‘the War’. It required his tact, particularly as the Army Nursing 
Service was closely associated with members of the Royal family. When ‘the War’ 
began, this service had a lady superintendent, nineteen superintendent sisters and 
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sixty-eight sisters serving the main military hospitals in Britain and abroad. There 
was no mechanism for expansion or bringing in reserves, but the creation of the 
Princess Christian’s (Queen Victoria’s daughter) Army Nursing Reserve enabled the 
deployment of 1,400 trained nurses in South Africa up until May 1902. Nurses 
served in base, general and stationary hospitals, and on hospital trains and hospital 
ships. As ‘the War’ progressed demands for the provision of medical assistance in 
the field grew largely because of the British practice of tending to both their own 
soldiers and wounded Boers.305  
While the involvement of the Royals in nursing matters raised the profile of 
the service it did little in the short term to strengthen the numbers for service in 
South Africa. The shortage of nurses was of concern to Wolseley: ‘I am certain we 
shall have over again the same rows about our hospitals that we had in the Crimea 
when Miss Nightingale went there, unless we take this question of the nurses up 
seriously and send a large number of trained nurses there under some lady who will 
undertake the job.’306 It was Wolseley’s view that the difficulty lay with the Army 
Medical Department which was obstructive and prejudicial. His view was shared by 
others. Violet Cecil, Salisbury’s daughter-in-law, then in South Africa, found ‘the 
military authorities treat the Red Cross like dirt’,307 and William MacCormac, 
Surgeon-in-Ordinary to the Prince of Wales and a Volunteer in South Africa, 
reported that the British could use more nurses.  Roberts found William Wilson, 
Surgeon-General with the force, was not very responsive,
308
 and noted that medical 
officers were not keen to employ them, seeming to resent their presence ‘probably 
because the nurses kept vigilant watch over their patients and detected any 
carelessness by the doctors.’309 It is of interest, that even though Lansdowne was 
acquainted with Florence Nightingale and had strongly promoted nurses in India, he 
did not think they should inundate South Africa with nurses, unless they were really 
wanted.
310
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The difficulty experienced by the War Office in providing nurses during ‘the 
War’ was part of a larger problem concerning the Army Medical Department and 
Army doctors. Lansdowne was aware that Army doctors as a class were not as good 
as they should be,
311
 and were a concern to Roberts. Roberts found them to be 
insufferably conceited, not good surgeons and, with scarcely any exception, a very 
inefficient lot. He recommended that Lansdowne should thoroughly reorganise the 
department.
312
 Army hospitals were administered by the Royal Army Medical Corps. 
Established by Lansdowne in 1898, it had not proved itself and was inefficient. Its 
conditions of service and low pay failed to attract men who might lend it status, and 
the personnel added to the corps during ‘the War’ were untrained in their special 
duties. Unsurprisingly, slackness was noticeable in much of the work of snatch 
teams and hospital orderlies. The system of seniority and promotion further 
weakened the machine and nearly all the military doctors were over-burdened with 
red tape. ‘There was an extraordinary want of organization in some of the base 
hospitals and want of business-like management.’313  
After the charges of medical negligence were debated in the House of 
Commons, Balfour announced that a small, impartial commission of inquiry would 
be established to report on the care and treatment of the sick and wounded during the 
war.
314
 The commission, led by Lord Justice Romer made no use of Royal Army 
Medical Corps assistance in their inquiry. This, Lansdowne believed, was the correct 
approach because the War Office must not seem to be ‘personally conducting’ the 
commission.
315
 That the commission included no soldier upset Wolseley. He 
regretted that the British soldier ‘is in no way represented…yet he is the man chiefly 
concerned in the matters complained of.’316 Lansdowne had in fact asked Wolseley 
to recommend a soldier to take part but the names he submitted would not have 
carried much weight with the public and Lansdowne concluded it would ‘be better 
that the views of the Army should be ascertained from the evidence of witnesses.’317 
                                                          
311
 Lansdowne to Roberts (private), 10 March 1900, ibid. 
312
 Roberts to Lansdowne (private), 28 August 1900, ibid., Add MS. 88906/19/24. 
313
 Unnamed correspondent to Wood (private), 22 August 1900, ibid., Add MS. 88906/19/29. 
314
 Balfour, ‘Commons Debate’, ‘South African War - Hospital and Medical arrangements - Mr 
Burdett-Coutts’s Charges - Committee of  Inquiry’, 5 July 1900, Hansard 4th Series, Vol.85, cc.618-
20.  
315
 Lansdowne to Roberts (private), 3 August1900, BL. (5) Lansdowne MSS, Add MS. 88906/19/24. 
316
 Wolseley to Lansdowne (private), 22 July 1900, ibid. 
317
 Lansdowne to Wolseley (private), 23 July 1900, ibid. 
233 
 
The findings revealed a lack of administrative and organisational ability among the 
principal medical officers, friction between the civil surgeons and the Royal Army 
Medical Corps and among the senior officers in the corps itself. Lansdowne’s 
reputation did not suffer for the inadequacies of the medical arrangements in South 
Africa as it was widely accepted both in and out of Parliament that he did more for 
the Royal Medical Army Corps than any previous Secretary of State.
318
  
Over the summer, as the focus of attention moved from one of military duty to 
civil duty the press and public began to probe deeper into the costs of the war. Hicks 
Beach pressed the War Office to reduce military expenditure. Lansdowne was 
unwilling to consider a reduction until the situation in South Africa was clearer and 
any reduction could be carried out with safety.
319
 In the autumn, with the costs of 
‘the War’ still spiralling, Hicks Beach appealed to Salisbury and Chamberlain that 
Britain’s finances were so bleak that he was reluctant to extend her financial or 
military obligations.
320
 When Hicks Beach tried to impose a deadline for reductions 
in the size of the force, Lansdowne replied:  
In South Africa Robert’s troops are all fully employed. The extent of the 
country which he is holding and the length of the railway which he has to 
protect are immense…to my mind it would be out of the question to take 
troops away from him at present. As to home troops I am not frightened 
by rumours of French preparations, but it is idle to deny that we are not 
strong at home and the outlook abroad is not reassuring. I am indeed 
pressed by the soldiers to do more than we are actually doing. If we were 
to disembody now I think the commander in chief would be justified in 
protesting…no one is keener than I am for a drawing of our horns all 
over the world…321  
Hicks Beach replied,  
I could not ask you to take troops away from Roberts which he says it is 
necessary to retain. But, as I said, I am told that there is a very large 
force left behind in the Cape Colony and possibly also in Natal…As to 
home troops I do not see how Wolseley could in reason protest against 
the disembodiment of a force which he has just pronounced to be useless. 
I think you attach far too much importance to the soldiers’ opinions on 
this matter which is a question of policy…I suspect that your soldiers 
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want to make up…abnormal armaments as long as possible in the hopes 
of making more of them permanent.
322
  
While Lansdowne was considering the military requirements in South Africa, 
Roberts informed him that he wished to retire from his command and return. It was 
Lansdowne’s opinion that he should replace Wolseley as Commander-in-Chief of the 
British Army when the latter’s term of office expired the following December. 
Although the proposal to appoint Roberts to Commander-in-Chief ‘really quite 
upset’ Queen Victoria for she had always hoped her son, the Duke of Connaught, 
might take the post, she recognised his claim.
323
 Among some biographical notes 
written after the publication of Lansdowne’s Peace Letter in 1917, Lansdowne 
summarised his memories of ‘the War’ in five short phrases: ‘Difficulties 
underrated; confidence shaken; Roberts invoked; Brown’s Hotel; Roberts had saved 
himself.’324 It can be speculated that Lansdowne was indebted to Roberts and his 
success in South Africa. While Lansdowne’s son noted it would be nice for his father 
to be at the War Office with Roberts,
325
 Lansdowne himself had no such desire. By 
the end of August 1900 it was obvious to him that, ‘we shall be met next session by 
demands for fundamental changes both in the Army and the War Office. With regard 
to the Army it is admitted that the experience of the war has revealed many defects 
and that changes are inevitable. As for the War Office I am far from persuaded that 
there is such a case for a complete alteration of system.’ He recognised that there 
would be great changes in War Office personnel over the following months and 
before they ‘laid rash hands on the organisation,’326 he hoped they would see what 
the staff thought of it and not refer questions of reform to a committee. He thought 
any such inquiry would be interminable and ‘no department has been subject of so 
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many enquiries as the War Office, no department is so much abused.’327 He 
questioned that, if reform came from within, then should they not have a new 
Secretary of State as well as a new Commander-in-Chief? Moreover he wondered 
whether the public would be convinced that he, on whose advice the existing 
organisation was introduced, was free from leanings. He believed ‘Everything 
depends on the influence of individuals,’ 328 and it was his view that, as the lessons 
of ‘the War’ emerged, he would not be the most suitable person to reform the 
office.
329
 Lansdowne’s reluctance to continue in office is also hinted at in a letter he 
wrote to Queen Victoria in which he remarked in his self-deprecating manner that, as 
Secretary of State, ‘he must often have seemed to you to fall short of Your Majesty’s 
expectations.’330  
Advising Lansdowne to avoid entering upon personal speculations, Salisbury 
refused to accept his resignation and cautioned him that ‘It is quite possible we may 
not be far from an election. We must all face it together. It would have the worst 
effect, if discussions about future resignations etc., were to be encouraged and get 
abroad just now. It would give the impression that we were falling to pieces.’331 
Lansdowne, who had found the War Office the most thankless and ‘irritating’ post in 
government,
332
 accepted Salisbury’s advice. That Salisbury refused his resignation 
and promoted him to the Foreign Office two months later was recognition of the 
Prime Minister’s confidence in him. The appointment was a surprise to Lansdowne 
who had ‘expected an uneventful existence at Bowood or perhaps relegation to some 
easy-going post.’333 According to Salisbury, ‘Stanhope, Stanley and Gathorne-Hardy 
had all been criticised over War Office reform’ and Lansdowne, he believed, was 
only the most recent victim.
334
  As further lessons emerged in the years following 
‘the War’ a new generation of ‘victims’ were given the challenge of reforming the 
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War Office. In implementing their reforms, Lansdowne’s three immediate successors 
were partly influenced by the legacy of their predecessor. This is the subject of the 
next chapter. 
237 
 
 
Chapter Seven - Lansdowne’s Legacy at the War Office 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore Lansdowne’s influence on War Office and 
Army reforms between 1900 and 1908. In the literature a considerable body of work 
exists on the reforms attempted during this period.
1
 Policy-making machinery has 
been extensively covered, as have technological and organisational developments of 
the Army.
2
 Furthermore our understanding of how the British government 
modernised the armed forces of Britain has been detailed in biographical studies of 
key policy makers.
3
 However, in the extant literature there is a gap in asking to what 
extent Lansdowne’s policies influenced the War Office and Army reforms of his 
successors, the Unionist War Secretaries St John Brodrick (1900-1903), Hugh 
Oakley Arnold-Forster (1903-1905), and the Liberal War Secretary Richard Burdon 
Haldane (1906-1912). This chapter will provide a brief overview of the different 
reforming policies they adopted and highlight in what ways they did or did not draw 
on Lansdowne’s earlier initiatives. The chapter will also illustrate, from 
Lansdowne’s own speeches and comments, his own thoughts on his successors’ 
reforms and demonstrate how as a senior statesman he could still direct the reform 
discourse. In exploring Lansdowne’s legacy the chapter will also demonstrate the 
way in which both Unionist and Liberal policy was made in and out of office. It will 
locate each Secretary of State for War and his advisers within the general political 
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background of the period and summarise some of the principal political factors that 
shaped their decisions.  
‘The War’ ‘transmuted the complacent arrogance and contempt of other 
nations begotten of long years of peace and prosperity to a truer consciousness both 
of our strength and of our defects and has awakened an earnest desire to make those 
defects good.’4 It exposed the deficiencies of not only the Army but the government 
too. Conciliating public opinion and pledging the country to a series of Committees 
and Royal Commissions to deal with the conduct of the war, the reorganisation of 
the War Office and the state of the Army, were essential elements in the survival of 
the Unionist party. These inquiries acted as both constraints and opportunities for 
Lansdowne’s successors. As important as these committees were in providing 
answers and recommendations, what no government could afford to overlook was 
the financial considerations of acting upon them. Implementing reforms were, as 
Lansdowne had experienced, only possible subject to the estimates Parliament was 
willing to vote. During Lansdowne’s term of office the changing balance of 
international power imposed substantial demands on the military resources of the 
Empire and the Army estimates rose steadily. Under Brodrick, his immediate 
successor, the ongoing war in South Africa sent them escalating upwards.
5
 After the 
conclusion of ‘the War’ further increases in military estimates were considered 
unpopular. Moreover the view that the Navy was the first line of defence, which 
during Lansdowne’s term of office was largely a view held by civilians, was under 
his successors broadly accepted by both civilians and military.
6
 As such, naval 
estimates continued to form a larger share of the nation’s defence expenditure than 
the military estimates. Even with the pressure these new conditions imposed, 
Arnold-Forster was unable to reduce his estimates below £28 million.
7
 Unlike his 
Unionist predecessors Haldane came into office promising a reduction in military 
expenditure.
8
 Like Lansdowne, he also believed that the Army should be reformed 
on the basis of existing forces. Although the interest in reform was more urgent than 
during Lansdowne’s period, popular sentiment against revolutionary change was still 
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a powerful constraint in the period from 1900 to 1908.
9
 Without support in and out 
of Parliament Brodrick and Arnold-Forster were powerless to enact their proposals. 
The fact that the number of service parliamentarians was less than during 
Lansdowne’s tenure was no reason to dismiss their influence. Balfour believed that 
Haldane underrated the political influence of the Volunteer MPs in the House of 
Commons. In 1907 there were twenty-eight remaining, of whom fourteen were 
Liberals. During Lansdowne’s term of office there had been sixty-five of all parties. 
No less important than securing the confidence of the service parliamentarians 
and defence intellectuals was that of the Cabinet and Prime Minister. Neither 
Salisbury nor Balfour, who succeeded him in 1902, were willing to sacrifice their 
premiership to schemes of reform which they were not comfortable with. Salisbury, 
as Lansdowne experienced, was opposed to any measures that undermined the power 
of the civilians over the military. Balfour, who had a wider knowledge of defence 
matters than Salisbury, believed that Britain’s Imperial commitments should 
determine her military policy. His creation and operation of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, itself a legacy of Lansdowne’s Defence Committee of the Cabinet, 
occasionally put him at odds with the views of his Secretary of State. Furthermore, 
as a believer in the indomitable bond of party unity, he was unwilling to support any 
scheme which threatened to damage that. When the unpopularity of both Brodrick’s 
and Arnold-Forster’s reforms became injurious to that unity he moved the former to 
the India Office and let the latter’s scheme collapse. Just as Parliamentary and 
government interest in defence matters had increased, so too had the influence of 
public opinion. It was public opinion’s opposition to the spiralling military costs 
experienced at the end of ‘the War’ that largely caused the collapse of Brodrick’s 
reform agenda. 
While the domestic and international political climate was becoming more 
complicated than before ‘the War’, British foreign policy had succeeded in reducing 
the task of military planners to a manageable extent. Having stood alone in 1901, the 
British Empire by 1908 was on increasingly friendly terms with her traditional rivals 
of France and Russia and with the new naval powers of Japan and the USA. This 
transformation, however, provided little comfort to the Navy and the General Staff 
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whose sights were set on Germany. With an awareness of the new role that foreign 
affairs had assumed, Brodrick adopted a fairly conservative approach to War Office 
and Army reform. As Lansdowne’s Under-Secretary of State and architect of many 
of the reforms between 1895 and 1898 he continued to modify the systems he and 
Lansdowne had defended. Guided by the findings of the select committee on War 
Office Reorganisation which noted ‘the real vice is not systems but persons,’10 by 
Order-in-Council of 4 November 1901 the soldiers at all levels of command were 
given a greater voice in administering Army affairs. The offices of Adjutant-General, 
Military Secretary, and Director of Mobilization and Military Intelligence were 
brought under the control of the Commander-in-Chief. Unlike in 1895, when the 
Adjutant-General held an independent position, in 1901 he became principal adviser 
to the Commander-in-Chief. As in 1895 the Commander-in-Chief was given general 
supervision of the heads of the other military departments and they remained 
responsible to the Secretary of State for War for the proper maintenance of their 
duty. The responsibility of training, discipline, organisation, mobilization and 
offensive and defensive schemes under his nominal authority was recognised. The 
Commander-in-Chief remained the principal adviser to the Secretary of State. Unlike 
in 1895 where the duties of the Director-General of the Army Medical Department 
were not defined and he reported to various departments according to the nature of 
the subject, in 1901 he was elevated to a similar position with that of the other 
departments under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief. The duties of the 
Financial Secretary were not altered and remained as they did under the 1899 Order-
in-Council.
11
  
Lansdowne thought it was ‘remarkable that the first step taken by Mr 
Brodrick…was to restore to the Commander-in-Chief, in deference to a very wide-
spread feeling, some of the functions of which the Order-in-Council of 1895 had 
deprived him.’12 Like Lansdowne, Brodrick disliked the bureaucracy and red tape of 
the War Office which prevented rapid decision-making,
13
 and the ability to 
concentrate on matters of substance. As with Lansdowne, he granted more 
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responsibilities to the general officers commanding intending to lessen the adherence 
to routine work and minute regulations. The consultative element of Lansdowne’s 
1895 system was also extended. The War Office Council was instructed to adopt 
frequent meetings and to hear any subject of consideration a civilian or military 
member might like to bring forward with or without the approval of the Secretary of 
State. Membership was extended to include the Director-General of Mobilisation and 
Military Intelligence and the Director-General of the Army Medical departments. 
The Defence Committee of the Cabinet was extended to include the Commander-in-
Chief and the Director of Military Intelligence. The new Army Board was given the 
same freedom of discussion as the War Office Council.
14
 Reforming the War Office 
was of less concern to Brodrick’s successor Arnold-Forster than reforming the 
Army. However, Balfour made it a condition of his appointment that he accept and 
support the Esher Committee on Reconstruction of the War Office in its task on 
reforming the department. Although the Esher report was a reversal of nearly all the 
reforms made since 1895, Lansdowne was less critical of it than Brodrick, but he 
held that it gave an incorrect view of the relations between the ‘military and the 
financial officials’ at the War Office.15 Balfour, and to a great extent Arnold-
Forster,
16
 however, accepted most of Esher’s recommendations. A new Army 
Council was constituted by Letters Patent on 6 February 1904 and simultaneously 
the office of Commander-in-Chief and the old War Office Council and new Army 
Board were abolished, and the Military Departments were reduced to four 
individuals. 
Although Esher had advised that a General Staff should be established and 
headed by a Chief of the General Staff with a seat on the Army Council, Balfour, 
who was in the final days of his government, was reluctant to accept this. When 
Haldane entered the War Office he was fully apprised of the merits of a General 
Staff, having discussed the subject with Esher and some of the Unionists. As a 
Liberal Imperialist and member of the ‘National Efficiency’ movement he 
committed himself to introduce it. By uniting the parts of the framework of a 
General Staff developed by the Unionists, he established it in two divisions: the 
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General Staff at Army Headquarters, (the War Office) and the General Staff in 
commands and districts. Among his other achievements in reforming the War Office 
was overseeing the move of the War Office from Pall Mall to a new building in 
Whitehall which realised the plans Lansdowne had originated and approved in 1896 
to bring all the departments under one roof.  
Haldane succeeded because of his willingness to create a spirit of cooperation 
between the civilians and military, something his predecessors had failed to 
accomplish. While his reforms were largely the legacy of his Unionist predecessors 
his determination to bridge the gap between the civilians and the military was new. 
While recognising the need for improved relations between the civilians and military 
but lacking the interpersonal skills to enact it, Brodrick entered office remarking, 
‘the Army is hopelessly disorganised and used up; everyone is stale.’17 His scheme 
of reform, as Wyndham elaborated, was that ‘instead of one War Office which tries 
to do everything and fails, and sixteen military districts which are left with little 
enough to do, you should divide the United Kingdom into six great commands, each 
sufficiently large to embrace the raw material which could be progressively trained 
and turned into an Army Corps and to provide each of those districts with generals, 
staff, transport, and equipment.’18 His scheme for six Army Corps comprised three 
formed of Regulars available for immediate despatch abroad as a striking force and 
three formed of both Regulars and Auxiliaries with a primarily home defence role. 
The scheme retained the principle of linked battalions at home and abroad introduced 
by Cardwell and adopted by Lansdowne in 1895. His Army reform was also based, 
like his predecessor’s, on the belief that correcting the malfunctioning system would 
be achieved by increasing the size of the Regular Army. It was his view, as he 
explained to the House of Lords, that Lansdowne increased the Army in 1897 
‘because for years…the pressure of every soldier of experience had been brought to 
bear on successive governments to prove that without more battalions you were not 
able to provide adequate drafts.’19 Although Lansdowne recognised the weaknesses 
in Brodrick’s scheme, he was one of the few members of the Cabinet who did not 
                                                          
17
 Brodrick to Curzon (private), 9 November 1900, BL. Curzon MSS, Mss. EUR F111/10b, f.236. 
18
 Wyndham, ‘Commons Debate’, ‘Army Organization’, 13 May 1901, Hansard 4th Series, Vol.93, 
c.1512. 
19
 Midleton, ‘Lords Debate’, ‘The Strength of the Army’, 12 March 1908, ibid. Vol.185, c.1661. 
243 
 
reject it. He cautioned Brodrick’s critics against weakening the Regular Army at a 
time when the Army reserve itself was weak.
20
  
When Arnold-Forster’s scheme for reforming the Regular Army was revealed 
to the Cabinet in February 1904, it was expected that he would reduce the Army 
estimates, rectify the enlistment crisis, and resolve the abortive reforms of his 
predecessor. As a defence intellectual, he was both a more ambitious and radical 
reformer than his two predecessors or his successor. His scheme, which rejected any 
overtures from Lansdowne, had at its core the abolition of the Cardwellian system of 
linked battalions. In light of the fact that Britain’s overseas commitments were 
increasing and demands on the Regular Army for home defence were diminishing, it 
was argued that linking battalions was potentially an obstacle to efficiency. Arnold-
Forster proposed a dual Army system with a short service Army for home defence 
and a long service Army for colonial defence similar to a scheme that Roberts had 
recommended to Lansdowne in 1897.
21
 Balfour welcomed the break with the 
Cardwell system because it freed the Regular Army for its Imperial role and even 
Lansdowne accepted the change: 
It has often been my lot to defend in this House [House of Lords] the 
system of linked battalions. I remain of opinion that, given the 
circumstances of the time, we had in these linked battalions a very 
valuable system for supplying the wants of the Army, but it was a system 
which…depended upon an approximation between the number of 
battalions required for service at home and the number required for 
service abroad…But from the moment that it was recognised that the 
bulk of our Regular troops are required for service out of the country, 
and that consequently the number of Regular battalions at home must 
represent a very insignificant number indeed compared with the 
battalions abroad - from that moment the linked-battalion system was 
doomed, and we were bound to discover some alternative.
22
  
Although Arnold-Forster’s scheme appeared on paper to be an improvement 
on Brodrick’s, its fate depended less on the political and military needs of the 
country than on financial circumstances. Moreover, the opposition and service 
parliamentarians were unable to accept such a radical change. Wemyss could not 
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comprehend how Lansdowne and the Cabinet had allowed ‘the present Secretary of 
State for War to play with the Army, as if they were tin soldiers in a nursery.’23 
In contrast to Arnold-Forster’s scheme, Haldane introduced an Expeditionary 
Force based on six self-sufficient divisions rather than Army Corps. Each division 
had its own medical support, transport and cavalry division all capable of rapid 
mobilisation. Making a break with Unionist military policy Haldane and his advisers 
were attracted by the idea of these smaller units because they provided a flexible 
force capable of pursuing small wars in Egypt or a war in Europe. Unionist military 
policy held that an Expeditionary Force which might be needed for a continental war 
was secondary to the security of the Empire and India in particular.
24
 Since Arnold-
Forster’s reform scheme had not been implemented, the Cardwellian system of 
linked battalions was still in place and it was Haldane’s intention to continue with 
that system. The principal difference between the system as established by 
Lansdowne and that which Haldane found was that the needs of imperial defence 
had widened the gap between the number of battalions abroad and those at home 
which fed them by eighty-five to seventy-one respectively. By retaining Cardwell’s 
system Haldane revived ‘the conditions essential to the sound position of infantry 
battalions,’25 which had existed during Lansdowne’s term of office. Affirming the 
latter’s legacy, the Earl of Portsmouth, the Under-Secretary of State for War, stated 
that when Lansdowne was at the War Office ‘such conditions did generally obtain’ 
and the state of the home battalions ‘was generally satisfactory.’26 Haldane also 
reverted to the size of home battalions that prevailed under Lansdowne and his 
predecessor of seven hundred and twenty men.
27
 The government did not overlook 
the fact that, in 1898, Lansdowne had increased this number to eight hundred men 
per battalion, but argued that they were ‘dealing now with the question of drafts, not 
with the question of the Regular reserve.’28 According to one of its architects, the 
Expeditionary Force ‘was in principle identical with the Field Force of 1895’; it was 
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only distinctive in as much as it was ‘not intended solely for home defence but…for 
offensive action overseas.’29  
Faced with increasing demands for retrenchment Haldane proposed reductions 
from the Regular Army that amounted to 20,000 men. Lansdowne believed these 
amputations were of ‘a ruthless character’, and ‘involve a very serious diminution of 
the fighting strength of the British Army.’ Moreover, given the magnitude of the 
officer shortage after ‘the War’, it was a concern to him that Haldane wanted to 
reduce the Regular Army because of ‘the number of officers whom we lose in 
consequence of them.’ Although Haldane’s measures for reforming the Regular 
Army had much in common with Lansdowne’s earlier infantry scheme and were 
accepted by Parliament and passed into law, Lansdowne remained critical of his 
reductions. He doubted if the Bill as a whole was a ‘thorough and considered scheme 
of Army reform, or that the passing of it will at once render the country, for purposes 
either of offence or of defence, stronger and better equipped than it was a few years 
ago.’30 
In the same way that Lansdowne’s successors’ willingness to adapt elements 
from their predecessor’s reorganisation of the Regular Army varied widely so too did 
their reforms of the Auxiliary Army. Brodrick, who like Lansdowne also served in 
an Auxiliary force, continued his idea of assimilating it with the Regular Army in a 
time of peace in order to smooth its expansion of the Regulars in a time of war. In 
1901 the establishment of the Militia was 150,000 and its strength was 100,000. He 
proposed reducing the establishment to its strength and, as Lansdowne had 
suggested, abolishing the Militia reserve and forming a reserve for the Militia of 
50,000. He also proposed adding to and training the Militia artillery for eighty-four 
days. Brodrick’s proposals for a real reserve for the Militia met little opposition from 
Parliament.
31
 However the reforms proceeded slowly because the drain from the 
Militia into the Regular Army showed no sign of weakening. As such his proposal 
for an increase of 50,000 in the Militia reserve appeared to be utopian. Arnold-
Forster inherited a Militia force in a state of crisis and, as the Norfolk Commission 
reported in 1904, lacking ‘the strength or the military efficiency required to enable 
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them to fulfil the functions for which they exist.’32 While professing to be a 
champion of the Militia he proposed reducing and converting the force into short 
service battalions, a scheme that Wemyss believed ‘will only add some fragments to 
the War Office administrative wreckage that floats and eddies round the base of Lord 
Herbert’s statue in Pall Mall…’33 Driven more by sentiment than practicality, the 
scheme met strong resistance and Balfour advised him not to commit the government 
to it. 
The Militia was still in crisis in 1906 when Haldane entered office. Given its 
condition, it is notable that Haldane’s proposals for using some Militia men to 
support his Expeditionary Force on mobilisation and forming the others into a 
Special Reserve were opposed by the service parliamentarians. They were against 
any change that used the Militia as drafts. Only with the collaboration of the 
Unionists and Lansdowne in particular, did he succeed in pushing his proposal 
through Parliament. As Leader of the Unionists in the House of Lords, Lansdowne 
advised that ‘the government scheme has…some very good points, and I have no 
desire to make party capital out of its imperfections.’34 He believed that the Militia 
should go over ‘bag & baggage’ to fill the place of the Special Reserve and that ‘too 
much’ had been made of the drafting question.35  
As with the Militia so with the Volunteers Lansdowne’s successors owed a 
debt to his previous policy. After ‘the War’ it became a matter of debate whether the 
Volunteers should continue with the traditional role they had before ‘the War’ as an 
Army of home defence exclusively or whether they should assume service 
throughout the Empire as an Army of reserve. Brodrick decided that they should be 
allocated a home defence role. Their deficiencies, he believed, could be addressed by 
a more exacting standard of training and service. He proposed making provision for 
twenty-five specially selected battalions of Volunteers to be attached to the Army 
Corps and making the special camp regulations introduced by Lansdowne in 1898 
compulsory. He also further developed Lansdowne’s scheme of utilising the 
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Volunteer artillery force
36
 by including twenty-one batteries of Volunteer artillery  in 
his plans for his fourth, fifth and sixth Army Corps. Largely due to the new 
regulations the number of recruits declined, a development that caused public 
opinion concern. To appease public opinion Balfour abandoned the scheme and 
appointed the Norfolk Commission to inquire into the state of the force. Just as 
Brodrick’s attempt to reform the Volunteers met resistance so too did Arnold-
Forster’s proposals to reduce the force.  
Although the Volunteer force bequeathed by the Unionists to the Liberals was 
not entirely unreformed, Haldane believed the condition of the force was ‘the most 
confused thing we have in the British constitution.’37 In his attempt to reform the 
force he built on Lansdowne’s earlier proposal for the employment of Volunteers in 
cases of emergency and penalties for non-attendance at camp. Whereas Brodrick and 
Arnold-Forster both broke with Lansdowne and attempted to make large reductions 
to the size of the Volunteers because they believed the likelihood of an invasion was 
remote, Haldane was less punitive. He envisaged utilising the Volunteers as a 
territorial force and for fulfilling the functions of a reserve fit for duty overseas.
38
 
Owing to opposition from the service parliamentarians Haldane was unable to carry 
through Parliament his reforms as he had wished to see them implemented. In 1908 
Lucas, the Under-Secretary of State for War, reassured the Lords that the Territorial 
Force was statutorily enlisted for service at home and was never considered in any 
other light than as a home defence Army.
39
 Although Haldane’s scheme had 
similarities with the past, the proposal to split command from administration under 
administrative bodies called the County Associations was new. It was Lansdowne’s 
view that these were ‘really miniature War Offices.’ As Haldane’s scheme for the 
Territorial Army developed Lansdowne remarked that it was ‘the Old Volunteer 
Force under a new title.’40 This view was not entirely accurate. Although under his 
successors the Volunteers functioned for the purpose of home defence as they had 
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previously done, they had also become more organised and more complete in arms 
and equipment than the old Volunteers.
41
 
During ‘the War’ the Volunteers and Yeomanry proved their value. Brodrick 
was especially keen to build on the renewed impetus the creation of Lansdowne’s 
and Wyndham’s Imperial Yeomanry gave to the force. In 1901 he appointed a 
committee on the future of the Yeomanry. Based on its recommendations he 
increased the size of the force, paid them a higher salary, and demanded that they 
undergo a longer period of training. Unlike Brodrick, Arnold-Forster spared the 
Yeomanry any structural reorganisation. He believed ‘the Yeomanry are as satisfied 
with the War Office, as the War Office is with the Yeomanry.’42 Making only a 
minor modification he proposed that the Yeomanry should be brought into closer 
contact with the higher formation branches of the Volunteers, the artillery and 
engineers. When Haldane entered the War Office he found the Yeomanry in a much 
more ‘satisfactory position’ than the other Auxiliary forces. But he worried ‘if we 
came to war nobody would quite know where to put them.’43 Since their last major 
reorganisation in 1901 they had grown to comprise fifty corps and their number was 
over 26,000 of all ranks and their annual training extended over a period of from 
fourteen to eighteen days besides the preliminary training. He decided to use some of 
the available Yeomanry units as divisional cavalry for the infantry divisions of the 
Expeditionary Force and those not allocated for that force would be enrolled with the 
Volunteers in the Territorial force under the administration of County Associations. 
The service parliamentarians disliked placing the Yeomanry under the County 
Associations.
44
 Harris thought that civil administration had been tried and found 
wanting in the previous century, and Scarborough remarked that Yeomanry officers 
would prefer to enlist for overseas service and remain under central military 
authority than accept the administration of the County Associations.
45
 Both peers 
also deplored the lower rates of pay associated with Haldane’s scheme.46 As a 
Colonel in the Wiltshire Yeomanry Lansdowne agreed with both Harris’ and 
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Scarborough’s views. He was against asking them ‘to do more work for less pay.’47 
Many of the newspapers waited until 30 June 1908, the date by which Haldane had 
hoped to enrol the bulk of the Yeomanry and Volunteers for the Territorial force, to 
pass judgement on the recruiting returns. At that date the number of men laid down 
as the strength for the whole Territorial force was 300,000 and the returns showed 
that 183,000 or 63% of its establishment had been filled. In language that 
Lansdowne would not have been unused to reading The Times reported ‘though we 
applaud the public spirit and enthusiasm of the 183,000 men who have joined, we 
cannot forget that 120,000 more are needed. Until these men have come forward it 
cannot be said that one of the first requirements of Mr Haldane’s scheme, units ready 
at full war strength, has been fulfilled.’48 
All attempts at Army reform by Lansdowne and his successors were dependent 
on effective recruiting. While Parliament might grant new Army establishments, it 
was still through voluntary enlistment that recruiting numbers had to be met. 
Lansdowne’s attempt to increase recruiting numbers by shortening the term of 
service to three years for the Regular Army did not get a fair trial owing to ‘the War’ 
as ‘all the three years men were kept and the experiment had not a chance.’49 By 
utilising the patriotism of ‘the War’ Brodrick adopted a similar scheme as 
Lansdowne for all enlistments to the Regular Army, with the option of entering the 
reserve for nine years or of extending their colours service for a further five years for 
an extra 6d a day.
50
 Brodrick’s 1901 scheme therefore ‘destroyed any chance of 
testing the value’ of Lansdowne’s arrangement.51 Unlike Lansdowne or Brodrick, 
Arnold-Forster’s scheme proposed enlisting recruits to the ‘General Service’ Army 
for nine years with the colours and their counterparts in the ‘Home Service’ Army 
for two years. Haldane reverted to the terms of enlistment for a Regular soldier 
maintained by Lansdowne before 1898 on the Cardwellian system, of seven years 
with the colours and five with the reserve. 
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In his attempt to solve the recruiting difficulty and make the Army an attractive 
career for officers and soldiers, Lansdowne made notable improvements to the image 
of the Army and the conditions of service. Brodrick did likewise. Lansdowne’s 
scheme for the employment of ex-soldiers was adopted and extended by Arnold-
Forster who established a War Office Council committee to examine the matter. By 
1905 the noticeable results of these changes were evident in falling figures of 
misconduct, drunkenness and wastage from the colours. In continuity with his 
predecessors’ policies for improved conditions of service Haldane ensured that 
soldiers returned to society better educated and qualified to find employment. 
Lansdowne’s modifications of soldiers’ pay and compensation based on age were 
also continued by Brodrick in a plan guaranteeing that only efficient soldiers would 
be rewarded.
52
 Under Haldane service pay was replaced with proficiency pay.
53
 
Resolving the lack of officers was a difficulty shared by both Lansdowne and 
his successors. Brodrick appointed Lord Stanley to enquire into officers’ expenses in 
the belief that regimental expenditure was a deterrent to joining. In 1906 Haldane 
appointed a War Office Committee to consider the means of attracting officers into 
the Army. Finding a deficiency in captains and subalterns the committee suggested 
that a Supplementary list of Regular officers should be formed of men who had had a 
year’s preparatory training. To administer the scheme, the committee proposed that 
the existing school and University corps should be reorganised in an Officers 
Training Corps supervised by a specially selected staff at the War Office.
54
 The idea 
of using the public schools and universities and their cadet corps to fill the gap in the 
number of officers was not new. During Lansdowne’s period of office a proposal 
that all boys over the age of fifteen should be given instruction in drill, manoeuvre 
and the use of arms was made at the Headmasters’ Conference. Lansdowne rejected 
the idea at the time due to the cost and the likely opposition it would have provoked 
but the proposal gave rise to an intense public debate. The War Office always looked 
with considerable suspicion on proposals made by educational institutions for the 
grant of facilities or of financial aid to cadet corps, rifle clubs or any such 
organisations, mainly because they could not see a return in military strength for the 
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money.
55
 Asked whether it would have been advantageous to him as Secretary of 
State, if on appealing to the manhood of the country, he had been appealing to a 
manhood who in their boyhood had been trained to arms, he replied, ‘that seems to 
me an obvious proposition.’56 It was his opinion that ‘it is desirable that we should as 
far as possible make use of the education given to the youth of this country at school 
for the purpose of encouraging them after they have completed that education to take 
their place in the military forces of the Crown.’57 Haldane’s Officers Training Corps 
drew on this idea. Radical opinion was not impressed by the prospect of a Liberal 
government harnessing the perceived militarism of the public schools.
58
 Many 
Unionists were sceptical as to whether Haldane would secure sufficient officers from 
this corps. 
To Spenser Wilkinson the three Unionist war Secretaries since 1899 were ‘a 
series of amateur vivisectors…each of whom surpassed his predecessor in ignorance 
of the organism which he had had in his hands and therefore in the ruthless use of the 
scalpel.’59 Although this comment is open to question given the administrative 
experience of these individuals and the political and social factors which impacted 
on their ability to operate, when Haldane entered the War Office the moment and 
conditions for using the scalpel were opportune. With hindsight he could pick and 
choose from earlier reforms, committees and Royal Commissions, he could 
understand the direction taken in British foreign policy, and at the start of a new 
government he had time. Haldane believed that ‘no one Secretary of State, no one 
government can solve the problem of imperial defence. Assume that the work is 
begun and carried on under the most favourable conditions, it must take two or three 
administrations to work it out thoroughly. What can be done is to work upon the 
basis of the past, because there is always a great deal of good in the work that has 
been done by your predecessors and to use that to build on, and so carry the matter a 
stage further, and then hand it on, administered in a spirit which makes it easy for 
those who come after, even if with political views of a different complexion to carry 
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on the work in which you have been engaged.’60 In the conclusion of this thesis it 
will be argued that by placing Lansdowne in his own social, political and intellectual 
context his significance as a political figure can be re-examined and restored to its 
proper position. 
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Conclusion 
No single appraisal of Lansdowne at the War Office between 1895 and 1900 has 
existed up until now. With two exceptions that deal specifically with civil-military 
relations, Lansdowne has received little attention from students of late Victorian 
politics. Many historians have suggested that his personality was flawed and largely 
to blame for the mistakes of ‘the War’. It has been argued that he lacked sufficient 
firmness for his task and that he neglected the logistical and administrative 
considerations of using military force. This thesis has broken new ground. It compels 
those who have written on the various problems Lansdowne encountered to rethink 
their conclusions by adding a new reflection. Drawing Lansdowne out of the 
shadows and portraying him as a man of his age dealing with the challenges 
politicians of the period had to deal with, the primary aim here has been to return 
him to his proper position. It has achieved this by using him as a prism through 
which to study late Victorian politics, civil-military relations, the reform discourses, 
the Army and ‘the War’. Moreover, by placing Lansdowne in his proper contexts 
and exploring how he dealt with contemporary pressures that influenced his 
thinking, his significance as a political figure has been demonstrated. Accordingly, 
this thesis has attempted to address the issue of War Office and Army reform. It has 
concluded that between 1895 and 1900 internal and external political rivalries, a 
complex inheritance, and a lack of interest made ‘total’ reform impracticable. 
The tensions with which Lansdowne struggled in his department were the 
result of a culture of disharmony which had evolved over more than a century. The 
problem was over the extent to which civilians should participate with soldiers in 
deciding questions of a technical and financial nature and over the constitutional 
issue involving the conflict between the Crown and Parliament for supremacy over 
the Army. It is people that make organisations work and the organisation of the War 
Office made personality clashes inevitable. Lansdowne was a younger Secretary of 
State than average and his principal advisers, both civilian and military, were with a 
few exceptions older than he was. In his career he had come into contact with the 
leading military authorities and had developed an understanding of the discourse.  
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Although he believed that business at the War Office should be conducted as 
far as possible by civilians and senior officers sitting side by side under one roof, he 
also realised that whatever the senior officers thought of as the most advisable 
military measures, they had to reckon with the Secretary of State and he with the 
Cabinet and with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. It was his view that the hand of 
the politician should not be forced by the senior officers and that a more or less 
ignorant civilian Secretary of State should not profess to be an expert. On entering 
office in July 1895, he accepted that reforms were necessary but held firmly that the 
Army could not be organised on any other lines than those of finance.
1
 Opposed to 
radical changes, he chose to implement, with minor modifications, the policy 
established by his predecessors. It was his view that the power centralised in the 
office of the Commander-in-Chief should be reduced and that wider use should be 
made of the expertise of the other senior officers. By giving them increased 
responsibility and direct access to the Secretary of State, he believed he would obtain 
an unreserved opinion. While attaching great importance to this method of 
conducting business, he also believed in the value of consultative bodies, 
establishing an Army Board, War Office Council and Defence Committee of the 
Cabinet. What Lansdowne could not have anticipated in attempting to reorganise the 
department in the autumn of 1895 was that Wolseley was not sufficiently capable to 
cope with the demands which changing diplomacy was asking of him. Unable to 
accept the modification of his office he determined to contravene Lansdowne’s re-
organisation and denied all attempts by the other senior officers to avail themselves 
of their statutory access to him. By undermining the 1895 reorganisation in this way 
Wolseley widened the gap between the civilians and the senior officers and opposed 
the spirit of collaboration.  
It was Wolseley’s opinion that the War Office system of 1895 was a fruitful 
cause of military weakness and the success of the mobilisation for ‘the War’ had 
nothing to do with the system but was due to the professionalism of the officers 
concerned.
2
 Lansdowne accepted that his system had imperfections but that it was 
not at fault. Moreover, it was irrefutable that every important step and decision 
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affecting the Army in South Africa was considered by the Army Board which itself 
was introduced as part of the machinery of the 1895 system. He believed that the 
failures and mistakes during ‘the War’ were if anything due to the fact that the 
system was not carried out as faithfully as it might have been. That the system did 
not break down during ‘the War’ was, according to his colleague Devonshire, a 
reason not to condemn it. To Devonshire it had provided Britain ‘in sufficient 
numbers with officers and with men…has been the means of transporting this great 
force over thousands of miles of sea, and over an enormous territory, and of 
providing that force with the necessary rations, supplies, stores and equipment’… ‘a 
military system which has been able to do even this is not to be condemned…’.3 The 
reorganisation of 1895 sowed the seeds of disharmony in the War Office by 
irreparably damaging Lansdowne’s relations with Wolseley and aggravating the 
latter’s unwillingness to make better use of the system.  But there were also clashes 
of ideology and control. Wolseley favoured a more prominent role for the military 
and held that a soldier should also be the Secretary of State for War,
4
 and 
Lansdowne believed that the Commander-in-Chief should not involve himself in 
politics.
5
 It can also be speculated that Wolseley’s illness corrupted his mind and fed 
his belief that all politicians were timeservers and ready to stoop to anything.
6
 
Just as political necessity dictated relations between civilians and senior 
officers, so petty jealousies and rivalries impaired relations between the senior 
officers themselves. While united in wishing to transfer the financial and supply 
functions from the civilian side of the War Office to their own side they were by no 
means united on broader issues of Army reform. This conflict was mainly one of 
personalities but it also had its roots deep within the social and class structure of the 
Army. On the one hand were the Horse Guards or regimental officers, including the 
Duke of Cambridge, and on the other were the reforming officers including men 
such as Wolseley and Roberts. Both the Traditionalists and the Reformers had 
different views on regimental organisation, education, training and staff planning. 
Just as these two groups were divided, so the Reformers were also divided among 
themselves. Whereas Roberts and his clique advocated reforms and strategic 
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priorities modelled by service in India, experience in Africa and Britain was the 
model for Wolseley and his clique.
7
 Such divisions weakened the senior officers and 
enabled the civilian authorities to exploit them and impose a system of divide and 
rule. Given the disharmony of civil-military relations operating within the War 
Office reform was unachievable. 
That this lack of cooperation and disunity at the War Office thrived during 
Lansdowne’s term of office was a result of Lansdowne’s Cabinet colleagues and 
Salisbury. They purposively chose to strengthen civilian control at the expense of 
military authority. Mutual suspicion between the different groups dictated thinking 
in government circles and made reform impossible. Of the nineteen Cabinet 
members there was an inner core with diverse backgrounds and experience. Such 
diversity produced a variety of views on defence planning and military matters. 
Salisbury, the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, believed ‘a War Minister must 
find his reward in his conscience or his salary, he must not look for fame,’8 He 
strongly distrusted the views of military experts. Devonshire, the Lord President of 
the Council, who in 1888 had chaired a Royal Commission to enquire into the Army 
and Navy departments, favoured abolishing the post of Commander-in-Chief and 
appointing a Chief of Staff. Goschen, the First Lord of the Admiralty believed in the 
primacy of the Navy. Balfour, the First Lord of the Treasury, wanted to introduce 
greater rationality and method in defence policy-making.
9
 Chamberlain believed that 
the War Office should secure British commerce.
10
 Hicks Beach, the Chancellor, was 
anxious to resist the relentless rising demands for defence spending.
11
 Hamilton, the 
Secretary of State for India, who had turned down the War Office in 1887, described 
it as the toughest of all the departments in government.’12  
Lansdowne attributed the lack of Parliamentary interest in the reform discourse 
to an indifference of public interest in military and defence matters. But the issue 
was also due to a natural antipathy of politicians to confront the status quo and risk 
antagonism which might lose votes. If the Cabinet had little desire to introduce 
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changes in military administration, so too did the Liberal party. The Liberals had an 
ambivalent attitude to military reform and during Lansdowne’s term of office 
developed no alternative policy on the subject. It had been Gladstone’s belief that 
resistance to the militant Jingoes was the natural attitude of his party and between 
1895 and 1899 he still cast a shadow over his party. Even after the outbreak of war 
in South Africa, most Liberals were more preoccupied with how far its conduct 
required a review of Liberal thinking about imperial society and the role of the state 
than why the country was at war.  
Lansdowne’s inability to reform the War Office and Army stemmed not only 
from a widespread lack of interest in the subject but also because those that most 
wished to bring it about were neither powerful nor coordinated enough as a group to 
challenge the government. The influence of the service parliamentarians was more 
apparent than real and in both Houses they rarely posed a threat. Similarly the 
defence intellectuals, who believed that the Cardwell system had caused the collapse 
of the Army and that a greater role in imperial defence should be given to the Navy, 
found only limited support for their ideas among parliamentarians and the military. 
Moreover the reformers among the press had their own doctrinaire views of reform 
and by condemning the entire system then in place overlooked that had it been better 
managed it might have succeeded.  
That the War Office was unreformable was also because of a general lack of 
pressure from domestic and foreign affairs to force change. The ‘National 
Efficiency’ movement which emerged during ‘the War’, when the intensity of party 
rivalry was absent,
13
 met with limited success in its attempt to reject that which was 
considered irrelevant to the needs of the new century. Achieving rather more success 
was the rejection of British traditional foreign policy led by a new generation of 
ministers and diplomatists. The part Lansdowne played in this movement should not 
be under-estimated. His role prior to ‘the War’ in dealing with imperial defence and 
overseas expeditions in Egypt and the Sudan had a profound effect on foreign and 
colonial policy. As the well-established system of protocol and tradition was 
perceived to flounder, a younger generation, including Lansdowne, forced through a 
transformation in Whitehall. It was axiomatic that Britain’s view of its place in the 
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world and its seemingly invincible Army and Navy bred a complacency which 
distanced the nation from the rest of the powers, and made military reform 
unattainable. It received a severe jolt from events in South Africa. Lansdowne 
clearly recognised this: ‘no one is keener than I am for a drawing of our horns all 
over the world…’14 was suggestive of his concern for imperial interests.  
It is the conclusion of this thesis that the War Office and Army were 
unreformable. This does not mean, however, that Lansdowne as Secretary of State 
for War was unable to initiate subtle changes in the administration of the Army. 
Having served as Under Secretary of State for War, he understood the existing 
military system established by Cardwell better than many of his predecessors had 
done, but even though he respected its purpose and principles he realised that it had 
its faults. The requirements of the Empire had grown, special calls had been made on 
the Army and consequently he believed it was ‘out of joint,’15 ‘wanting in 
elasticity,’16 and capable of simplification.17  Lansdowne’s gradualism modified the 
system while preserving the basic structure of the system which had had the support 
of eight Secretaries of State before him, two Commanders-in-Chief and four 
Adjutant-Generals. Unlike Wolseley, who believed that the Army had already been 
reformed and that recovering the original purpose of the Army system could be 
established by an increase in men, Lansdowne adopted a more flexible view. By 
grafting many understated changes onto the existing system he did more than either 
the military or civilian advisers in their rigid defence of the system were willing to 
attempt.  
The principal changes introduced by Lansdowne between 1895 and 1899 
included a degree of decentralisation by enabling the general officers commanding, 
to have ‘experience in times of peace of duties that would inevitably fall upon them 
in time of war.’18 Furthermore, fourteen new regiments of infantry were authorised 
and were either wholly or partially raised. Three-year enlistment was introduced and 
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third and fourth battalions were created of double battalions. The regiments of the 
cavalry were brought up to strength in men, horses and guns and the organisation of 
the Royal Artillery which had numbered nearly 40,000 men and had been 
administered as one regiment from Pall Mall was decentralised. Fifteen batteries of 
field artillery and three of howitzers were authorised and partially raised. The home 
battalions were increased from seven hundred and twenty to eight hundred men. 
These additions which were the first additions to the Army since 1871 resulted in a 
total increase of approximately 25,000 men.
19
 The higher practical training of the 
Army and the generals’ commanding it was considered and for the first time in 
twenty-six years Army manoeuvres on a large scale were possible due to the 
acquisition of land at Salisbury Plain. New rifle ranges were established and new 
barracks were built, the pay of the soldier was increased, and an extended and more 
thorough training for the Militia was decided on and put into force; employment of 
Militia regiments on service abroad was also instituted. A special Army reserve of 
5,000 infantrymen in their first year of reserve service was created to bring up to 
strength regiments sent abroad. Inter-changeability of officers between the Militia 
and the line was established and a rigid overhaul of every branch of military 
equipment was made. Quick-firing guns were provided for coastal defence, the 
construction of coastal fortifications completed, and provision made for the defence 
of London by the Volunteers. The Ordnance Department and factories were 
reorganised along business-like principles and control was given to the military to 
administer both design and inspection. The Education Department, and Clothing 
Department were reformed and changes in the Medical Department were 
implemented to improve the status and duties of doctors and nurses.  
During ‘the War’ Lansdowne’s emergency measures provided for a further 
twelve infantry battalions and an increase in the number of infantry men serving on 
the three year enlistment. Thirty-six batteries of field artillery and seven batteries of 
horse artillery were raised and the fifteen regiments of cavalry were reformed and 
raised to war strength. Veteran soldiers were re-enlisted for home defence under the 
name of the Royal Reserve Battalion. All militiamen were embodied and thirty-six 
battalions saw service abroad, a reserve for the Militia was proposed and 
opportunities made for Militia officers to attend courses of instruction. The office of 
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Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces and Recruiting was divided into two 
departments with a new Inspector-General of the Auxiliary Forces. A subordinate 
officer to the Inspector-General of the Auxiliary Forces specifically to deal with the 
Militia was also established. The Volunteers received increased grants of several 
kinds, and were encouraged to recruit up to their full strength of 1,000 men per 
battalion and to recruit second battalions. They were given a limited number of 
Regular commissions to fill vacancies in the new infantry battalions and allowed to 
raise mounted companies. Legislation to provide for appropriate buildings and rifle 
ranges was enacted and the ninety-eight batteries of Volunteer artillery men were 
also entirely rearmed partly with a semi-mobile 4.7 inch gun. A Volunteer Bill was 
enacted giving the government power to accept offers from the Volunteers to 
undertake military duty in Britain at any time. By utilising the services of the 
Yeomanry, the Imperial Yeomanry was established and the remaining Yeomanry 
received a month’s training under canvas, an increase in their contingent allowance 
and a grant for travel.
20
  
A common thread holding together these subtle changes and their effect on the 
efficient mobilisation of the Army to South Africa and its successful occupation was 
Lansdowne’s greatest achievement, his preservation of the Cardwell system. At the 
time, it was condemned by the regimental officers, the service parliamentarians, the 
defence intellectuals, a large section of the press, the Royal family and London 
Society. Although the system was consistently blamed for the poor state of the 
Army, 1897 was a watershed for the reform discourse. By recognising and offering 
to repair the faults of the system with improvements in the conditions of Army 
service and an increase in men Lansdowne not only silenced his critics and their 
wish to abolish the system, but won from them a measure of confidence in his 
proposals. By using the public’s anxiety which had been stirred up by the 
reinvigorated reform discourse as a lever, Lansdowne secured from the Cabinet his 
Army proposals and the greatest increase in the Army in peacetime. Lansdowne’s 
flexible defence of the Cardwell system proved itself a success during its first trial in 
time of war, thus further silencing its critics. It illustrated Lansdowne’s political 
shrewdness. On both these occasions, by collaborating with the critics of the system 
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and listening to public opinion, the War Office acquired significant political 
influence. 
Towards the end of Lansdowne’s term of office, the reformers, particularly in 
Parliament, acquired greater leverage. Issues which had previously been treated as 
part of an intellectual discussion began to take on a practical aspect. As the lessons 
of ‘the War’ emerged, organic reform could no longer be ignored, and in the 
following years reforming the War Office and Army systems became a matter of 
urgency. Responsibility for this was entrusted to the Unionist Secretaries of State, St. 
John Brodrick and Hugh Oakley Arnold-Forster, and the Liberal Secretary of State 
Richard Burdon Haldane. That the two Unionists failed to reform the War Office and 
Army and Haldane succeeded was the result of a number of different factors. By 
pledging the country to a series of inquiries into almost all aspects of the War Office 
and the Army the Unionist government appeased public concern but acting on their 
recommendations created both constraints and opportunities. The changing balance 
of international power, the widespread view of the Navy as the first line of Imperial 
defence, greater Parliamentary and public interest in defence matters, and spiralling 
costs also weakened their ability to carry out their reforms as they might have 
wished. Moreover, Balfour’s Committee of Imperial Defence, which in many 
respects owed a legacy itself to Lansdowne’s earlier Defence Committee of the 
Cabinet, undermined many of Arnold-Forster’s ideas. It was not until Haldane 
approached the issue with the benefit of experiences born of hindsight that with the 
support of the Committee of Imperial Defence and Unionist party and a new spirit of 
civil and military collaboration was reform conceivable.  
Winston Churchill argued that the Army was not an ‘inanimate thing like a 
house, to be pulled down or enlarged or structurally altered at the caprice of the 
tenant or owner.’21 And yet successive Secretaries of State had introduced quite 
different schemes of alteration. Brodrick adopted a fairly cautious approach, largely 
continuing to mirror the system he inherited from Lansdowne. Like his predecessor 
he attempted to adjust any imperfections in the system by an increase in the size of 
the Regular Army and improvements in the conditions of service. Arnold-Forster in 
contrast introduced a reform scheme which amounted to a complete reversal of those 
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proposed by his predecessors. Haldane reverted to the system of linked battalions 
modified by Lansdowne, although the functioning of his Expeditionary Force and 
Territorial Army had less in common with Lansdowne’s functions for the Army, the 
latter’s being based on the Stanhope Memorandum. With one of its possible 
functions being for intervention on the continent, it also broke with Unionist military 
policy which held that security of the Empire and India in particular was a their 
primary requirement. Apart from its functioning and where it could intervene, 
Haldane’s Expeditionary Force was in principle identical with the Field Force of 
1895, and the Volunteer force that merged into the Territorial Army in 1908 was in 
some respects like the old Volunteer force. The formation of the Officers Training 
Corps was also testimony to Lansdowne’s legacy and his view that education might 
be used for the purpose of encouraging schoolboys to join the Army after completing 
their education.
22
 
While the direct impact of Lansdowne’s legacy was notable, it is equally 
valuable for assessing Unionist and Liberal politicians at the time. While Brodrick 
and Haldane remained respectively Conservative and Liberal ministers for their 
entire political careers, Lansdowne made the transition from Liberal to Liberal 
Unionist to Unionist, and Arnold-Forster that from Liberal Unionist to Unionist. The 
continuity of military policy adopted by Haldane of both Lansdowne’s and Arnold-
Forster’s schemes is suggestive of much about the nature of political affiliations in 
this period. While Brodrick was trusted by his Cabinet colleagues and was one of the 
next generation of parliamentarians, he was also tainted by his association with 
Lansdowne. His successor Arnold-Forster, not having been in the Cabinet of 1895, 
was not as ‘particeps criminis’ with Lansdowne.23 Yet he was widely disliked. As a 
defence intellectual he had a preconceived vision of how to reform the department. It 
engendered an uncompromising dogmatism and self-assertiveness that went beyond 
all limits, and made him unpopular across parties. Haldane, by contrast, had not been 
involved in the debate on the Cardwell system or the reorganisation of 1895. He had 
no military experience or knowledge, although he had served on a War Office 
                                                          
22
 Lansdowne, ‘Lords Debate’, ‘Military Instruction (Schools and Cadets) Bill [H.L.]’, 29 April 1901, 
Hansard 4
th
 Series, Vol.93, c.16. 
23 
Akers-Douglas to Selborne (private), 21 September 1903, Bod. Sandars MSS, MS. Eng. Hist. c.736, 
f.48-9. 
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explosives committee during Lansdowne’s term of office.24 He had no preconceived 
reform proposals. As an advocate of the Blue Water School, however, he believed 
that the Army’s commitment to home defence was inappropriate and costly. He was 
personally acquainted with both Balfour and Lansdowne and as a Liberal Imperialist 
he shared with the Unionists an antipathy to Irish Home Rule. Wishing to achieve 
continuity in military policy with the Unionists he relied greatly on their 
cooperation. As has been shown, while their conception of the Army differed, 
Unionist military policy continued to influence the Liberal War Office and Army 
reforms after 1906.  
While Haldane’s reforms achieved a far greater measure of success than those 
of his three predecessors, attitudes towards the Army were much the same in the late 
Victorian period as in Edwardian Britain. Although punishments were less severe, 
the health of the soldier steadily improved and the number of deserters and drunks 
declined, the Army was still unpopular. This is evident in that a far smaller 
proportion of recruits joined the Territorials than Haldane had anticipated. It is 
concluded that at a time of approaching mass warfare and national armies voluntary 
enlistment and part time soldiering had as limited appeal during Lansdowne’s term 
of office as it did under his successors. 
Historians have found Lansdowne wanting as Secretary of State for the 
blunders of ‘the War’. Among others he has been accused of neglecting to prepare 
the Army for the war. This fails to acknowledge that Lansdowne’s decisions were 
not made in a vacuum but were taken in consultation and with the guidance of his 
military advisers and the Cabinet. One of the complaints made at the time had regard 
for the deficiency of stores. While Lansdowne accepted the criticism, he also 
believed that ‘great as our deficiencies were the Army at that moment was probably 
better equipped than it had ever been before.’25 It was his view that ‘the operations 
assumed proportions far in excess of anything we had ever professed to be prepared 
for.’26 Lansdowne accepted that they underrated the fighting value  and power of 
endurance of the Boers,
27
 and that more was not done to prepare the Army for war 
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 PP, 1904, XLI, Cd.1791, RC, 21325, p.523. 
26
 Ibid., 21417, p.528. 
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on account of political considerations.
28
 But he held the view that the troops in and 
on their way to South Africa in September 1899 would be sufficient to secure the 
colonies, ‘not perhaps against raids, but against a successful invasion. That being so 
we did not see much object in sending out an Army Corps until it was likely to find 
on arrival that everything was ready for its advance.’29 He believed the problem was 
one of personnel rather than the fault of the system.
30
  
Among  the complaints made by the senior officers was that prior to ‘the War’ 
they had no idea how matters were proceeding, had not been consulted and did not 
know how fast diplomacy was moving.
31
 Contrary to this view Lansdowne kept the 
Army Board consulted at every stage of the preparations, and once war was 
imminent ‘it cannot be doubted that the generals knew perfectly well what they were 
going to South Africa for.’32 Similarly, on the spot in South Africa, Lansdowne kept 
Roberts informed at every stage, giving him a free hand to bring ‘the War’ to a 
successful conclusion. It was Roberts’ view that ‘Lansdowne has done everything 
which can be expected from a Secretary of State for War to push on the campaign.’33 
The precise delimitation of the civil and military sphere was (and is) always 
contended. By conceding some civilian authority in this way Lansdowne met the 
wishes of the senior officers to administer ‘the War’ unimpeded, and yet without 
undermining the importance the Cabinet placed on civilian supremacy. That the 
soldiers were frustrated by the approach taken by Lansdowne and the Cabinet is 
understandable. However, their failure to recognise political necessity, public 
opinion and the cost of their proposals made consensus impossible. Under the 
system of responsible government and the nature of the constitution, the balance of 
civil-military relations favoured the civilians. Given the degree of mutual suspicion 
and unwillingness to collaborate among the political and military elites, ‘total’ 
reform was impracticable. 
Lansdowne could not shake off the political and bureaucratic constraints. But 
he was no mere prisoner of circumstances. Even with the limitations imposed on him 
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he pushed through subtle reforms that helped to prepare Haldane’s, later, more 
wholesale restructuring of the Army. In this Lansdowne showed great political nous 
and practical sense. His gradualism should not belie his historical significance, nor 
should it be overshadowed by his role during the Constitutional Crisis in 1910-11 or 
in connection with the ‘Peace Letter’. It was time to bring Lansdowne out of the 
shadows into which historians have banished him. 
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Appendix I: List of buildings in which the various departments of the War 
Office were housed in the summer of 1899 
1) War Office Pall Mall, Central Branch, Military Secretary’s Division, 
Adjutant-General’s Department (except Inspector-General of Cavalry), 
Quartermaster-Generals Department (except Remount Subdivision), 
Ordnance Department, Chaplain-General, Finance Department (part of) 
Contracts Division 
2) Winchester House, Finance Department (part of) 
3) Horse Guards, Inspector-General of Cavalry and Staff Department of 
Inspector-General of Fortifications, Finance Department (one branch) 
4) Woolwich, Finance Department (some clerks) 
5) Pimlico, Finance Department (some clerks) 
6) 66 Victoria Street, Remount Subdivision 
7) 5 King Street, Westminster, Veterinary Division 
8) Grosvenor Road, Royal Army Clothing Department 
9) 18 Queen Anne’s Gate Military Intelligence Division 
10) 12 Carteret Street, Military Intelligence Division 
11) 18 Victoria Street, Army Medical Department 
Source: PP, 1904, XLII, Cd.1792, RC, Appendix no.46, p.297.  
Outside of Central London departments for the design and manufacture of 
armaments were: 
The three Ordnance Factories at Woolwich comprising: Guns (The Royal Gun 
Factory), Carriages (The Royal Carriage Department) and Ammunition (The Royal 
Laboratory). 
Explosives at Waltham Abbey  
Small Arms at Enfield Lock  
Small Arms at Sparkbrook in Birmingham 
 
Source: A.H. Atteridge, ‘The War Office’, The Windsor Magazine: An illustrated monthly for men 
and women, 7 (December 1897) pp.545-52. 
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Appendix II: Secretaries of State for War between June 1854 and June 1895  
Name Term of 
Office 
School University Military 
Experience 
Junior 
Post 
Party 
Henry 
Pelham-
Clinton, 5
th
 
Duke of 
Newcastle 
12 June 
1854 to 30 
January 
1855 
Eton Oxford No Chief 
Secretary 
for Ireland 
Peelite 
The Lord 
Panmure, 
11
th
 Earl of 
Dalhousie 
8 February 
1855 to 21 
February 
1858 
Charterhouse Edinburgh Yes 
(Cameron 
Highlanders) 
Vice 
President 
of the 
Board of 
Trade 
Whig 
Jonathan 
Peel 
26 
February 
1858 to 11 
June 1859 
Rugby No Yes 
(Grenadier 
Guards) 
Surveyor-
General of 
Ordnance 
Conservative 
Sidney 
Herbert, 1
st
 
Baron of 
Lea 
18 June 
1859 to 22 
July 1861 
Harrow Oxford No Secretary 
of State 
for 
Colonies 
Liberal 
Sir George 
Cornewall 
Lewis 
23 July 
1861 to 13 
April 1863 
Eton Oxford No Under-
Secretary 
Home 
Office 
Liberal 
George 
Robinson, 
1
st
 
Marquess 
of Ripon 
28 April 
1863 to 16 
February 
1866 
Educated at 
home 
No Yes 
(Honorary 
Col. 1
st
 
Volunteer 
Batt. West 
Yorkshire) 
Under-
Secretary 
War 
Liberal 
Spencer 
Compton, 
Marquess 
of 
Hartington 
16 
February 
1866 to 26 
June 1866 
Educated at 
home 
Cambridge No Under-
Secretary 
War 
Liberal 
Jonathan 
Peel 
6 July 
1866 to 8 
March 
1867 
    Conservative 
Sir John 
Pakington 
8 March 
1867 to 1 
December 
1868 
Eton Oxford No Secretary 
of State 
for War 
and the 
Colonies 
Conservative 
Edward 
Cardwell 
9 
December 
1868 to 17 
February 
1874 
Winchester Oxford No Secretary 
of State 
for the 
Colonies 
Liberal 
Gathorne 
Hardy 
21 
February 
1874 to 2 
April 1878 
Shrewsbury Oxford No President 
of Poor 
Law 
Board 
Conservative 
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Name Term of 
Office 
School University Military 
Experience 
Junior 
Post 
Party 
Frederick 
Stanley, 
16
th
 Earl of 
Derby 
2 April 
1878 to 21 
April 1880 
Eton No Yes 
(Grenadier 
Guards) 
Financial 
Secretary 
to War 
Office 
Conservative 
Hugh 
Childers 
28 April 
1880 to 16 
December 
1882 
Cheam 
School 
Cambridge No Financial 
Secretary 
to 
Treasury 
Liberal 
Marquess 
of 
Hartington 
16 
December 
1882 to 9 
June 1885 
    Liberal 
W.H. Smith 24 June 
1885 to 21 
January 
1886 
Educated at 
home 
Oxford No Financial 
Secretary 
to 
Treasury 
Conservative 
Gathorne 
Hardy 
21 January 
1886 to 6 
February 
1886 
    Conservative 
Henry 
Campbell-
Bannerman 
6 February 
1886 to 20 
July 1886 
Glasgow 
High School 
Cambridge No Financial 
Secretary 
to War 
Office 
Liberal 
W.H. Smith 3 August 
1886 to 14 
January 
1887 
    Conservative 
Edward 
Stanhope 
14 January 
1887 to 11 
August 
1892 
Harrow Oxford No Under 
Secretary 
of State 
India 
Conservative 
Henry 
Campbell-
Bannerman 
18 August 
1892 to 21 
June 1895 
    Liberal 
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Financial Secretary 
Accountant-General 
Director of 
Clothing 
7 Sub-Divisions 
15 Officers 
26 Clerks 
Director -
General of 
Ordnance 
Factories 
Commander-in-Chief 
Adjutant-General 
Quartermaster-General 
Inspector-General 
of Ordnance 
Inspector-General 
of Fortifications 
3 Sub-Divisions 
7 Officers 
26 Clerks 
6 Sub-Divisions 
8 Officers 
40 Clerks 
6 Sub-Divisions 
13 Officers 
77 Clerks 
Director of Military 
Integlligence 
Military Secretary 
6 Sub-Divisions 
6 Officers 
29 Clerks 
1 Sub-Division 
1 Officer 
26 Specialists 
 
3 Sub-Divisions 
2 Officers 
13 Clerks 
Deputy I.G.F. 
6 Sub-Divisions 
16 Officers 
 
1 Sub-Division 
1 Officer 
11 Clerks 
Deputy I.G.F. 
Deputy I.G.F. 
5 Sub-Divisions 
4 Officers 
74 Clerks 
10 Typists 
 
3 Sub-Divisions 
1 Officer 
24 Clerks 
Permanent Under-Secretary 
Central Department 
4 Sub-
Divisions 
4 Officers 
93 Clerks 
 
2 Sub-
Divisions 
2 Officers 
18 Clerks 
 
2 Sub-
Divisions 
2 Officers 
45 Clerks 
 
Deputy 
Accountant
-General 
3 Sub-Divisions 
1 Officer 
24 Clerks 
2 Sub-Divisions 
2 Officers 
65 Clerks 
Assistant 
Accountant -
General 
Director of 
Army 
Contracts 
Assistant 
Accountant -
General 
Assistant 
Accountant 
-General 
The Secretary of State for War 
Adapted from M. Tadman, ‘The War Office. A study of its development 
as an organizational system, 1870-1904’ (PhD, London, 1992), p.221. 
Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for War 
Appendix III: The War Office in 1896 
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Appendix IV: Published Studies of Lansdowne’s Colleagues in the 1895 Cabinet 
 
The 3
rd
 Marquess of Salisbury - The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary 
P.H. Bagenal, The Tory Policy of the Marquess of Salisbury (London, 1885). 
M. Bentley, Lord Salisbury’s World: Conservative Environments in Late Victorian 
Britain (Cambridge, 2001). 
R. Blake and H. Cecil, Lord Salisbury: the Man and his Policies (London, 1987). 
P.R. Brumpton, Security and Progress: Lord Salisbury at the India Office (London, 
2002). 
Lady G. Cecil, The Life of Robert, Marquess of Salisbury (4 Vols., London 1932). 
Lady G. Cecil, Biographical Studies of the Life and Political Character of Robert, 
3
rd
 Marquess of Salisbury (London, 1948). 
F. Dolman, Lord Salisbury and Reform: The Leader of the Lords. A Record of the 
Career, and a Criticism of the Character of the Marquess of Salisbury (London, 
1884). 
J.A.S. Greville, Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy: The Close of the Nineteenth 
Century (London, 1964). 
C.H.D. Howard, Splendid Isolation: A Study of Ideas concerning Britain’s 
International Position and Foreign Policy during the latter years of the 3
rd
 Marquess 
of Salisbury (London, 1967).  
S.H. Jeyes, Life and Times of Lord Salisbury (4 Vols., London, 1895-6). 
A.L. Kennedy, Lord Salisbury 1830-1902: Portrait of a Statesman (London, 1953). 
H. Lucy (ed.), Speeches of the Right Honourable Marquess of Salisbury (London, 
1885). 
P.T. Marsh, The Discipline of Popular Government: Lord Salisbury’s Domestic 
Statecraft, 1891-1902 (Hassocks, 1978). 
A. Mee, Lord Salisbury: The Record Premiership of Modern Times (London, 1901). 
M. Pinto-Duschinsky, The Political Thought of Lord Salisbury (London, 1967). 
A. Roberts, Salisbury: Victorian Titan (London, 1999). 
E. Rodgers and E.J. Moyle, The Right Honourable Lord Salisbury (London, 1902). 
Lord Salisbury, Essays of the Late Marquess of Salisbury (2 Vols., London, 1905). 
Lord Salisbury, Evolution - A Retrospect (London, 1894). 
P. Smith (ed.), Lord Salisbury on Politics: A selection from his Articles in the 
Quarterly Review 1860-1883 (London, 1972) 
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J.L. Scott, Lord Salisbury and Popery: The “new departure” of the Conservative 
Party (London, 1886). 
R. Shannon, The Age of Salisbury 1881-1902 (London, 1996). 
W. B. Smith, Lord Salisbury (London, 1902). 
D. Steele, Lord Salisbury: a Political Biography (London, 1999). 
R. Taylor, Lord Salisbury (London, 1975). 
H.D. Triall, The Marquis of Salisbury (London, 1892). 
 
Arthur James Balfour - First Lord of the Treasury and the Leader in the House of 
Commons 
R.J.Q. Adams, Balfour: The Last Grandee (London, 2007). 
B. Alderson, Arthur James Balfour: The Man and his Work (London, 1903). 
J. Ridley and C. Percy, The letters of Arthur Balfour and Lady Elcho, 1885-1917 
(London, 1992). 
Robin Harcourt-Williams (ed.), Salisbury and Balfour Correspondence: Letters 
exchanged between the Third Marquess of Salisbury and his nephew Arthur James 
Balfour, 1869-1892 (Hertfordshire, 1988). 
W.M. Short (ed.), Arthur James Balfour as Philosopher and Thinker: A Collection of 
the more important and interesting passages in his non-political writings, speeches 
and addresses, 1879-1912 (London, 1912). 
B.E.C. Dugdale (ed.), Chapters of Autobiography (London, 1930). 
Lady F. Balfour, Ne Obliviscaris (London, 1930). 
C.G. Beardslee, Arthur James Balfour’s Contribution to Philosophy (Rhode Island, 
1931). 
P. Brendon, Eminent Edwardians: Four Figures who defined their age, Northcliffe, 
Balfour, Prankhurst, Baden-Powell (London, 2003). 
B.E.C. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour: First Earl of Balfour, K.G., O.M., F.R.S. (2 
Vols., London, 1836). 
M. Egremont, Balfour: A Life of Arthur James Balfour (London, 1980). 
A.M. Gollin, Balfour’s Burden: Arthur Balfour and Imperial Preference (London, 
1965). 
E.H.H. Green, Balfour (London, 2006). 
P. Harris, Life in a Scottish Country House: The Story of Arthur James Balfour and 
Whittinghame House (Whittinghame, 1989). 
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R. Jenkins, Mr Balfour’s Poodle: An Account of the struggle between the House of 
Lords and the Government of Mr Asquith (London, 1954). 
G. Lewis, Balfour and Weizmann: the Zionist, the Zealot and the Emergence of 
Israel (London, 2009). 
R.F. Mackay, Balfour: Intellectual Statesman (Oxford, 1985). 
I. Malcolm, Lord Balfour: A Memory (London, 1930). 
E.L. Rasof, Arthur James Balfour, 1848-1930: Historiography and Annotated 
Bibliography (London, 1998). 
Lord Rayleigh, Lord Balfour and his Relation to Science (London, 1930). 
E.T. Raymond, Mr Balfour: A Biography (London, 1920). 
C.B. Shannon, Arthur James Balfour and Ireland, 1874-1922 (Washington D.C., 
1988). 
J. Tomes, Balfour and Foreign Policy: The International Thought of a Conservative 
Statesman (Cambridge, 1997). 
C.C.J. Webb and Sir F.G. Kenyon, Arthur James Balfour, Earl of Balfour K.G., 
O.M., P.B.A., 1848-1930 (London, 1931). 
K. Young, Arthur James Balfour: The Happy Life of a Politician, Prime Minister, 
Statesman, and Philosopher, 1848-1930 (London, 1963). 
S.H. Zebel, Balfour: A Political Biography (London, 1973). 
 
Hardinge Stanley Giffard, Lord Halsbury - The Lord Chancellor 
A.W. Fox, The Earl of Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor, 1823-1921 (London, 1929). 
J. Hostettler, Lord Halsbury (Chichester, 1998). 
R.F. Heuston, Lives of the Lord Chancellors 1885-1940 (London, 1987). 
The Duke of Devonshire - Lord President of the Council 
B.H. Holland, The Life of Spencer Compton, Eighth Duke of Devonshire (2 Vols., 
London, 1911). 
P. Jackson, The Last of the Whigs: A Political Biography of Lord Hartington, later 
Eighth Duke of Devonshire, 1833-1908 (Rutherford, New Jersey, 1994). 
H. Leach, The Duke of Devonshire: A Personal and Political Biography (London, 
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Lord Richard Assheton Cross - Lord Privy Seal 
R.A. Cross, A political history (London, 1903). 
D.J. Mitchell, Cross and Tory democracy: a political biography of Richard Assheton 
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Joseph Chamberlain - Secretary of State of the Colonies 
Anon, Great Conservatives: Benjamin Disraeli, Lord Randolph Churchill, Joseph 
Chamberlain, Stanley Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain, Edmund Burke (London, 
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L.S. Amery, Mr Chamberlain and Fiscal Policy (London, 1912). 
M. Balfour, Britain and Joseph Chamberlain (London, 1985). 
H. Browne, Joseph Chamberlain: Radical Imperialist (London, 1974). 
C.W. Boyd (ed.), Mr Chamberlain’s Speeches (London, 1914). 
C.H.D. Howard (ed.), A Political Memoir, 1880-1892 (London, 1953). 
H. Cox, Mr Chamberlain and Fiscal Policy (London, 1914). 
J. Courdier de Chassaigne, Les Trois Chamberlain: Une famille de Grands 
Parlementaires Anglais (Paris, 1939). 
L. Creswicke, The Life of the Right Hon. Joseph Chamberlain (4 Vols., London, 
1904). 
T.L. Crosby, Joseph Chamberlain: A Most Radical Imperialist (London, 2011). 
P. Fraser, Joseph Chamberlain: Radicalism and Empire, 1868-1914 (London, 1966). 
J.L. Garvin and J. Amery, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain (6 Vols., London, 1932-
1969). 
R. Grinter, Joseph Chamberlain: Democrat, Unionist and Imperialist (London, 
1971). 
E.E. Gulley, Joseph Chamberlain and English Social Politics (New York, 1926). 
F.J. Harries, The Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain, M.P.: A Biographical 
Sketch (Pontypridd, 1913). 
C.W. Hill, Joseph Chamberlain: An Illustrated Life of Joseph Chamberlain, 1836-
1914 (Aylesbury, 1973). 
M.C. Hurst, Joseph Chamberlain and West Midland Politics, 1886-1895 (Oxford, 
1962). 
R. Jay, Joseph Chamberlain: A Political Study (Oxford, 1981). 
S.H. Jeyes, The Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain (London, 1896). 
274 
 
G.C.G. Jones, With Chamberlain Through South Africa: A Narrative of a Great Trek 
(London, 1903). 
D. Judd, Radical Joe: A Life of Joseph Chamberlain (London, 1977). 
R.V. Kubicek, The Administration of Imperialism: Joseph Chamberlain at the 
Colonial Office (Durham, North Carolina, 1969). 
H.J. Leech, The Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain, M.P.: a Political Biography 
(Manchester, 1985). 
H.W. Lucy, Mr Chamberlain and Home Rule (London, 1914). 
J.R. MacDonald, Mr Chamberlain as a Social Reformer (London, 1914). 
A. Mackintosh, Joseph Chamberlain: An Honest Biography (London, 1906). 
A. Mackintosh, Joseph Chamberlain on Both Sides: A Book of Contrasts (London, 
1905). 
W.T. Marriott, The Liberal Party and Mr Chamberlain (London, 1884). 
N.M. Marris The Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain: The Man and the 
Statesman (London, 1900). 
P.T. Marsh, Joseph Chamberlain: Entrepreneur In Politics (New Haven, 1994). 
W.R.D. Maycock, With Mr Chamberlain in the United States and Canada, 1887-
1888 (London, 1914). 
A. Mee, Joseph Chamberlain: A Romance of Modern Politics (London, 1901). 
Viscount Milner, Life of Joseph Chamberlain (London, 1912). 
S. Newton and D. Porter, Joseph Chamberlain, 1836-1914: A Biography (London, 
1994). 
C. A. Petrie, Joseph Chamberlain (London, 1940). 
C.A. Petrie, The Chamberlain Tradition (London, 1938). 
A.N. Porter, The Origins of the South Africa War: Joseph Chamberlain and the 
Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1895-1899 (Manchester, 1980). 
J.E. Powell, Joseph Chamberlain (London, 1977). 
R.A. Rempel, Unionists Divided, Arthur Balfour, Joseph Chamberlain and Unionist 
Free Traders (Newton Abbott, 1972). 
J.M. Robertson, Chamberlain: A Study (London, 1905). 
B.C. Skottowe, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain (Birmingham, 1885). 
B. Smith, Chamberlain and Chamberlainism: His Fiscal Proposals and Colonial 
Policy (London, 1903).  
275 
 
W.L. Strauss, Joseph Chamberlain and the Theory of Imperialism (Washington 
1942). 
A. Viallate, Joseph Chamberlain (Paris, 1899). 
D. Watts, Joseph Chamberlain and the Challenge of Radicalism (London, 1992). 
A. Wallace, The Right Honourable Joseph Chamberlain, M.P. (London, 1901). 
H.W. Wilson, Mr Chamberlain’s New Policy: Fifty Years of Free Trade and the 
Result (London, 1903). 
 
Lord George Hamilton - Secretary of State for India 
G. Hamilton, Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections, 1868-1885 (London, 
1916). 
G. Hamilton, Parliamentary Reminiscences and Reflections, 1886-1906 (London, 
1922). 
 
George Joachim Goschen - First Lord of the Admiralty 
A.R.D. Elliot, The Life of George Joachim Goschen, First Viscount Goschen, 1831-
1907 (London, 1911). 
G.J. Goschen, A Wreath of Memories, George, Joachim Goschen, 1893-1916 
(London, 1917). 
G.J. Goschen, The Life and Times of George Joachim Goschen, Viscount Goschen 
(London, 1903). 
P. Colson, Lord Goschen and his Friends: The Goschen Letters (London, 1946). 
T.J. Spinner, George Joachim Goschen: The Transformation of a Victorian Liberal 
(Cambridge, 1973). 
 
Sir Michael Hicks Beach - The Chancellor of the Exchequer 
V.A. Hicks Beach, Life of Sir Michael Hicks Beach, (Earl St. Aldwyn) (2 Vols., 
London, 1932). 
T.G. Otte, Black Michael: Sir Michael Hicks Beach and the Problem of Late 
Victorian Conservatism (Tunbridge Wells, 2006). 
 
Henry Chaplin - President of the Local Government Board 
E.H. Vane Tempest Stewart, Henry Chaplin: A Memoir (London, 1926). 
 
276 
 
Aretas Akers-Douglas - First Commissioner of Works 
E.A. Akers-Douglas, Viscount Chilston, Chief Whip: The Political Life and Times of 
Aretas Akers-Douglas 1
st
 Viscount Chilston (London, 1961). 
 
Lord Edward Ashbourne - Lord Chancellor of Ireland 
A.B. Cooke and A.P.W. Malcomson (eds.), The Ashbourne Papers, 1869-1913: A 
Calendar of the Papers of Edward Gibson, 1
st
 Lord Ashbourne (Belfast, 1974). 
 
Lord Alexander Balfour of Burleigh - Secretary for Scotland 
Lady F. Balfour, A Memoir of Lord Balfour of Burleigh K.T. (London, 1924). 
 
Walter Hume Long - President of the Board of Agriculture 
J. Kendle, Walter Long: Ireland and the Union 1905-1970 (Dublin, 1992). 
W.H. Long, Memories (London, 1923). 
R. Murphy, Walter Long and the Conservative Party 1905-1921 (PhD dissertation, 
University of Bristol, 1985). 
Sir C.A. Petrie, Walter Long and his Times (London, 1936). 
 
Henry, Lord James of Hereford - Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 
Lord Askwith, Lord James of Hereford (London, 1930)  
 
Those with no studies to date include: 
 
Sir Matthew White Ridley - Secretary of State for the Home Department 
George Henry, 5th Earl of Cadogan - Lord Lieutenant of Ireland 
Charles Thompson Ritchie - President of the Board of Trade 
 
 
 
277 
 
Appendix V: Members of the 1895-1900 Cabinet  
Name Position in 
Cabinet 
Age on 1
st
 
July 1895 
School University Military 
Experience 
Lord 
Salisbury 
Prime Minister 
and Secretary of 
State for Foreign 
Affairs 
65 Eton Christ Church, 
Oxford 
 
Arthur 
Balfour 
First Lord of the 
Treasury and 
Leader of the 
House of 
Commons 
47 Eton Trinity 
College, 
Cambridge 
 
Lord 
Halsbury 
Lord Chancellor 71 Educated at 
home 
Merton 
College, 
Oxford 
 
The Duke of 
Devonshire 
Lord President of 
the Council 
61 Educated at 
home 
Trinity 
College, 
Cambridge 
 
Lord 
Lansdowne 
Secretary of State 
for War 
50 Eton Balliol 
College, 
Oxford 
Royal Wiltshire 
Yeomanry 
Lord Cross Lord Privy Seal 72 Rugby Trinity 
College, 
Cambridge 
 
Sir Matthew 
White Ridley 
Secretary of State 
for the Home 
Department 
52 Harrow Balliol 
College, 
Oxford 
 
Joseph 
Chamberlain 
Secretary of State 
for the Colonies 
58 A Dame school 
in Camberwell, 
University 
College, 
London 
 
Lord George 
Hamilton 
Secretary of State 
for India 
49 Harrow  Joined Rifle 
Brigade in 1864 
then 
Coldstreams 
George 
Joachim 
Goschen 
First Lord of the 
Admiralty 
63 Rugby Oriel College, 
Oxford 
 
Henry 
Chaplin 
President of the 
Local 
Government 
Board 
54 Privately and 
Harrow 
Christ Church, 
Oxford 
 
Sir Michael 
Hicks Beach 
Chancellor of the 
Exchequer 
57 Eton Christ Church, 
Oxford 
Captain in the 
Royal North 
Gloucestershire 
Regiment of 
Militia 
Charles 
Thomson 
Ritchie 
President of the 
Board of Trade 
56 City of London 
School 
  
Lord James of 
Hereford 
Chancellor of the 
Duchy of 
Lancaster 
66 Cheltenham 
College 
  
Aretas Akers-
Douglas 
First 
Commissioner of 
Works 
43 Eton University 
College, 
Oxford 
 
Lord Cadogan Lord-Lieutenant 
of Ireland 
55 Eton Christ Church, 
Oxford 
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Name Position in 
Cabinet 
Age on 1st 
July 1895 
School University Military 
Experience 
Lord 
Ashbourne 
Lord Chancellor 
of Ireland 
57 Privately Trinity 
College, 
Dublin 
 
Lord Balfour 
of Burleigh 
Secretary for 
Scotland 
56 Eton Oriel College, 
Oxford 
 
Walter Hume 
Long 
President of the 
Board of 
Agriculture 
50 Privately and 
Harrow 
Christ Church, 
Oxford 
Major in the 
Royal Wiltshire 
Yeomanry 
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Appendix VI: The Stanhope Memorandum 
The Stanhope Memorandum was a reply by the Secretary of State for War Edward 
Stanhope to proposals made by Garnet Wolseley, then Adjutant-General about the 
purposes of the Army. 
‘Her Majesty’s Government are not able to concur in the proposed definition of the 
objects to be provided for, nor can they accept the proposal to aim at forming three 
Army-Corps of regular troops instead of two. They have examined this subject with 
care, and are of opinion that a general basis for the requirements of our Army might 
be more correctly laid down by stating that the objects of our military organization 
are -  
(a) The effective support of the civil power in all parts of the United Kingdom 
(b) To find the number of men for India which has been fixed by arrangements 
with the Government of India. 
(c) To find garrisons for all our fortresses and coaling stations, at home and 
abroad, according to a scale now laid down; and to maintain these garrisons 
at all times at the strength fixed for peace or war footing. 
(d) After providing for these requirements, to be able to mobilize rapidly for 
home defence two Army-Corps of Regular troops, and one partly composed 
of Regulars and partly of Militia; and to organize the Auxiliary Forces, not 
allotted to Army-Corps or garrisons, for the defence of London and for the 
defensible positions in advance; and for the defence of mercantile ports. 
(e) Subject to the foregoing considerations and to their financial obligations, to 
aim at being able, in case of necessity, to send abroad two complete Army-
Corps, with cavalry division and line of Communication. But it will be 
distinctly understood that the probability of the employment of an Army-
Corps in the field in any European war is sufficiently improbable to make it 
the primary duty of the military authorities to organize our forces efficiently 
for the defence of this country.’ 
 
Source: E. Stanhope, ‘minute’, 8 December 1888, WO 33/48, Paper A 148A. 
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Appendix VII: Army estimates of effective and non-effective services  
During Lansdowne’s term of office 
1895-1896  £18,470,535 
 
1896-1897  £18,156,520 
 
1897-1898  £19,528,390 
 
1898-1899  £20,096,373 
 
1899-1900  £43,065,398 
 
1900-1901  £91,343,544 
 
Source: PP, 1904, L, (73), ‘Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective services for the year 
1904-05’, p.3. 
 
During Brodrick’s term of office 
1901-1902 £92,660,874 
 
1902-1903 £68,803,527 
 
1903-1904 £30,728,618 
 
Source: PP, 1904, L, (73), ‘Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective services for the year 
1904-05’, p.3. 
 
During Arnold-Forster’s term of office 
1904-1905 £28,895,624 
1905-1906 £28,478,863 
Source: PP, 1908, LXIII, (49), ‘Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective services for the year 
1908-09’, p.3. 
 
During Haldane’s term of office 
1906-1907 £28,301,421 
1907-1908 £27,141,642 
1908-1909 £26,859,299 
Source: PP, 1910, LX, (30), ‘Army Estimates of Effective and Non-Effective services for the year 
1910-11’, p.3. 
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Appendix VIII: Speeches in Parliament on military subjects made by 
Lansdowne, Brodrick, Arnold-Forster and Haldane 
 
Lansdowne during his sixty-five months at the War Office spoke in the House of 
Lords on 122 defence related issues occasionally referring to three or more different 
issues on any given day during the session.  
 
Brodrick during his twenty-three months spoke in the House of Commons on 1,357 
defence related issues, often referring to eight or more issues on any given day 
during the session.  
 
Arnold-Forster in his twenty-four months spoke in the House of Commons on 541 
defence related issues, often referring to four or more issues on any given day during 
the session. 
 
Haldane spoke in the House of Commons on 2,564 defence related issues during his 
seventy-nine months, often referring to three or more issues on any given day of the 
session.  
 
 
Source: Hansard - People, Lansdowne, St.J. Brodrick, H.O. Arnold-Forster, R.B. Haldane, 
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/people/ 
 
Although these figures indicate that Brodrick made more contributions than Haldane, the former’s 
contributions were principally related to the ongoing events in ‘the War’. 
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Appendix IX: Numbers of men on the Home and Colonial Establishments of the 
British Army exclusive of those serving in India 
 
1895-1896 155,403 
1896-1897  156,174  
1897-1898  158,774 
1898-1899  180,513 
1899-1900  184,853  
 
Source: ‘Army Estimates’, 7 March 1896, p.6, 5 February 1897, p.11, 21 February 1898, p.12, 2 
February 1899, p.10, The Times. 
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